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ABSTRACT
100 x Ramallah is an investigation of spatial (re-)imagineering of the city of 
Ramallah, Palestine since the demise of the Osmans and over the past century 
of Anglo-Zionist colonisation, and an exploration of what could follow. The line 
of evolution of successive Ramallite spacio-sensibilities transcribes the tensions 
of nonuniform yet cyclical tides of centralised hegemonic control and counter-
resistance. By triangulating morphological and territorial shifts with socio-
demographics and politico-economic orders this work argues through three 
hypotheses. 
First, Ramallah’s city-space is a product of an articulate colonial project 
whose discourse promotes narrow homogenised imaginaries of ethnicities and 
national identities, and therewith sterilised, surveilled and securitized spaces. 
These concepts have been inducing variations of both, co-optation and opposition. 
In the same line, neoliberal development discourses continue to infantalize 
target populations as passive recipients. Hence, these are decisively myopic to 
the fact that the latter are capable of engendering alternative imaginations, and 
in cases where these materialise into realities they are rejected and combated as 
anomalies. The result has been the (intentional?) creation of a mutated system 
of bureaucratic, incompatible administration that repeatedly fails to provide for 
basic socioeconomic needs, therewith shared development and stability. In effect, 
what has been unfolding in Palestine is de-development.
Second, the dialectic Marxist discourse contends urbanities as natural 
decodings of psycho-ecological processes. Understood from this perspective, the 
post-Oslo contestation and frustration in the city can be traced to the exasperation 
of social otherness beyond regular metropolitan symptoms, due to the acute 
increase in scales of uncertainty (diminishing securities), inequality and spatial 
non-dignity. Through mapping the behavioural trend of re-making of sumud 
(social resilience) it can be concluded that tensions are bound to be released 
through (mostly ad hoc) techniques and formations of citizen mobilisations. 
Identified factors and scholarship indicate an elevated possibility of violence; 
whether due to high levels of militarisation by the nation-state policing discourses 
or its vulnerability to natural misfortunes. The scales and impacts of clandestine 
sub-group activities in turn depends on several factors, one of which is the 
manner by which the city-space will be produced in the coming, critical decades. 
Third, urban design, planning, and management are tools often advocated 
as bearers of welfare and rarely admitted as enablers of mental as well as corporeal 
crisis. These are professions that by nature capitalise on and catalyse political 
ideologies which include/exclude anticonformist visionaries in/from formal 
processes of socio-spatial production. Here Ramallah presents no exception to 
the neocolonial rule, where its planners (rightfully) blame the failure in forging 
egalitarian urbanism on racial subjugation and instability, yet fall short of 
constructively labouring applicable alternatives that account for uncertainty. In 
cities like Ramallah where subjective temporalities constantly produce new risk-
strategies and population flows, static frameworks of indexed mechanisms and 
hierarchies are rendered obsolete. In combination with today’s digitally-enabled 
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pseudo-concrete realities and heightened levels of privatization; Ramallah’s 
resilience necessitates that it democratizes spatial production and therewith 
decolonize its spaces based on concepts of the civic right to flourishing. The 
future shape and degree of resilience/sumud depend on the ability of the (self-
declared) Ramallites to spatialize (grant legitimacy to) their diversity, fluidity, 
and inter-relevance. To that end, an Umdenkenprozess about the role and range of 
fields of interventions of Ramallite urban visionaries is quintessential.
The outline of this work spreads over six chapters, starting with setting the 
parameters, territorial and temporal back-drop, and elaborates on the hypotheses. 
The second chapter focuses on tracing and understanding the spatial evolution of 
the city through cross-comparing those to political and socioeconomic elements; 
hence philosophically differentiating between projected (imagined, mental) and 
grounded (scientific, real) meanings, ideologies, and their economic, social and 
particularly spatial trails and implications. Chapter three expounds on the politico-
economic factors fuelling Ramallah’s spatial tendencies in the past two decades 
since the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993. It simultaneously investigates the 
spacio-social relationalities and sensibilities legitimising and incubating these 
discourses. Chapters four and five proceed to map urban undertakings by both 
public and private parties (respectively); they feature the power and decision-
making mandates and influence; modes of operation, structures and systematic 
variables; the most relevant projects and engagements; theoretical genealogies 
and comparative cases; foreseen sociospatial consequences, and; the underlying 
opportunities. Chapter 6 concludes this work with puzzling the findings of former 
chapters in variable imaginations of alternative urban realities that Ramallah could 
potentially produce. Through re-negotiating the existing colonial morphology 
and centralized, bureaucratic decision-making systems, this chapter explores 
opportunities for nurturing environmentally, economically and politically resilient, 
inclusive and progressive spaces of resistance and sociospatial decolonization. 
In the current critical moment for Palestine specifically and cities featuring anti-
colonial revolutions generally; modes of spatial absorption, scaling, synthesis, and 
reimagineering of locational social ideologies and movements is essential for the 
quality of life and dignity.
Along the process arguments are based on scholarly review of a wide range of 
works from varying disciplines, both academic and otherwise. These were cross-
analysed with empirical data collected through twenty qualitative interviews, 
eight focus groups, observations and quantitative indicators; collected through 
eight field-visits totalling thirty-two weeks and spanning over intervals of six 
months in average. 
Aside the scientific motivations of this work, it desires to serve as a scholarly 
narrative that coalesces some facets of the momentary polemics, voiced aspirations 
and intellectual brainstorming about Ramallah. This five-year process has 
travelled through multitude of provocative and inspiring conversations, debates, 
and assemblies, and herewith aims at expounding on concepts of insurgent 
urbanism. The reflections outlined here do not claim premise to foreclosing or 
limiting differing understandings and interpretations; rather it calls attention to a 
selection of polychromic aspects requiring deeper investigation. 
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ACRONYMS
BM alBireh Municipality
BOD Board of Directors
BZU Birzeit University
B’Tselem The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories
CECP Central Elections Commission Palestine
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CSOs Civil Society Organizations 
COGAT Coordination of [Israeli] Government Activities in the 
Territories; a unit of the Israeli Ministry of Defence
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DoPs Declaration of Principles
EU European Union
FAB Foreign development-Aid Bingo (fashionable terminology)
FG Focus Group (e.g. FG 2011, no. 2) 
GIZ German International Cooperation Agency
GS Gaza Strip
HPC Higher Planning Council
ICA Israeli Civil Administration, a department of COGAT
ICAHD Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
ICBS Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
ICPD Israeli Central Planning Department
IDF/IOF Israeli Defence Forces a.k.a. Israeli Occupation Forces  
(see following section, Terms)
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
JA Jewish Agency
Knesset Israeli Parliament
LGs Local Governments
MAS Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
MDLF Municipal Development & Lending Fund
MENA Middle East and North Africa Region
MNC Multinational Corporation
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOLG Ministry of Local Government
MOPAD Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development 
 formerly known as MOP, MOPIC
NAD Negotiations Affairs Department
NGC National Guidance Committee
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NLI National Leadership of the Intifada (1987)
OAs Oslo Accords
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA (sulta) Palestinian Authority
PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and 
Reconstruction
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIF Palestine Investment Fund
PLC Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PNG Palestinian National Garden
PNGO Palestinian NGO Project
PP Peace Process
PPP Palestinian People’s Party, formerly Palestinian Communist Party
 not to be mistaken with the PPP - Palestinian Peace Program
PRDP Palestine Reform and Development Plan
PRICO Palestine Real Estate Investment Company
PWCs Popular (voluntary) Work Committees
RABMA Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Beitunya Metropolitan Area
RC Refugee Camp
RDPF Ramallah Developmental Planning Framework
RM Ramallah Municipality
SU Soviet Union
TNC Transnational corporation
UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP UN Development Program for Palestine
UNHCR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees
UNISPAL United Nations Information System on the Question of 
Palestine
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East
USAN Union of South American Nations
USSC US Security Coordinator 
WB West Bank
WZO World Zionist Organization
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1967 Borders Territories annexed by Israel through the Six Day War, the term 
refers to the WB and GS.
Dayton Army Naming used commonly in reference to the Palestinian security 
apparatuses that were trained starting 2004 by USA generals 
through the framework of the USSC; the primer of which was 
Lieutenant General Kieth Dayton.
Dunum a.k.a. ‘dunom’, area measuring unit where 1.0 dunum = 1,000 
sq.m. = 0.1 Hectare = 0.247 Acres.
Fatah Palestinian National Liberation Movement, founded in 1959 
as a movement and in 1965 reframed itself into a party, yet it 
still holds to the ‘movement’ naming.  Since the signature of 
the OAs it has systematically weakened opposition, ensured 
its domination as ruling party and monopolized public 
policymaking. The death of its founder and spiritual leader 
Yasser Arafat in 2005 revealed the down-side of his autocratic 
ideology, and the extent of the party’s internal fragmentation. 
Although Fatah continues to dominate Palestinian politics and 
WB votes, nonetheless, the contestation of its ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
guards is publicly played and echoed.
Fayyadism Coined after Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad who first joined 
the PA as Minister of Finance, and refers to the PA’s neoliberal 
agenda which primed in the years he was in office. He is accused 
by some to be a neo-conservative, others place the blame for his 
shortcomings on Fatah’s bureaucratization and internal strife.
Green Line The Armistice Line of 1949, see Map 1.8; p. 26, also referred to 
as 1967 Borders.
Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement, founded in 1988 in place of the 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood which is an offshoot of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It is not represented in the PLO, 
and considered by western powers to be a terrorist organization. 
In 2007 it lead a coup in the GS liquidating Fatah’s monopoly over 
power and exercises supreme reign since. As a fundamentalist  
party it claims to follow Islamic Shari’a doctrines.
IDF/IOF The Israeli Government refers to its military as the Israeli 
Defence Forces, IDF. However, the UN and most world 
diplomacies regard Israel’s activities in the 1967 territories over 
the past half a century as ‘occupation’. Additionally, the subjects 
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of this research, Palestinians do not enjoy protection from the 
IDF rather prosecution and repression. Hence, this work uses 
the Palestinian naming: Israeli Occupation Forces, IOF.
Intifada Arabic for ‘uprising’ or ‘rebellion’
 First Intifada 1987 - 1993
 Second Intifada 2000 - 2006 (estimated)
 also used in uprisings against the British Mandate in 1929, 1936.
Jewish Agency Originally named the “Palestine Zionist Executive”, later “Jewish 
Agency for Palestine”. It is the body that has been financing the 
agenda of the WZO, at the foremost of which lies a century of 
financing the emigration of world Jews to Palestine.
Knesset Israeli Parliament
Mossad is one of three principal organizations of the Israeli intelligence 
community which focuses on foreign intelligence service, 
alongside Aman (military intelligence) and the Shin Bet 
(homeland and occupied territories intelligence). The Mossad 
is responsible for intelligence collection, covert operations, 
and counterterrorism, as well as bringing Jews to Israel from 
countries where official Aliyah agencies are forbidden, and 
protecting Jewish communities (Wikipedia).
Nakba is Arabic for Catastrophe, used as naming for the events of 1947-
1949 which resulted with the creation of the State of Israel and 
the expulsion of around one million Palestinians, the majority 
into today UNRWA-operated refugee camps in neighbouring 
countries (alKhalili 2009).
Normalization in Palestinian contexts is a term used to refer to engagements 
in joint relations and projects with Israelis, in ways that provide 
the false impression of normalcy despite the continuation of 
colonial oppression, inequality and racial discrimination.
Outpost An Israeli colony constructed in annexed territories that is 
neither legal by international law nor licensed by the Israeli 
Government, normally established by radicals. Many of the 
Registered Settlements commenced as outposts.
Settlement An Israeli colony constructed in annexed territories that 
is illegal by international law yet licensed by the Israeli 
Government, thence enjoying several benefits and subsidies. 
Smaller ones are predominantly residential, while larger ones 
include military bases and offices, industrial parks, farms, 
commercial centres and education facilities among others.
Settler An Israeli citizen that lives in a colony.
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Shin Bet a.k.a. Shabak is one of three principal organizations of the Israeli 
intelligence community, alongside Aman (military intelligence) 
and Mossad (foreign intelligence service). Its duties are 
safeguarding state security, exposing terrorist rings, interrogating 
terror suspects, providing intelligence for counter-terrorism 
operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, counter-
espionage, personal protection of senior public officials, securing 
important infrastructure and government buildings, and 
safeguarding Israeli airlines and overseas embassies (Wikipedia).
Palestine When mentioned alone, it refers to the geography between the 
Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO
 It was conceived at the first Arab League Summit in Cairo in 
1964, and recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian People by the UN, where it has enjoyed an observer 
status since 1974 and non-member state since 2012. It composes 
of 10 Palestinian parties amongst which Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, and 
PPP. Noteworthy, conservative Islamic parties are not members, 
neither Hamas nor alJihad alIslami.
Legal Statuses / Classifications of Palestinians
 Laji'a (f) - Laji' (m) - Laji'een (pl)  |  Refugee, -s
 UNRWA defines those as ‘persons whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 
1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a 
result of the 1948 conflict’ (UNRWA 2014a). These Palestinians 
were forced to leave their homes at arm’s point or through 
violent intimidation by Jewish militias e.g. the Deir Yassin 
Masacre on 9 April 1948 in which the Zionist paramilitary 
groups Irgun Zevai Leumi and Lohamei Herut Israel. In 1950 
there were about 750,000 UNRWA registered Refugees, a 
number which has soared to 5 million. Refugee camps are 
scattered around Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, WB and GS. At the 
end of 2013 44% of Palestinians in WB & GS were refugees; 
29.7% and 67.4% respectively.
 A’ida (f) - A'id (m) - A'ideen (pl)  |  Returnee, -s
 Palestinians who up to the OAs lived in exile due to their right 
of residence being revoked by Israel over the years starting 1948, 
or escaped due to prosecution by its apparatuses. This term 
refers persons who returned to Palestine by power of the OAs 
(not to be confused with Mub’ad / Deportee).
 Mughtariba (f) - Mughtabrib (m) - Mughtaribeen (pl)  |  Expate,-riates
 Palestinians which migrated to other countries (starting late 
1800s) but maintain contact to Palestine.
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 48er - Falastinyee elDakhel  |  1948 Palestinians
 Palestinians residing in a locality inside ‘Israel proper’ and 
possess an Israeli-issued (blue) ID i.e. Israeli citizenship, albeit 
an unequal one.
 Naziha (f) - Nazih (m) - Naziheen (pl)  |  Displaced
 A Palestinian who was displaced (lost her/his right to residency) 
as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War (Map 1.13; p. 30). These are 
not recognized by the UNRWA as refugees, and therewith their 
claims to compensation and return continue to be ignored.
 Maqdisieh (f) - Maqdisi (m) - Maqdisyeen (pl)  |  Jerusalemite, -s
 Palestinian who have an Israeli permit to reside in Jerusalem 
but are neither considered citizens of Israel nor fall under 
the authority of the PA. Legally, they are equated to foreign 
residents of Israel, enjoy various systems of discrimination and 
possesses an Israeli-issued (blue) ID.
 
 Ghazzawieh (f) - Ghazzawi (m) - Ghazzawiyeen (pl)  |  Gazan, -s
 A Palestinian residing in a locality in the Gaza Strip and holds 
an Israel approved and PA-issued (green) ID.
 Dhaffawieh (f) - Dhaffawi (m) - Dhaffawieh (pl)  |  West Banker, -s
 A Palestinian residing in a locality in the West Bank and holds 
an Israel approved and PA-issued (green) ID.
Sumud Arabic for steadfastness, resilience. The term is commonly 
associated with the ethos of solidarity and cohesion that prevailed 
in Palestinian communities pre-OAs, particularly the 1980s.
Zionism In 1897 the First Zionist Congress was held in Basel, 
Switzerland; where the attendants adopted the proposed 
program declaring that ‘Zionism seeks to establish a home for 
the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law’ (Jewish 
Virtual Library 2012). The Britannica Encyclopedia defines 
Zionism as ‘Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goal 
the creation and support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, 
the ancient homeland of the Jews (Hebrew: Eretz Yisra’el, ‘the 
Land of Israel’). Though Zionism originated in eastern and 
central Europe in the latter part of the 19th century, it is in 
many ways a continuation of the ancient nationalist attachment 
of the Jews and of the Jewish religion to the historical region 
of Palestine, where one of the hills of ancient Jerusalem was 
called Zion’ (Britannica 2012). Even though many scholars 
insist that Zionism is a national and not an ideological political 
movement, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines 
Zionism as ‘an ideology which expresses the yearning of Jews 
the world over for their historical homeland - Zion, the Land of 
Israel’ (MFA 2012). The Israeli historian Shlomo Sand sees it as a 
political movement that incorporates traces of German Volkism. 
It ‘emulated the other nationalists in Europe and assumed an 
 |  xxii i
ethnoreligious or ethnobiological identity to conceptualize their 
self-definition. Seeking to build a bridge that could connect 
Jewish believers – mainly former believers, whose languages 
and secular customs were polyphonous and diverse’ (Sand 
2010:255; emphasis added; for more information see section 
2.2.1; p. 75). Regardless of the definition, the Zionist movement 
has been a major player in the colonialism of Palestine for over a 
century today, and Palestinians regard it as the ultimate enemy. 
The name is used in day-to-day cursing, as well by younger 
generations whether knowing or not the history behind it.
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PREFACE : A NOTE 
ABOUT THIS WORK
This research has been an enamoured titillating 
journey both personally and academically. What 
I present in these pages is a testimony about my 
town which I escorted into global-hood; from 
social consanguinity to individuality, from political 
collectivism to post-nationalism, and from economic 
egalitarianism to extreme capitalism. It is my narrative 
of a provocative, charged, very confused and creative 
space. I do not claim that this work is objective for 
the Palestine question is congenitally political. The 
few past years have been a continued confrontation 
with my prejudices and entrenched impressions of the 
theatre of my life. This had to start with taming my 
impartiality and applying scrutiny to what otherwise 
seemed an orthodox conclusion. It was a process of 
constructing parallels, derivation of scales, dissection 
of characteristics, and redefinition of my relationship 
to this place that is home and now is a case in my 
laboratory.
With time this work turned enigmatic 
resembling the perplexity of my presence between 
Ramallah the passion and Berlin the freedom, and 
it held more questions than answers about the place 
that once was a certainty. I embarked on this journey 
driven by idyllic ardour to find myself in dismay 
and chagrin, only to then re-discover the inherent 
elements of imagination, receptiveness to change and 
the desire to indeed, make a change. Ramallah is not 
just an academic case. It is my battle field for freedom 
under continued colonialism, for individuality in a 
kindred and stereotyped context, and for endorsing 
native creativity and resilience in face of encroaching 
global policies and their unfavourable articulations. 
In these pages Ramallah becomes a comrade that 
shares her secrets with me, and we plot together. 
This work is scientific in approach and 
methodology, and equally a narrative. It combines 
theory and analysis with events and anecdotes that 
construct the additional testimonial dimension. These 
are either embedded directly in the main text or can 
be found in the Notes of this work, which also give 
biographical synopsis about named characters – 
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whether Palestinian or Israeli – to help construct the 
setting and understand the politics of these actors. 
This is my narrative about my mentally-constructed 
and lived socio-political history as a Palestinian female 
in a patriarchal society; as a secular in the temple of 
monolithic religions; as a colonized subject who was 
raised to voice the claims of national freedom, only 
to find out that the frame and discourse, the ‘national 
dream’ promoted by Palestinian and international 
politicians, including my parents for the longest time, 
is not a goal that guarantees the promised and personal 
right to flourishing. 
Over the past decade it became increasingly 
evident that the name of the ‘country’ is not relevant; 
you can call it Israel or Palestine or tomatoes. 
What matters is the right to live in a society that is 
confident of its Palestinian identity, historic traits of 
diversity, actively resisting its colonial subordination, 
and mostly, where persons are able to collectively 
exercise differentiated social ethos and practices. I 
do not encourage socio-political normalization of the 
abnormal Israeli colonialism. On the contrary, I am 
posing questions and discussions towards genuine 
rather than figurative spatial liberation. In what 
became one of his most known lyrics – and later 
consumed with exaggeration – Mahmoud Darwish 
wrote ‘Atop this Earth what is worth a life’. It is not 
the earth, rather, the people walking it that make life 
worth the hardships. So who are these people today? 
And what kind of behaviour could unfold tomorrow? 
These are the existential questions for my Ramallah.
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1  | PROTEST URBANISM 
AND THE ‘NEW 
COMER’ RAMALLAH
With the shifts in and expansion of privatized global financial operations, 
digitalization of systems, virtual and physical communication and resource 
efficiency concerns; the ‘city’ has reclaimed the spotlight as prime nexus whether 
for economy, state monopoly, ‘national’ status, and among others, as battlefield of 
seemingly polemic sociopolitics. Principally these are antediluvian contestations 
of restrictive discourses versus the right to dignified and differentiated living 
irrespective of religion, ethnicity, race, cast, economic or political status or other. 
This dichotomy is reflected in the countless variables of the urban hitherto, e.g. 
capitalist, laissez-faire ‘formality’ de-legitimizing the proactive ‘informality’; 
philanthropic ‘urban renewal/regeneration’ as major cause of gentrification, 
internal displacement and exclusion; ‘traditional’, ‘sacred’ and ‘taboo’ as morality 
terms enacting imagined ‘collective’ mental borders, hence excuses to undermine 
alternative, avant-garde relational sensibilities and cultures. And among further 
examples, this dichotomy is enabled throughout the (self-ascribed) ‘democratic’ 
countries (e.g. USA, Mexico) whose legislation is centrally governed by the mono 
politics of ‘majority rule’, which is ontologically partisan and hence exclusive. 
While the grave impacts of the epidemic of ‘exclusion’ have been long deciphered 
and identified theoretically, the mounting numbers of failed prevention, 
containment and elimination policies indicate systematic deficiencies. Evidently, 
the causes and modes of operation differ with each particular case in relation to 
contextual elements, whereby the activities of occupy movements in the USA 
differ substantially between New York and Oakland, and further if compared 
with those of the Zapatistas in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal in Chiapas1. 
The current moment of mobilized populations occupying public spaces 
for local, national, and global affairs has revealed an additional dimension 
to the construction of the lived space. Formerly imagination and enacting 
of alternative realities required physical contact and the construction of 
sensibilities through physical mediums. However, the ease of cross-border 
communication and visualization (whether through sharing of photographs 
on social media, watching films, animations and documentaries, playing a 
video-game that satisfies such fantasies, etc.) is providing the mental support 
necessary for exercising agendas defiant of the surrounding socio-political 
system. This behaviour is a double-edged sword; while in some cases it is used 
to fuel demands for equality, in others it is a tool of radical ideology. As Slavoj 
Zizek phrases it:
[The] plague of fantasies of which Petrarch speaks in My Secret, images which 
blur one’s clear reasoning, is brought to its extreme in today’s audiovisual 
media. Among the antagonisms that characterize our epoch (world-market 
globalization versus the assertion of ethnic particularisms, etc.), perhaps the 
key place belongs to the antagonism between the abstraction that increasingly 
determines our lives (in the guise of digitalization, speculative market relations, 
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etc.) and the deluge of pseudo-concrete images. In the good old days of 
traditional Ideologiekritik, the paradigmatic critical procedure was to regress 
from ‘abstract’ (religious, legal ...) notions to the concrete social reality in which 
these notions were rooted; today, it seems more and more that the critical 
procedure is forced to follow the opposite path, from pseudo-concrete imagery 
to abstract (digital, market ...) processes which effectively structure our living 
experience. (Zizek 2008: 1; emphasis in original)
Irrespective of size and type of enactment, mass-mobilization requires 
particular psychologies which downplay the phantasmic dimension of the 
ideology represented in their ‘motion’. Axiomatically neither acts of protest nor 
their accumulative effects are alien to cities as transcribed in volumes of history. 
However, the synthesis of solidarities, timely sharing of ‘know-how’, and staging 
simultaneity as tactic is furthering the internationalization of – particularly 
but not only – cities. Besides economic and political policy mobility, regional 
influences, and locational cosmopolitanisms, today trans-border ideological 
non-state alliances and ethos are making their claims through the direct 
space; targeting economic policies (e.g. Athens, London, São Paulo); social 
disenfranchisement (e.g. Paris, Tunis, Santiago de Chile); housing rights (e.g. 
Cape Town, Tel Aviv, Rome); political rights (e.g. Tehran, Cairo, Washington); 
anti-government groupings (e.g. Kiev, Caracas, Bangkok); separatist demands 
(e.g. Barcelona, Benghazi, Glasgow); and among many others, the terrorization 
of cities frequented by radical insurgent (and state) groups and powers in pursuit 
of their ideology e.g. Da’esh – Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, and La Familia and Noar HaGva’ot (Hilltop Youth) in Israel. 
In today’s reality where theories of Urban Psychogeographies by Guy Debord 
and Social Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre are receiving recognition and 
critical elaboration; the inquiry of urban planners is implored to, first, exercise 
‘collective puzzling’ cross-discipline and specialty at the speed of progress of 
knowledge; second, track and decipher the growing inflow of information, and; 
third, ‘be one day ahead of them’ as Leó Szilárd was quoted in 1961. Yet, how does 
‘inter-disciplinary’ exchange and flexibility function in the study of urbanisms? 
How can rhizomatous, bureaucratic, centralized systems involving countless 
actors be adapted to new knowledge in domain- and time-sensitive tempo? How 
can planners filter past-tense global data to envision future-oriented context-
sensitive scenarios? How can planners break from today’s reactive and speculative 
ruling coalition to more proactive and rooted approaches? And down the line 
of variables involved in urban beau ideal sublimation of mass-mobilization and 
protest; could planners become the fortune-tellers they are presumed to be? 
This work neither claims the ability to answer those questions nor 
ponders scope and impacts of centralized psychological projections and 
planning. However, it is concerned with and engages in discussing some of the 
opportunities underlying paradigms that consider cities as organic – macro and 
micro – ecologies whose biological processes are – to a great extent – calculable. 
This dialectical Marxist approach treats paradoxicality as rooted commonness 
rather than incidental abnormality. Also, neither mapping spaces, genealogies 
and histories of urban protests nor the investigation of the role and kinetics of 
social (resistance and radical) movements in inducing urban spatial change are 
per se the interest of this work. However, it recognizes and argues the postulate 
that roots, elements, methods, dynamics, articulations and fuel of popular and 
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social movements differ between a locality and another; including within a 
singular national territory, and equally, through the numerous urban layers 
that are combinations of political, economic, and social psychogeographies. 
Herein campaigns, rallies, festivals, access to resources and services, commuting 
and other structurations of daily practices are engendered, sized and projected 
through particular spatializations. Thus, urban morphologies are mediums of 
encouragement or impeding claims to social justice, negotiation of bureaucratic 
systems, compromising principles of equality, and possess an underestimated 
power in instilling feelings of satisfaction, dignity, belonging, disenfranchisement 
and contestation. 
Regardless whether the central theme is ideology, security, sustenance 
or other; a main ingredient determining whether the ‘motion’ is peaceful or 
violent, constructive or destructive is the presence or absence of mediums of 
negotiation, neutralization of social tensions, and freedom of expression rather 
than oppression. This aspect constitutes a structural difference in dynamics of 
civic movements in countries – hence cities – featuring advanced democracies 
and those with imperial, post- and neocolonial heritage; those with dependent, 
compromised and authoritarian systems, and; those in geographies of ethnic and 
cultural mosaics of indigenous, immigrating, and annexing civilizations. 
For example, Lebanon has a total area of 10,452 square kilometres, 17 official 
sects, half a million refugees and asylum seekers, and an estimated population 
of about 4.8 million. The last census took place in 1932, based on which the 
National Pact of 1943 was drafted placing a confessional ‘democratic’ political 
structure into government. Fears of altering the delicate political balance has 
translated with official abstinence from conducting a population census since. 
This heterogeneous ethnic patchwork of Lebanon is a specimen indicative of the 
composition of the Levant. Meanwhile, European colonial thought assumed its 
relatively limited ethnic and religious variations (until the early twentieth century) 
as universal, hence re-drew the political borders of the region upon conquering it 
accordingly; straight lines through mountainous landscapes, fluid socializations, 
macro and micro economies. 
In the same line, following mythological maps wars in the Levante since 
World War II continue to physically reshuffle ethnic constellations. Thus, taking 
into consideration the polarizing role of mental and lived collective memory in 
shaping contestation, what are the urban, demographic, ethnic and ideological 
formations in place today? Why and how were they produced? What are the 
variables and tools sustaining them? And can those be manipulated?
The afore-described mutated colonial spatial reconfiguration was partly 
conceived by the assumption that military and technological supremacy is capable 
of disciplining and scaling indigenous resistance; complimented by economic and 
political tools whose agent is centralized autocratic regimes, and sustained through 
hegemonic executive arms and particular morphological and micro-spatial 
arrangements. Evidently, the short sightedness of this discourse gave rise to various 
forms of protest beyond political spheres; literature, arts and culture, and many 
others to which the urban space constitutes an incubator. Notwithstanding, the 
result has been the omnipresence of ‘shadow regimes’ to presumably independent 
nation-states; public and private foreign (nonnational) actors exasperating and 
factoring decision-making on internal (local-)government policy. Thus, while 
cities like Berlin plan their strategies bound with respective central governments, 
global private capital, and within some space extract policy-elements from civic 
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participation; on the other side, cities like Amman have to negotiate with respective 
central government, World Bank and IMF, donor countries, UN organizations, 
foreign aid private international subcontractors, and global private capital, leaving 
little (if any) space for civic participation on the crowded rectangular table. Thereof 
and in such particular ecologies, what and where are the systematic loopholes 
(spatial opportunities) that can be employed for empowering civic participation 
and case-sensitivity? Calculating that bureaucratic and social change require 
flexible, long-term, self-reinforcing processes and physical spatial articulation; 
what are the existing frameworks and resources through which channels for 
integration of public and private, local and international spheres in mutually 
constructive undertakings can be established?
Beyond issues of sovereignty and power structures, central to the practice of 
urban design and planning is the projected impacts of climate change, neoliberal 
crisis, resource efficiency, and technological advancement amongst others. 
Such tangible and administrative infrastructures are faced with the question of 
compatibility to mental and behavioural logic in general, and the relationalities 
within a (non-)collective mass specifically; what the behavioural economist 
Sendhil Mullainathan calls ‘last mile problem’. He argues that typically the majority 
of effort in tackling phenomena is channelled to the development of the ointment 
– the thousands of inventions and policies that earmark the progress of man kind; 
however, often the component of behavioural compatibility is compromised by 
the inconsistency between rational thinking – hence planning and administration 
– models and persuasion, whether of individuals or groups. He explains:
Convincing people to do something -- take oral rehydration therapy, intercrop, 
whatever it might be -- is not an act of information: ‘Let’s give them the data, 
and when they have data they’ll do the right thing.’ It’s more complex than that. 
[...] They are situations where the mental model doesn’t match the reality. [...] 
That’s what I’m talking about as a last mile opportunity. You see, we tend to 
think the problem is solved when we solve the technology problem. But the 
human innovation, the human problem still remains, and that’s a great frontier 
that we have left. This isn’t about the biology of people; this is now about the 
brains, the psychology of people, and innovation needs to continue all the way 
through the last mile. (TEDIndia 2009: minute 7:30 and 15:53)
The last mile problem reiterates an old-new challenge for urbanists, 
namely, the question on applicability of plans, visions and policy beyond 
selective compatibility criteria that are predominantly statistical, economic 
and political. Global benchmarks routinely shed their weight on prioritization 
of elements, allocation of resources, administrative structures, and therein 
internationalize the local discourse by marginalizing components that constitute 
a ‘programming’ anomaly, including the range and stimuli of the ‘psychology of 
people’. Expressing the predicament, it remains customary to classify (reduce?) 
geographies through mythical, subjective, hypothetical, and numerical binaries 
through the employment of terminology such as the orientalist East and West, the 
hierarchical First and Third World, the infantalizing Developed and Developing, 
and the segregationist Global North and South. Recently the third category 
Emerging Economies was assumed a sufficient addition that depolarizes and 
instills credibility in the indiscriminate GDP scale. These patronizing paradigms 
are legible in the intensities and socioeconomic impacts of profusion, diversity 
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Image 1.1. October 2011, view direction north-west from Ramallah’s centre.
and extents of penetration of aforementioned neo-colonial ‘shadow regimes’ 
in geographies with particular historic contexts; constructing what Dipesh 
Chakrabarty describes as ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ (Harvey 2009:40). 
Consequently, how can reductionist urban modulations be resisted and coopted? 
What tools are needed to generate timely-sustainable, flexible, grounded, diverse 
and coherent city-spaces? And how would these hypothetical frameworks and 
spaces neutralize the schism between adopted policies that are overtly targeting 
improved living conditions, yet whose exercise involves restriction and/or 
violation of civic rights?  
In the same line, while acknowledging the significance of futuristic 
and unrestrained imaginations to innovation and progress, the Palestinian 
philosopher and political scientists Mudar Kassis2 abstracts the challenge of the 
current moment by highlighting two truisms that factor the ongoing processes 
of intellectual production. First, we are rapidly approaching the threshold of the 
world order as we know it and are observing it labour a – structural/alternative or 
superficial/derivative? – shift in economic (post-capitalism?) and political (post-
national?) systems. Logically we recognize that we ‘do not know’ what the new 
‘post’ organisms and operating systems will be like. Second, although scholarship 
acquiesces the ‘non-knowledge’ of the future, nonetheless propositions on how 
the world could or should operate in the future are too often based on expertise 
obtained in former eras under ontologically varying conditions. Therein the 
prophecy question resurfaces albeit in philosophical contexts; can urbanists 
innovatively plan for socio-economically compatible and just future cities under 
proliferating uncertainty in spite of the conditioned and limited foresight?
In view of these debates on approaches to envisioning urban discourse 
and practice; the interest of this work lies in exploring the characteristics of 
potential resilient (social, environmental, financial) morphologies in urbanisms 
of continued colonialism, economic and political precariousness, namely the city 
of Ramallah, Palestine. It analyses the particular political, economic and social 
imaginations versus institutionalized and fluid mechanisms and types of actors 
and spaces propagating these positions. Thereupon, it discusses and explores 
spatial elements, requirements and alternative frameworks that could contribute to 
the decolonization and improvement of quotidian living conditions within the city. 
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1.1.    INTRODUCING 
RAMALLAH
Ramallah stepped into the 20th century as a village and by the dawn of the 
1980s it had wandered into a large town in the shades of Jerusalem. During the 
first Intifada (1987-1993) it claimed the role of a major political command centre, 
where the Palestinian collective motto was sumud which signifies ‘steadfastness’, 
‘resilience’, and within its manifolds social solidarity. Following the launch of 
the Peace Process (PP) and the subsequent signature of the Oslo Accords (OAs) 
in 1993, Ramallah gradually gained increasing power as seat of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA); the executive arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Today it is a contested urbanism resembling normalcy, quasi freedom, 
and enablement to some; and to others political hegemony, colonial agency, 
and neoliberal individualism. Palestinian popular associations in the second 
millennium depict Jerusalem as the precious prisoner in which right to self-
determination is to be found; Gaza and Jenin as the battlefields of colonial 
militarism, counterinsurgency and the message of continued resistance; Nablus 
and Hebron as strongholds of extended family traditions and economic engines in 
spite of penetrative colonies and temporalization; and Ramallah is the bordel. The 
city’s association rapidly shifted from the ‘beautiful, lush, summer resort’ in 1994 
(Barghouti 2005) to the ‘Green Zone’ (Massad 2006), ‘five-star prison’ (Taraki 
2008), ‘bantustan sublime’ (Abourahme 2009), ‘coeur du mirage palestinien’ 
(Barthe 2011), ‘hornet’s nest’ (Yehya 2013), and ‘home’ by 18% of the participants 
in eight focus groups conducted by this work.
According to Ahmad Odaly, former head of the Engineers Union, Ramallah 
grew five-fold between 2002 and 2010 (Assadi 2010). While the accuracy of 
the number raises some questions, it is evident that Ramallah hosts both local 
and international, public and private institutions and organizations. The city is 
encapsulated and constrained in a mixed reality of direct and indirect colonization 
that rests on the periphery and through the vessels. Sous-prétext creation of 
necessary infrastructure for an independent state, foreign aid is provided since 
1994 to stir the wheel of development in a process under which imposed neoliberal 
and global policies on one hand, and on the other mutated quasi-sovereignty, are 
deforming the space of the ‘district-size’ city, towards becoming what the town 
and regional planner Rassem Khamaisi (2006) described as ‘national core’, and 
what this work considers a pregnable cosmopolis. Hence, between enclavization 
and liberation of the market, the city is renegotiating its relationship to the wider 
liberation-movement context on one hand, and on the other reshaping the space 
within its agglomerate under continued precariousness and colonial systems.
Ramallah, the fourth largest city administered by Palestinians that has 
neither independent import-export potentials (e.g. Gaza), nor a strong economic 
production base (e.g. Nablus, Hebron); neither a history of wealth and bourgeoisie 
nor a location of any biblical mention (e.g. Jerusalem, Bethlehem); and whose 
myth of modern creation involves quasi refugees, new-comers from the east bank 
of the Jordan as its ‘original families’; Ramallah, the urb with one-fourth the size 
of Manhattan and the imagined role of New York is the unrivaled Palestinian 
star-city. It is internationally regarded as an agglomerate undergoing ‘plan-
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boom’ (ARTE 2011), ‘bolstered by peace’ and ‘an uptick of investors’ (The Wall 
Street Journal 2010), whose recently inaugurated Mövenpick Hotel ‘is testament 
to political stability’ (Sherwood 2010), and whose economy was compared to 
that of the Asian tiger-economies in a quote by the Spiegel International (von 
Mittelstaedt 2011).  Herein Taraki notes:
Western and Israeli journalists have been the most enthusiastic promoters of 
the new Ramallah, focusing on its cafés, restaurants, theatres, fitness centres 
and cultural venues; wonderment that Palestinians are capable of intelligible 
lives pervades these journalistic writings. Ramallah is variously depicted as 
proof of the resilience of the middle class, the victory of globalization, the 
defeat of the [Palestinian] resistance, or of the PA’s ability to assure normalcy 
in a time of conflict and strife. Palestinian sentiments about the city tend to be 
strong and are themselves indicative of emerging political and social divisions. 
(Taraki 2008:12)
Multiple interviewees of this work regard Ramallah as a ‘bubble’ that is 
bound to explode. It is heavily discussed, adorned, impugned and often calls for 
reminders that ‘Ramallah is not Palestine’ rather ‘a sliver of land’ that claims to 
be the ‘Liberty Enclave’ (Toalan 2010). Through its status as seat of the PA it has 
become the prime sociospatial battlefield due to the coincidence of five; First, 
the PA’s quasi-monopoly on the political and administrative discourses, whose 
ideology and tools are outdated, strategy disclosed, and factually unintelligent. 
This is enabled by, again, a quasi-monopoly on violence through the centralization 
of command of the policing apparatuses in the agglomerate, which has had 
significant spatial, societal and behavioural articulations; Second, the heavy-
weight presence of agendas, agents and capital of subjective international aid 
institutions that enjoy impunity and limited-sightedness genealogically; Third, 
the high concentration of private capital whose accommodation is subsidized 
through unnecessary incentives, compromised judiciary system, and intimacy 
with decision-makers; Fourth, the early phases of the exponential growth of 
the city between 2000 and 2007 have created a mosaic where social, economic, 
political and ideological colours are highly mixed spatially, and whose interaction 
and settlement of locational differences is largely de-regulated. Prediction of 
future evolution potentials of this ecology is multifarious, requiring application 
of critical knowledge, on uncertain components, while following the dialectic 
logic of causality and nexus. The complexity of exercising urban envisioning 
in Ramallah – which is the focus of this work – is essentially due to the Fifth 
factor; the geopolitical condition of being under Zionist colonization which 
systematically nurtures Palestinian despotic politics, filters foreign aid from 
nutrients, tames the imagination of entrepreneurs and private capital keeping 
them predictable, and fragments Palestinians through legal codifications whose 
impacts are economic, corporeal and psychological. 
Meanwhile, Ramallah seems to have a pact with new comers, therein 
otherness, and therewith simultaneously and sensitively redefining itself with such 
flows over the past century. In the 1920s Ramallah leaped from a farmer village 
to an administrative town concomitant with the inflow of Palestinians from 
other regions and British Mandate affiliates. In the 1950s it evolved into a city 
of tradesmen with the re-settlement of thousands of Nakba3 refugees in 1948. In 
the 1970s and in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War4 it redefined itself into an 
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activist city with the reconnection of politico-intellectuals across the Green Line5, 
and the growth of Birzeit University hence the number of its long- and short-
term affiliates residing in the agglomerate. In the 1990s it became a diplomatic 
city with the arrival of Yasser Arafat and his coterie, hence the congregation of the 
two centres of weight of the Palestine Liberation Organization6 (PLO), in addition 
to the World Bank family setting residence. In the early 2000s the closure of the 
West Bank (WB) by Israeli checkpoints triggered the centralization of the PA in 
Ramallah, which is turn resulted in an inflow of new comers who were initially 
predominantly public servants, and later seekers of blue- and white-collar work 
opportunities; turning the city into the de facto capital. Today with the death 
of the national movement, stagnation of the Peace Process, features of irk of 
international donors, and the ongoing inflows of new comers and capital into the 
hauptstadt, Ramallah is once again in-labour redefining the features of its persona 
for the coming era. Here a fundamental question crystallizes: in what direction?
the Other
Not to sound discriminatory, but seriously, all these people that are flooding 
Ramallah do not share our ideology. Neither you nor I will be able to continue 
our life-style soon. (Ramallah, male, 40s, Mar.2013)
When the people of Jenin all end up here then it will all be over. (Ramallah, 
female, 17, Oct. 2012)
They move to Ramallah for work like they would emigrate to the US, which is 
the enemy, yet one will go there to make a living. Considered from the same 
perspective, many of the people moving to Ramallah spend their years without 
developing any feelings of association or loyalty. If you visit the north and run 
a casual conversation you would be surprised that not only some regard it is 
an enemy, but even wish harm for it such as by an earthquake or the like. This 
estrangement between Ramallah and other West Bank cities is caused by the 
discrepancy in capital distribution where much of the wealth is concentrated in 
Ramallah. This aspect is exasperated by the fact that the PA has no resources, 
and has liquidated wealth from other regions and re-pumped it into Ramallah. 
All the aforementioned combined results with the regard for Ramallah being 
that of aggressiveness, absence of loyalty, and Ramallah will be targeted. 
(Barghouthi 2012)
Ramallah is not unique, it is uniquely complex. It is where Lefebvre’s (2009) 
social production of space meets Fanon’s (2008) ‘Black Men, White Masks’ on 
the grounds of Harvey’s (1990) ‘space-time’ compression to attend the debate 
of ‘globalization or denationalization?’ (Sassen 2003). According to 50% of 
participants of 8 focus groups (FG 2011) the most positive aspect of Ramallah is 
its living conditions, openness and pluralism, at a time the city lies at extreme 
odds to all other Palestinian localities with its doubling population. In Nablus and 
Hebron – the largest WB cities – 74.6% and 87.5% (respectively) of the population 
have been living within the locality since birth. In Ramallah-alBireh this figure 
stood at a mere 48% (PCBS 2007). Today it has surely sunken further. 
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Image 1.2. A Photoshop-ed image 
obtained through its sharing on Facebook. 
Someone added on a picture for a public 
transportation van the phrase ‘Ramallah - 
Thailand and back’ on the rear windshield.
Nevertheless, pluralism, access to opportunity, and social justice are results 
of – among others – failed attempts to eliminate the other as equal, an achievement 
that Ramallah cannot – yet – claim. It is grounds for contending ideologies, 
unfolding despotic power, ardent merchant warfare, and a birth place for old-new 
social associations and their attempts to climb the stage. As global processes and 
modern life-styles materialize within the city – emancipation from the clan, social 
otherness, internationalization of habits, and demands for civic rights – there is a 
lack of ownership, originality, perspective and freedom. The neoliberal patterns 
and dynamics of the Ramallite ‘new middle class’ (Taraki 2008); the outlawed yet 
practiced derelict labelling of persons from northern regions of the West Bank 
as Tailandieh (from Thailand, insinuating cheap mobile labour; see Image 1.2), 
and; the system by which ‘personal success is based on a collective destruction’ 
(alKhalili 2012) are manifestations of crucial shortcomings and what Adania 
Shibli (2012) calls the ‘limitations of imagination’ in the Palestinian crafting of 
discourse, amongst which the spatial. Here Anani notes:
There is a strong similarity with the colonial mechanism of gazing at space, 
fragmenting space, controlling the mountain tops, creating gated communities 
and fostering elitism in the planning of these housing projects. There is an 
obvious parallel, however, how we produce space in this neocolonial era is not 
acknowledged. (Anani 2011)
As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, decisions on the city are taken mainly 
by a clique on the basis of interests of private investors, foreign donors and 
Israel through a highly centralized and hegemonic governing PA. In 2014 the 
international Official Donor Assistance (ODA) for Palestinian institutional, 
economic and social ‘development’, ‘peace-building’, and ‘conflict resolution’ 
approached the US$ 25 Billion benchmark, in a period of 21 years. This sum has 
earned Palestinians the fifth rank worldwide in ODA per capita after Palau, Tuvalu, 
Marshal Islands, and the Federal Republic of Micronesia; all of which combined 
amount to less than 5% of West Bank and Gaza in terms of population size (Table 
3.1; p. 121). Along the course, the ‘goose laying golden eggs’ – as described by the 
political scientist Rex Brynen – has proved the prophecy of capacity to ‘encourage 
both authoritarianism and neopatrimonial patronage-based politics’ (2000:28), as 
the coming pages will illustrate. Meanwhile, stories of cities that provide freedom, 
dignity and security to all citizens equally undeterred by the colonial, neocolonial 
and hegemonic reality are still to be told.
While Ramallah Municipality (2008) announced several programs aiming 
at increasing public participation, revolutionizing its administration systems, 
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revising its decision-making structure and articulating its support of higher 
social pluralism and civil engagement; nonetheless these frameworks remain 
exclusive, limited, and lacking rigour (Rayyan 2010; Taraki 2010). Expectedly, 
the emerging urban forms are mobilizing some civil society members and 
institutions to voice claims for a healthier city-discourse akin to Berlin and Rio 
De Janero7. Debates, exhibitions and acupuncture symposiums such as Ramallah 
Syndrome, Civic Encounter, Ramallah the Fairest of them all City’s Exhibition 
and Qalandya International amongst others indicate social, economic and 
spatial reimagineering endeavours by local scholars and professionals. However, 
acupuncture can only achieve positive results if all needles work constructively. 
Further, a limited number of researchers and practitioners recognize the need for 
holistic analytical paradigms of ungoverned micro and macro ecologies, beyond 
the desultory official policy, bureaucratic regulations and master-plans. Proving 
to be no exception, Ramallah systematically renders efforts of experts obsolete in 
today’s global, neoliberal, capitalist economy which propagates politics of mass-
production, mass-consumption, and along the chain, mass-homogenization and 
-categorization in spite of apparent endemic biological differences. 
From some perspectives, the city is caressing narratives of Paris in the 
1960s, Beirut in the 2000s, and Barcelona since the 2010s. While voluminous 
constructions overshadow shrinking remainders of pre 1993 characteristic spatial 
features and ethos, here grave impacts of free-range capitalist economies are 
clamping sensitive nerves. Fragmented, vapid and monotonous urban landscapes 
house – the diagnosable – swelling of social tensions of exclusion (e.g. financially 
underprivileged), marginalization (e.g. ideological /stereotypical outcasting), 
isolation (e.g. oppression and absence of social securities), despair, optimism and 
vulnerable seeds of change. Yet, what is the orientation of this momentum? What 
are the factors, policies and resources stirring the course of developments? What 
are their ideologies, priorities, tools, economies and agendas? 
Participation as a common practice and tool of decision-making – similar to 
pluralism – is a result of failed attempts to exclude the other. Herein, if Ramallah’s 
social development patterns (feelings of pluralism, ownership and purpose) could 
be positively influenced by enabling the involvement of average (diverse) citoyen in 
the ecosystem of the city-scape; then, planners need to develop tools for decision-
making that; first, are flexible for the governing conditions of uncertainty; second, 
determine frameworks that naturally guide individual decisions – whether 
ideological or financial – to meet the larger ‘coalition’ strategy; and third, enable 
a resilient environment that is viable and rapidly as well as continuously adapting 
socio-economic urban systems. Would Ramallah’s growth patterns been different 
had the citoyen had a stronger influence on city-planning? Neither Yes nor No are 
here appropriate, because on one hand bottom-up influence requires incremental 
frameworks which neither the current nor the forthcoming constellations offer, 
and on the other, this would be an act of unnecessary speculation.
Notwithstanding, given the readiness of both parties – Ramallah 
Municipality and civil society – to engage on one hand, and on the other the 
continued enthusiasm of capitalists; there are grounded reasons to believe 
that Ramallah is fertile grounds for undertaking urban experimentation, 
namely; first, there is considerable receptiveness and institutional support for 
proposals targeting system-improvement particularly in light of the knowledge-
based character of the Palestinian economy. The latter is de facto deprived of 
access to both natural resources and trading mechanisms (Palestine Reform & 
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Development Plan, MOPAD 2007, Ersheid & Jabarin 2007). Second, Ramallah 
is undergoing academically-revised – some even predictable – sociospatial 
contestation processes, thence delivering urgency for conception of endemic 
tools for translating achieved knowledge to applicable measures. And third, 
geographic fragmentation of the landscape and the militarization of space by 
Israel has resulted in the condensation of Palestinians – physically and mentally 
– inside the islands under PA-sovereignty. The national-space has been reduced 
to city-scale, and the paradoxical morphology is reflected in the attitudes of 
residents, chiefly in the form of acute otherness. This is accompanied by rapidly 
growing post-nationalistic sentiments, which are worth noting and investigating, 
particularly under the continued colonial conditions on one hand and on the 
other the dramatic shifts in the world economic structures. 
Purpose of this work
Hitherto history has neither sustained political projects based on ethnic or 
religious superiority, nor in retrospect applauded them; the persecution of early 
Christians by the Roman Empire; Reyes Cathólicos’ expulsion of Muslims and 
Jews from Spain in the 15th century; The ethnic-cleansing of Caucasians in the 
19th century; The British colonization of India; The South African apartheid... 
Why should the Zionist colonial project have a different fate? Why would 
humanity’s discourse veer at a project whose critical momentum and ordination 
was achieved corollary to the morbid ethnic cleansing of Jews by Nazism in 
the 20th century? Further; whose legitimacy was granted in the aftermath of 
its ethnic cleansing and displacement of about a million persons (Pappe 2007, 
alKhalili 2009), eradication of over 400 localities (Khalidi 2006, Pappe 2007), 
and continues in spite of more than 200 UN Security Council resolutions 
against it, a higher number of non-binding UN General Assembly and UN 
Human Rights Council resolutions (UNISPAL 2014), and a standing order 
since 2004 from the International Criminal Court of Justice de-legitimizing 
Israel’s – audaciously continued – construction of the Separation Wall. While 
the future and its dynamics are highly hypothetical, the nonce is poising critical 
problematics for Ramallah.   
Following the postulate that behaviour shapes spaces while the latter is a tool 
of empowering the former; the purpose of this work is to conceptualize  frameworks 
which reorganize the space of Ramallah through and beyond outlines engendered 
by official regulations and systems towards decolonizing the morphology of the 
urban sub-space of the neighbourhood. The approach triangulates knowledge-
based and system-oriented participatory (insurgent) planning tools with decisive 
geopolitical conditions on one hand, and prevalent and rhizomatous economic 
systems on the other. The constellation is both individual and collective, 
capitalist and socialist. It is theoretically rooted in concepts of; first, urban social 
movements and social pluralism; second, geopolitical (de-)colonialism and it 
social, economic and spatial strategies; and third, contemporary urban decision-
making mechanisms for uncertainty and towards attaining resilience. It is founded 
in the activist pursuit of transforming the barriers separating academia, practice, 
and the public realm into accessible points of exchange, critical discussion, and 
constructive discourse. It is not about creating a melting pot, rather, investigating 
a pilot for a block in the bee’s nest called Ramallah.
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1.2.    APPROACH, 
METHODS AND 
SCALE OF  
100 × RAMALLAH
In 2010 study of official urban development and foreign aid policy seemed 
to be a favourable discourse to understanding the transitional character of 
Ramallah. The initial months focused on drawing connections between the case 
and theory on one hand, and investigating regional and global similarities on the 
other. Consequent findings and analysis indicated that the city space is dominated 
by colonial territorializations that enable surveillance, foreclose claims to the 
public realm, fragment economic logic, and entrench sociospatial discrimination 
to name a few. A preoccupation in Ramallah’s vulnerability in the unfolding 
tolerance quiz and disaster-risk (environmental, economic, political) stimulated 
the venture into futuristic speculation. What does tomorrow hide for Ramallah?
Gradually the initially perceived research problematic deflated into one 
cogwheel in an intriguing ecology. Space as system became focal; past, present 
and future; constituents, engines and consequences; political, economic and 
social; perceived, lived and representational; and individual, relational and 
collective. Needless to point out the aforementioned encapsulates a scope beyond 
the capacity of any individual research. As a result, a process of reasoning, 
conditioning and prioritization took place. The later was factored by mainly 
three; first, access to information (e.g. limited access to cartographic data due 
to securitization, lack of transparency and access to public databases10, poor 
spatial archiving11, etc.); second, timely socio-political markers (e.g. events 
of spatial claiming and bending of discourse), and; third, detected tangible 
activities within the larger space (e.g. constructions, regulatory frameworks, 
announced programs and projects, etc.). Hence, this research followed flexible 
criteria and progressive re-evaluation in the process of defining the specific foci 
in which case-based empirical, statistical and narrative data pairs with rooted 
and speculative epistemological readings. This methodology culminated with the 
reorientation and specification of the research inquiries from focus on enacted 
policy (retrospective) to potential scopes of protest (decolonizing) urbanism 
through nonviolent insurgency tactics (prospective); as described earlier.
Over the course of this work eight field visits totalling 32 weeks were 
conducted, ranging between two to six weeks each, and spanning over intervals 
of 6 months in average. During these visits twenty qualitative interviews with 
practitioners and experts of varying backgrounds were conducted; public officials, 
private investors, urbanists and planners, politicians, economists, journalists and 
researchers. Interviews averaged around an hour in length and followed a semi-
structured outline. The main tracks guiding the conversations were six questions:
• How do you perceive the change in Ramallah?
• What is your opinion about the emerging physical patterns and forms?
• Do you feel there is a social change? why/how?
• What is your opinion about the economic vehicles of the city?
• What is your opinion about the politics and governance of the city?
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• Personal relation to the city: since when? relation to city’s core? to other 
spaces? favourite place? what do you find positive/negative in Ramallah?
With the exception of the last questions, interviews did not equally 
expound on all six items. Rather, topic-time allocation was scaled in reference to 
the experiences and field of expertise of the interviewee; which was reflected in 
the final compilation of transcripts. Further, the personal archive of interviewees 
varied in length, where 50% of the interviewees were above 50 years in age – 
those whose consciousness was shaped with the rise of the national liberation 
movement in the 1970s; 40% of interviewees were in their thirties or forties – 
those whose consciousness was shaped with the peek of societal collective 
disobedience in the 1980s; and only 10% with persons in their twenties – those 
whose consciousness was shaped with the slow death of the national liberation 
movement. This formula comes into balance through combining with eight 
focus groups where each of the first two age categories corresponds to one focus 
group, the third corresponds to two focus groups, and an additional fourth 
category of teenagers (17-18 years) corresponds to four focus groups – persons 
whose consciousness is being shaped at this moment under the currents of post-
nationalism, where the collective political cause of a national state is significantly 
compromised by the corporeal and economic emergency. Focus Group 
participants were also requested to fill a questionnaire whose outline followed 
the afore-stated items. Tables with further details about conducted interviews 
and focus groups can be found in Annex.2; p. 382.
 In parallel, observing banal behaviours and logic of socio-economic 
spatializations became an amusing and equally intimidating puzzling exercise; 
through legal documents, public announcements, market operations, quotidian 
comments, selection of courted spaces, mapping of varied reactions to same 
behaviour in different neighbourhoods and many more little things. Many of 
these observations had to be suspended pending further investigation, however 
some served as orientation sensors for the research discourse. Meanwhile, a four-
year archive of over 8,000 items was constructed; images, maps, visualizations, 
flyers, data-sources, media articles, grey literature and publications.
In line with the goal of this work – contribute to the imagineering of 
discourses of sociospatial decolonization – the methodology sought to identify 
potential components of what Ferguson (2014) coined makeshift city. These 
are urban conditions under which insecurity and scarcity stimulate acts of 
‘renegotiations in the forms of interventions – both temporary and permanent 
– that crack urban codes and regulations open up urban areas for reuse and for a 
previously un-thought condition of heterogeneity and diversity’ (ibid:15). These 
components where employed in an urban speculation tactic whose strategy 
capitalizes on morphological fluid re-territorialization as measure of countering 
the colonial temporalization (see section 2.1.3.i; p. 57). In its approach, it drew 
on the romanticism and contemporary sensibilities of sumud (see section 3.2; p. 
132); seeking the psycho-spatial dignified collective in the varied, fragmented and 
disenfranchised ecology. 
The targeted (grounded) imagined interventions had to therewith explore 
concepts and methods of civic economies and urban recycling on one hand, and 
on the other those of the socio-spatial impacts of the contextually often exercised 
urbicide; the logic of violence which if ‘understood as a distinct form of political 
violence’, then it represents ‘the destruction of the built environment qua that 
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which comprises the conditions of possibility of a particular existential quality: 
heterogeneity’ (Coward 2009:91). 
Along this process it became evident that parameters governing Ramallah’s 
growth patters and ethos have their naissance in the British Mandate era, in 
spatial principles of counter-insurgency, and socializations of survivalism (see 
section 2.2.2; p. 82). Therein, following concepts of causality as analytical engine 
the historic time-frame of this work commences with World War I which marks 
the placement into effect of French and British regional colonial rapacity, as 
articulated in the Sykes Picot Agreement12 and brought about by the establishment 
of the British Mandate of Palestine (Map 1.1; p. 24). Hence the time-frame of 1914-
2014 was determined as backdrop. This paradigm falls in line with the hypothesis 
of this work which stipulates that Ramallah’s urbanism is a product of its colonial 
genealogy since ‘all political and social projects are ecological projects, and vice 
versa’ (Harvey 2009:237). However, where and how do the futurist envisioned 
analysis-based interventions take place and how are they justified? While the 
aforementioned methods form the main tracks of this project, nonetheless, 
further specification was necessary.
Conditionality as Criteria
Assuming that decolonization requires socio-spatial intoxication from the 
narrow colonial, legal and economic parameters reproducing subsidiarity, and 
based on a universalist approach, the investigative discourse therein conditioned 
identification of relevant urban strategies for Ramallah as measured by two; 
first, improvement of quotidian living conditions, and second, the corollary 
balancing of access to resources (see section 2.2; p. 73). Within its manifolds, this 
work therewith places itself opposite to the PLO’s project of state-making arguing 
Ramallah’s sociospatial deformation as evidence of non-conformity as well as 
failure of the adopted discourse in respect to the claimed goal of attaining the right 
to self-determination and equality. Instead, through the dialectic argumentation of 
the following chapters I speculate on quasi-clandestine, incremental, fluid, private 
and public frameworks for spatial appropriation as a potential course for achieving 
those democratic targets. Therein and in light of the contextual socio-economic 
othering and relationalities, the city and neighbourhood spaces as mediums of 
behavioural (mental and material) engenderment compose the third condition of 
possibility (see section 2.1; p. 47). Borrowing the words of Martin Coward about 
the quintessence of morphological contours:
[...S]ince buildings are fundamentally public, this spatiality is always already 
shared with others and thus contains the possibility of heterogeneity. According 
to Heidegger and Nancy, heterogeneity comprises a Being-with, or sharing of the 
world with others. This Being-with, or sharing, is understood as a fundamental 
relationality in which identity (the presence of an entity) is constituted only in 
relation to difference. Self and other are not pre-existing entities that exist side-
by-side (and thus are contingently forced to enter into a relation), but rather 
identities that are established in and through the constitution of a relation. 
These identities unfold from a shared boundary that marks where self finishes 
and other starts and vice versa. (Coward 2009:91; emphasis added)
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Exploration of the where that Coward names as pivotal produces an array 
of domains for physical urban makeshift-interventions, whose categorization in 
terms of priority yields several legitimate arrangements. Upon investigating some 
constellations of fields posing relevance for Ramallah, the criteria of ‘what spatial 
components would always existentially condition any scenario?’ was applied 
(see section 3.2; p. 132). Combined once again with the two earlier conditions 
narrowed down the potential fields to a handful.
At this advanced stage of the research three more conditions inspired by the 
context of the work were adopted; fourth, low-bureaucracy given the centralized, 
hegemonic reality (see section 3.3; p. 173); fifth, pertaining to incremental-scale 
where small, varied individual items puzzle a continuum (see section 4.4; p. 
220), and last; sixth, potentiality of outsourcing hence structural resilience and 
efficiency (see section ; p. 262).
Following this methodological framework through the 1914-2014 time-
frame while factoring case-related social, economic and political components, 
resources and dynamics; this work determined the issue of mobility within 
the city – particularly pedestrian and mental – as its central preoccupation, 
domain of makeshift interventions, and therein tool for the targeted sociospatial 
decolonization through morphological reconfiguration. As for the localization, 
antispaces throughout the city space were determined as the mediums of feasible 
solutions given their characteristic dichotomy of posing a threat on one side, 
while on the other a semi-guaranteed financial (market) profitability (see section 
2.1.3.iii; p. 65 and 4.4.1; p. 223).
1.2.1.   Structure of 100 × Ramallah
[W]hat we academics so often forget is the role played by the sensibilities 
that arise out of the streets around us, the inevitable feelings of loss provoked 
by the demolitions, what happens when whole quarters (like Les Halles) get 
re-engineered [...], or the despair that flows from the glum desperation of 
marginalization, police repressions and idle youth lost in the sheer boredom of 
increasing unemployment and neglect in the soulless suburbs that eventually 
become sites of roiling unrest. (Harvey 2013:xi)
Affirming the definitive role of accumulative sociopolitical mentalities on 
urban policy and spatial formations, this work commences with a brief time-line 
that maps geopolitical events relevant to this work in the century between 1914 
and 2014. In this chapter landscapes of collective memories, shifting borders, and 
spatial discourses are displayed to frame the Palestinian psyche and tempo of the 
era. In a sense, the following pages of Chapter 1 could be considered a framed 
geographic and political capitulation of the case at hand.
Knowing that policies are successful ideological and financial marriages that 
breed (multiple) urban ethos and ecologies, Chapter 2 investigates the political 
roots of nowadays morphology; therein spatial features, specificities, functions, 
dynamics, evolutions, economic, social and environmental ecologies, and equally 
importantly, the fuelling ideologies and politics. This chapter questions dominant 
theories, their propositions and terminology, and gives voice to alternative 
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interpretations. For example, general discourses regard the Israeli control over 
Palestine as an ‘occupation’, which is a term that implies limited intervention and 
temporality. Article 55 of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) of 18 
October 1907 states:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary 
of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to 
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the 
capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of 
usufruct8. (ICRC 2014)
It is not the interest of this work to state or detail the tens of violations 
of International Law that Israel has committed since 1948. However, one of 
the major reason for shortcomings of modern scholarship on Palestine is 
the narrowness of approach lined by – amongst others – the employment of 
incompatible definitions which distort vision and precision (Abourahme 2011, 
Hamami and Tamari 2008). Equations utilized to compose targets, policies, plans 
and legal justifications (e.g. Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 2007) 
would have been variably different in scope, structure and tools had ‘occupation’ 
been replaced with ‘colonialism’, ‘state-building’ with ‘terminating colonial 
subsidiarity’, and ‘nationalism’ with ‘civic rights’ or ‘combating inequality’, among 
several other terms. Hamami and Tamari summarize the ongoing re-weighing of 
terminology employed for the case by writing:
Various conceptions of colonialism are increasingly gaining currency amongst 
critical Israeli and international scholars; Tony Judt has deemed Israel’s status 
as a ‘colonial state’ an anachronism. Israeli architect, Eyal Weizmann now calls 
Israel’s project in the occupied territories, ‘late-colonial occupation’, building 
on post-colonial theorist, Achille Mbembe’s theorization of it as a ‘modern 
colonial occupation’. And in various attempts to conceptualize the process of 
spatial control, territorial transformation and their effects, we have scholars 
using concepts such as ‘Bantustanization’; ‘carceral geography’; ‘spacio-cide’, 
‘urbicide’ and ‘politicide’. That the nature of Israeli spatial strategies in the West 
Bank and Gaza is unprecedented is borne out by the interest it has garnered 
among non-Palestine specialists in issues of political geography. (Hamami and 
Tamari 2008:24)
This scholarly debate ensues decades of Israeli re-territorialization policies 
between maximalist and pragmatist Zionist political wings partnered in evading 
a ‘final status’ agreement while claiming its pursuit (see Chapter 2; pg. 45). The 
highly improbable ‘two-state solution’ clinches to the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty and administration which assumes a homogeneous nation, and its 
ongoing application camouflages the ethno- and bio-politics at play in a geography 
(hence urbanisms) that sustained as communities of ethnic and cultural natural 
selection through 4,000 years of history. The significance of this linguistic scrutiny 
lies in accuracy of prognosis of (urban) phenomena at hand. Herein:
What is suggestive of the range of attempts to simply find concepts that can 
explain the current situation, under which Palestinians live under Israel’s rule, 
is that in terms of their sophistication and magnitude, Israel’s strategies of 
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control have reached a critical mass. At the same time, their logic as a political 
project has reached a critical impasse. Forty years of facts on the ground, 
premised on outmaneuvering a one or bi-national state solution have led to a 
situation in which Israel’s strategies have now reached far beyond a workable 
two-state option. Thus at this time, Palestinians and Israelis seem to face only 
two choices; a continuation ad-infinitum of the current state of emergency or 
an exit in the form of an implausible ‘transitional state’, with the latter likely to 
be simply a diplomatic cover for some version of the former. (ibid.)
Hence, it is quintessential for this work to philosophically differentiate 
between projected (imagined, mental) and grounded (scientific, real) meanings, 
ideologies, and their economic, social, and particularly spatial trails and 
implications. Chapter 2, hence, serves comprehension of the causes and game-
rules of the contemporary ‘Oslo-Era’, to which the dramatic sociospatial change 
of Ramallah is attributed.
Chapter 3 expounds on the politico-economic factors fuelling Ramallah’s 
tendencies in the past two decades since the signature of the Oslo Accords (OAs) in 
1993. It simultaneously investigates the spacio-social relationalities and sensibilities 
legitimizing and incubating these discourses. In the first half of the chapter, the 
OA’s state-making project is evaluated through capitulation of the international 
and local economic policies, administrative priorities, ‘securitization’ of domestic 
politics and their impacts on the city. In the second half of the chapter the spatial 
and social translations of this system are displayed, scrutinized and puzzled 
following dialectics of causality; establishing that socio-political consciousness of 
Ramallites and their spacio-economically articulated changed ethos – in both pre 
and post the Oslo era – constitute ecological processes whose birth-to-death cycle 
is aphoristic, and whose components and intensities are – largely – manipulations 
of ingredients determined by spatially-sensitive contesting ideological powers.
After addressing bionomic theory and debates relevant to Ramallah’s 
evolution; Chapters 4 and 5 proceed to map urban undertakings by both public 
and private parties (respectively). These chapters outline the power and decision-
making mandates and influence; modes of operation, structures and systematic 
variables; the most relevant projects and engagements; theoretical genealogies and 
comparative cases to screened urban visions, policies, targets, and tools; foreseen 
sociospatial consequences for these strategies, and; the underlying opportunities. 
Therein, these chapters identify cross-sectoral spaces for profit-oriented 
(financial or mental) relational solidarities at liminalities of societal archetypal 
categorizations, leading the way to the following chapter.
Chapter 6 concludes this work with puzzling the findings of former chapters 
in variable imaginations of alternative urban realities that Ramallah could 
potentially produce. Through re-negotiating the existing colonial morphology 
and centralized, bureaucratic decision-making systems, this chapter explores 
opportunities for nurturing environmentally, economically and politically 
resilient, inclusive and progressive spaces of resistance and sociospatial 
decolonization. In the current critical moment for Palestine specifically and cities 
featuring anti-colonial revolutions generally; modes of spatial absorption, scaling, 
synthesis, and reimagineering of locational social ideologies and movements is 
essential for the quality of life and dignity. 
Based on empirical findings, theoretical reviews, and acknowledging that 
economy has the upper hand over (particularly radical) ideology in politics; in 
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envisioning future scenarios for Ramallah this closing chapter sets ‘financial 
profitability’ and ‘social equality’ as conditions and target of proposed urban design 
strategies. Urban antispaces and vessels of mobility are assumed as landscapes of 
experimentation, and empowerment of low social and administrative hierarchies 
as methods. In the larger perspective, these propositions aim at revising and 
exploring possibilities of amelioration of the bureaucratic, capitalist and social 
systems of production of space in Ramallah, while recognizing the challenges of 
scale and subjectivity of the imagined civic commons.
Prior to advancing into the approaches and methods of this work; here it 
should be noted that aside the scientific motivations of this work, it desires to 
serve as a scholarly narrative that coalesces some facets of the momentary 
polemics, voiced aspirations and intellectual brainstorming about Ramallah. This 
five-year process has travelled through multitude of provocative and inspiring 
conversations, debates, and assemblies, and herewith aims at expounding on 
concepts of insurgent urbanism. The reflections outlined here do not claim 
premise to foreclosing or limiting differing understandings and interpretations; 
rather it calls attention to a selection of polychromic aspects requiring deeper 
investigation. 
 
1.2.2.    Scaling Ramallah
Work on the city therefore also frequently became ‘social work’, work on an 
urban ‘people’ who had apparently lost their ethics and morals in a big city 
[Berlin] environment allegedly bereft of traditions and taboos. (Kaschuba 
2012:241; primary testimony on conditions in Berlin, end of the 19th century)
When asked about the most negative aspect of Ramallah 48% of participants in 
focus groups answered with ‘over-crowdedness’, ‘pollution’ and ‘traffic congestion’ 
as the worst aspect of the city. In reality and through a subjective comparison, 
Ramallah’s total area is 1.5 that of the district of Kreuzberg (Berlin), but has 20% 
of the population of the latter and 12.5% the population density (Infographic 1.1; 
p. 19). However, Kreuzberg has the Görlitzer Park (14 dunums), Viktoria Park 
(16 dunums), and Gleisdreieck Park (26 dunums) and countless neighbourhood 
gardens – not to mention its bordering of the Tempelhofer Feld (230 dunums). 
In contrast, Ramallah has the Radana Park (7 dunums) and less than a dozen of 
(much smaller) neighbourhood gardens; which is reflected in the higher demand 
for residential unit space per capita in Ramallah as compared to Kreuzberg. While 
in the former 120 sq.m. apartment for a family of four constitutes a basic space, in 
the latter it equates to comfort. Corollary, in place of the 1.2-meter average sidewalk 
with in the former the later has 3 meters, and while Kreuzberg boasts stretches of 
pedestrian areas Ramallah has none. Logically, comparison should keep in mind 
that – first – the morphology of Kreuzberg which was outlined by James Hobrecht 
in 1862 (akin the Ildefons Cerdà plan in Barcelona in 1860) was placed in effect 
prior the intensification of inflows of new-comers, integrated substantial geometric 
mobility axis long before the mass-production of automobiles, and targeted a 
topography of marginal elevations. The Cerdà plan remained limited to the coastal 
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plains of Barcelona and the Kreuzberg (mountain) rises 66 meters above sea level, 
while Ramallah rests on a series of hilltops whose contours range between 630 and 
880 meters above see level, where a site-inclination of 30% is a standard, and often 
reaches 40%. Second, Kreuzberg’s experience with disenfranchisement terminated 
twenty-four years ago, in the pre-digital era. At the time, Ramallah was stepping 
into the ‘next level’ of the colonial game.
However, this comparison was employed to demonstrate two. On one hand, 
the feelings of spatial crowdedness in Ramallah are produced by many factors, 
some of which are physically tangible (e.g. congestions during rush hours due to 
weak  and monotypic infrastructure), and other non-tangible ones whose weight 
is projected (e.g. absence of pedestrian and congregation spaces as overcrowding 
in spite of the relatively large undeveloped space). While the private sector caters 
for some of the spatial needs of the financially capable, the larger social strata 
compete over the scarce public services; feeding into the predictable phenomena 
of otherness, urban poor, and among others insecurity, which are highly 
associated with rapidly growing capitalist metropolises.
On the other hand, the Ramallah – Kreuzberg comparison was displayed to 
scale the case at hand. The rapid growth pace of Ramallah since the year 2000 is 
often cited as argument for the expansion of its municipal territory. This is in fact 
a policy that the Ramallah Municipality actively peruses as demonstrated in the 
Infographic 1.1.  Comparing Ramallah and 
Kreuzberg in terms of area and population size 
and density in 2009.
28.726 1.760 / sq.km 14.000 / sq.km
1.000 persons 147.227
1  
km
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recent annexation of alReehan Neighbourhood that was built on lands under the 
neighbouring Surda and Abu Qash Council (see section 5.1.3; p. 249). Although 
concepts such as Jerusalem Metropolitan Area (Ramallah to Bethlehem), Greater 
Ramallah and the Ramallah, alBireh, and Beitunya Metropolitan Area (RABMA; 
elaborated in Chapter 4) are circulating in ministerial planning departments; 
nonetheless Ramallah Municipality seems to remain focused on its statute in 
spite of the melted borders between its fabric and those of Jerusalem, alBireh 
and Beitunya. 
Frameworks for integration of technical infrastructure (e.g. sewage system) 
have indeed been agreed upon between the triplet municipalities. However, 
considering that such works are predominantly executed by the Ministry of 
Public Works and the testimonies of public servants reveal the cosmetic nature 
of cooperation. As for social and administrative infrastructures, these remain 
segregated as heretofore. While this topic is elaborated in Chapter 4, here it 
should be noted that Ramallah Municipality is investing significant energy in 
ameliorating its performance based on framed elements in place of factoring 
its comprehensive posture as district in a pubertal metropolis rather than an 
autonomous city. This scalar differentiation is calculated in the approach and 
propositions of this work.
1.2.3.   Why Ramallah not alBireh, or both?
In spite of the fact that alBireh Municipality is older, wealthier, and governs 
larger geography than that of its twin; nonetheless, over the past century it has 
remained quiet, giving the impression of being an extension to rather than a root 
of Ramallah9. The majority of Palestinians – besides those of the twin cities – refer 
to the region as Ramallah, a dominance further evidenced in the coining of the 
PA as the ‘Ramallah regime’ at a time its headquarters (Mukata’a; see section 2.1.2; 
p. 53), President Mahmoud Abbas’ residence and the bulk of ministries until 2013 
were located within alBireh municipal territories. 
The 1931 Census of Palestine by the British Mandate categorised the region 
as the Ramallah Sub-district within the Jerusalem District (Mills 1932) with 
no mention of alBireh. In the same line, a glance through recent research and 
publications or simply a Google-search provides another indicator of Ramallah’s 
precocious visibility over alBireh. Therein, Ramallah has evidently won the 
spotlight and became a coining for the ethos of residents and influential actors 
whom are actively factoring the image of the agglomerate; the reputation, and the 
form. In this view, it was decided to focus on Ramallah Municipality as institution 
while eyeing the agglomerate as the geography of examination. 
On a different level and while recognizing the unorthodoxy of this indicator, 
entering ‘Ramallah’ as search item in Facebook provides ‘more than 1.000 pages’ 
(with tens of thousands of members), while alBireh (or Bireh) yields a mere 
‘Fewer than 100 pages’ (Annex.1; p. 381). Noteworthy is the genre of namings of 
these pages; Ramallah-ing [as verb], Ramallah Friendz, Ramallah loveers, and 
365 things to do in Ramallah among many others the common characteristic of 
which is the expression of affection to the place and its dynamism. Yet, more eye-
catching are the namings which translate a (nonerudite?) ideology of Ramallah 
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as superior to other localities e.g. First [comes] Ramallah (80.098 members), 
Dawlet Ramallah (state of-, 42.207 members), and Ramallah a7la (prettier, 
19.581 members), among others. On the other side of the same coin, a page titled 
Ramallah liljamee’ (for everyone) attracted a mere 274 members. Noteworthy, the 
estimated population of Ramallah in 2014 is 33,218 (PCBS 2010).
While Facebook memberships and ‘likes’ cannot be considered statistically 
reliable neither in terms of correctness nor precision; notwithstanding, it is a 
valid social indicator of growing sentiments of differentiation among residents 
of this space in relation to other Palestinian localities; a post-nationalist process 
unfolding in parallel to the continuing and intensifying settler-colonial project 
of Israel.
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1.3.    
VISUALIZING 1914-2014:  
BRIEF TIME-LINE OF 
POLITICAL EVENTS AND 
TERRITORIALIZATIONS
1.3.1.    British Mandate of Palestine
The end of World War I marked two decades of the Zionist project’s13 
unfolding and more importantly its detrimental leap. Following the signature of 
the Sykes Picot14 agreement in 1916 (Map 1.1); on November 2nd 1917 the British 
Foreign Secretary at the time Lord Arthur James Balfour sent a letter to Baron 
de Rothschild (leader of the Jewish community in Britain) pledging British 
support for the establishment of a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine in what later 
became known as the Balfour Declaration (PASSIA 2012). The promise turned 
into an evident policy as the British Mandate over Palestine come into effect and 
emigration of Jews from Europe facilitated. In three decades the Jewish population 
in Palestine inflated from 8% in 1914 to 30% by 1941 (ProCon 2012). 
By 1937 and 1938 the Peel and Woodhead Commissions (Map 1.3, Map 1.4) 
submitted partition proposals for the British Government based on the concept 
of creating two nation-states as legacy to the departing Mandate-regime: an 
Arab state for Palestinians, and a Jewish state for the multi-ethnic immigrants 
(Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Mizrahi, etc.). While these remained as proposals, the 
inherent colonial prejudice and disregard to realities liquidated and reduced 
Palestinians into ‘Arabs’ – assuming that the today 22 nations of the Arab League 
possess an individual horizontal identity – while concomitantly multi-national 
immigrants were bundled utilizing religion. The latter approach created the 
second predicament that nowadays remains increasingly convoluted: how to 
recalibrate a system that was founded on politico-religious basis? The latter is 
evident in the demands of the successive Israeli negotiating teams since 2009 to 
recognize Israel as a ‘Jewish State’, at a time a quarter of its population is non-
Jewish15, not to mention non-Israeli Palestinians (ICBS 2013).
On Nov. 29th, 1947 the UN General Assembly passed resolution ‘181 (II) Future 
Government of Palestine’ which suggested keeping Jerusalem and Bethlehem as 
corpus separatum under their umbrella apart from the two intertwining states 
illustrated in Map 1.6. The Palestinian population – 66% of total – was to have 
43% of the lands of Palestine, while the Jewish population – 33% of total – were 
to receive 56% for their state (MERIP 2012, HPIP 2012). This proposition ignored 
that towards ‘the end of the Mandate in 1948, the Jewish communities owned 
around 5.8% of the land of Palestine’ (Pappe, 2008: 18, Map 1.5). According to the 
Israeli historian Ilan Pappé the Zionist leadership had an offense strategy designed 
over years: Plan Dalet; whose execution resulted in the establishment of the State 
of Israel on the ruins of expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians, the wiping 
out of over 400 villages, and significant altering of urban demographics (Khalidi 
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Image 1.3. UNRWA aid card for an 
8-persons family (UNRWA 2012a)
Image 1.4. UNRWA camp, 1949 
(UNRWA 2012b).
Image 1.5. UNRWA camp, 1950s 
(UNRWA 2012c)
2006, Pappe 2007, Map 1.9). Map 1.7 demonstrates the directions in which the 
Palestinians fled, and thus places where refugee camps were eventually established 
(Map 1.10); in Lebanon (12 camps), Syria (12 camps), Jordan (10 camps), the West 
Bank (19 camps) and Gaza Strip (8 camps), as separate entities and remain as such 
nowadays. Almost all related affairs are handled by the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East16 (UNRWA); which in 2012 
had 5,115,755 registered refugees (UNRWA 2012). 
By early 1949 the newly established state of Israel on 78% of the lands of 
Palestine (Map 1.8) signed Armistice Agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan 
and Syria marking an end for the battles of 1948 on the official level without 
answering the Palestinian question. Later the West Bank was assigned to the 
custody of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip to that of Egypt.
A note on the Nakba 
The 1948 Nakba remains a fundamental unifying memory in the minds 
of Palestinians up to date where the Right of Return of refugees is declared 
inalienable. With the refugee camps scattered around – and even at hearts of – 
urban centres (inside and beyond Palestine) it is difficult to ignore the question 
of how those spaces can be integrated at a time their incorporation remains a 
politically rejected thought, for those are ‘temporary spaces’. The refugees will go 
‘home’, the camps will be dismantled, and the lands will be returned to their owners. 
Notwithstanding, after 66 years and third- and fourth-generation refugees the 
temporality of those spaces of ‘territorial illegitimacy’ is highly questioned, and 
the living conditions in them continue to be troubling.
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1.3.2.   Transit into Apartheid : 1948 - 1993
Between 1948 and 1967 the West Bank and Gaza Strip were 
respectively placed under the custody of the Kingdom of Jordan 
and the Republic of Egypt. This corresponded to the height of the 
Pan-Arabism17 period and the fight against the remaining traces of 
colonialism (not to be confused with imperialism which was picking 
momentum from the other side of the battle field); an example of which 
was the Tripartide Aggression on Egypt in 1956 (Map 1.11, Map 1.12). 
In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was officially 
declared in the Arab League’s summit in Cairo. As of that date the PLO 
continues to promote itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people, yet it wasn’t until ten years later – in 1974 – that it gained 
international recognition as such.
Three years after the establishment of the PLO Israel ended the 
months-long period of tension and armament with a grab-strike on 
the Egyptian airforce. Events followed and the war culminated merely 
6 days later with Israel’s victory and respective annexation of the West 
Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and 
the Golan heights from Syria (Map 1.13). This is known today as the Six 
Days’ war: between the 5th and 10th of June 1967.
Shortly after general Yigal Allon presented a plan to the Israeli 
Knesset proposing it keeps all areas occupied in the Six Day’s war, 
thereof declaring them as the new borders. However, two islands within 
the West Bank which include the majority of Palestinian citizens were 
to be handed to Jordan (Map 1.14).
In 1973 the October War broke out. Even though it was Egypt and 
Syria who launched the surprise attack this time, yet they were defeated 
and Israel gained more territory (Map 1.15) as well as the image of 
being invincible. The importance of this event lies in the resulting shift 
in Egyptian political discourse whom signed the Camp David peace 
agreement with Israel in 1978/9. With that, the major Arab power was 
neutralized, and Pan-Arabism shelved.
By 1971 PLO presence in Jordan was terminated due to the events 
of Black-September (1970), cornering the former in Lebanon. With its 
entire eastern, southern and western borders at guaranteed calm, Israel 
focused its attention on eliminating the PLO and for that end invading 
Lebanon in 1982 (Map 1.16). Upon the signature of Camp David Israel 
withdrew from the occupied Sinai Peninsula, handing it back to Egypt. 
However, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights 
remain under Israeli colonization up to the date of this work.
Last, noteworthy is the correspondence of the aforementioned 
events to the quiet yet swift encroachment of the colonial settler-
enterprise in all occupied areas: WB, GS, Sinai Peninsula and Golan 
Heights. This core concept of this dossier was that of creation of 
irreversible facts on the ground by colonizing the space; transforming 
it into an integral part of the lands of Israel. This topic will be re-visited 
and elaborated over the coming pages.
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1.3.3.    The Oslo Accords and the Peace Process
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (...) representing the 
Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation 
and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive 
to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a 
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation 
through the agreed political process. (Declaration of Principles, 13 September 
1993, Washington; NAD 1993)
The Oslo Accords (OAs), also known as Declaration of Principles (DoPs), 
were signed on 13 September 1993 in Washington D.C. following a period of secret 
negotiations between the Israeli Government and the PLO in the Norwegian 
capital Oslo; at a time public negotiations were being held in Washington D.C. 
following the Madrid Peace conference in 1991. It was the first signed agreement 
between the two sides, and was intended as frame for an interim period of five 
years. Its 17 Articles and 4 Annexes were presented as the framework through 
which final status issues would be negotiated.
Article I of the DoPs defined the aim of the negotiations as that ‘to establish 
a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority’ that should facilitate reaching 
‘a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 24218 and 33819’ 
in a period ‘not exceeding five years’ (NAD 1993); while article IV specified 
that the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority will be within areas specified 
in negotiations annexed to the agreement. The latter was further articulated and 
featured small-scale territorial redefinition over the following 7 years; in the Taba 
Agreement in 1995 (a.k. Oslo II), in the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, and the 
Camp David Summit in 2000. These were followed by multiple proposals such as 
the Clinton Parameters, the Arab Peace Initiative, and Bush’s Road Map, as well as 
others political endeavours  but none crystallized. 
Article V stated that core-conflict issues were to be sidelined and 
subsequently addressed in the permanent status negotiations. These issues were: 
Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations 
and cooperation with neighbours. In relation to this, Article VIII underlined that 
the PA will have a strong police force for maintenance of public order, however, 
it shall establish no army and Israel shall remain in charge of overall security and 
defence against threats. Of the listed core-issues only that of security was detailed; 
initially through the joint patrolling units20 which did not live past the year 2000, 
then the Dayton Era21, and most recently the EUPOL COPPS22 program.   
Article VI defined the sectors in which transfer of powers and responsibilities 
from the Israeli authorities to the Palestinian ones was to take place; according to 
which the PA was to be in charge of education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation, and tourism.
Artcile VII outlined the path of the planned interim economic-based 
negotiations by naming the following projects: a Palestinian Electricity Authority, 
Gaza Sea Port Authority, Palestinian Development Bank, Palestinian Export 
Promotion Board, Palestinian Environmental Authority, Palestinian Land 
Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority. This was further 
enforced in Article XI which re-affirmed the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation 
on economic issues via the establishment of a liaison committee. This article 
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Image 1.6. Former USA President Bill Clinton, former Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and former PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat shaking hands upon the signature of the DOPs 
on the White House loan in Washington DC on September 
13th 1993. (Edmonds 1993)
was further detailed in Annex III of the DoPs: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation in Economic and Development Programs. The annex named 11 sectors 
of cooperation: water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications, 
trade, industry, labour, human resources development, environmental protection, 
and communication and media.
In short, the DoPs focused on the issues relevant to Israel, namely: security 
and economy, and sidelined those that were and are the raison d’être of the 
Palestinian claim to self-determination. In light of the above, the DoPs are 
widely considered as the process by which the Israeli Civil Administration23 was 
substituted by a similar apparatus yet with Palestinian personnel. According to 
political analysts, this arrangement on one hand produced the illusion that Israel 
was no more a colonizing power, and on the other, it was the fatal compromise 
that killed the Palestinian national resistance movement, with the following 
agreements as the nails in its coffin (Kassis 2010, alAtar 2010, Arouri 2010). 
34 |  100 × RAMALLAH
40
 M
ile
s
40
 k
m
0
19
9
5
19
9
3
Israel
Territory occupied  
by Israel
Area for PA
The Geography of the OAs
The territorial arrangements of the 
Oslo Accords took place in two-fold. At 
the time of the signature of the OAs in 
1993 the Gaza-Jericho First arrangement 
was made, by which the leadership of 
the PLO would return to the occupied 
territories, organize their cadre, and 
prepare for general elections to take 
place in 1996 towards the official and 
democratic establishment of the PA.
Short before the elections, a second 
agreement: Taba (also known as Oslo II) 
Agreement was signed by which it was 
agreed to divide the West Bank into:
• Area A: PA administrative control 
and policing
• Area B: PA administrative control 
and Israeli security control
• Area C: full Israeli control
• Jerusalem: under Israeli control, 
to be decided upon in final status 
negotiations
These areas would be expanded and 
re-arranged and / or expanded gradually 
over the course of time, towards a final 
status agreement that would be reached 
at the end of the interim period of 5 
years, namely, in 1998.
While the Taba Agreement presents 
the map on the right, the reality on the 
ground looked different, since it conceals 
the built-up Israeli illegal colonies and 
their declared territories. The practical 
reality of the territorial division is 
hence demonstrated on the following 
pages, along with further territorial 
propositions that were discussed in the 
various rounds of negotiations between 
1997 and 2001.
Map 1.17.  
1993 | Declaration 
of Principles (Oslo 
Accords), Gaza-
Jericho First. 
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Map 1.18.  
1995 | on the right 
Taba (Oslo II) 
Agreement
20 Miles
20 km0
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Map 1.19.  
1995 | Israeli 
military bases, 
illegal settlements, 
and the areas 
annexed to Israel 
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Map 1.20.  
1995 | Taba 
Agreement territorial 
arrangements 
overlapped with built-
up Israeli structures 
and the areas annexed 
to Israel
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Map 1.21.  
1997 | Netanyahu’s 
Allon Plus 
proposal for a final 
settlement with the 
Palestinians.
Map 1.22.  
2000 | The Camp 
David proposal 
for a final 
settlement with the 
Palestinians.  
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Map 1.23.  
2001 | The Taba 
proposal for a final 
settlement with the 
Palestinians.  
Map 1.24.  
2001 | The Ariel 
Sharon proposal 
for a final 
settlement with the 
Palestinians.  
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1.3.4.   The Segregation Wall and Mobility
As chapters 2 and 3 expound, the Israeli strategies are territorialized and 
fluid, constituting a tactic of layered conditional controls, or valves. These 
systems are highly complex, hence while they are acknowledged and generally 
factored into the logic and methodology, nonetheless they will not be detailed or 
thoroughly addressed in this work.
Therein, the following and final pages of this introductory chapter visualize 
two aspects of the geography of Ramallah, namely; the Segregation Wall project 
which was long conceived yet placed into effect in 2002; and the road network 
restrictions and prohibitions against Palestinians.
Box 1.1. Israel’s Segregation Wall
‘Israeli authorities provided figures to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel regarding the number of 
permanent permits issued to Palestinian farmers who live east of the Separation Barrier and whose lands remain 
west of it: the number of permits allowing the farmers to work their land that was cut off by the Barrier dropped 
by 83 percent from 2006 to 2009 (from 10,037 to 1,640 permits). During this same period, Israel extended the 
amount of Palestinian land that remained west of the Barrier by 30 percent to approximately 119,500 dunams 
[11,950 hectares]. In addition, many Palestinians have to travel long distances, usually along unpaved roads, to 
get to the gate to their land. Because of the difficulty and expense in gaining access to their land, farming is not 
cost effective and many residents do not exercise the right to go to their land, thereby losing their primary source 
of livelihood. In setting the Barrier’s route, Israeli officials almost entirely disregarded the severe infringement of 
Palestinian human rights. The route was based on irrelevant considerations completely unrelated to the security 
of Israeli civilians. A major aim in planning the route was de facto annexation of part of the West Bank: when 
the Barrier is completed, 9.5 percent of the West Bank, containing 60 settlements, will be situated on its western, 
“Israeli” side. Israeli politicians already consider the Barrier’s route as Israel’s future border’.  (B’Tselem 2014e)
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Map 1.25. Route of the Segregation 
Wall as documented in 2011, with 
an enlargement of the Ramallah 
agglomerate. Its construction 
commenced in June 2002, and was 
declared ‘illegal’ by the International 
Court of Justice ‘The Hague’ in 2004. 
(B’Tselem 2014e)
42 |  100 × RAMALLAH
Image 1.7. The north Jerusalem neighbourhood of Kufur Aqab, which is physically 
continuous with the Ramallah agglomerate, October 2013.
Image 1.8. Jerusalem as seen from its northern neighbourhood, Kufur Aqab, October 2013.
Image 1.9. (below) The DCO at Beit El colony and military base, north of Ramallah.
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Image 1.10. (below) The Beitunya ‘border point’ at Ofer Prison, west of Ramallah.
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Map 1.26. 
2001 | West Bank 
road network 
restrictions and 
prohibitions against 
Palestinians.
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2  | THE COLONIAL 
PROJECT: ETHNOCRATIC 
TERRITORIALITY AND THE 
IMAGINED PALESTINIANS
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ 
in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a 
conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall 
clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and 
this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism. 
Walter Benjamin
Theses on the Philosophy of History, Spring 1940
Palestine is one of the most and longest surveyed and researched 
geographies on earth. This slither on the land-route connecting ancient 
civilizations has not seized to be populated, contested, invaded, destroyed and 
recreated physically, politically and socio-demographically through flows and 
tides of ethnicities, powers, and narratives. In today’s pursuit of  ‘lasting peace’, 
‘security’ and ‘sustainable development’ local and international discourses 
tend to focus on selective, eurocentric parameters and interpretations of 
– predominantly but not exclusively – the events of the twentieth century. 
However, Palestine’s volumes of geopolitical shifts (e.g. wars, annexation) and 
the persistence of productive Palestinian livelihoods (e.g. identities, urbanisms) 
provides evidence to Walter Benjamin’s argument of integrability of uncertainty 
into civic struggles. As such, a re-examination of Ramallah’s history beyond 
commonly circulated analysis and opinions is necessary, and therewith the 
labouring of an alternative understanding of events and their (evident) past and 
(potential) future socio-spatial consequences.  
The coming fifty pages analyse Ramallah’s politico-economic history and 
city-space through today’s perspectives; a sort of trail-tracing of the colonial 
thought and methodology through physical configurations and their respective 
socializations and spatializations. Why are there row-house structure and 
detached ones in such proximity and frequency? Why are there every now and 
then junctions with rounded buildings? How do people navigate and circulate? 
What were the spatial and behavioural evolutionary processes of Ramallah?  
In the process this chapter discusses the role of transnational politics, 
happenings, and discourses of global powers in the shaping of Palestine’s image 
and space on one hand, and on the other its nature as a ‘process geography’, a 
space of ‘precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction, and motion’ in lieu 
of abstract and ‘relatively immobile aggregates of traits’ (Arjun Appadurai IN 
Collins 2011:4). Through this approach the conditions enabling the signature of 
the Oslo Accords are discussed – this event which is considered as the major 
turning point in Ramallah’s development trajectory. Therewith components and 
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game-rules of Ramallah’s fluid risk-strategies, survival tactics and urban (mental 
and physical) spatializations are linked to the ethnocratic systems governing 
the colonial ecology. This review is essential for understanding the Oslo Era 
discussed in the following chapter. Here the socio-political origins of the central 
concept of sumud as ethos are surveyed and the role of socioeconomic needs in 
the shaping of Ramallah’s insurgent behaviour are noted.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first focuses on the 
structure and network systems of the city, what can be regarded as a brief 
genealogical synopsis of the British colonial morphology and the locational 
‘architecture of enmity’ as described by Gregory (2004). This overview includes 
both the hard and soft systems; the physical space and its conditionalities of 
temporalization, militarization, functionalist thought and urbicide.
The latter section of this chapter explores the characteristics of the exhibited 
system, their variables and players, their modes of operation and (re-)production. 
What are the econo-political relations that induced Ramallah’s varied forms and 
spaces? What were/are the obstacles to a healthy, rooted urbanism? And who 
are the Palestinians and what were/are their imaginations of liberation and post-
liberation? 
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2.1.    
PRE-OSLO RAMALLAH:  
FROM VILLAGE TO 
CITY, AND ROOTS 
OF CONTEMPORARY 
MORPHOLOGY
Ramallah1 is situated on a series of mountain-tops parallel to the historic 
trade route running along the central mountain range from northern to southern 
Palestine. While its sister-city alBireh rests in proximity to the route, Ramallah’s 
positioning deeper to the west kept it in the shadows of history until the late 19th 
century. Nonetheless, overlooking the old city in east Jerusalem from a mere 
distance of about 15 kilometres and an elevation difference of about 150 meters 
promoted it as the final halt for pilgrims before descending on the holy city at 
dawn. Bearing an elevation of 900 meters above sea level and an open window 
to the coastal planes of the Mediterranean Sea (40 kilometres away) further 
endorsed its reputation as a fine ‘masyaf’ – summer-tourism destination (Shaheen 
1982; Barthe 2011). On the other side of the same coin, the Mediterranean 
summer breeze turns into bone-knocking winter winds, considerable rain, and – 
minimum once a year – snow storms streaming down the steep topography of the 
city causing erosions and oft, utter paralysis.
Archaeological remains indicate that Ramallah dates back to the Byzantine 
period (330–640 CE), though stronger indications point at the Crusade Period 
(1099–1187 CE). The oldest records of the city originate from the Ottoman 
Period: year 1596, where its production was indicated as agrarian, and population 
estimated at 400 persons: 71 Christian and 9 Muslim families (alJubeh & Bishara 
2002). Socio-politically, records indicate that Ramallah has five clans stemming 
from the (re-)founding Christian family, nowadays three atop. Besides highlights 
on the official webpage2 of the municipality, the most visible tribute to these 
families is alManara square (Image 2.2 and Box 2.1); which today holds five lion-
shaped statues (the original clans) and three fountains (the branching families). 
Since its declaration as a Municipality in 1908 Ramallah has been steadily 
growing in spite of the successive occupations with which the city, every time, 
has re-adapted. Remaining a relevant geography along the past gruelling and 
detrimental century was enabled by the – not necessarily intelligent – periodic 
redefinition of its role and sociopolitical positioning. By early 20th century the 
village was an established ‘education town’ with multiple missionary schools to 
which pupils and educators alike converged from throughout the region and 
farther. Under British Mandate the town grew into an administrative and leisure 
‘hill station’, from which it solidified its reputation as a masyaf in the region under 
the Jordanian annexation; a character accelerated by the arrival of intellectual 
and merchant urban refugees who were forced to leave their established cities in 
1948’s Nakba. The Israeli invasion and consequent subjugation and isolation of 
Palestinians from their Arab extensions on one hand and the servility of Jerusalem 
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Box 2.1. alManara Square
It was established in 1935/6 when the British Mandate connected Ramallah 
and alBireh with electricity. As the most-central border-point between the two cities 
it met the criteria for locating the pole with the common switch for the electricity 
lines, which in turn ran to both towns. In 1946 the Ramallah Municipal Council 
ordered the erection of alManara Square, commonly believed to have been an act 
of demonstration of power against the sister-rival city alBireh. The five lion-heads 
design though is believed to have been a message to Ramallah’s new residing families 
where each lion-head resembles one of the five original clans, and thus the claim to 
the city. Upon the Israeli Occupation in 1967 the square was to be demolished by 
Israeli orders, yet the lion heads were removed and remained hidden until 1996, when 
the PA arrived. The lion-heads were then placed at the Midan Square, while new full-
sized 5 lions of marble were ordered from Japan and placed at the Manara Square 
with a new design. The presence of a visual testimony to privilege and otherness at 
the busiest junction is not necessarily an act of wickedness, yet certainly symptomatic 
to Ramallah’s persisting struggle to cope with its reality: the village is a city now.
Image 2.1. Ramallah early 1900s (RM 2014)
Image 2.2. alManara Sqaure in the 1950s (RM 2014).
Image 2.3. Cinema Dunia, 1950s (RM 2014).
Image 2.4. Shops at the Main Street of Ramallah, 1950s (RM 2014).
Image 2.5. Khalil Salah House 1926 (alJuben and Bshara 2002: 136).
Image 2.6. Students of Friends Girls School, 1950s (RM 2014).
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on the other entrenched the organized anti-colonial underground political 
activism that had prior commenced in Ramallah. And by the end of the 1970s it 
had become a significant ‘operations room’ for the national liberation movement.
What are the accumulative spatial, social, economic and political legacies of 
these epochs that preceded the creation of the PA? How did they contribute to 
the choice of Ramallah as seat of the latter? And how do they relate to, and are 
influencing nowadays urban affairs?
2.1.1.   Late Ottoman and British Times : 1800s - 1948
Throughout the 19th century increasing numbers of missionaries made 
residence in the village of Ramallah breaking grounds of systematic schools 
in accompaniment to the surfacing institutionalization and administrative 
functions. By the rise of the 20th century Ramallah had four nouveau Christian 
sects beside the dominant original Greek Orthodox, and considerable numbers 
of new functions and necessary constructions. While until then Ramallah was 
an agrarian community dependant on its crops of olives, figs, grapes, legumes 
and it’s famous spices, herbs, as witnessed by the Manateer3; this was gradually 
replaced with crafts, professions, and indoor alternatives. The wheels of change 
were set in motion in terms of both: urban and social morphology (alJubeh and 
Bshara 2002).
With the establishment of the Friends Schools (Quakers) in 1869 and 1901 – 
for girls and boys respectively – news spread about the land of dreams: America 
(as commonly referred to the USA; alJubeh and Bshara 2002). According to the 
Municipality’s website the first case of migration to the USA from Ramallah 
was in 1895, after which the wave continued to grow and multiply4. Ramallah’s 
expatriates – estimated around 30,000 persons – still maintain a close relationship 
with their hometown5, thus having a relatively considerable impact on Ramallah 
whether directly or indirectly (Ramallah Municipality 2013). Akin scholarly 
registered cases, the role of Ramallah’s diaspora remains fluid and reactionary 
rather than accumulative and adhering to defined processes. While ‘[t]he 
potentials of diaspora capital are valuable because they are non-competitive’ the 
extent of their impact is condition by ‘policymakers and practitioners’; while 
‘diaspora matters, yet the potentials of diaspora capital remain unrealized’ (Aikins 
and Russel 2013:30).
In 1903 the area became connected to Jerusalem via a peddling carriole, and 
two years later the Jerusalem - Nablus Road was paved (Barthe 2011), fulfilling 
the rooted prophecy that ‘socioeconomic development in remote and inaccessible 
mountains [sic] areas that are cut off from mainstream development’ is motorized 
through ameliorated accessibility (Rawat and Sharma 1997:117). Three years 
later the Ottoman qa’em maqam (governor) declared Ramallah as town thence 
establishing the Ramallah Municipality in 1908, by 1910 it had an open clinic, and 
‘peu à peu, le hameau agricole se transforme en une petite ville’ (Barthe 2011:23).
A decade later the town experienced a major turn with the culmination of 
World War I and the consequent establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine 
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which arrived equipped with its experienced generals, determined theorists, and 
fermented volumes of colonization tools for taming the natives who are imagined 
as ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’ (Harvey 2009:38). However, the image of the 
saviour was hard to argue having a year earlier published the Balfour Declaration6.
In spite of political tension accompanying the arriving Mandate institutions, 
Palestinians were eager to fold the pages of years of economic stagnation produced 
by WWI and the consequent transition of power. Expatriates were again capable 
of resuming transfers of savings, and considerable numbers of Ramallah’s citizens 
were absorbed in the Mandate institutions in light of their intellectual abilities 
and fluency in foreign languages (catered for by the multiple foreign missionary 
schools). The growing significance of the region, population growth and the 
increased capital flow accelerated the process of urbanization of the area on one 
hand e.g. the opening of hotels like Odeh (Grand) Hotel7 in 1919 and establishment 
of cultural infrastructures such as the Radio Station whose staff was trained by 
the BBC in 1936 (Barthe 2011); and corollary on the other hand, the relocation8 
of wealthier Ramallah families out of the old – morphologically Mediterranean 
– centre and into mansion-like houses that are colonially-inspired and enabled 
by pilgrimaging contemporary technology (Image 2.5, p. 48 and Image 2.7, p. 51). 
The expansion took place on peripheries of the old centre and along the newly 
paved axes in all directions, thereof planting the initial seeds from which today’s 
bridge-neighbourhoods – with alBireh and Beitunya – emerged (alJubeh and 
Bshara 2002). This pattern of linear expansion along ridges remains the main 
skeleton of the agglomerate, where with time, urban expansion materialized with 
streets paved and units erected in parallel to and around main arteries. Some of 
these mansions survive today, standing as random silent monuments from that 
era and the outline of the base layer of spatial formation in the area. 
In spite of the institutionalization of Ramallah into an administrative urban 
centre; the city kept on losing numbers of its original families with rising political, 
security, and economic hardships associated with the colonial British Mandate 
and the Zionism-directed immigration of Jews to the region in correlation to their 
prosecution by anti-Semits and fascists in Europe (UNISPAL 2014a). New comers 
from other Palestinian regions – chiefly from Hebron – filled the vacancies the 
Ramallites left behind in terms of agriculture, crafts, and professions (alJubeh & 
Bshara, 2002).
The Nakba in 1948 formed a harsh turn of events for Ramallah akin the 
entirety of Mandate Palestine. In that year approximately 8,500 refugees arrived 
to the city at a time the original population was estimated at 4,500 i.e. double the 
size. According to Taraki (2008) Ramallah became home for Palestinians fleeing 
namely from Jaffa, alLidd, and Ramla. In a census by the Jordanian government in 
1953 it was noted that 67% of Ramallah’s 13,500 inhabitants were refugees (Shaheen 
1982). In narratives of the expulsion of 1948, Ramallah emerges as one of the 
localities that was friendliest to the refugees whom were able to – comparatively – 
swiftly resettle and integrate9 into the community spatially, socially, economically 
and politically (Taraki 2008a, Barthe 2011). This ability of absorption resurfaced 
with the arrival of the Returnees10, and again with the centralization of the PA, but 
is currently being challenged, as transcribed in section 3.2, p. 132 of this work.
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Image 2.7. Drawings of Ramallah structures by Riwaq Centre; (above) Plan of an area in 
Ramallah’s historic centre which is morphologically Mediterranean; (below) House of Salem 
Issa, 1911, one of the early constructed detached dwellings in Ramallah – using steel beams and 
pitched roofs rather than the traditional stone and earth dome – atop rooms dating back to 
mid 1800s, located at the periphery of the old centre. (alJubeh and Bshara 2002: 23 & 84)
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2.1.2.   The Mukata’a: a Corner-Stone 
of Colonial Morphology
Twelve years prior the Nakba, in 1936 Ramallah was connected to electric 
power conjointly with alBireh, where the switch was placed at – what was later 
created and named as – alManara Square. Short after another spatial element 
was introduced to the area which dramatically influenced the cartography; 
a Mukata’a was constructed on a – then – secluded yet highly feasible plot in 
alBireh governorate (Map 2.1), where its longest edge borders the exposed lime-
stone mountain-peeks of Ramallah and over-looks the coastal plains. A signature 
residuum of British colonialism is fifty Tegart-forts across Mandate Palestine 
including one in this agglomerate (Barthe 2011). These structures are derivatives 
of the hill stations which British colonialist employed as escapes from heat in 
warm climates, create environments resemblant of the homeland11, cater for the 
population of European expatriates (emigrants) and business executives, and 
they were the ‘temporary home away from home’ (Ramachandrean 2004:65). The 
design of the Mukata’as was conceived by Sir Charles Tegart and inspired through 
his work in suppressing the Indian movements for independence. These bale 
reinforced-concrete headquarters served as command centres, residence, military 
bases, detention facilities, and defensive shelter with supplies sufficing for up to 
one month. Before the turn of the century they became statues of – continued – 
colonial oppression. 
With the withdrawal of the British Mandate from Palestine in 1948 (the 
Nakba) and the consequent war and annexation of the WB by the newly born 
Kingdom of Jordan; the command of the new custodian moved into the 
constructs of the abdicating colonial, as foretold by Anderson (2006) and Fanon 
(2004). The Jordanian anti-leftist aegis – which operated and continues to operate 
under British patronage and in close alliance with the Saudi Kingdom and USA 
imperialist interests – could not be co-opted by the predominantly left-leaning12 
Palestinian politicians. In that period the Jordanian government became the 
primary prosecutor of Palestinian politics and prison-guard of their cities. In 
those times, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’as.
In the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War Israel annexed the WB along with 
the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights (Map 1.13, p. 30). Here 
again the new occupier converged on the Mukata’a; in front of which I remember 
standing as a child with my mother for hours. I remember the unpaved side walk, 
metal rails, revolving doors, caged corridors and rusty waiting area. In those 
times, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’as.
Upon the signature of the Oslo Accords Yasser Arafat entered the WB 
airborne by a helicopter from the west and landing in the Tegart-fort, which he 
made his residence, and to which ten years later he returned – from the east – a 
corpse and remains buried in it. Rumours claim that his coffin is floating in a pond 
of water awaiting reburial in Temple Mount at the heart of the eternally contested 
city, Jerusalem. A monumental – but ‘temporary’ – mausoleum and museum have 
been erected for Arafat on the premise of the Mukata’a, and it remains an open 
question whether PA officials pondered the irony of; First having made residence 
of presidency of a liberation movement, and second, the burial place of the face of 
the PLO; both on an archaeological site of despotic power, which did not spare the 
PA in the era of which, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’a.
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Practically and beyond political irony, the Mukata’a is the corner-stone in a 
much wider structure. It was placed at the heart of the strait formed by the two 
traditional axis, thence away from the inferior locals, yet in control of movement 
in the region and a stone-throw away from old centres (Map 2.1, p. 52). Colonial 
and European urban planning experiences – evolving with European political 
transformations of the 18th century – dictated a flexible mobility network, 
rendering urban planning tools ‘the expression of a new style of warfare – instead 
of the medieval walled town, cities must now be planned along broad formal 
avenues where mobile armies could deploy themselves’ (Hall and Jones 2011:12). 
Connections for motorized vehicles are straight lines in plain regions, and in 
mountains deform into topography-sensitive rings. In the same line and learning 
from the French Revolution and the Haussmann period, the spider-web network 
was integrated into the infrastructure to maximize mobility speed at one hand, 
and on the other to increase surveillance capabilities via employing the 18th 
century Panopticon Theory13 to the urban system (Jordan 2004). Zureik notes on 
the British colonial conduct in neighbouring Egypt by writing:
[T]he British and French aimed at imposing ‘order’ on the mind and body of 
nineteenth century Egyptian society by introducing surveillance and disciplining 
techniques in the monitorial educational system, military training, workplace 
environment, and the use of living spaces. It is no accident that Jeremy Bentham, 
who visited Egypt in the nineteenth century and advised Muhammad ‘All 
Pasha, drew up plans on how to instill obedience and discipline in the Egyptian 
population through the use of surveillance methods. Mitchell contends that 
Bentham’s ‘panoptic principle was devised on Europe’s colonial frontier with the 
Ottoman Empire, and examples of the panopticon were built for the most part 
not in Northern Europe, but in places like colonial India’. (Zureik 2001:211)
The command of Palestinian streets was complimented with two urban 
design elements; First, under British Mandate all buildings on corners of crossings 
were due to have an arced edge which constitutes an offset of the parallel sidewalk, 
serving wider angles of visibility and hindering ambushing. And second, starting 
under Israeli colonization major crossings were to host physical circulation 
regulators rather than traffic lights, thereof enabling personnel from rapidly 
claiming right-of-way thence avoiding the wait and risk of becoming a stationary 
target; the same reason for which the Israeli Coordination of Activities in the 
Territories (COGAT) deprived Palestinian localities from traffic lights until the 
signature of the OAs (alKhalili 2011).
Eighty years later the Mukata’a remains the pivotal point for controlling 
circulation in the agglomerate, a point which the Israeli army continues to employ 
post the signature of the OAs. In its multiple incursions over the past two decades 
Israeli military deployment around the Mukata’a was an orthodoxy. While some 
politicians argued it as siege against president Yasser Araft, in reality, it was the 
siege over the entire population of the agglomerate.
In its successive attacks on WB cities between the years 2000 and 2005, 
the Israeli army has either severely damaged or destroyed the majority of the 
Mukata’as which housed the PA security apparatuses. Meanwhile, among other 
items of its Palestine Reform and Development Plan – submitted to the December 
2007 Paris Donor Conference – the PA requested and received funding for:
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Security infrastructure: Substantial investments in security infrastructure 
are required. Eight governorate headquarters – Moqata’at [Mukata’as] – will 
be constructed. These will house detention facilities, barracks, and training 
facilities. A central prisoner rehabilitation facility will also be constructed. 
(MOPAD 2007:41)
While the reincarnation of these spaces of subordination is ontologically 
predictable (Fanon 2008, Lefebvre 2009), attempts at intellectual decolonization 
of space in Palestine surfaced – as topics often but not sufficiently discussed in the 
public realm – only in this millennium, e.g. Decolonizing Architecture Program15 
(2006), Ramallah Syndrome (2008), and Civic Encounter (2011) a.o.
Acknowledging mechanisms of colonization does not suffice with visible 
symbols – e.g. the Mukata’a – rather investigates the roots catering for the 
continuation and reproduction of the former and its contemporary derivatives. 
Ramallah’s municipal plans and strategies (section 4.3, p. 190) translate a discourse 
traceable to British Mandate practices of spatial militarization, to which Ramallah’s 
current mobility system (Map 2.1, p. 52) presents evidence. In this context, 
while pathways for motorized vehicles are rhizomatous and preceding physical 
expansion (Image 4.7, p. 210), pedestrian routes are shrunken to remains and 
charity16. Likewise, Ramallah’s Municipality has channelled significant resources 
since 2008 to the redesign and rehabilitation of tens of streets, crossings and 
squares around the city (Image 4.23, p. 213), none of which is ruled by pedestrians. 
In other words, the Mayadin17 which are supposedly destined for the public to 
exercise its right to the collective space are systematically granting superiority to 
the better equipped: a pedestrian is dominated by the civil vehicle, and the latter 
is in turn dominated by military vehicles. This arrangement equally entails the 
inability to accommodate public events – e.g. festivals and demonstrations a.o. – 
without the ‘interruption’ of traffic. The indirect consequence is the framing of 
public expression as a prerogative to quotidian systems rather than integral, and 
thereof the Cartesian fortressing of hegemonic regimes against mobilization of 
masses and change; as Lefebvre wrote:
A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; 
indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed 
ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses. A social 
transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative 
capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space. (Lefebvre 2009:54)
Thereof, to achieve its potentials Ramallah is required to question and tackle 
spaces that have become customary and are forging and entrenching the colonial 
state whether physically or mentally, directly or indirectly, and whether social, 
economic, or political. Hence, how has this colonial reconfiguration of space 
evolved since? What are its contemporary dimensions and characteristics?
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2.1.3.   Post 1948 : Temporalization, Spatial 
Militarization, and Functionalist Morphology
The first decade following the Nakba was that of coping with the aftermath 
of what Israel refers to as the War of Independence. The resettling of Palestinian 
refugees across the region18: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip overwhelmed Palestinian and regional populations which had to redefine 
their existence: social spectrum, economic dynamics, and political regimes. The 
‘Palestine Question’ that was deliberated at a Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1947 had become a regular file with two platforms dedicated 
solely to it in additional to the customary regional chapters; the United Nations 
Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) and the UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which 
began operations on 1 May 1950 (alKhalili 2009).
Through the support of the United Kingdom and the framework of the 
Armistice Agreement of 1949 the newly-born Jordan Kingdom annexed the WB. 
While PA politicians remain defensive of the role of the Hashemites in the region, 
the reality remains that their first monarch – King Abdullah bin elHussein – was 
assassinated by a Palestinian complot soon after, on 20 July 1950 at Temple Mount. 
This event exposed the colonially – still – underplayed political antagonism 
between the two banks of the river which reached its peak with the events of Black 
September between 1970 and 1971. Here it should be noted that social connections 
across the Jordan River have been proximate along history. Notwithstanding, the 
Palestinian-Jordanian dynamic was not solely factored by political ideologies, but 
additionally and equally by the 20th century byproduct of colonially imagined 
and projected nationalisms which in turn argued legitimacy through presumed 
differentiation, and thereof politically instigated social othering (Anderson 
2006). On 31 July 1988 – two decades post the Six Day War – Jordan ceded its 
claims to the WB and recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of 
Palestinians, thence ending the publicized confrontation between the two. 
This ethos was reflected in Ramallah’s form of urbanity: extrovertedly 
interested in the bon viveur and consumed with enjoying its fashionable provincial 
personagrata; while introvertedly producing spatial and social mechanisms and 
sub-infrastructures to manipulate the colonial morphology of their existence. In 
the 1950s Ramallah had three operating cinemas: alWaleed, alJameel, Dunia and 
a bustling re-opened Grand Hotel (Barthe 2011) which often presented musical 
concerts, dance balls, ceremonies, and in its rooms hosted international guests, 
prominent political and financial elites, as well as Arab and Western cinema and 
music celebrities of the epoch (Hutchison 2014). That was also the era in which 
over several nights the Jordanian Army force-deployed corporate Atallah Hassan 
(from Ramallah agglomerate) smuggled the type-writer of his command centre – 
at nowadays Water Authority headquarters at the heart of Ramallah – taking it to 
a nearby safe-house of a comrade that awaited him to commence the night shift: 
producing a copy of the Arabic translation of the censored Marxist Manifesto. 
While tunnels, off-grid and back-yard pathways over dwarfed parcel markers 
were being plotted à pied women and children additionally strolled the surveyed 
streets as the secret mail service of the national movement.
By the time Israel annexed the WB in 1967 Ramallah had formed a solid 
and politically intellectual and diverse community, whose solace with the defeat 
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– that ‘brought about a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million’ 
(UNISPAL 2014a) and the Israeli occupation of the WB among other regions19 – 
was found in the ability to collaborate with the other half: Palestinians who were 
citizens of Israel since two decades past. Mobilized communities in Nazareth 
and Haifa and figures such as Tawfiq Zayyad20 and Emil Habibi21 became an 
accessible extension and reference when needed, and vice versa (PBC 2014). On 
another level, the 1967 War had furthered the Zionist predicament of achieving 
a predominantly Judaized landscape, where amongst Israelis ‘the debate was 
between those who looked back to the exclusivism of the past and those who 
see forward to exploitation of the Arab [Palestinian] people in the future’, where 
‘traditionalists’ such as Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir feared ‘that if Israel tries to 
swallow the new territories, it will choke’ (Ryan 1974:7). 
2.1.3.i.   Temporalization
While in 2014 we know that Israel has indeed bit more than it can swallow, 
at the time, General Yigal Allon’s response22 to the threat was launching the – 
by now extensive – Israeli discipline of drafting spatial proposals for creating 
expellable enclaves of dense Palestinian population (see Map 1.14, p. 30). In parallel, 
then Israel’s president Golda Meier baptised the – according to Article 47 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 194923 – illegal colonial settlement enterprise in 
captured territories. By the time she left office in 1974 a total of 1924 colonies had 
been established. In the Ramallah agglomerate this policy translates with over 20 
registered colonies25 and their tentacle neighbourhoods (some of which extend over 
several hilltops) within the radius of 15 km from the central alManara Square (Map 
2.2, p. 59). The Psagot colony (founded 1981), in fact, lies at less than 2 km and 
a mere 20 minutes spaziergang from alManara Square, where in aerial images it 
can be mistaken for a peripheral neighbourhood whilst being a gated and highly 
militarized space that is off-limit to the residents of the area. Noteworthy, the Israeli 
settler colonialism should not be reduced to the its physical boundaries, whereby:
[I]t is necessary to conceive of ‘conquest to colonization’ as involving an 
entire gamut of means, ranging from brute force and primitive might, at one 
extreme, to resource deprivation and economic sanctions at the other end, 
passing through gradations of quasi-legal to ‘legal’ subterfuges. Throughout, 
it is important to bear in mind that while methods vary, the non-negotiable 
goals remain the same: namely, the incorporation and eventual annexation of 
the occupied lands. (Abu-Lughod 1982:18)
Recognized from this perspective, these superstructures compose regional 
pillars and markers of extensive mobility infrastructures throughout the WB. 
By the end of 2012 there were 137 Israeli government sanctioned colonies (of 
which some are ‘settlement blocs’) and over 100 Outposts26 (B’Tselem 2013). The 
population of these colonies has exceeded half a million – significant numbers 
of which are armed – and since the signature of the OAs tens of thousands of 
additional units have been approved by successive Israeli governments27. 
According to Weizman (2007) the settler enterprise which was launched short 
after the Six Day war serves five; first, establishment of early ‘defence’ lines deep 
within occupied territories employing Israel settlers as surveyors and guards 
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(civilian militias?) or what Allon called ‘frontiersmen’ and ‘rearguard’ (Abu-
Lughod 1982:18); second, eliminating the contiguity of Palestinian populated 
territories and apprehending organic regional networks; third, appropriation 
of valuable material and human resources in the occupied territories to the 
descriminate benefit of Israelis; fourth, rooting colonization as endemic culture 
to Israelis by involving the population in the act, where ‘war was only over because 
it was now everywhere’ (Weizman 2007:85); and fifth, creation of irreversible 
facts on the ground that inhibit any political propositions of withdrawal from 
annexed areas. Weizman elaborates:
In total, by the early 1990s, more than 38 per cent of the land area of the West 
Bank, comprising this patchwork quilt of isolated plots and non-contiguous 
pockets of land, as well as tracts of desert, were registered under Israeli 
ownership. If by this time, one were to slice the terrain of the West Bank 
along an invisible horizontal datum line a few hundred meters above sea level, 
almost all the land over this line was settler territory annexed by the Israeli 
state; the valleys below it remained ‘occupied territories’. The topographical 
folds, summits, slopes, irrigation basins, valleys, rifts, cracks and streams, were 
no longer seen simply as naïve topographical features, but as signifiers to a 
series of legal manipulations. Many of the complex borderlines of the present-
day West Bank were thus generated by the application of the principles of a 
nineteenth-century land law to the particular nature of mountain topography. 
Latitude became more than a mere relative position on the contoured surface 
of the terrain. The colonization of the mountain regions created a vertical 
separation between two parallel, overlapping and self-referential ethno-
national geographies, held together in startling and horrifying proximity. 
(Weizman 2007:117)
Towards the end of the 1970s the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice was forced 
into addressing the illegality of the settlement enterprise. The tactical solution was 
found in the temporalization of the problematic, whereby the Israeli side justified its 
mechanism through characterising it as a ‘temporary intervention’ to meet timely 
‘pressing security needs’; thus yielding the approval of the court which revoked 
the Palestinian accusation of settlements being ‘permanent community’ through 
regarding the latter as a ‘purely relative concept’ (Weizman 2007:103). Yet, the 
judges conditioned the life of settlements to the deployment of the Israeli Defence 
Forces (from here onwards: Israeli Occupation Forces, IOF; see Terms, see pg. xix) 
in the territories, which in turn was subject to outcomes of political negotiations. 
Based on the aforementioned, the colonies which are constructed to instill security 
require, first, the continuation of violence as justification of persistence; while the 
former is counter-intuitive, the latter is quintessential for the voluntary relocation 
of average – non-radical – Israeli families28 to occupied territories. And second, 
that peace should not be achieved, at least not in accordance with what Palestinians 
refer to as alThawabet alWatanieh, the unalienable rights29.
While the fragmentation of regional – and additionally in the cases of 
Hebron, Jerusalem and soon Ramallah the urban – space is achieved through 
settlements and road networks, in parallel, the population of Palestinian 
islands is controlled through soft systems of spatial regulations and legislations 
that extended into their localities. For example, up to the signature of the OAs 
Palestinian drivers (white plate) followed conditional regulations whereby right 
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Map 2.2. Distribution of Israeli 
illegal colonies within the vicinity of the 
Ramallah agglomerate.
1977 – Beit Horon3
1981 – Psagot4
1982 – Giv’at Ze’ev5
1983 – Dolev6
1984 – Geva Binyamin
1984 – Nahliel
1985 – Kokhav Ya’akov
1989 – Talmon
7
8
9
10
1977 – Beit El2
Ofer, pre-Israel base / prison since 1988
Chronology of ten colonies near Ramallah
1
9
4
2
1
5
6
3
10
8
7
Israeli army military base
Built-up Israeli settlement area
Settlement municipal territory
Greater Jerusalem, annexed territory
1948 Israel
Built-up Palestinian area
15 km radius from alManara Square
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of way while driving on a freeway had to be ceded on nearing exits of colonies 
to Israeli vehicles (yellow plate), and urban traffic arrangements were referenced 
to locations of colonies rather than physical elements and local mobility needs. 
In Palestine ‘mundane elements of planning and architecture have become 
tactical tools and the means of dispossession’ (Weizman 2007:5), where ‘the 
transformation of the built environment’ constitutes ‘acts of organized violence’, 
and therewith ‘the work of architects and planners’ could be ‘equated with those 
terrorists’ (ibid 2006:172).
The marrying of the spatial settler colonialism with the time element 
of temporalization produced an ecosystem whose organisms are militarized 
(Abourahme 2011). The temporary became the physical and lived political 
mien, corresponding to Walter Benjamin’s description of the temporality of the 
oppressed as ‘a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and 
has come to a stop’ (Abourahme 2011:455). Here Barghouthi writes:
In the disaster of 1948 the refugees found shelter in neighboring countries as a 
‘temporary’ measure. They left their food cooking on stoves, thinking to return 
in a few hours. They scattered in tents and camps of zinc and tin ‘temporarily.’ 
The commandos took arms and fought from Amman ‘temporarily,’ then from 
Beirut ‘temporarily,’ then they moved to Tunis and Damascus ‘temporarily.’ We 
drew up interim programs for liberation ‘temporarily’ and they told us they had 
accepted Oslo Agreements ‘temporarily,’ and so on, and so on. Each one said to 
himself and to others ‘until things become clearer.’ (Barghouti 2005:26)
2.1.3.ii.   Architecture of Enmity: Evolution and Militarization of 
Colonial Geography
Complementary to colonies and their bifurcating infrastructures, planning 
and administration of the WB and GS was – and remains – assigned to the Israeli 
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT), seated 
under the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Whether through theory or its experience 
in the 1948 Nakba the IOF had recognized that cities are engines of social 
transformation and political change (Knox and McCarthy 2005) on one hand; 
and on the other that persistence of domination entails the saturation of such 
adverse loci with surveillance and targeting systems, which in turn materialize 
through the physical space (Graham 2006a). Hills elaborates:
Cities represent a complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, and external 
forms, superimposed on natural relief. Ground manoeuvre becomes 
multidimensional. Structural density requires precise small-unit location 
capabilities within a three-dimensional puzzle. Such terrain provides cover, 
concealment, and sustainment but it also limits observation distances, 
engagement ranges, weapons effectiveness, and mobility. (Hills 2006:236)
Morphologically, the British had introduced the panopticon infrastructure 
and rounded junctions which contributed to the ‘securitization’ of Ramallah. This 
tool was inherited and reproduced by the COGAT (Map 2.3). Moreover, British 
spatial plans endorsed the rowhouse alignment of constructions at the city centre 
(efficient land use; integrated filtering of space: public, semi-public, private) and 
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detached housing in peripheries (lower land values; larger estates). In contrast, 
the COGAT regarded alleys, courtyards and back-paths as clandestine spaces that 
require elimination. Spatially this translated with the abolishment of the public and 
semi-public space (Davis 1992) through the expansion of zones where licensing 
of detached buildings is enacted, including at the centre. Excluding those along 
Ramallah’s Main Street, necks of crossings of the former and few older blocks 
(e.g. in Ramallah elTahta30); buildings  in Ramallah are detached with regular 
retention spacings that constitute militarily – first – predictable corridors and – 
second – archetypal entrapments at the copious points of extreme topographical 
differences. Herein, pedestrian mobility in the city is limited to visually open and 
vehicle-accessible roads. In the same line, parcels possess singular access points 
enabling higher precision surveillance and the oft subsequent chase of targets.
Further, detached buildings facilitate military occupation of the city 
through enabling rapid creation of ad hoc locational IOF bases. The city is 
thence infiltrated by instantaneous outposts and barracks in pre-defined strategic 
building31 whose tenants are maimed32 in the process. This temporary annexation 
and infiltration mechanism necessitates pliability of space to disassembling and 
reconfiguration of singular units in accordance with timely military tactics, what 
Weizman refers to as Ariel Sharon’s33 legacy of ‘ever-flexible internal frontiers’ 
(2006:173). Throughout half a century of urban warfare the IOF has repeatedly 
established acupuncture outposts over durations varying from hours to months, 
not to mention permanent appropriation. 
Demonstrating the relevance of permeable morphology to military 
operations; in the IOF Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 Palestinian ‘cities 
were not just the environment in which attacks occurred, they were often the 
explicit target, along with the governmental and security infrastructure that they 
house’ and in the process causing – much of which avoidable – material damages 
estimated at US$ 342 million (Allen 2008:453). In Jenin, the IOF  levelled the 
compact Jenin Refugee Camp to the ground using missiles and bulldozers over 
weeks of fierce combat with Palestinian resistance militias; as a driver of an IOF 
D-9 armoured bulldozers testifies:
For three days I just destroyed and destroyed. The whole area. Any house 
that they fired from came down. And to knock it down, I tore down some 
more. They were warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before I came, 
but I gave no one a chance... Many people were inside houses we started to 
demolish... I didn’t see houses falling down on live people. But if there were 
any, I wouldn’t care at all. I am sure people died inside these houses... I found 
joy with every house that came down, because I knew they didn’t mind dying, 
but they cared for their homes. If you knocked down a house, you buried 40 
or 50 people for generations. If I am sorry for anything, it is for not tearing the 
whole camp down. (Gregory 2004:114)
Here urbicide is a tactic for subordination through devastation which deprives 
a locality of its modernity (Coward 2009), and equally a tool for three-dimensional 
‘reconfigurations to maintain and deepen Israel’s geopolitical advantage’ as part of 
the ‘broader strategy of the annihilation of landscape’ (Graham 2006:197-199). In 
the aftermath Israel conditioned UNRWA’s reconstruction of the scourged camp 
with the securitization of the space by replacing the formerly dense and vernacular 
fabric with wide systematic streets and rectangular detached units; a policy 
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Map 2.3. (left) Nolli Plan of Ramallah’s centre along its Main Street 
(based on an Google-Maps satellite image as available online in 2013).
Image 2.8.  (above) View of Ramallah’s Centre as indicated in point A, Map 2.3.
Image 2.9. (below) View of EinMinjed neighbourhood as indicated in point B, Map 2.3. 
Notice the spacing and lack of coherence as well as identity of units.
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simulated by the Lebanese Government in the reconstruction of the Palestinian 
Nahr elBared refugee camp post the 2007 events (Hassan and Hanafi 2010). 
From this perspective, spatial securitization is a concept that enables military 
domination and materializes with what Gregory calls ‘architecture of enmity’; 
physical representations that ‘give shape and substance’ to fears and desires, and 
‘inhabit dispositions and practices, investing them with meaning and legitimation’ 
towards cementing the ‘difference of others’ through spacial dynamics and 
aesthetics (Gregory 2004:20). This representation of space is ‘conceived of not 
as the building of a particular structure, [...] rather as a project embedded in a 
spatial context and texture which call for ‘representations’ that will not vanish 
into the symbolic or imaginary realms’ (Lefebvre 2009:33; emphasis added). 
Thereof, through pre-determining the constituents of the triad of the perceived, 
conceived and the lived space (Lefebvre 2009) in the occupied territories the IOF 
is sustaining the colonial mode of (re-)production of space and social behaviour 
(Gregory 2004; Harvey 2009). In an interpretation to Said’s work on orientalism, 
the IOF had ‘lived in, studied [and] imagined’ the ‘geographical space’ of the 
occupied territories which ‘was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of ’ and 
turned into ‘colonial space’ (Said 1979:211).
Since urban space is a source of oppositional politics (Harvey 2009), from 
an ontological perspective a Palestinian strategy of decolonization requires the 
dismantlement of the colonial fragmentation mechanisms and the conception of 
channels commissioning of endemic social production of space. In this context, 
the public space – in its wider meaning  – is the mirror of the militarization of a 
specific space (Trancik 1986); as Davis narrates on Los Angeles:
The universal consequence of the crusade to secure the city is the destruction 
of any truly democratic urban space. The American city is being systematically 
turned inward. The ‘public’ spaces of the new megastructures and supermalls 
Image 2.10. Buildings in elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012. Yellow lines mark ground floor 
levels, while red shades indicate excavation volumes.
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have supplanted traditional streets and disciplined their spontaneity. Inside 
malls, office centres, and cultural complexes, public activities are sorted into 
strictly functional compartments under the gaze of private police forces. 
This architectural privatization of the physical public sphere, moreover, is 
complemented by a parallel restructuring of electronic space, as heavily guarded, 
pay-access databases and subscription cable services expropriate the invisible 
agora. (Davis 1992:155; emphasis in original)
This does not justify the radical regressive call of reverting to methods of past 
centuries; rather, it is an argument for intellectual exploration of possible case-
sensitive solutions that capitalize on contemporary knowledge, tools and needs. 
This process commences with the identification of the latter: the needs; thence 
the gap between status quo and the desired form and kind of resilience should be 
explored. Ergo, what is the gap between the current urban geography of Ramallah 
and the desired – sociospatially resilient – one?
2.1.3.iii.   Statics and Climatology of Ramallah’s 
Functionalist Morphology
The aforementioned process of spatial militarization had found some 
of its tools in principles of Functionalist architecture, that ‘of pure forms and 
unbounded, democratic, or flowing space’ (Trancik 1986:21). The fortunate 
alliance with emerging technologies of high-rise construction and the argument 
of economic advantage endorsed its attitude of ‘start from a clean slate’ where:
In the triumph of Modernism, regionalism and environmental identity were 
ignored. The very term ‘International Style’ suggested that ‘buildings in 
Image 2.11. Building on parcel bordered by streets on both sides, as indicated by form which 
constitutes of elevations of four floors from street level at either end. 
Image 2.12. Same building from other side, demonstrating the absence of regulation of retention 
spaces. The unnecessary wall demarcating the property is supported onto the building itself.
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the Nubian Desert in Sudan and Northern Canada had much in common’. 
Architects and landscape architects reduced the conditions to formal, abstract 
considerations, resulting in exciting designs on paper, but yielding segregated 
urban buildings and spaces. Somehow, without any conscious intention 
on anyone’s part, the ideals of free-flowing space and pure architecture have 
evolved into our present situation of individual buildings isolated in parking 
lots and highways. Public urban space merely serves the utilitarian function of 
accommodating roads to get quickly from A to B with little regard for the quality 
of the trip. Sigfried Giedion, the enthusiastic spokesman for the Functionalists, 
expresses their almost mystical fascination with the freestanding building in his 
Space, Time and Architecture – presenting this approach as the sine qua non of 
modern architecture and urban planning. (Trancik 1986:21)
Under Functionalism transitional public and semi-public spaces were 
rendered an optional accessory, and in the case of Ramallah, an economic 
disadvantage. The freedom to treat a parcel irrespective of the surrounding 
‘environmental identity’ enabled investors to increase the built-up area by 
excavating the site until levelled at its lowest end e.g. in A-classified residential 
areas where structures are allowed a maximum elevation of four floors and a roof 
above street-level, developers are able to add any number of ‘basement’ floors. As 
demonstrated in Image 2.10, the building to the right has a total of seven basement 
floors (yellow line indicates ground-floor level), constituting a 60% increase in 
total built-up area as compared with the envisioned two-dimensional master-plan 
and corresponding construction laws. Assimilation of topography into design 
through transition elements would translate with – first – higher execution costs 
resulting from landscaping works, and – second – reduce the ‘additional gain’ to 
half – 30% instead of 60% – where the built-up area shaded with fading red would 
have been spared excavation. 
Diagram 2.1. Earthquakes in Palestine. This diagram illustrates the frequency and 
number of earthquakes in Palestine up to the 19th century A.D. based on data by Willis (1928).
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The triangulation of abolishment of transition spaces, the contemporary 
functionalist form of construction, and the absence of strong civil-rights legislation 
in Palestine is producing environments hazardous to citizens. Referring again to 
Image 2.10, buildings typically have a maximum of two exits, one at ground floor 
level and the other at the lowest point of the construction, here level -7. There are 
no external fire-escapes, and typically there is only one central staircase. In other 
words, in case of fire at the ground floor, the 12034 tenants of the 23 apartments in 
this building have one escape option, which is somehow making it to the garden 
at level -7. Here one should also notice that the latter is as well isolated from 
surroundings. What if a fire ignites at the -7 floor? Will all tenants – including the 
old, differently-abled and young – be able to climb the smoke-filled staircase to 
the street level (yellow line)? How will the fire department contain and eliminate 
the threat? As demonstrated in Image 2.11 the aforementioned problem reiterates 
across the city. 
The marriage of colonial geopolitics and Functionalism has rendered 
the archetypal elements of neighbourhood staircases and – the regionally 
sociospatially characteristic – hosh (courtyard) obsolete, in utter disregard to the 
fact that they are structurally rooted in geological and climatological specifications 
and social habits. In terms of geology, the fault-line along the African and 
Arabian tectonic plates runs along the north-south axis of Palestine marking the 
four regional earthquake provinces35. Up to the 19th century the area survived a 
mean frequency of 5.4 and a median of 4 earthquakes annually (Diagram 2.1). 
Noteworthy is that these values exclude shocks, e.g. between the 17th and 19th 
centuries 206 earthquake shocks were registered in the region (Willis 1928). As 
illustrated in Diagram 2.1, the seismic cycle is sinusoidal in terms of intensity over 
time, whereby every six centuries the region experiences a climax that materialises 
through relatively higher rates of activity. Could the forthcoming peek culminate 
in the 24th century?
Diagram 2.2. Illustration of dynamics of Torque.
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Whether rural or urban, Palestinian localities predominantly composed of 
continuous morphologies of back-to-back structures. Among others, Jerusalem, 
Acre, Nablus and Hebron retain up to date historic cores of continuous fabric 
dilating over hundreds of meters. While earthquakes are frequent visitors and 
research has established an understanding of the interaction between them and 
built structures; nonetheless, the application of this knowledge is limited to 
materials and design of individual structural elements while the accumulative 
dimension seems to be absent. It is not the intent of this work to revise the 
mathematics of construction codes applied in the occupied territories; however, 
assessment of spatial resilience – from a planning perspective – necessitates the 
comparison of the observed built up ecology with basic laws of physics.
Compactness served the reduction of earthquake-induced torque36 on 
structural elements by statically reframing it into a linear momentum that is in 
turn curtailed through employing Newton’s third law of motion37. As illustrated in 
Diagram 2.2, p. 67, earthquakes apply three-dimensional forces on built structures: 
Fx, Fy and Fz. Since Fz will have an equal impact on structures whether attached 
or detached, it is ignored in this conceptual analysis.
While junctions at the base constitute the fixed foundation (pivot, point ‘A’), 
parallel junctions in upper floors have to survive the planar torque ‘τ’ resulting 
from the coinciding of Fx and Fy. In the event of an earthquake torque forces on 
detached buildings operate in free space unopposed which creates an increased 
chance of structural failure. In contrast and employing Newton’s third law of 
motion, in case of row-housing Fx will induce a reactionary force in the opposite 
direction. In reality this translates with a significant reduction in the impact of 
Fx on the particular pivot. In this context, one could compare this scene with the 
strategy for breaking five wooden sticks individually or collectively. Also relevant 
to the dynamic is – thence – the height of the building i.e. the distance ‘r’ between 
the pivot and point at which force is applied. Returning to the latter example, the 
longer the stick, the easier it is to break. In physics, this relationship is expressed 
by τ = F × r × sin θ ; thus, the higher the building the larger the torque produced 
by the same force ‘F’, and as the value of ‘θ’ decreases so does ‘τ’. In line with the 
aforementioned, torque produced by Fx in detached buildings is higher than that 
in row-buildings, i.e. τ1 > τ2 .
Besides torque curtailment, in the event of structural failure detached units 
would collapse irregularly in any direction. Disintegrating elements are thence 
momentarily transformed into projectiles whose momentum (P = mass × velocity; 
kg•m/s) is higher than that of free-falling debris (mv > mg where ‘g’ is acceleration 
of gravity); therein creating additional hazard to surroundings38. Meanwhile, in the 
case of row-buildings adjacent units mold a partially introverted collapse of the 
failing structure and thereof reduce damage by debris. Naturally, in the event of an 
earthquake a structure’s stability is conditioned by scores of forces and factors, of 
which the alignment and distancing of buildings is only one. In addition, there are 
advantages for the detachment of buildings as well such as the frequent view points 
and higher exposure of surfaces to sun and light. The combination of the reality of 
predominantly detached structures and the advantages of attached systems provides, 
thus, argument for investigation of nouveau interpretations. 
In terms of climate, Ramallah is warm and dry in summer and cool and wet 
in winter with mean air temperatures ranging – in 2010 – between 18.6°C and 
31.0°C in the months of July to September, and 9.5°C to 16.3°C in the months of 
December to February (PCBS 2014a; PCBS 2014b). It has an annual mean wind 
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speed of 10.7 km per hour and a mean sunshine duration of 9.1 hours per day 
(PCBS 2014c; PCBS 2014d). As the data indicates Ramallah’s pleasant climate 
which is relatively free of clouds and disturbing ranges is an unwaning factor in 
the city’s allure and the appetite of people to spend their time in open spaces; 
which are often climatologically more pleasing than the masonry indoors. The 
practice can be authenticated by the hard and soft systems of the Mediterranean 
disposition. On one side the obvious archaeology, and on the other, the social mien 
which often incorporates a myriad of persons whose overlapping conversations 
could turn deafening when trapped in the corporeality of a room.
As in every transformation process, early interpretations of functionalist 
architecture under the COGAT followed local scales, proportions, and related to 
sociospatial needs; Image 2.13, p. 70 demonstrates a typical 1970-80s unit. Early 
manifestations were two to three floors in elevation, and incorporated large 
verandas, terraces, gardens, or a combination of the three. In addition, notice 
the path that runs through the property connecting it to its surroundings in both 
directions. Notwithstanding, the fruits of the entrenchment of the indicated form 
of architecture arrived in the advanced stage of the ‘marriage of Functionalism 
and private enterprise’ (Tancik 1986:36); in the case of Ramallah, in the post-
Oslo era. As Image 2.14 exhibits, gardens are reduced to minimum side-retention 
antispaces39, verandas are shrinking, and connection paths are replaced with 
vertical retention walls totalling 12 meters in height in this image, and a staggering 
20 meters in Image 2.10, p. 64. As Anani states:
The hegemony of exchange value makes the city mobile, movable and 
transformative like a container harbor, but at a slower rate. When a society 
loses its organic connection with its history, geography, climate, tradition, 
language and values, urban space becomes a purely functional setting, like 
the container, based primarily on utilitarian considerations that can be easily 
copied and transferred from one place to another. This containerization 
of urban space, and the fragmentation of the humane, essential for the 
production of urban space, has its root in the history of colonial policies 
fragmenting and separating the Palestinians from their geography, society, 
culture and environment. This phase, which I call the neocolonial era and 
which happens to coincide with neoliberalism, is marked by a systematic 
fragmentation of what remains of Palestine. It transforms the long history 
of political resistance and struggle against occupation into a neoliberal 
project, to the point of presenting itself as the project for achieving the 
Palestinian dream. (Anani 2011; emphasis added)
Essential to the production of space that Anani envisions is the encountering 
of and engagement with the elements of space, the primitive and universal 
mode of which is walking. On one hand, this new – mutated – morphology has 
rendered walking in Ramallah a risky practice; threats of sweat, sun-strokes 
and bad smell in summer and wetness, sickness and mud in winter. This 
contemporary predicament is multiplying in scope due – essentially – to the 
elimination of the local and environmentally customised pedestrian networks 
in favour of motorized routes, as showcased in multiple cities around the 
Mediterranean specifically, and the globe generally. In humid Barcelona people 
are often apt to walking 1.5 - 2 km from the barrio of Gracia to that of Raval 
through the pedestrian stretch of Rambla de Catalunya a.o. This is promoted by 
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Image 2.13. A typical 1970-80s unit in Ramallah. Notice the ample veranda and garden spaces.
Image 2.14. Demonstration of growing scale of Functionalist construction in Ramallah; Batn 
elHawa neighbourhood, October 2012.
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the higher quality of the journey40 where walking along the scene of tree-shed 
benches, small-shops and cafés is pleasing while using the metro at peek hours 
is disturbing, and strolling is sometimes faster than driving along the three to 
six lanes-wide, congested and additional-heat-radiating roads. This behaviour 
has been further encouraged since the introduction of the shared bicycle system 
‘Bicing’ in 2007. The same applies to Nablus, where people would cross the entire 
old city on foot, but revert to motorized vehicles within few tens of meters from 
leaving the continuous fabric. The self-enforcing concatenation of expansion of 
motorways and marginalization of pedestrian networks is a scholarly established 
vicious cycle (Trancik 1986), whose debilitation necessitates a change in urban 
policy-making mechanisms towards incorporation of adaptive epistemologies 
which progressively enable resilient urban ecologies (Evans 2010).
On the other hand, the materialization of this twentieth-century genre of 
urbanism today is exposing the extent of damage induced by the COGAT policies 
of dwarfing public social infrastructures; namely, the absence of public parks, 
playgrounds and promenades. While Ramallah’s elTireh Street is turning into the 
informal deck of wanderers; the few gardens that the Municipality of Ramallah 
has managed to provision in the past few years are facing higher demand than 
their absorption abilities41. This reality leaves scores of citizens with the sole 
option of turning to private service providers, namely, restaurants and cafés with 
gardens and terraces. Getting a table in Sangrias, Azur or Reef often requires 
prior reservation, as testified by the snakes of cars parked in vicinities of such 
places. With the disappearance of the extended family hosh (courtyard), gardens, 
and municipal strangulation due to land ownership limitations42; it is legitimate to 
assume that the luxation lies in the suspension of concepts of ‘element integration’ 
from spaces newly ejaculated by the distancing of buildings from one another; 
what Trancik refers to as antispaces. As he explains:
The usual process of urban development treats buildings as isolated objects 
sited in the landscape, not as part of the larger fabric of streets, squares, and 
viable open space. Decisions about growth patterns are made from two-
dimensional land-use plans, without considering the three-dimensional 
relationships between buildings and spaces and without a real understanding 
of human behavior. In this all too common process, urban space is seldom even 
thought of as an exterior volume with properties of shape and scale and with 
connections to other spaces. Therefore what emerges in most environmental 
settings today is unshaped anitspace. (Trancik 1986:1)
While Functionalism had argued its principles through hygiene, sanitation 
and decay reduction a.o.; in Ramallah the produced antispaces are themselves loci 
of disintegration as demonstrated in Image 2.15, p. 72. In 2012 the agglomerate 
witnessed 58 days of rainfall, 860.8 mm of rain, and a mean relative humidity of 
59% (PCBS 2014e; PCBS 2014f; PCBS 2014g). Every year the natural soil erosion 
process dawns on the city closing streets and causing settlement, cracking, and in 
the worst cases collapse of retention walls. How many earthquakes, rain seasons 
and snow storms will the retention walls in images on former pages survive? What 
is the cost of their failure? What is the cost of their post-disaster rehabilitation? And 
meanwhile, what is the cost of researching, designing and implementing resilience-
oriented adaptive measures, both, prospectively and retrospectively?... A precise 
and comprehensive feasibility study falls beyond the scope of this work, however, 
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coming chapters assume and appropriate the Cartesian argument of profitability – 
whether financial, political, human casualties, etc. – as achieved through adhering 
to disaster risk reduction measures into urban management systems.
In the close: the built-up, contained and residual spaces of Ramallah 
– akin other mundane localities – were and continue to be conceived through 
overlapping and interdependent systems whose comprehension entails attention 
to case-specific biology and genealogy – as elaborated hitherto in this section. 
Notwithstanding, decision-making as expression of locational epistemology 
materializes in the binary of place-making and articulated political strategy 
whether official or clandestine (Escobar 2001). Indispensable, thence, is the 
mapping of the city from the perspective of what Appadurai refers to as ‘process 
geographies’ which are ‘precipitates of various kinds of actions, interaction, 
and motion’ in lieu of the treatise of ‘relatively immobile aggregates of traits’ 
(Appadurai IN Collins 2011:4). In other words, what ideologies and politics have 
and are reproducing and enforcing the aforementioned physical crystallizations? 
And foremost, what are the Palestinian political shackles and shortcoming 
preventing the conception of contemporary spatial thought (e.g. post colonial-
functionalism?), resilient evolution, and decolonization?
Image 2.15. Storm-water puddling in Ramallah’s anti-spaces, 2013 (RMfb 2014).
Image 2.16. Storm-water streaming downhill in Ramallah, 2012.
Image 2.17. Snow at the centre of Ramallah, December 2013 (RMfb 2014a).
Image 2.18. Snow in Ramallah, December 2013 (RMfb 2014b).
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2.2.   WHOSE NATION? 
ALLON & DAYAN VS. 
SUMUD & CIVIC AGENCY
The urban form and formation of Palestinian localities cannot be suspended 
from elapsing politics. The churches of Holy Seculpture and Nativity (Jerusalem 
and Bethlehem) are neither ordained with large glass windows nor inviting 
ample entrances; rather, they modulate fortresses capable of enduring long-term 
siege. The back-to-back morphology of cities stemmed from identical rationale 
that remains compelling, as demonstrated by the IOF’s bombing of the historic 
cores of Nablus and Bethlehem during its operation Defensive Shield, April 2002; 
as air-borne (or bulldozer) destruction was ‘safer’ than a chase in the mazes 
and alleys of such Palestinian localities (as elaborated in section 2.1.3.ii, p. 60). 
Herein, discussion of Ramallah’s urbanism in suspension of its political pedigree 
delineates an obsolete undertaking, as in Palestine ‘frontiers are deep, shifting, 
fragmented and elastic territories’ (Weizman 2007:4), and since:
elastic geographies respond to a multiple and diffused rather than a single 
source of power, their architecture cannot be understood as the material 
embodiment of a unified political will or as the product of a single ideology. 
Rather the organization of the Occupied Territories should be seen as a kind of 
‘political plastic’, or as a map of the relation between all the forces that shaped 
it. (Weizman 2007:5)
Before World War I had elapsed the ‘question of Palestine’ was posed and 
remains subject to and of global negotiation and (re-)imagination. Zionism 
wished the resurrection of the Kingdom of Israel from 3,000 years past in 
audacious disregard of history, happenings and lives since. The British Mandate 
attempted a long-term colonization through infantilization of the ‘rude’ 
Palestinians and propagation of the sui genris Zionism. In its turn, the United 
Nations and in the name of its constituent nation-states hypocritically promoted a 
‘balanced’ proposition of two-states whilst ignoring legal parameters, population 
composition43, and describing one as Jewish (religion) and the other as Arab 
(imaginary ethnicity). As for Palestinians, gradually over decades of time they 
locked themselves into the imagined narratives of so-called nationalisms thereof 
reducing their claims to the ‘relatively narrow context of national liberation 
struggles focused on the taking of state power’ (Collins 2011:3). Integrating the 
eurocentric rhetoric of nation-states as territorialization of claimed democracies 
whom in reality constitute exclusive systems (e.g. EU asylum and immigration 
policies); Palestinian politics – as mirrored in its urbanity – marginalized the 
question of ‘who are the Palestinians’ in favour of a ‘construct of a flat, one-
dimensional, monolingual identity’44. Seen from this perspective, Zionism (and 
western politics) was undermining Palestinians through the construction of:
binary logic that splits the world [local geography] into hierarchically  ordered 
halves (us/them, [...] developed/developing, terrorism/legitimate state violence, 
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etc.), and with the stale language of realpolitik and ‘national interests’. All of 
these have served to lock Palestine into restrictive patterns of familiarity and 
unfamiliarity that reflect and reinforce prevailing global hierarchies. (Collins 
2011:x; emphasis in original)
The PLO’s implicit recognition of a two-state solution in its 12th Palestinian 
National Conference in 1974 marks the commencement of a long and slow 
Palestinian political crisis, which was articulated in the 1988 Declaration of 
Independence, materialized with the establishment of the PA, and whose effects 
are surfacing today. In this regard and on 9 April 2014 as the latest round of 
USA sponsored negotiations between Israel and the PLO stalled yet again, the 
Palestinian urbanist, researcher and educator at Birzeit University Dr. Yazid 
Anani wrote:
I personally have a different perspective regarding the current overwhelming 
global fashion of ‘lets have a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians’. I’m not 
quite sure that the current schizophrenic conditions now can be superficially 
countered by a ‘dialogue’ as a trajectory of political change. This is not only 
due to the ongoing global crisis of parliamentary democracy and its failure 
in delivering the people’s voice through its institutional representation; and 
defiantly not because we keep on forgetting the history of ‘dialogue’ that we 
have had in the 80’s and 90’s, while most of the visiting internationals keep on 
dismissing it and defiantly [sic] don’t have the chance to probe and understand 
the history of ‘dialogue’ that took place in that era, in relation to its social 
historical moment; finally it is also not due to the ample literature on the 
epistemology of the ‘dialogue’ in colonial condition! 
To me, it’s more complex than that. The post-Oslo era is exactly like a nauseating 
blow on the head, where it left us knocked unconscious. What I think I need 
in this phase is to wake up and try to stand up, and figure out who we are as 
Palestinians? What are our aspirations and dreams? What are our imaginations 
of liberation and postliberation? What is our construct of society, geography, 
landscape, nature, diaspora, the rural, the urban, and economy within the current 
political delirium? To me at this particular moment, it’s defiantly [sic; definitely] 
not at all a priority to engage in ‘dialogue’ with Israelis, as much as, it’s rather 
a moment of internal dialogue with ourselves that we haven’t historically had 
the chance to explore and understand. So lets understand the current fashion 
of ‘dialogue’ from the latter perspective. (Yazid Anani, 9 April 2014, Facebook; 
emphasis added)
 Anani’s questions – shared by several young Palestinian scholars e.g. Shibli 
2012, alKhalili 2012, Abourahme 2009 – reflect a growing debate in Ramallah 
whose aesthetics are those of layered sociopolitical contestation, and its translation 
is spatial polarization, exclusion, and securitization. Hence, what are the current 
sociopolitical constructs and what needs are they articulating? What are the 
ideologies and factors hindering the conception and labour of future-oriented 
sociopolitical – thence spatial – imaginations of liberation and post-liberation? 
How can Palestinians plan for their precariousness and how can they capitalize on 
– rather than being reduced by – global knowledge and experiences? 
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Herein and as indicated in the previous section, when Israel commenced its 
perpetual reign as official custodian over the occupied population – and as it was 
(remains?) inspired by the exodus of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967 – it embarked on 
voiced strategies of impoverishing45 localities in the WB and GS towards inducing 
further emigration (Abdulhadi 1990). To this end, ‘Israeli control strategies have at 
core involved three main necessities: [first] demographic containment; [second] 
land alienation and colonization; and [third] the subversion of Palestinian political 
independence’; where the contours of these strategies ‘have undergone radical 
revision in response to two main challenges; Palestinian resistance and Palestinian 
demographics’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:26). Through addressing those 
strategies this work seeks to answer the collective questions stated by Anani earlier.
2.2.1.   Pandora’s Box : Nationalism, 
Exclusivism, and Ethnocracy
One of the doctrines that nationalism has turned into a feature of our 
ordinary common sense is that the world is divided into nations, so that 
every person, under normal circumstances, is born into a nationality. 
(Chatterjee 2001:10336)
 The ‘nation’ concept is deeply rooted in the consciousness of everyday 
people: the passport, the flag, and the visual symbols and representations. This 
postulate is a by-product and a fertilizer of the truism ‘that the proper form of 
modern politics is to be found where the political unit of the state coincides with 
the cultural form of the nation’ (Chatterjee 2001:10336). While some scholars argue 
nationalism through historic vestiges of ethnic, linguistic, religious or dynastic 
communions, a second opinion associates it to the German Romantic movement, 
the French Revolution, or even the Latin American movements of independence. 
In contrast to the former and in line with the latter, a third crowd of scholars 
argues lineages to history as – predominantly – a product of nonuniversalist 
ideologies courting concepts of social justice whereby ‘Nationalism was the form 
in which democracy appeared in the world contained in the idea of the nation 
as a butterfly in a cocoon’ (Greenfeld IN Sand 2010:23). Regardless of the origins 
and excuses, do democracies at large and global cities in particular tolerate the 
persistence of such a swathe in the climate of the 21st century?
Internationalization of nation-based politics commenced in the 17th century 
with the emergence of the Westphalian System (Jones & Jessop 2010) and the 
definition of national sovereignty as the ‘unique jurisdiction of a single state over 
a territory’. In the 18th century this concept embedded the notion that the centre 
of sovereignty lies in the masses as bearers of rights and entitled to expression of 
opinion. Yet under parliamentary democracy authority is hegemonized to claimed 
majorities. By the 20th century wars of independence were fuelled by the resonant 
title of ‘right to self-determination’ which was associated with the individual nation 
(Chatterjee 2001), and remains the refrain of Palestinian politics today. 
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Notwithstanding, nationalism is chiefly organic and seldom universal. While 
the latter believes that the ‘right to self-determination’ should include choice of 
one’s affiliations and loyalties; in contrast the affluent organic nationalism claims 
the fundamentalism of culture and ‘collective’ history for such an entitlement. 
In this regard, Anderson (2006) argues that the nation is an imagined political 
community for which the act of imagination lies in four; first, through the 
repetitive use of the term ‘community’ which embeds the idea of collective 
space and fate; second, that the sovereignty of the community falls in line with 
the modern political notions; third, that the community is limited and unique 
among the others; and fourth, it is imagined as a force creating ‘deep, horizontal, 
comradeship’. This ‘imagined’ paradigm - according to Anderson (2006) - is like 
any other, created with tools. It is embodied and stressed through written and oral 
mediums, emblematic representations, and is regularly dogmatized via the use of 
language, museums, maps, census, anthems and memorials. 
Whilst ‘nation-states’ were battling the constituents of the persona, the 
anima of Palestinians inhabiting the holy land remained multi-ethnicity, religious 
diversity, and cultural pairings. Up to date Palestinian Muslims bury their dead in 
fondled graves with biographic headstones and commence their holy celebrations 
of elFiter and alAdha by visiting the dead immediately after morning prayers 
(similar to Christian traditions). In contrast, in Saudi Arabia Islamic preachings 
of human mortality are sociospatially enacted, where graveyards are abandoned 
extra urbs, lifeless, and graves lie unidentified and forgotten. Palestinian cultures 
and ethnicities – hence symbols, applications and spaces of constituents of morals 
and faith – are gradations of many, as Sand writes:
[O]ver thousands or even hundreds of years almost any population, especially 
in such geographic junctions as the land between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean, mingles with its neighbors, its captives or its conquerors. 
Greeks, Persians, Arabs, Egyptians and Crusaders had all come to the country 
and always mingled and integrated with the local population. (Sand 2010:183) 
This dynamic of the seemingly aeonian cultural and religious re-adaptation of 
the Philistines (Diagram 2.3, p. 76) was alien to modern Zionism which was reborn 
in the late 18th century in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the majority of 
Jewish intellectuals had been ‘eager supporters of the new [European] states’ (Sand 
2010:251), rising anti-Semitism and the depiction of Jews as the ‘ultimate other’ 
(ibid. 253) by European Christians gave excuse for the Zionist exclusivism:
[J]ust as Germanity at some stage needed abundant Aryanism to define itself, 
so Polishness needed Catholicism and Russianness needed Orthodox pan-
Slavism to swaddle their national identities and imagery. Unlike the Jewish 
religious reform movement, or the liberal and socialist intellectual groups that 
sought participation in the emergent national cultures [in Europe], Zionism 
borrowed extensively from the dominant nationalist ideologies flourishing in 
the lands of its birth and infancy, and integrated them into its new platform. It 
included traces of German Volkism, while Polish romantic nationalist features 
characterized much of its rehtoric. But these were not mere imitations – it 
Diagram 2.3. (right) Illustration of the political 
history of the geography between the Jordan River and 
the Mediterranean between 2000 BC and 2000 A.C.
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was not a case of an agonized victim taking on some features of his smiling 
executioner. [...] educated Zionists emulated the other nationalists in Europe 
and assumed an ethnoreligious or ethnobiological identity to conceptualize 
their self-definition. Seeking to build a bridge that could connect Jewish 
believers – mainly former believers, whose languages and secular customs were 
polyphonous and diverse – they were unable to build on the lively popular 
mores and turn them into a homogeneous, domesticated modern culture, as 
the Bund tried to do. To achieve their aim, the Zionists needed to erase existing 
ethnographic textures, forget specific histories, and take a flying leap backward 
to an ancient, mythological and religious past. (Sand 2010:255; emphasis added)
Through this approach ‘Zionism secularized46 and nationalised Judaism’ 
(Pappe 2007:11); rejected the integration of post World War I Jewish emigrants 
from Europe with the ‘strangers’47 in Palestine in contrast to the pre-World War 
I organic emigration, and; re-imagined the native population in respect to its 
exclusive doctrines which considered irrelevant the reasons for which the delicious 
Ma’moul is the celebratory sweet across regional faiths. According to Pappe only 
few of the local elites had recognized the threat of Zionism, and majority of those 
fell short of recognizing its ‘destructive potential’ as they considered it merely a 
‘part of the European missionary and colonialist drive’ (ibid).
Thereof and while limiting to the twentieth century, in terms of the 
First strategy of ‘demographic containment’ the British, Zionists and recently 
Palestinian politicians as well – all fulfilled and repeatedly re-framed Anderson’s 
(2006) and Fanon’s (2004; 2008) postulates of colonial discourse and agency in 
imagining indigenous communities. The Britons faced difficulty in indulging 
the rapid integration of Palestinians into their Mandate system. The anti 
‘Mohammedan’ (Pappe 2007), orientalist and colonialist (Said 1979) stratification 
of Palestinians composed the main argument for ‘custody’ over the people that 
‘were not civilized enough to rule themselves’ where:
Some historical time of development and civilization (colonial rule and 
education, to be precise) had to elapse before they could be considered 
prepared for such a task. Mill’s historicist argument thus consigned Indians, 
Africans and other ‘rude’ nations to an imaginary waiting room of history. In 
doing so, it converted history into a version of this waiting room’. (Chakrabarty 
IN Harvey 2009:40)
Following their ‘common sense’ the British Mandate Government – with 
West European consent – opted to solve two predicaments in one operation; 
First, solve the mounting restlessness across the old continent whose fuel was 
the presence of the Jews by facilitating the transfer of the latter; and Second, 
guarantee its geographic persistence at the neck of the Suez Canal (connection to 
far-east colonies) through trapping the Mediterranean natives and thence exiled 
European minority in politics of animosity that renders the presence of a ‘referee’ 
empirical. Herein, Collins regards both Palestinians and Jews ‘as populations 
whose shared vulnerability derived directly from the perpetuation of European 
anti-Semitism’ (2011:47) which in turn was ‘grounded both in the discourse of 
sovereignty’ and that of ‘permanent war’ (ibid:57). From this perspective, British 
colonialism had also constructed an ‘imagined’ partner, a Jewish Agency (JA, arm 
of WZO in Palestine) that shared the European ‘civility’ and blissfully played the 
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content servant and ideological missionary. The roles were clearly defined, the 
‘rude nation’ and the ‘agent’, rendering Palestinian ethos of assimilation irrelevant. 
In the wake of the Palestinian uprisings of 1929 the British Mandate 
gradually increased its deployment on one hand, and on the other the India-born 
chargé d’affaires Lord Charles Wingate who took onto himself the assignment to 
‘transform the principal paramilitary organization of the Jewish community in 
Palestine, the Hagana’ (Pappe 2007:16); he:
made the Zionist leaders realise more fully that the idea of Jewish statehood 
had to be closely associated with militarism and army, first of all to protect the 
growing number of Jewish enclaves and colonies inside Palestine but also – 
more crucially – because acts of armed aggression were an effective deterrent 
against the possible resistance of the local Palestinians. From there, the road to 
contemplating the enforced transfer of the entire indigenous population would 
prove to be very short indeed. (Pappe 2007:15; emphasis added)
By the 1936 Palestinian uprising the British had stationed ‘more troops in 
Palestine than there were in the Indian subcontinent’ (Pappe 2007:14), and the 
Hagana Jewish paramilitias were attached to the Mandate’s forces on ‘punitive 
missions’ (ibid:16). While the coloniser imagined the subordination of its agent, 
the latter had integrated the tools of its custodian and produced its differentiating 
goal: the referee was no longer desired. 
In preparation for the upcoming battle Zionists conformed as well to 
imaging the geography and population. Their first project was The Village Files48, 
which were complete by the time World War II irrupted, where:
precise details were recorded about the topographic location of each village, 
its access roads, quality of land, water springs, main sources of income, its 
sociopolitical composition, religious affiliations, religious affiliation, names 
of its mukhtars, its relationship with other villages, the age of individual 
men (sixteen to fifty) and many more. An important category was an index 
of ‘hostility’ (towards the Zionist project, that is) decided  by the level of the 
village’s participation in the revolt of the 1936. (Pappe 2007:19)
Zionism convinced the Jewish Community – which by the end of Mandate 
in 1948 owned a mere 5.8% of the territory (Pappe 2007; Map 1.5, p. 25) – that they 
are trapped in a predicament whereby ‘to become indigenous: ‘they’ [Palestinians] 
must die so that ‘we’ [Israeli settlers] may live’ (Collins 2011:58); where salvation 
necessitates aggression. The military, intelligence and political advantages enabled 
the relatively swift ethnic cleansing of Palestinians between 1947 and 1949; 80% 
of Palestinians living in the area designated for the Jewish State – by the 1947 
partition plan (Map 1.6, p. 25) – were displaced and countless killed. This marked 
the switching of roles, where Israel assumed the role of ultimate coloniser and 
instated sui generis ideology, systems, and agents.
Three months after the Six-Day War, Israel conducted a comprehensive 
census of land and population and their respective bureaucratic and legal 
codifications. This population registry – actively or passively – displaced between 
182,000 and 355,000 Palestinians, and ‘continues to determine the right [of 
Palestinians] to ‘legally’ reside in the occupied territories as concretized through 
Israeli identity cards’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:26). This registry tinctured 
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Palestinians into several categories and subcategories to which legal titles were 
attached (Weizman 2007). For example, a Jerusalemite (for non-Jews the status 
can only be claimed by living pedigree) is given an Israeli residency that is 
obstinately a subject for abrogation, and requires a Laissez-Passer permit to leave 
the country49, since:
Palestinians [in Jerusalem] hold the status of ‘permanent resident’ of the State of 
Israel. This is the same status granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen 
to come to Israel and want to live there. Israel treats Palestinian residents of 
East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in their homes at the beneficence of the 
authorities and not by right. The authorities maintain this policy although these 
Palestinians were born in Jerusalem, lived in the city, and have no other home. 
Treating these Palestinians as foreigners who entered Israel is astonishing, since 
it was Israel that entered East Jerusalem in 1967. (B’Tselem 2014c)
Then there are the West Bankers, the Gazans, the 1948-Palestinians, the 
exiled, the expatriates, the returnees, the UNRWA registered refugees inside the 
WB and GS and in a different category those who are in exile (see pg. xxi). The legal 
status of Palestinians – with the exception of expatriates and the 1948-Palestinians 
– is Stateless50. Notwithstanding, if they pursue a foreign citizenship their Israeli 
residency permit – referred to as ID – becomes subject to repeal51. Highlighting 
the employment of judiciary systems and legislation for quasi-legitimation of its 
colonial mechanisms, Yiftachel identifies Israel as an ethnocracy which is: 
a specific expression of nationalism that exists in contested territories where a 
dominant ethnos gains political control and uses the state apparatus to ethnicize 
the territory and society in question. Ethnocracies are neither democratic nor 
authoritarian (or ‘Herrenvolk’) systems of government. The lack of democracy 
rests on unequal citizenship and on state laws and policies that enable the seizure 
of the state by one ethnic group. (Yiftachel 1999:730)
Herein and akin past conquerors of Palestine, Zionism planted its seeds of 
the imagined ethnography and exclusive ideology, whose fruition blossomed 
when it found its compatible agent; the Arafat-PLO which ‘blissfully played 
[though ignorant] the content servant and ideological missionary’ through 
its signature of the OAs in 1993. This harvest was enabled by the Third Israeli 
strategy of ‘subversion of Palestinian political independence’ (Hamami and 
Tamari 2008:26) which fostered the ridge between the exiled PLO leadership in 
Tunisia on one side and on the other the National Guidance Committee (NGC) of 
inland Palestinian politics.
In order to understand Palestinian politics and hence government policy 
today, scholarship has to note that ontological scrutiny into Palestinian post-1948 
nationalism and political-psych yields ideological geographies matching those of 
Zionism, namely, Central and East Europe. The termination of World War II and 
the resulting Cold War not only placed the Allies and Soviets at cannon-ends, 
but equally, redefined the relationship of the latter with Zionists and Palestinians. 
According to Arouri (2013) the Soviets had articulated their pro-Palestinian 
stance as early as 1919. Whereas this expounds Israel’s proximity to the Allies, it 
does not rule out the indications that the Soviets as well ‘imagined’ a Palestinian 
nation with an individual and horizontal identity. 
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Throughout the Cold War and as Israel gained fame and footing amongst 
the alliance of ‘settler international’52 as Collins coins it (2011:58), the Soviets 
provided network, grounds and channelled resources for the PLO on one hand, 
and on the other assumed responsibility for the majority of inland Palestinian 
higher education, as Palestinians with no Israeli citizenship were limited by the 
Zionist regime to universities outside of Israel. Yet it was not merely logistical 
support, but ideological patronage to those who wished to face their colonization. 
For example, Tayseer Arouri studied Physics in Moscow officially between 1966 
and 1973, but had secretly – in a location he remains ignorant of – preceded his 
academic education with two-years of underground political training on strategy 
construction and mass mobilization among other leadership skills. He narrates 
that along were Jordanians, Italians, Syrians, Palestinian refugees and exiled 
persons as well as other nationalities but no Israelis. There, the combination of 
the Soviet Pan-Slavism and unfolding heights of Pan-Arabism rendered exclusive 
(mono) national constructions and preachings inapplicable; more so in the 
suspended space and time of the secret facility and amongst the regional and 
ethnically differentiated ‘classmates’. 
As Israel was carving its first decade into history, Gamal AbdelNasser – 
second President of the Republic of Egypt, 1956 to 1970 – became the symbol 
of anti-imperialism throughout the Arab World. His regional econo-political 
agenda mirrored those of the Soviet and European Unions, where he recognized 
the importance of border permeability for socioeconomic progress and pursued 
it. A comparable history and discourse can be found in the development of 
the Union of South American Nations (USAN), enacted since March 2011. 
AbdelNasser was a propagator of Pan-Arabism that evolved in the prelude to 
WWI, which is a school of thought defining ‘Arabs’ as ‘people linked by special 
bonds of language, history and religion, and that their political organization 
should in some way reflect this reality’ (Khalidi et al 1991:vii; emphasis added). 
His target of – a prosperous and ethnically diverse political entity through – 
amputating the arms of former regional colonialists and imperialist from the 
region starting with the Suez Canal was met by the UK, France and Israel with 
the Tripartite Aggression (also known as Suez Crisis, Map 1.11, p. 29) against 
Egypt four months after AbdelNasser assumed office. His sudden death in 1970 
was the first nail in the coffin of mid-20th century inclusivist Pan-Arabism, 
while later ones were delivered through the USA’s sponsorship of anti-socialist 
and ideologically radical minorities such as the Taliban and Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood - alIkhwan; which in turn conceived the Islamic Resistance 
Movement - Hamas in 1987 and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Da’esh 
(ISIL a.k.a. ISIS) in 2014.
In relation to Palestine and contrary to other ‘socialist’ trainees, following 
their academic studies, political training and otherwise; Palestinian politicians 
did not conjoin in a singular territory. Whereas inland politicians returned to the 
native colonized yet still socially plural space, exiled ones referred to a varying 
number of countries. Whether in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen or an 
East European country, Palestinian politicians lived the unfolding social-space 
of post-Nasserism53 nationalist politics; which in essence was eurocentric in 
definition, imperial in its concepts of territory and population, and ideologically 
exclusive. This mutated political discourse was enabled through the pseudo-
marriage of concepts of right to self determination with the narrow concept of 
the ‘nation’. This difference in geography of evolution, fine-tuning and operation 
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bred the corrugation in Palestinian politics, which was sparked with the Camp 
David Eqyptian-Israeli peace-treaty in 1978, articulated in the PLO’s Declaration 
of Independence of Palestine on 15 November 1988 in Algiers, and staged to 
contest through the signature of the OAs in 1993 as elaborated over coming pages. 
Thereof, how did the political ridge materialize in Palestinian decision-making? 
And how does this Palestinian nationalism(s), Zionist ethnocracy and the colonial 
stratification of Palestinians relate to the sociospatial transformation of Ramallah? 
These fundamental questions lead us to the next section.
2.2.2.   Colonial vs. Civic Agency and their 
Sociospatial Applications
As aforementioned and under the Third strategy; Israel militarized the 
1967-occupied geographies (see section 2.1.3.ii, p. 60) and reduced its provision of 
public services and – social and physical – infrastructural investment in localities 
to speculative minimums, while existential resources of water, power and road 
infrastructures were integrated into Israeli systems (AbuHelu 2012). Meanwhile, 
the PLO was gaining global attention and visibility that followed it through 
the chase; out of Amman to Beirut in 1971, and by 1982 further away from the 
homeland to Tunis. Given the PLO’s implicit recognition of a two-state solution 
in its 12th Palestinian National Conference in 1974, it was recognized by the Arab 
League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, its chair Yasser Arafat 
was invited to speak at its General Assembly meeting in November 1974, and a year 
later it was granted an observer status at the UN. Arafat’s unilateral concession to 
the Zionist state made the Palestinian ‘nationalist activity’ appear and be ‘treated 
as a form of outside infiltration into a population that was perceived as largely 
quiescent’, where:
quiescence during this period was not only due to the immaturity of the 
national movement on the ground, or to the use of brute force (where and 
when necessary) but most overwhelmingly to the ‘life giving’ power (or 
biopower) of Israeli governmentality over Palestinian lives. Health insurance, 
school certification, car licensing, applications for birth certificates and death 
certificates, permits to build or extend a house, tax receipts, permits for visiting 
relatives – all the necessities of quotidian life compelled the residents of the 
occupied territories to depend on the bureaucratic apparatus of the military 
government. Thus much political suppression took place not [only] through 
the visible threat of deportation, house or town arrest, but [also] through threat 
of bureaucratic disenfranchisement. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:28)
As an extra-territorial political representative, the Tunis-PLO had free 
space to employ the militarization of the Palestinian anti-colonial discourse, 
which did achieve visibility, recognition, international solidarity and momentum 
amongst Palestinians regardless of geography. Yet, these operations ‘represented 
the particular response of a group of revolutionaries to a set of circumstances 
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they did not choose’ and constituted ‘acts of war without war’ (Collins 2011:70). 
Hence,  this mode of operation was also episodic, reactionary and short-term. 
Meanwhile, inland politicians – whom congregated under a sub-PLO framework 
named the National Guidance Committees (NGCs) – recognized their military 
detriment and followed the only path possible: unarmed mass mobilization which 
in its early stages operated undetected by the radars monitoring the PLO and its 
command centre in Tunis. 
Inland politicians in cities e.g. Ramallah were leading the charging of local 
masses for rebellion54 through nurturing a collective sense of purpose which was in 
turn promoted through socialist and liberal concepts that appeased the ethnically 
and socially plural and institutionally disenfranchised colonized subjects. This 
mobilization was achieved through complimentary systems of civic agency that 
countered Israel’s colonial policies of isolation, fragmentation and weakening. 
Examples are the Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committees (PARC, mobilised 
in 1970s and registered in 1983) which worked against land confiscations, 
conspired shortages, etc.; the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS, 1979) 
as supplement for the insufficient provision of medical services; and the Popular 
Work Committees (PWCs) as well as scores of varying forms of unions which 
catered for needs such as orphanages, day-care, clandestine supply pipelines to 
besieged areas55, and other civil services (PBC 2014; Fasheh 2010). 
Faced with the tag of insurgency lead Palestinian domestic politicians – 
regardless whether voluntarily or involuntarily – to appropriate the will of the 
masses, whom constituted its only medium and source of legitimation. This 
dynamic of conditionality and swift accountability in which Palestinian politics 
peddled translated in a distinct arena of urban warfare whose spatial precipitations 
remain in circulation. Palestinian localities were a battlefield on which Israel – akin 
the British – was blinded by its militarism to the social chromosome of resilience 
and its topography. This arena is fluid, uncategorised, and nowadays an account of 
the sine qua non sociospatial shifts assimilating the ideological contestation over 
the mental and lived spaces of Palestinians.
2.2.2.i.   The Sitting Room: Integrating the Mental- and Lived- Spaces
Elaborating the afore-described space in reference to Lefebvre’s (2009) triad; 
the dichotomy of the ‘mental space’ of Zionist versus indigenous ideological 
contestation – between exclusivism and inclusivism respectively – materialized 
in the progressive shifting and re-identification of the ‘lived’ and representational 
‘spaces’. For example, in the pre-mandate Palestinian architecture (of peasant and 
middle classes which composed the majority of population and is typologically 
comparable to other Mediterranean cases), single family units either had one 
room for all purposes within the space of the extended family, or one multi-use 
living room, or depended on the shared hospitality facilities of the hosh (or Diwan 
in villages). The pre-industrial optimal use of resources and space is inscribed in 
the nolli-plans of Palestinian villages and towns. The impact of availability of steel 
load-bearing elements under the British Mandate is not limited to enabling multi-
story construction and the relatively lower costs. These two factors catalyse but 
alone fall short of inducing the rapid and widespread mental and behavioural shift 
from minimal living spaces to the modern spatial program. Nowadays, archetypal 
Palestinian single-family units include – amongst other spaces – a ‘living’ room and 
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a ‘sitting’ room (Diagram 2.4). While the etymology is irrelevant the ontology is. The 
combination of moving beyond extended family hosh along with the persistence of 
social habits of assembly necessitated the presence of hospitality spaces, thence the 
adoption of the English living room as quintessential space. However, why is there 
a – no matter how small – ‘sitting room’? Some could argue that ‘sitting’ rooms 
replaced the courtyard, yet this argument abates when faced with the complete 
enclosure of the space which could have equally been a terrace, or large balcony 
with latticework along the lines of the mashrabiya56. 
Herein, the aforementioned civic agency can be argued as the modem that 
created the ‘sitting room’ by translating the mental- into the lived-space. As public 
spaces (streets, restaurants, cultural centres, etc.) were compromised or red-tapped 
by Israel (elaborated below), the semi-private ‘living’ room had to be redefined into 
public use as meeting place of comrades, and the concept of a minimal, private, 
family-sitting-room was conceived. Hence, every private family unit (the lived) 
catered for a semi-public space (the mental) on its own expense; from a conceptual 
perspective, the individual produced and financed the collective. As a female 
participant in the +50 years-old Focus Group testifies:
In the period in which the political parties were strong, there were social 
factors acting against any droop. And our houses, they were the cafés and loci 
of congregation. Did either of you ever hold a meeting in a café? Or when a 
journalist called for an interview with a politician? Or the members of a party 
meet?.. There were no headquarters for parties and our houses were the hotels 
and the cafés. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 yrs)
Thereof, the rapid integration of the ‘sitting’ room into Palestinian and 
regional single-unit construction was a byproduct of – among others – the 
crowding of the urban public spaces by the colonial. The ‘simultaneity’ of sumud 
as ‘national consciousness’ was also enabled by the print industry which had 
commodified, made accessible, and therein internationalized knowledge and 
ideology barter in a demonstration of the ‘primacy of capitalism’ to political 
systems (Anderson 2006:37). However, vital to metabolism of ideological scripts 
was – and remains – communication whether in the form of public talks, debates, 
visual and acoustic arts among many others. Given the Israeli surveillance of the 
streets and public facilities of Ramallah and other cities induced the development 
of alternative lived as well as representational spaces and their connectors.
2.2.2.ii.   Parliament or University? Palestinian Representational 
Spaces and their Connectors
The signature of the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1978 
brought the – hitherto considered marginal – NGCs to the attention of Israeli 
decision-makers with announcing their rejection of the treaty in a series of public 
events throughout the territories controlled by Israel. The NGC had captured the 
spot-light as Yasser Arafat – in Beirut – was calculating potential consequences of 
criticising the most regionally influential Arab state on the PLO which he chaired. 
This revelation of mobilization capabilities had advantages, namely the as of then 
the NGC was able to claim its weights and thence role in determining the course 
of the national liberation struggle; and disadvantages, of which the NGC attracted 
The Colonial Project: Ethnocratic Territoriality and the Imagined Palestinians |  85
Israel’s attention and hence became a target of liquidation attempts (PBC 2014). 
This pivotal shift in Palestinian political dynamics marked the first incident of 
the aforementioned ridge between exiled and inland parties, and concomitantly 
induced two major changes in Israel’s colonial methodology.
First, the inversion of the IOF policy of ‘the invisible occupation’ whose 
tactic was such that ‘a local Arab can live his life... without needing to see or speak 
to an Israeli representative’ (Weizman 2006:142). This policy had originated with 
the birth of Israel and its lack of interest in integrating the 150,000 – then and 
today 1.658 million57 (CBS 2014) – Palestinians whom had survived displacement 
attempts during the Nakba and were ultimately granted second-class citizenship 
in the ethnocratic Israel (Yiftachel 1999; Sand 2010). Under the new strategy the 
Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) was established in 1981 with its headquarters in 
the Beit El colony, 4 km north east of alManara Square (Map 2.2, p. 59). It operates 
– still – within the larger framework of the COGAT in order to: 
administer the civilian affairs in the region [...], for the well-being and good 
of the population, and in order to supply and implement the public services 
and [...] maintain an orderly administration and public order in the region 
(Shehadeh 1985:70; emphasis added)
To this goal, the ICA added another dimension to mobility restrictions. As of 
that moment growing numbers of average – politically uninvolved, ‘law-abiding’ 
– Palestinians required permits as well for movement within the one territory, 
between the Jordan and Mediterranean. This tool was introduced at a time the 
COGAT had compromised the communication systems of post and telephone; 
13 m
4 m 4 m 4.5 m
Bedroom
Balcony
Bathroom and guest toilet
Circulation
Kitchen
Living and Sitting rooms
Diagram 2.4. Typical middle-
class apartment in Ramallah, around 
120 sq.m. Contains 3 bedrooms, 2 living 
rooms, 2 bathrooms, a guest-toilet, a 
kitchen and a balcony. 
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thus propagating the ulteriority of Palestinian anticolonial political action and 
correspondence in a predigital era where the physical realm was quintessential. In 
this light Israel considered necessary more:
radical and comprehensive containment strategies [...] which came to focus 
on three main tracks. On the one hand was the destruction of the external 
organization of the national movement [PLO] in Lebanon [1982 invasion], 
while internally, was the destruction of its representatives, and in place of both 
was the attempt to develop a local class of quislings – empowered by being 
middlemen to crucial services of the Civil Administration. (Hamami and 
Tamari 2008:30)
In regards to the first track the Israeli government commissioned the 
Mossad58, for the second it gave a free hand to the Shin Bet59 (a.k.a Shabak), while 
the third target swayed until it found a stable course through the fitting format of 
the OAs and the customized clone of the ICA, the PA. 
Utilizing – then and today – the tactic of ‘denial of privileges’ (Weizman 
2006:142) students were banned from leaving the country to pursue higher 
education while others were denied return afterwards. People waited for years 
to get a driver’s license or a telephone line, volunteering in the PWCs in the 
provision of social services accounted to a misdemeanor, and hundreds of 
unindicted ‘suspects’ served extended terms in Israeli prisons without charges, 
presenting justifications such as: ‘they [Israeli security apparatuses] think that 
you were thinking about doing something, and they arrested you to prevent you 
from doing that something. They arrested you for your own good’ – as explained 
to Arouri by his prison-ward after 30 of the total 45 months of administrative 
detention in 1974-78 (Arouri 2013:157). 
The second tactic that Israel placed into effect to counter the home-grown 
resistance was partial and complete curfews and closures of Palestinian localities, 
which became a common IOF practice e.g. in the year 1988 over 1,600 curfews 
were imposed and therewith ‘60 per cent of the population had been confined in 
their homes for extended periods of time’ (Neve Gordon IN Weizman 2006:289), 
and for the duration of the 1991 Gulf War Yitzhak Shamir60 ‘ordered the closure 
of the entire Occupied Territories for the first time from Israel and the rest of the 
world’ (ibid:142). The permit manuscript which was launched in the early 1980s 
was physically placed into effect by the signature of the OAs in 1993, after which:
[...] the politics of closure was further extended, perfected and normalized. 
During 1994, Israeli security control retreated into the roadways that connected 
centres of Palestinian population. Between 1994 and 1999, Israel installed 230 
checkpoints and imposed 499 days of closures. Israeli sovereignty was exercised 
in its ability to block, filter and regulate movement in the entire Occupied 
Territories, and between it and the ‘outside’. The occupation effectively shifted to 
[...] working as a system of on / off valves [...]. Even the level of flow in the water 
pipes connecting the separate Palestinian enclaves throughout the territories 
was controlled by the Civil Administration. (Weizman 2006:142)
The Israeli restriction on Palestinian movement is ‘enforced by a system of 
fixed checkpoints, surprise ‘flying’ checkpoints, physical obstructions, roads on 
which Palestinians are forbidden to travel, and gates along the ‘Separation Barrier’ 
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(B’Tselem 2014b). In February 2014 there were 99 fixed checkpoints – of which 
59 are internal – in the WB, while ‘flying’ ones registered a peak with a monthly 
average of 495 surprise checkpoints from January through September 2011 
(B’Tselem 2014). This process was accompanied by the weakening or complete 
liquidation of Palestinian public transportation systems by inducing their 
disadvantageous privatization. And as the Israeli Egged buses placed stations in 
colonies it deflected from passing through Palestinian localities.
The urban-management version of this system of ‘filtration’ was – as well 
– piloted in the 1980s. At the time, Palestinian representational spaces shifted 
constantly in relation to the Israeli tactic of ‘denial of privileges’. Ability and 
parameters of operation of Palestinian civil bodies were scaled against the level 
of complicity of the particular institution with the colonial. That was when 
the Grand Hotel and elHamra, Ramallah’s three Cinemas, some newspapers, 
bookshops, and several neighbourhood-clubs and cultural-centres were forced to 
close their doors (Barthe 2011). In the 30-40 years-old Focus Group conducted by 
this work Birzeit University’s role as a representational space during the 1980s was 
described as:
[Birzeit U]niversity used to be the compass for the political scene, and its 
lecturers enjoyed a symbolic social respect and status. The students of the 
university were regarded as the leaders of tomorrow who are fighting and 
learning despite the closure of their university by the occupation. (FG 2011 no.2)
Legitimacy of representation – whether human or spatial – amongst 
Palestinians of the 1980s was corollary to the duration of imprisonment or closure 
whereby ‘the number of years spent in an Israeli prison was a reflection of his 
or her value’ (FG 2011 no.2). For the only higher education institution in the 
agglomerate and surroundings – Birzeit University, this translated with 4 closures 
(8 months) in 1980-82; then 7 closures (11 months) in 1984-87; and in 1989 – at 
the peak of the First Intifada – the university was closed down by Israel for the 
15th time and a total duration of 51 consecutive months until 29 April 1992. In this 
period the campus was substituted with ‘makeshift arrangements’ for small study 
groups, where ‘many students require [sic] 10 years to complete their four-year 
degree programs’ (BZU 2014).
Thereof and in spite of the incarceration of spaces of Palestinian collective 
sociopolitical production; the framework of the aforementioned voluntary civic-
service providers (which had commenced in the 1970s) served as an adhesive 
against isolation of individuals in the private space and the consequent social 
dissolution. Spatially, it was an ongoing process of discarding formal public spaces 
(whether a university campus or restaurant) and in parallel the appropriation 
of the private as the informal substitute. In turn, this process reconfigured the 
private ‘living room’ space into the representational space of the collective political 
demarcated with the omni presence of hanging embroidered maps of Palestine 
and pictures of family prisoners and martyrs (Anani 2013).
The afore-described geographies and mechanisms ‘were responsible for the 
forging of new identities that made possible sustained collective action’ (Robinson 
1993:302). They were enabled by the underground discourses conceived and 
entrenched prior the 1967 War on both sides of the Armistice line (see section 
2.1.3, p. 56). Spatially, these networks constituted an intransigeant shadow layer 
on the maps, against those of interrupted and surveyed infrastructures. Amongst 
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other aspects, these – political, social, and economic – systems became substitute 
connectors reinforcing rural regions against Israeli colonisation on one hand, 
and on the other enforcing comradeship between rural and urban. This erudite 
strategy was produced by the virtue of the post-Nakba Palestinian political 
consciousness regarding relevance of the rural to regional connectedness, mass-
mobilization, and later, the holistic and integrated national development. Its 
politics was facilitated by the post-Israel transfigured socioeconomic order of 
Palestinians, where the break of ‘traditional patron-client relations that had been 
the social base of the old elite’ had in effect:
[...] paved the way for the rise of a more extensive, better educated, more rural, 
and nonlanded elite. [...] In its essence, the social mobilization of Palestinian 
society after 1967 was about breaking old forms of identity, creating new ones, 
and, as a result, changing patterns of political behavior. (Robinson 1993:301; 
emphasis added)
This description of inland Palestinian politics by Robinson in 1993 attests 
to Sand’s (2010) diagnosis of Palestinians as a population that endured through 
assimilation, as manifested – for example – through the creation of the Rakah 
socialist party in 1965 by both, Palestinian and Israeli communists that opposed 
Zionism. Rakah and later the Hadash – The Democratic Front for Peace and 
Equality in Israel – collaborated with the NGCs and its various constituting 
parties in the mobilisation and civic engagement of the population between the 
Jordan River and the Mediterranean e.g. the annual commemoration of Land Day 
on the 30th of March through voluntary service activities and the coordination 
of the International Workers Day every 1st of May demonstrations. This nouveau 
Palestinian – inland – political identity allowed the emergence of the Israeli 
leftists human rights organizations such as Peace Now in 1978 (with international 
chapters) and B’TSELEM – The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories in 1989. The height of this ‘integration’ was reached in 
the Israeli 1992 election when the Likud was outset after fifteen years in office 
in favour of the Labour Party with an Israeli cabinet majored by politicians that 
recognised the ‘demographic threat’ and supported the disengagement from 
Palestinians through a two-state configuration. However, this ostensibly liberal 
political discourse was not that of the majority, lost footing with the end of the 
Cold War. Moreover, it came twenty-five years too late, tens of colonies too late, 
and hundreds of quasi-legal military orders and by-laws too late, and a ‘Drobless 
Plan’ too late.
The Drobless Plan (coming section) had fantasized Palestinian state-
borders to include 65% of the WB and GS, which combined constitute 22% of 
historic Palestine i.e. less than 15% of the total. The fictional territory excluded 
Jerusalem, and envisioned to house a nation reduced to Palestinians already 
residing in the WB and GS, i.e. less than 50% of those who identify themselves 
as Palestinians. A decade prior to the OAs, Zionism – which according to Avi 
Shlaim61 ‘has never been liberal’ (Head to Head 2014) – required a certain genre 
of Palestinian identity, and found its inspiration in USA and UK neoliberal 
policies of marginalization of middle classes. Given its inability to outcast unions 
and similar frameworks due to its socialist constitution, Israel sought a local 
commissioner, as revealed later.
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2.2.2.iii.   Land Alienation: the Drobless Plan
Referring back to Hamami and Tamari’s second named Israeli strategy of 
‘land alienation and colonization’ which underwent ‘ radical revision in response 
to two main challenges; Palestinian resistance and Palestinian demographics’ 
(2008:26 , see pg. 73);  within twelve months of the Six Day War the survey of WB 
territories by the Israel Lands Administration and the General Staff ’s Settlement 
Department was completed, along with a set of recommendations for the use of 
state-lands. This was accompanied by sequential IOF military orders sanctioning 
prompt and prospective usurpation of public as well as private ‘absentee’ property 
which therein cleared 20% of the WB for settler colonialism, and a further 26% a 
decade later through the employment of the miri62 land classification (Hamami 
and Tamari 2008). The Israeli land-grab culminated with the institutionalization 
of Israel’s settler colonialism via its request of a new master settlement plan from 
its spiritual patron, the World Zionism Organisation (WZO). In 1981 the plea was 
answered with the Drobless Plan63 which stated that:
[T]here is to be not a shadow of doubt regarding our intention to remain in 
Judea and Samaria. A dense chain of settlements on the mountain ridge running 
southwards from Nablus to Hebron will serve as a reliable barrier on the eastern 
front. This buffer zone of settlements will also create security for settlers in the 
Jordan Valley. Both areas between concentrations of the minority [Palestinian] 
population and the area around them must be settled to minimize the danger 
of the rise of another Arab state in the region. (Dobless IN: Abdulhadi 1990:48)
1949 Armistice (Green) Line
Territories for settlement intensification
Map 2.4. Dobless’s ‘Master Plan for 2010’ for targets 
and acceleration of settler colonialism in the WB, 1981/3.
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The Israeli government whose Prime Minister at the time was Yitzak 
Shamir64 needed no convincing. Shamir said: ‘The settlement of the Land of Israel 
is the essence of Zionism. Without settlements, we will not fulfil Zionism. It’s that 
simple’ (21 February 1997 in Maariv IN NAD 2014). Two years later the plan was 
refined and re-presented as the ‘World Zionist Organisation Development Plan 
for 1983-86’ a.k.a. ‘Master Plan for 2010’ (Map 2.4, p. 89); which was designed to:
‘disperse maximally large Jewish populations in areas of high settlement 
priority using small national inputs and in a relatively short period by using 
the settlement potential of the West Bank and to achieve the incorporation into 
the national [Israeli] system’. According to the plan, about 6,000 housing units, 
23 settlements, 20 strongpoints, 500 dunums of industrial zones, and 100-150 
kilometers of paved roads were to be constructed each year of the plan at a total 
expenditure of about $2.6 million. (Abdulhadi 1990:48)
These plans constituted the shift from the pre-1978 ‘pragmatist camp’ – as 
referred to by Hamami and Tamari (2008:24) – whose orientation leaned towards 
Allon’s proposals (Map 1.14; pg. 30) of concession of minimal territory in favour 
of higher Jewish demographic representations; to the post-1978 ‘maximalist’ 
ideology of apartheid promoted by the radical Gush Emunim movement (Arij 
2014). The Israeli chief political columnist and editorial writer Akiva Eldar 
described such radical groups – whom Hamami and Tamari (2008) refer to as the 
‘Greater Israel Movement’ – with:
For them it is God that gave them the land and the Arabs have nothing to do 
here, besides if they would be willing to be servants. I’ve visited South Africa 
recently and I spoke to black people who still remember the Apartheid. This is 
the South African Apartheid, this is Rhodesia. Actually the Palestinians in the 
best case are transparent; they don’t see them, they don’t exist. (Akiva Eldar IN 
alAtar 2006: minute 34)
While local planning frameworks within Palestinian localities were abolished 
Settlement Regional Councils were established65, provided simplified alternative 
paths to formal planning procedures, and granted jurisdictions in Palestinian 
populated areas through a series of military orders66. In 1981 the Partial Regional 
Master Plan 1/82 for Jerusalem was drafted proposing the further annexation 
of  446,270 dunums67 – including the Ramallah agglomerate – to the Jerusalem 
Municipality in addition to the 70,000 dunums annexed in 1967 (Abdulhadi 1990). 
On one hand this constituted the first recognition of Ramallah as a natural urban 
extension of Jerusalem, on the other, the plan wasted no effort in concealing its 
ethnocratic68 character. It is based on a Palestinian population projection of 
272,000 persons in the year 2002 (twenty years in the future), while in the year 
of publication there were 275,000 Palestinians residing within the annexation 
area. Moreover, the total area designated for their development was limited to 
existing cores and their timely makeup of 13%69 of the total area; thence ‘placing 
90 percent of the lands remaining in Palestinian hands off-limits to Palestinian 
construction’ (Abdulhadi 1990:53). Map 2.2, p. 59 demonstrates the realization of 
the Drobless plan on the Ramallah agglomerate which within one decade became 
surrounded with colonies from all directions. Therein, work on the city cannot be 
limited to its borders be they cartographic or physical, old or new. Understanding 
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the why and how behind Ramallah’s growth patterns requires the acknowledgment 
of the ‘enforced invisibility’ on Palestinians and their localities, a strategy amongst 
a copious sum that ‘sustains an Israeli system neither interested in killing nor in 
assimilating the Palestinians’ (Hanafi 2009); an opinion often resonated by Zionist 
politicians e.g. in the Head to Head (2014) interview:
Mehdi Hasan [Moderator]: Paul, it’s a very simple question. Are Palestinians 
immigrants in their own land?
Paul Charney: [chairman of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland 
since October 2012] Non-Israelis, which is fundamentally part of Judaism, 
are limited in the amount of people that can come into Israel. [sic]
2.3.   SUMUD: FRAMING PRE-
OSLO FLUID SOCIO-ECONOMICS 
AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY 
As Israel was nationalising the settlement enterprise throughout the 
1970s and 1980s; Palestinian inland factions were synthesizing Sumud (Arabic 
for steadfastness, resilience) through cross-geography systems of supply and 
demand. From this perspective both Palestinian and Israeli discourses conform 
to what Pickerill and Chatterton (2006) describe as sociopolitical survival tactics 
which ‘combin[e] resistance and creation’ with ‘challenging dominant laws’; 
therein, localities were loci of both conception and materialisation of ‘politics 
of difference’ as ‘space constitutes a mediating dimension of the transformative 
processes through which the symbolic potential of movement discourses may be 
manifested’; thence giving rise to ‘alternative spatialities’ which consolidate as well 
as socially legitimize political agendas (Feldman 2002:31). Interviewees who lived 
and played part in the shaping of the late 1980s inland Palestinian ethos  (+20 
years-old in the 1980s) confirmed this politicization of the quotidian life:
For us, 90% of our time in that age-period [youth] was about either reading or 
politics or both. Whether we are in a friends’ place or in one of the few cafés, the 
main concern was always the political one, nothing else. From that perspective, 
if you say we are going to take youth and give them money to do things [e.g. per 
diums], at that time, we called this grand treason. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old)
[...] my main point is ‘Social Values’. In the First Intifada when the Israeli army 
used to wander into town on a day of strike, and used to break the locks of the 
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chains of the various shops, there used to be numerous 13-14 year old kids that 
would very soon after go around and re-lock the shops with new locks, and 
find a way to send a key of the new lock to the owner. [...] Second issue is the 
commitment. When there was a strike everyone, literately everyone abided by 
the commands of the United Leadership of the Intifada [an arm of the NGCs]. 
I am not saying that shop owners did not want to sell, or pondered raising 
the prices on limited commodities, they did, but never dared to bring those 
thoughts into action due to the over all collective. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old)
Whether Palestinian or Israeli, up to the 1990s politics and spatial practices of 
communities were ruled by fluid alliances of its constituent minorities; as remains 
reflected by the Israeli cabinets which constitute of coalitions of 4 - 6 political 
parties. The Israeli settler colonialism would not have become a widespread 
infectious frenzy had Ariel Sharon not been in office on one hand, and on the 
other had he not distanced the colonies from limited political ideology while 
marketing them as the prime affordable housing solution of average middle-class 
Jewish families (Shehade 1985; Weizman 2006), where:
Settlements were now a new ‘neighborhood’ within reach of Jerusalem or Tel 
Aviv where average Israelis could enjoy a better quality of life suddenly made 
affordable through generous government subsidy. Thus, by changing the spatial 
nature of settlements, and naturalizing them as Israeli suburbs, it became possible 
to vastly widen the political constituency for them – by giving ‘mainstream’ 
Israelis a stake in the settlement enterprise. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:29)
On the Palestinian front, the aforementioned tactics functioned 
predominantly due to their effect as antibiotic against the contrived economic 
strangulation by the colonialist custodian. Returning to the example above, the 
shop owner whom wished additional profit had also recognized that his shop 
could have been looted had the kid – who is encouraged by one of the multiple 
civic frameworks – not relocked it. In financial terms, merchants – irrelevant 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily – accepted a winning trade-off: they abstain 
from avoidable price elevation, and in exchange receive the free-of-charge 
protection of their shops and get to assemble with the heroes. Hence, in both 
cases the approach to socioeconomic needs was quintessential. This conformity of 
the contesting politics of Palestinian liberation movement and Zionism should 
be of no surprise as both – at the time and as explained on pg. 53 and pg. 84 – 
had received their infantile training predominantly from Marxist patrons that 
advocated ‘internationalism’, as elaborated in section 5.2, p. 263. 
Further, in terms of administration dynamics of both the colonizer and 
the colonized; the aforementioned demonstrates that sociopolitical resilience 
in ecosystems of mental warfare – where the war is everywhere and nowhere 
(Abourahme 2009) – requires customized courses of treatment. In order for 
policies to be nationalized amongst populations that are genetically diverse (the 
Bedouin and the urban Palestinians; the Polish and Ethiopian arriving Jews) 
decision-making systems operated through fluid, context- and locality-sensitive 
representations. Hebron’s spatial dilemma (social, economic, political) created 
by the presence of the Tomb of Patriarchs at its heart is variably different – for 
both Israel and the Palestinians – than that of Ramallah which has no mention 
neither as locus in holy scripts nor its records tell of a presence of Jewish believers. 
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The Israeli land-grab policy in Hebron is exercised through the Palestinian fabric 
and population, in Nablus it penetrates at tangential points, while in Ramallah it 
remained peripheral. These strategies were case-sensitive, and ironically remain 
in operation uncombated. Hebron, the second largest Palestinian city which 
‘traditionally served as the commercial centre for the entire southern West Bank’ 
was put under an Israeli ‘policy [that] led to the economic collapse of the centre of 
Hebron and drove many Palestinians out of the area’ (B’Tselem 2014d). The Israeli 
government sponsors a cell of few hundred aggressive settlers through a colony 
– Tel Rumeida – inserted at the heart of the old city, along with the corollary 
tentacles through the everyday streets and lives of the 150,000 Palestinian dwellers 
(alAtar 2006). In Nablus the largest Palestinian city whose economy (akin 
Hebron) is manufacturing-based, the policy of economic strangulation focuses 
on the city’s supply valves e.g. for the decade between 2000 and 2010 Nablus was a 
closed military zone with no vehicles allowed in or out. Permits for a vehicle were 
a diamond’s worth. Meanwhile, Ramallah has a considerably varied experience 
due to the reality that its pre-Oslo town-economy had neither a national extension 
nor impact; and its post-Oslo donor-economy can be sentenced into crisis from 
Tel Aviv by blocking a bank transfer. Mentally, these differently scaled military 
strategies correspond respectively – on the Israeli side – to settlers of radical 
aggressive ideology, economically-motivated settlers, and the ‘more liberal-
minded Israeli Jews who’ prefer to avoid direct engagement with the occupation 
yet ‘are ready to drop the principles of democracy when faced with the prospect of 
a demographic majority of non-Jews in the country’ (Pappe 2007:13). 
On the other side of the same coin, for Palestinians up to the establishment 
of the PA, the political ‘production’ of anticolonial socioeconomic strategies was 
decentralized, case-sensitive, and horizontal in dynamic. Rising tension between 
Palestinians and their occupiers over the 1980s provided fertile grounds for 
the outbreak of the First Intifada on 8 December 1987 in the GS. On that day 
an IOF vehicle struck a civilian Palestinian car killing four Palestinian workers. 
This reiterating incident of Israeli disregard to Palestinian lives ignited the WB 
and GS in the form of mass civic disobedience. As events intensified the inland 
Palestinian politicians of the NGCs expanded their mission through a cross-
faction coordination committee, a framework comparable to modern-day 
disaster response operation rooms. This National Leadership of the Intifada 
(NLI) designed what could be referred to as the anticolonial action program. On 
timely basis regionally varied strikes, demonstrations and civic service events 
were planned and announced through the numerous voluntary arms. These 
‘pressure’ variables utilized the cover of informality, resilience of multi-pillar 
and horizontal leadership, and responsiveness. Releases by the NLI fraternized 
the envisioned activities away from factionalism, Israeli detaining of individuals 
had minimal impacts on persistence, and relief was swiftly delivered encouraging 
further sumud. In this process, cities – e.g. Ramallah – were quintessential:
Even though peasant uprising drove decolonisation across the Third World, it 
was elements of this urban comprador class that defined the nationalist project 
and appropriated the vestiges of the colonial state. (Moxham 2008:4)
The collectivity of the aforementioned processes is evidenced through the 
composition of the initial Palestinian negotiations team sent to Washington in 
1992; the team included amongst others Haydar AbdulShafi from Gaza, Ghassan 
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elKhatib from Nablus, and Hanan Ashrawy from Jerusalem. This dynamic was 
also the reason why in the early years of the PA ministries were spread throughout 
multiple cities of the WB and GS, and while Arafat resided in Ramallah the 
Parliament was constructed in AbuDies, Jerusalem. 
Further, the absence of rigid representational spaces indirectly served as a 
shield against mental demoralization. The Israelis had no iconic presidential 
palace to defile, no parliament which they could freeze the operation of, and when 
Birzeit University was red-taped living rooms became temporarily the symbolic 
class rooms; a spatial dynamic that has been laid to rest in the post OAs era. The 
pre-Oslo political flexibility of Palestinians was achieved through what Hall calls 
‘policymaking as a social learning’ (1993:275). He quotes:
Politics finds it sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men 
collectively wondering what to do... Governments not only ‘power’... they also 
puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf... 
Much political interaction has constituted a process of social learning expressed 
through policy. (Heclo IN Hall 1993:275; emphasis in original)
On one hand, this argument extends legitimacy to the call of contemporary 
Palestinian intellectuals for re-negotiating, re-imagining, re-defining, and re-
puzzling the presence, principles and aspirations of the indigenous population. On 
the other hand, it disqualifies the claim of democracy as byproduct of the political 
structure of a state. For Palestinians, this lesson is transcribed through the inverse 
realities of the pre-Oslo denial of nationality and concomitant fluid politics that is 
socially produced, and on the other side its later substitution with the post-Oslo 
recognition of Palestinians as a nation and the corollary institutionalization of 
their politics and the establishment of a PA monopoly over policymaking. Starting 
1996 the furnishing of a neighbourhood garden has to await municipal approval 
and PA or donor financing; a demonstration is conditioned by a clearance from 
PA policing apparatuses, and; Birzeit University gets closed for extended periods 
by Palestinian hands; those of its own students. 
In the pre-Oslo era the sumud of the citoyen and support of locally produced 
politics against Zionism was associated with sociospatial ‘dignity’ in spite of the 
continued humiliation through ‘denial of privileges’ (As’ad 2010; Kassis 2012). 
Phenomena of homelessness and shortages were absent, as social solidarity and 
accountability of politics was both, swift and collectively exercised (FG 2011, no.2; 
30-40 years old; FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old). It was a process of de-naturalization 
of dependence on (the state) Israel ‘through active disengagement from the Civil 
Administration and a boycott of Israeli products’, where the ‘spatial side of this 
resistance aimed at de-normalizing Israeli access to Palestinian space – through 
blocking the army’s ability to routinely patrol Palestinian communities’ and where 
‘the strategy of the mass insurrection generally defined the strategy of counter-
insurgency’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:31, 32). 
Seen from this perspective, sociopolitical resilience necessitates a 
governance system where the majority of social groups (the self, the Others, and 
their variations) feel represented on matters they regard of prime importance, 
while the delicate balance is sustained through shifting concessions of secondary 
ones in a mutually agreed-upon trade-off. Once more, such non-centralized and 
non-static politics lie in contrast to majority-representation parliamentarian 
systems which operate in power of the ‘binary logic that splits the world 
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into hierarchically ordered halves’ (Collins 2011:x), herein, the majority vs. 
minority(ies). Here it must be asked, if Palestinians had a resilient system as 
claimed hitherto in this work, then why did it seize to exist? Why are the post-
Oslo (today’s) social, political as well as economic structures regarded negatively? 
The answer is multifold, and to be found in the transmogrification of Palestinian 
political ideology in the late 1980s, which in turn staged the OAs and outlined – 
among other frameworks – its spatial blueprints whose translations are mapped 
in the following chapters. So what was this turning point or threshold?
Less than a year post the outbreak of the First Intifada and on 15 November 
1988 the PLO adopted the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (Annex.4, 
p. 392), which was written by the renowned poet Mahmoud Darwish who 
was often described as the ‘voice of Palestine’. Proclamation of the script was 
achieved through a vote at the 19th session of the Palestinian National Council 
in Algiers; where 253 voted in favour, 46 against and 10 abstained. The statement 
– which was passed with 82% of the votes of various political parties in both, 
exile and inside Palestine – evidenced the entrenchment of the narrow ‘national’ 
terminology and ideology in the Palestinian mindset, which conforms the corner-
stone of exclusive politics i.e. non-collectivity. It was not a theory of the left or 
right, rather, that of a plenary system of alliances whose adhesive lineament was 
the targeted ‘complete equality of rights’; or in urbanity terms, dignified living 
conditions (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Collins 2011, Kassis 2012). This testament 
describes Palestinians as ‘people’ of ‘national genus’, for whom Palestine is the 
‘state’ in which they ‘enjoy their collective national and cultural identity’. Beyond 
the institutional orientation replacing hitherto social accountability, noteworthy 
is the singular form of ‘identity’ which is elaborated in the designated ‘means of 
a parliamentary democratic system of governance’ under which ‘minorities must 
abide by decisions of the majority’; the latter again in singular form, expressing 
the assumption of permanence of a distinctive and homogeneous social order 
over a definite territory and indefinite time.
On practical levels, the need to remain relevant – in terms of timely messages 
and needs – forced the NGCs to favour responsiveness on official Palestinian 
political unity, as the latter necessitated a time-extensive and compromised 
predigital consultation with the exiled PLO comrades in Tunis. Over the seven 
years of the First Intifada, the NLI delivered three jolts to Arafat’s leadership, upon 
which and blinded by confidence (arrogance?) they handed him the keys to the 
house and an agenda to their neutralization. This ‘malentendu tragique’ (Barthe 
2011:67) shaped Arafat’s spatial policy which he brought into action with the OAs, 
and whose spatial manifestations in Ramallah are the loci of nowadays political, 
social, and economic contestation. 
The first stroke was delivered in 1990 when Arafat – given the PLO’s 
weakened ‘status and legitimacy at the regional and international levels’ (Shikaki 
1996:8) – leaned towards a USA sponsored de-intensification of the Intifada. This 
was the prime – and later proved fatal – occasion of Palestinian politics agreeing 
to USA monopoly as broker between them and Israel. However, the NLI declared 
its opposition and refrained from cooperating on the matter (PBC 2014). This 
rejection was followed by open calls for the reform of the PLO and the reduction 
of what was referred to as ‘bureaucracy’, and in reality constituted – among 
its noble goals – a diplomatic phrasing for the desire to override the existing 
hierarchy. In an article published in the popular journal Sawt elWatan (Voice of 
Homeland) in October 1990 Arouri wrote:
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The central concern and compass for a nonmistakable Palestinian programme 
capable of freeing the Intifada from most, if not all negative aspects and 
encroachments [...]; to that end, quintessential is the maintenance of the routed 
democratic character of the Intifada as a popular rebellion operation. The latter 
has significantly receded [lately...]. The aforementioned compass necessitates 
that Palestinian fronts in the inside [WB, GS] or outside [exile], and at its front 
the PLO and its composing parties and operating systems; all parties must first 
- halt the ongoing processes of bureaucrat-ization of the Intifada; and second, 
need to take the necessary measures for dismantling and restructuring such 
existing frameworks. [...] Hence the question, why do reform measures remain 
undiscussed in PLO meetings? (Arouri 2013:248 and 256)
This call for reform was accompanied by the – second jolt to Arafat through 
– rejection to have the activities of the NLI in Palestine pre-approved by the 
PLO in Tunisia. This over-ride of hierarchy was argued through efficiency and 
vulnerability of communication to Israeli espionage (PBC 2014). In other words, 
the role of the PLO in Tunisia in the shaping of domestic policy was marginalized, 
and the overall work of the exiled organization was to focus on (be limited to?) 
foreign relations. In other words, the NLI utilized public support for it and the 
border control of Israel to play a (non-planned and non-articulated) political 
coup inside the PLO. As history insists on repeating itself, this same strategy was 
utilized less than two decades later by Hamas in its coup against Fatah in the GS 
in 2007.
The third stroke was delivered in the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace 
Conference which marked the launch of Israel-Palestinian direct negotiations 
towards reaching a political settlement to the predicament of colonization. 
Thence Israeli government blackmailed the PLO through insisting on having 
the Palestinian representation composed of inland politicians only. While they 
upheld the claim of the PLO as sole representative of Palestinians with Yasser 
Arafat as Chair, notwithstanding, NLI politicians where in the driver’s seat of the 
PLO politics, in a further – regardless whether intelligent or not – undermining 
of Arafat’s gist to Palestinian decision-making. In an opinion published about the 
events in Sawt elWatan in January 1993 (before the Oslo process came to public 
knowledge); Arouri stated:
There was an advantage for having the Palestinian negotiating team formed 
from within the occupied Palestinian territories, a condition by Shamir and his 
government in order to serve Israeli goals, of which fragmenting the Palestinian 
people to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ [...]; yet the magic turned on its executor, [...] 
where Shamir found himself facing a Palestinian team in Madrid that was more 
[than Tunis-PLO?] knowledgeable of and experienced in Israeli and Palestinian 
affairs; and whose loyalty to the PLO was guaranteed. (Arouri 2013:334)
In the 8th session of the Washington negotiations the Israeli team handed 
the Palestinian one an ‘Interim Self Government Arrangements’ proposal – can 
be called an early and a significantly more generous version of the OAs. The 
scenario gave sovereignty to the PLO over 60% of the WB and GS, a joint Israeli-
Palestinian command of 30%, while Israel retains the remaining 10% which 
correspond to built-up areas of colonies and East Jerusalem (Arouri 2013). The 
Palestinian team rejected this proposal, and soon after were handed another 
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insult: Israel breached the truce agreement by ruling the deportation of more 
than 400 Palestinians to Marj Zhour in southern Lebanon. As a result, leftist 
politicians of the Palestinian negotiation team decided to withdraw from the 
‘peace process’ in spite of Fatah’s opposition, thence handing the driver’s keys to 
the latter whose uncontested leader was Arafat. In his turn, Arafat recognized 
that this uncoordinated withdrawal is an echo of the earlier ‘PLO reform coup’, 
whose elimination necessitates his control over domestic policymaking. While 
the politicians of the NLI convinced themselves that their withdrawal will halt 
the negotiations and pressure Israel, Arafat had already agreed to a Plan B and 
sentenced the Washington Negotiations to what it remains to be today, the pre-
band from the concert that nobody remembers.
Seen through those internal PLO power contestation and the omnipresence 
of ideology of national-institutionalisation, the terms of the OAs and Arafat’s PA 
politics become a Cartesian concatenation of events. Israel recognized Arafat’s 
weakness, hence in January 1993 and as the Washington sessions were still 
being held it shifted its dialogue from the radical ‘anti territorial compromise’ 
charactered inland politicians in Washington to the exiled and vulnerable ones, 
inviting Arafat to commission his right hand Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to 
conceive the Oslo Accords in back-channel talks. While ‘only a decade earlier 
the Israeli leadership had embarked on a war to annihilate the PLO as political 
entity’, by 1993 they ‘undertook its exact opposite’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:33). 
A common opinion amongst observers stipulates that during the Washington 
Negotiations the Israeli team recognized the limited knowledge of exiled 
politicians of the geography, hence used the withdrawal of the NLI to trap the 
PLO into the illusion of expressions such as ‘dismantling the settlements’ – a term 
that remains in heavy circulation. In reality:
Statistics are meaningless. Discussions and speeches and proposals and 
condemnations and reasons and maps for negotiation and the excuses of 
negotiators and all we have heard and read about the settlements, all this is 
worth nothing. You have to see them for yourself. [...] If you hear a speaker 
on some platform use the phrase ‘dismantling the settlements’, then laugh to 
your heart’s content. These are not children’s fortresses of Lego or Meccano. 
These are Israel itself; Israel the idea and the ideology and the geography and 
the trick and the excuse. It is the place that is ours and that they have made 
theirs. The settlements are their book, their first form. They are our absence. 
The settlements are the Palestinian Diaspora itself. I said to myself that the 
negotiators of Oslo were ignorant of the true meaning of these settlements, 
otherwise they would never have signed the Agreement. (Barghouti 2005:29)
Not surprisingly, Hilde Waage who investigated the Oslo process from the 
framework of ‘third-party mediation in highly asymmetrical conflicts’ found ‘not 
a single scrap of paper for the entire period from January to September 1993 – 
precisely the period of the back-channel talks’ between Palestinians and Israelis in 
Oslo (Waage 2008:54, 56). She elaborates:
In the end, I had not a single original Norwegian document to work with. 
This was an obstacle, to be sure, but not insurmountable. Through scores of 
interviews with key players (Norwegian, Israeli, Palestinian and American), 
excerpts from key missing documents published elsewhere, and a good dose 
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of common sense, it was possible to put together a comprehensive picture of 
the back channel, its pitfalls, and its limitations, focusing on Norway’s role. 
My book caused a considerable stir when it came out in April 2004. I had 
challenged the prevailing myth by demonstrating that Norway had acted very 
much as the United States had acted (albeit for different reasons): Norwegian 
facilitators, anxious to bring the agreement to conclusion, had consistently 
sided with Israel, shared information with them, and leaned on the Palestinians 
to give in at crucial moments. (Waage 2008:56)
This Norway sponsored peace process (entrapment?) ‘came at a time when 
many were expecting the demise of the existing Palestinian political centre’ 
(Shikaki 1996:8), and it:
had a negative impact on national reconstruction by leaving unresolved the major 
issues of the conflict, including the future of Arab Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, 
and Palestinian refugees, to say nothing of the question of sovereignty over the 
land and the nature of the Palestinian political entity. Deferral of these issues to 
future negotiation has created serious defects in the state-building process and 
deepened Palestinian divisions regarding the Palestinian political order and the 
consensus on which it was built. (Shikaki 1996:8)
The claim that an agreement negotiated by the inland NLI politicians 
would have had a better outcome than the Oslo Accords which were signed 
upon by Arafat’s wing in the PLO remains an unevidenced speculation, whose 
relevance seized to exist with the signature of the Declaration of Principles on 
the White-House lawn on 13 September 1993. Moreover, nationalism-based 
regional governments (whether Arab, Persian or Turkish) provide no support for 
the hypothesis that Palestinian in-house policymakers would have conceived a 
‘more inclusive’ version of the equally wished – and delivered – parliamentarian 
governance. This is evidenced with the reality that the – still in operation – 
National Council (PNC) of the PLO which is composed of all Palestinian parties 
and happens to be capable of exercising power on the politics; the PNC did not 
fend off its marginalization under and post Arafat’s leadership; rather, they joined 
in the journey; as AbuSyrrieh writes:
We watch AbdulAziz Boutafliqa placing a ballot from a wheelchair, and accepts 
nomination for presidency at a time he is approaching eighty; same age as 
King Abdullah Bin AbdelAziz [Saudi Arabia] whose two throne-heirs have 
passed away already, akin the Prince of Kuwait. In reality, aging is not the main 
problem, rather, the reality that all Arab regimes are based on the hegemony and 
centrality of an individual. As these rulers age on their positions the situation 
intensifies. Since about three decades when the PNC held its 16th session its 
steering committee has not changed. In other words, symptoms of Arab and 
Palestinian dictatorships are not limited to the term they spend in office, 
rather, it extends through every pillar of the system. Hence one should repeat, 
by observing how this discourse has emptied the Arab liberation movements 
from their essence, components, and failed its goals; it is easy to deduce the fate 
of the Palestinian revolution which no longer enjoys neither the freshness nor 
dynamic of its youth in the 1960s and 1970s. (AbuSyrrieh 2014)
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The transition that the Palestinian political discourse underwent was from 
creation of new identities, social structures and spatialities up to the late 1980s as 
afore-described, to the forth coming exploration of post-Oslo exclusivism, agency, 
and deterioration, death and reconception of resistance practices and thought. 
Here political policy-making as a financially-sensitive process of social learning 
becomes a condition for resilience against uncertainty and marginalization. 
Beyond theory and before delving into detailed discussion; in Palestine this has 
been demonstrated practically twice; in the pre-Oslo activities of liberal politics in 
the face of colonialism and again in the post-Oslo contestation of Hamas against 
Fatah placing at fire-ends insurgency and institutionalisation. Both happenings 
further assert the necessity of fluid alliances (horizontal administration), urban 
media (the space and features), and the elastic reconfiguration of both to 
unfolding processes of political, geographic and social consolidation in face of 
systematized disenfranchisement.
In the close: The shift from horizontal, informal and fluid spacio-politics 
to that of centralized, static and exclusive state-institutions served as a catalyst 
for the contested growth of Ramallah in the post-Oslo era and the realities faced 
throughout the agglomerate today. Arafat’s need to control local policymaking 
eliminated frameworks of civic agency on one hand (alAtar 2010; As’ad 2010, a.o), 
and on the other favoured decision-making based on political loyalty rather than 
knowledge, as Zananiri testifies:
[T]here were two mentalities involved in the [post-Oslo, PA] planning process. 
The first was that of professionals who had training in foreign countries, past 
experiences, and actually knew what they were doing. The second and the more 
powerful of the two, was those affiliated with the politics and the processes of 
Oslo. They came from their exile with projects and plans to build a state, but it 
seems a compatibility study was not conducted to check the correctness of those 
proposals or approaches on how to deal with the situation. (Zananiri 2010)
The impacts of Arafat’s strategy of incredulity on discourses of public (mis)
management, policy-making and spatial organization of Ramallah in the post-
Oslo era are elaborated progressively over coming chapters. These concomitantly 
demonstrate that comprehension of and attempts to improve the forms of created 
urbanism can neither be achieved in suspension of the lineages of Palestinian 
political ideologies and contestation, nor while ignoring global imperial 
forces described in this chapter. In contrast, it asserts that the ‘strategies – the 
land confiscation, the settlement colonies, the assassinations and the perpetual 
[Palestinian] counterinsurgency – have relied on money, machines and manpower 
from outside Israel’ (Collins 2011:5). In the same line, the program of the PA 
remains largely dictated by Israel and foreign players through the post-Oslo 
entrenchment of economic dependency (Abdullah 2010; Khoury 2010; Botmeh 
2012; a.o). Before the OAs the PLO was indebted, today a whole population is 
indentured. 
The political precariousness of Palestinians is a defining factor of – as well as 
continuously re-shaped by – space, time, and changing social ethos. Therefore, the 
OAs should not be reduced to an ideological or political ‘peace process’ between 
two ‘nations’. Rather, this agreement outlined the mechanisms and geographies 
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that nurtured the fundamental shifts of glocalization of Ramallah’s economy and 
the cosmopolitanism of social ethos and solidarities, as well as their opposition. 
Addressing the physical urban transformation of Ramallah under continued 
colonial and neocolonial practices necessitates taking into perspective the 
economic and social dimensions and ideologies elaborated in this chapter; more 
so as urban politics and policymaking is the direct product of both.
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3  | RAMALLAH’S OSLO: 
NEOLIBERAL STATE-
MAKING AND 
SOCIO-RELATIONAL 
SENSIBILITIES
Palestine is located at the intersection of two sets of global processes that 
symbolize not only the profoundity of the structural injustices that are being 
confronted today, but also the resilience ans creativity with which many people 
are confronting those injustices. (Collins  2011:2)
The concept of state-building has been the preoccupation of several 
populations upon the collapse of the last soldiers of the classical empires in the 
20th century. Theories have been drafted, recipes prepared, strategies followed, 
and nation-states fulfilled. However, the story does not end with the formation 
as revealed in the postscript. In this respect, the international community has 
invested heavily in the reconfiguration of the occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPTs) sous-prétext the formation of the physical and institutional foundation 
necessary for the future independent Palestinian state. In the decade between 
1994 and 2004 about US$ 8 billion in foreign aid was pledged to the PA, ‘averaging 
roughly between $250 and $400 per capita over this period, and equivalent to 
10-30% of GDP per year’ (Brynen 2005:1); and delivered US$ 6.2 Billion (World 
Bank 2014). In December 2007 the Paris Donor Conference pledged further US$ 
7.7 billion in support of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan, at a time 
the proposal requested 37.5% less, US$ 5.6 billion to be precise; according to Dr. 
Samir Abdullah (2012), former Minister of Planning and Administration. 
Twenty years erstwhile, making the Palestinian state and gathering 
international funds for that end remains the main postulate. On May 26th 2013 
the U.S. Secretary of Sate John Kerry declared an economic plan to attract further 
US$ 4 billion in investment to boost the Palestinian economy through the sectors 
of tourism, construction, and information technology, because: 
If we don’t eagerly grab this moment we will condemn ourselves to a future 
conflict. [...] The current situation endangers the economy and the social fabric 
of both nations, and may render the two-state solution unattainable. (John 
Kerry IN AFP 2013)
On one hand, the choice of sectors reflects the colonially-conditioned 
approach of the USA government to the development of Palestinians. Tourism and 
construction require minimal access to resources outside of areas A hence avoiding 
the debate on the territorial sovereignty of this assumed state;  while information 
technology constitutes the only viable economic sector for Palestinians given the 
continued denial of control over space and borders (movement, import, export, 
etc.), raw materials and resources. On the other hand, the plethora of similar 
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statements implying a Palestinian state ‘in the coming future’ has rendered the 
latter a comic rhetoric. Such proclamations are coupled with reference to what is 
considered the foundation; the Peace Process that was launched with the Madrid 
Conference in 1991 and phrased in the OAs in 1993. Noteworthy, the ‘interim self-
governance agreement’ (Annex.3, p. 384) within its ten articles and many pages 
of annexes does not mention once a ‘State of Palestine’. Instead, when needed, 
the term ‘Palestinian Authority’ (PA) is applied. Later, the newly founded PA 
unilaterally added the adjective ‘national’ making it the Palestinian National 
Authority, fulfilling the prophecies of Anderson (2006) as he notes ‘that since 
World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in national terms 
[...] ground[ing] itself firmly in a territorial and social space inherited from the 
prerevolutionary past’ (Anderson 2006:2, emphasis in original). This naming was 
not adopted by any other official body or government, keeping this entity as an 
authority over a population but not necessarily a nation, up to 27 November 2012 
when the UN General Assembly passed resolution 67/19 accepting Palestine as a 
‘non-member observer state’1, hence seating the PLO aside of the Holy See. 
The importance of this reality lies in the – non-intelligent and non-
planned – re-orientation of the Palestinian political leadership from leading a 
struggle for the acclaimed ‘right to self determination’, to the post-revolution 
preoccupation of territorial administration in spite of the continuation of their 
subjugation (Fanon 2008; Lemke 2003; Kassis 2010). In other words, from 
preoccupation in combating colonialism to an alleged freedom materialized in 
the lived illusion of state-building. In this regard scholarly work demonstrates 
that western models of democracy and their promotion employ sociopolitically 
incompatible goals, systems, time-frames and indicators. These imaginaries 
are consumed with complicit regimes against endemic alternatives under the 
politics of ‘infantilization’ which is myopic to locational specificities (Harvey 
2009, Escobar 2012, Martin 1998, Lemke 2003). 
Under these dynamics conceived regimes typically inherit a foreign 
system of claimed democracy, which is normatively desirable yet significantly 
vulnerable and often hegemonic (Moxham 2008). Herein, the PA administers 
the Palestinians, who remain subjects under the custody of the state of Israel 
while neither enjoying the status of Israeli citizens, nor are they acknowledged as 
citizens of another country (Israeli military law and tribunals apply to Palestinians 
under all conditions)2. In this position they are similar to their representing 
authority, which is presumed autonomous, but enjoys neither sovereignty nor 
freedom of decision-making, a fact underlined in the headline, in its naming 
as an ‘authority’3. Thereof Palestinians are a ‘nation’ whose nationality remains 
legally unrecognised, and live the imaginaries of revolutionary state-formation 
as heard in tales of post-colonial communities (Collins 2011; Escobar 2012). The 
aforementioned befalls simultaneously with – since mid 1990s – increasingly 
right-wing Israeli governments of what Hamami and Tamari (2008) describe 
as maximalist-Zionists, who openly express objection for a Palestinian state or 
the normalization of Palestinians into its population. While MK Danny Danon 
(deputy Defence Minister) argued that there is a majority amongst Israeli 
legislators opposing a two-state solution (Ahren 2013), the current Minister of 
Economy Naftali Bennet stated that the home of Palestinians is in Jordan, and:
The attempt to establish a Palestinian state in our land has ended. [...] Everyone 
who wanders around Judea and Samaria [WB] knows that what they say in the 
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corridors of Annapolis and Oslo is detached from reality. [...] It must be said 
that this land has been ours for 3,000 years, [...] there was never a Palestinian 
state here and we were never occupiers. (Ravid 2013)
Within this condition of ‘seeming-post-colonial’ colonialism the underlying 
terms of nation, state, territoriality and security are the dominant in the jukebox 
of policy makers regarding city development, planning, and the corresponding 
strategies with little regard to the specific sociopolitical circumstance of being 
hitherto colonized and temporalized; as if ‘conducted in an international 
vacuum’ (Ayoob IN Lemke 2003:3) whilst ignoring that ‘When no heed is paid 
to the relations that inhere in social facts, knowledge misses its target’ (Lefebvre 
2009:81). In the same line, the nationalist political paradigm continues to 
draw Ramallah further from resilient urbanity, and closer towards militarized 
spaces and neoliberal totalitarianism. While several local scholars are re-
investigating the existential questions and mechanisms of their decolonization, 
Palestinian politics remains trapped. The PLO’s dogma and the PA’s policies 
for administering the Palestinians are both limited to the narrow scope of the 
imagined homogeneous identity (as elaborated in section 2.2, p. 73), whose 
unmatching population is undergoing serious fragmentation as a result of 
this non-compatibility. In this context Ramallah should base its development 
strategies on primary investigations of the factors amidst which it is growing, 
where even though territoriality is regarded as kernel to political sovereignty 
(Taylor 1994), nonetheless:
The isomorphism of people, territory, and legitimate sovereignty that 
constitutes the normative character of the modern nation-state is under threat 
from the forms of circulation of people characteristic of the contemporary 
world. It is now widely conceded that the world we live in is one in which 
human motion is more often definitive of social life than it is exceptional. 
[Moreover,] modern conceptions of citizenship, tied up with various forms 
of democratic universalism, tend to demand a homogeneous people with 
standardized packages of rights. Yet the realities of ethnoterritorial thinking 
in the cultural ideologies of the nation-state demand discrimination among 
different categories of citizens even when they all occupy the same territory. 
The civil status (or nonstatus) of Palestinians in respect to the Israeli state is 
only the extreme example of this contradiction. (Appadurai 2003:38-39)
In this context Lefebvre contends that the ‘space that homogenizes’ in effect 
‘has nothing homogeneous about it’, rather, the state-tools of mass treatments 
of urban planning and the development enterprise are territorial processes that 
produce ‘a shapeless mixture, in chaos, despite the administrative order and 
spatial logistics of the state’ (2009:308;85). In a round-table discussion at the 
Joschka Fischer & Company consultancy in Berlin on 14 November 2013, the 
urban strategist and Chief Urban Designer of Portland (Oregon, 2002-2009) Arun 
Jain argued that master plans and zoning schemes are outdated and incompatible 
urban management practices. They are two-dimensional impositions on a four-
dimensional context; they are generic rather than locational; their integration 
of corollary and varied economic and social systems is cosmetic; they require 
extensive preparation durations that dilute their relevance as they are based on 
start-line knowledge while intelligence is continuously and rapidly evolving 
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and shifting; they assume stability at a time uncertainty is the global prevalent 
circumstance, and; such tools lack the flexibility and re-adaptation features 
necessitated by mechanisms of resilience. Can Ramallah become resilient?
Up to date no system has managed to account for all variables shaping the 
urban, however the lack of utopias neither abates the positive experiences of 
some cities, nor excuses those whom seem to continue to encumber. Ramallah, 
in spite of the pessimism of many, has just entered the epoch of metropolitanism 
and global relations, as such, decision-makers do have the choice between 
entrenching systems of urban vulnerability or convert to principles of resilience 
via employing need-based innovation. Through the work of the urban theorist 
Jane Jacobs on the relevance of human scale to urban life and his own research 
and various projects, the Danish architect and urban strategist Jan Gehl (2011) 
advocates the development of urban form and space through gradual incremental 
improvements, given that these measures are conceived through research and 
documentation pre and post the operation. He argues the centrality of location-
sensitive documentation to urban planning, as influencing variables and their 
intensities vary across urban subdivisions, where he quotes the Dutch architect 
Van Klingeren as having ‘summarized his experience of city-activities in the 
formula ‘one plus one is three – at least’’ (ibid:73). Gehl also adds that:
Life between buildings is potentially a self-reinforcing process. When someone 
begins to do something, there is a clear tendency for others to join in, either to 
participate themselves or just to experience what the others are doing. In this 
manner individuals and events can influence and stimulate one another. Once this 
process has begun, the total activity is nearly always greater and more complex 
than the sum of the originally involved component activities. (Gehl 2011:73)
Within the context of this work which aims at contributing to the imagineering 
of discourses of sociospatial decolonization through investigating and developing 
fluid and relational concepts for the morphological re-configuration of the 
antispaces of Ramallah; therein, the mapping of spatially dominant social groups 
(whether by vested power or size, physical or mental occupation of space), and 
their dynamics, systems, aspirations and imaginations constitutes a corner stone 
to understanding the logic of their undertakings and behaviour. Hence, this 
chapter resumes the discussion from the former one, yet frames itself for the 
period following the signature of the Oslo Accords, i.e. 1994 - 2014. The first 
section focuses on two; first, analysing the mode and impact of change in the 
political (hierarchy of colonial decision-making) system on the various scales 
of stakeholders, particularly, the bureaucratic and financial re-arrangements 
of the peacebuilding as state-making discourse. And therewith, second, it maps 
the processes that lead to the dismantling of sumud. The following section then 
builds the arguments further through focusing on the successive socio-economic 
adaptation and coping tools that were employed by Ramallites under the new 
mutated (fremd) system. It elaborates on the mentalities of Palestinians as risk-
society through the psycho-geographies of Ramallites. Along this exploration 
the four phases of transmogrification of the city-landscape features are surveyed. 
Thereupon, what are the politico-economic factors stirring Ramallah’s tendencies 
over the past two decades? And what are the physical and mental spacio-social 
relationalities and sensibilities legitimizing and incubating happenings?
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3.1.   THE 
FELICITOUS STATE: 
BUREAUCRATIZATION, 
CORRUPTION AND THE 
CIRCUS ECONOMY
Some narrations claim Ramallah had no significance for former PLO 
chairman Yasser Arafat who chose to return to Gaza first (father’s birthplace), 
spread the PA ministries across the WB and GS (coopting local leaderships?), and 
placed the Palestinian Parliament in the Jerusalem district of AbuDeis – where 
no session took place and four families have squatted the building (Mottelson 
2013) as this locality enjoys very limited PA policing abilities (Area B; see pg. 
34). Scholars, observers and average citizens concur that the fate of the borough 
was rewritten due to Arafat’s choice of its hill-station – alMuqata’a – as his WB 
residence and command centre, and the consequent economic, demographic, and 
structural changes the agglomerate had to process. The neither economically nor 
socially nor biblically significant Ramallah and alBireh were favoured by account 
of four; first, the Jerusalem towns of elRam and AbuDies are categorized under 
Area B where Arafat’s security apparatuses cannot deploy (Barthe 2011); second, 
they are the closest and relatively least Israel-militarized localities to Jerusalem 
with Area A classification (neither Gush Etzion nor Ma’ale Adumim blocks of 
colonies) and the valve to the north (Barghouthi 2012); third, in contrast to the 
larger cities this area possessed no entrenched sociopolitical structures and ‘had 
become an important node in national politics’ by the 1980s (Taraki 2008a:66), 
and; fourth, Ramallah enjoyed a romantic echo for the returnees from Beirut and 
Tunisia – amongst which Arafat – where diversity, liberalism and joie de vivre were 
elements of the setting (Taraki 2008; Barthe 2011). Therein, the early years of the 
OAs had little impact on Ramallah which next to the natural population growth 
experienced minimal additional influx; few of the returnees4 who anomalistically 
refrained from pursuing residence in the ancestral locality, or curious expatriates, 
or the pioneers and scouts of the development-aid industry. 
Two years after Arafat’s entry to Gaza, in June 1996 the Likud party candidate 
Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel. Three months later 
Palestinians took to the street again, a wave of civil disobedience in protest of 
the excavation works under the Temple Mount Mosque of alAqsa by Zionist 
groups searching for the remains of the Second Temple and the confiscation of 
the Abu Ghunaim natural reserve for the purpose of the construction of a new 
colony (Image 3.2, p. 106). Palestinian cities were caught once more in cross-fire 
with the IOF, scores were killed and injured breaking the illusion of retracting 
colonialism, and Ramallah for the first time became political command ghetto 
as PLO echelons pilgrimaged to the Mukata’a to consult with Arafat after waiting 
on checkpoints and manoeuvring around closure zones. This non-PLO invoked 
event exposed the PA’s territorial non-sovereignty, economic vulnerability5, and 
non-monopoly over violence, as well as prompted two; first, a rise in the intensity 
of centralization of PA-institutions and the corollary emigration to Ramallah 
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including agents of foreign representation offices, and; second, the World 
Bank launched its Palestinian NGO Project (PNGO) which served as a main 
incubator during the future rise for what Taraki (2008a) calls the ‘new middle 
class’. In this regard testimonies attribute major post-Oslo changes in Ramallah’s 
ethos primarily to the returnees arriving during the mid to late 1990s and abetted 
by Palestinians of other regions post the year 2000, indirectly assuming that 
Ramallites would not have altered otherwise. In the Focus Group no.2 (30-40 
years old) the post OAs change of Ramallah was expressed as:
There were lots of new people arriving into the city, leading to its physical 
growth. There were also numerous investments [...] accompanied by the 
arrival of a political elite and a change in awareness. Awareness not particularly 
in positive terms. There was an image of a different living style that arrived, 
politically, economically, construction, built environment, cafés and 
entertainment, which all led to a mutation in the track of the resistance. (FG 
2011, no.2, 35-45 yrs old)
Confirming that the impact of a particular social group is not necessarily 
relevant to its size, Gehl argues that the ‘self-reinforcing’ ‘positive-’ or 
‘negative-process’ of urban dynamics are a ‘product of number and duration 
of the individual events. It is not the number of people or events, but rather 
the number of minutes spent [...] that is important’ (2011:77; emphasis in 
original). As an elaboration on this stipulate and while avoiding the cliquish 
example of new-comers, in Ramallah the projected ‘threat’ of the Tahrir Party 
– radical pro-Caliphate and Shari’a6 Islamists – is dilating by power of the time 
it consumes of the lived- and mental-spaces of the Ramallites on the street, in 
café discussions, and in social media; rather than the generally claimed growing 
size (visible segments) of the group which remains comparatively small in spite 
of surging. Beyond direct discussion of the phenomena liberal patrons request 
of their minor and adult associates to be discrete and cautious (more than 
otherwise) in their activities to avoid potential retaliation from the ‘violent 
party’. The dynamic that the Tahrir Party has on Ramallah can be compared to 
provincial European politics which constantly attempts to find and or expand 
footing in larger mixed cities, although their centre of weight lies in rural 
areas. That said, the repetitive – and sharpened – passive preoccupation with 
or consumption of actions of ‘other’ groups (ideology, authoritarianism, etc.) 
and speculation over their real size and future ‘crime [...] becomes a problem, 
everyone stays away from the streets – with good reason. The vicious circle is 
complete’ (Gehl 2011:77).
Image 3.1. Abu Ghuneim Mountain in 1996, 
south of Jerusalem (MOEA 2014).
Image 3.2. ibid in 2010 (Nadel 2010).
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Ramallah’s sociospatial change – the emergence of new social ethos and 
lived spaces in the post-Oslo era (FG 2011, no.2; no.6; As’ad 2010; Taraki 2010) 
– is in essence endemic to its persona of short hierarchies and features of re-
adaptation. Notwithstanding, the preeminence of contestation (inter- and intra- 
the agglomerate) is a result of the mutation factors that reversed the trend from 
positive (pre-Oslo) to negative processes (post-Oslo); to which PA systems served 
as accelerators and the Zionist colonial geographies and tools as dissever. In the 
same line, the criticism of Ramallah’s growth can be attributed to the schism 
between spatial materializations and varied micro socio-economic aspirations; 
whereby ‘people and events are so spread out in time and space that the individual 
activities almost never get a chance to grow together to larger, more meaningful 
and inspiring sequences of events’ (Gehl 2011:75). Under the same logic, it is 
valid to assume that the problematic of Ramallah lies neither in the coincidence 
of social antagonisms, nor and the barter of alliances, nor the sharing of 
spaces; rather, in the lack of corollary development of essential frameworks of 
deliberation and accumulation whose absence eliminates positive exchange in 
favour of contestation, and diversity in favour of fragmentation. Combining the 
aforementioned with the reality that resilience necessitates ‘ability of systems 
to respond and adapt effectively to changing circumstances’ (IFRC 2012:7), the 
investigation of whether Ramallah is able to develop a social ethos of scaling 
(vis-à-vis elimination) of contending ideologies commences with identifying the 
dominant systems of policymaking sustaining the mutation factors.
3.1.1.   The Autocracy of the Archipelagos: the 
OAs, Foreign-Aid and Nation-State Model
‘Ripeness’ for negotiations is not the same as ripeness for conflict resolution. 
This was the situation with regard to the Oslo Accords. [...] The act of mutual 
recognition embedded in the Oslo Accords masked this critical flaw in the Oslo 
process. [...] This meant that peace, rather than being associated with justice, 
was associated with capitulation or at best pragmatism. (Rynhold 2008:9-11)
Common discourse and literature on the European state model as a 
political entity link it to the ability to control resources, economic profit and 
the cornering of non-state entities, bringing forth what is referred to as the 
Westphalian Sovereignty (Lemke 2003). In the same line, the foreign-aid for 
peacebuilding policy postulates conflict resolution via economic development 
and mutually-constructive partnerships among contesting parties (Moxham 
2008). Through the signature of the OAs Israel retained control over majority of 
tradeable market-resources by locking 60% of the WB territory into the Area C 
category, and cornered the PLO (through its executive arm the PA) into 18% that 
correspond to the built-up areas (Tamari 2002; Map 1.20, p. 37). While pre-Oslo 
Palestinian attitudes and sociopolitical associations extended over the geography 
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, in the aftermath it rapidly 
shrunk into 3.3%7 of the geography (FG 2011, no.6; Anani 2010); as As’ad testifies:
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I personally believe that Israel has occupied us today, more than any other point 
in history. Before 1993/4 Israel could not claim a full occupation because it was 
still unable to occupy us mentally and intellectually. Today we are definitely 
occupied, that’s why we find it hard to get out, leave our ghettos [Area A] and 
enjoy the country. Before we had a clear identity and clear priorities, so even 
when the Israeli army units were in the city centre, we were able to go around and 
connect with the spaces as ours. [... W]hat really hurts is that Israel has succeeded 
in diverting us from the path the Palestinian community was progressing along 
into that of compromise, individuality, and foreign-hood within our own space. 
We became a subsidiary company, no matter what sector it is you are talking 
about. My husband is originally from Gaza and has been living in Ramallah since 
the signature of Oslo. Since that date he has not seen his parents or siblings not 
a single time, and they have not met my children, their grandchildren. My kids 
think Ramallah is Palestine. I am a Jerusalemite, but with all the trouble I have 
to go through every time I want to enter Jerusalem my visits have become very 
limited, to the extent that my kids deal with going to Jerusalem as a trip to another 
country. And as they are in an age of becoming aware of their surroundings it 
is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to them why their father cannot 
accompany us, why we cannot just decide to go to the beach as a family. [...] do 
you have any idea how frustrating that is? (As’ad 2010)
What Anani (2010) refers to as the ‘shrinking mental space of Palestinians’ is 
as well a ‘self-reinforcing process’ (Gehl 2011), stimulated through Israel’s optical 
settler colonialism which changed latitude from a ‘mere relative position on 
mountain topography’ to ‘a vertical separation between two parallel, overlapping 
and self-referential ethno-national geographies, held together in startling and 
horrifying proximity’ (Weizman 2007:117). 
Besides the geography, the maximalist Zionists discourse had laid the WB 
and GS as ‘captive markets’ (Lagerquist 2003) to Israeli entrepreneurs whom 
capitalized on the access to both, cheap human and material resources. By 1991 
a third of the WB and GS workforce was operating inside the Green Line (Roy 
1999), accounting to 28% of the GNP (Brynen 2000). Zionism envisioned the 
dynamic to be that of expanding mental space of Israeli entrepreneurs beyond the 
legal borders while increasing dependence of the Palestinians on their economy. 
In reality the product was a the growth of both – mental space and economic 
interdependence – in both directions across the invisible border, which in turn 
stimulated the re-bridging of social ties as well as politics between WB and GS 
Palestinians on one side and on the other those with Israeli citizenship. The 
need to re-limit the mental geography of Palestinians while maintaining Israeli 
economic profit lead the Israeli government to search for alternatives. 
Reminding yet again of the quiddity of the urban and regional planning 
discipline to the Zionist strategy; in 1989 the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe 
Arens commissioned the director of the Ministry of Finance Ezra Sadan to 
draw up a ‘development’ plan for the WB and GS, whose goal ‘was to build up a 
domestic industrial base, first in Gaza and then in the West Bank, which, linked 
to the Israeli economy, could absorb Palestinian workers’ (Lagerquist 2003:7). 
These zones8 would maintain advantages of the Israeli businessmen while 
avoiding the entry (hence visibility) of Palestinian workers into the Israeli social 
and mental spaces (interacting with the general Israeli public on bus stations, in 
workplace, marriage of Palestinians of different legal statuses, etc). Capturing 
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the spirit of infrastructural design by the Israeli government, Jeff Halper – an 
Israeli anthropologist and co-founder of the Israeli Committee Against House 
Demolitions (ICAHD) in 1997– stated:
Here is where the highway system feeds in and the whole infrastructure, 
because you create a landscape in which you’re in Ma’ale Adumim in the middle 
of the West Bank, but with a beautiful highway you go to work in Jerusalem 
and back to home in 15 minutes [...], never encounter an Arab, obviously – God 
forbid! – you never go through an Arab village or neighbourhood or anything 
else, you stay completely in a Jewish Israeli environment. So you come from 
Jewish Jerusalem, you go down the beautiful Jewish highway, through a Jewish 
landscape of the land of Israel which is all idyllic because you don’t see Arabs, 
you get into your Jewish dormitory suburb, go to your Jewish swimming pool at 
the end of the day, and everything is normal, is banal, it’s not an issue, it is not 
political at all! (Halper IN alAtar 2006: minute 16:00)
The contours of the archipelagos outlined by the OAs were aimed at 
naturalizing the imagined Palestinian identity between the people and a reduced 
territory, where ‘the enclosure, measurement, and commodification of space have 
been key for the production of the modern notion of a national territory bounded 
by frontiers that sharply distinguish inside from outside’ (Alonso 1994:382). 
In the same context Edmund Burke adds that this distinguishing of territory 
‘is a fundamental condition of collective and individual political identity’ since 
it ‘constitutes the ground through which notions such as duty, obligation, 
order and freedom come to have the political meaning that they do’ (Burke, in: 
Harvey 2009:42). Herein, Israel utilized the psycho-epistemological variation 
materializing from adding an ‘inverse factor’ to the existing equation. Through 
the OAs citizens ‘duty’ is proclaimed by the ‘representative’ Palestinian PA rather 
than the occupying Israeli ICA; the ‘obligation’ to the rule of law is stated in the 
constitution by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) while the military 
system of the IOF maintains invisible supremacy through hidden Annexes; ‘order’ 
is imposed by Palestinian policemen and frames of locally (rather than externally) 
supported hierarchies; and claims for ‘freedom’ are redirected from the powering 
colonial to that against the self-representing, colonial-middleman, the agent- 
state. The advancement of this irreversible process of quivering power structures, 
symbols of oppression/freedom, and the subsequent redefinition of sociopolitical 
priorities are crystallizing in the approach of Ramallites to the –mentally bounded 
and shrunken – city-space.
Under the same equation of the OAs Israel was freed of its internationally 
stipulated duty9 of provision of basic services and administration of the – in 2013, 
4.5 million (PCBS 2013c) – Palestinians as operations were transferred to the 
subsidiary PA whilst withholding decision-making at the COGAT (Barghouthi 
2012). Further, the US$ 3 billion nowadays annual expenses (Times of Israel 
2014) of the continued colonization of Palestinians have been outsourced to 
the international community at a time prior to the OAs these were affixed to 
the national budget of Israel (Roy 1999; As’ad 2010). Greater dividends were 
atop ensured as Israel allowed its private as well as public sectors to engage in 
the development and provision of systems that had been hitherto withheld from 
Palestinian communities e.g. Israeli telecommunication companies allow the 
created Palestinian quasi subsidiaries – albeit legislatively independent – to use 
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their infrastructures (not pro bono), whereby the permissible network coverage 
range is a variation of Oslo’s territorial contours. Power, water, fuel, import 
and export are few sectors among others of basic and secondary commodities 
whose Palestinian entrepreneurs generate a negatively factored profit due to 
the obligatory subservience to colonial ones (Roy 1999; Samara 2000). These 
as well as other biased economic policies were placed into effect through the 
Paris Economic Protocol (Oslo II) on 29 April 1994, an agreement which ‘is, 
in fact, worse than the Oslo Accords that laid the groundwork for it’ (Samara 
2000:23). Over thirty-five pages it details the PA’s economy whose every element 
is conditioned by Israeli consent: coordination committees, import and export, 
monetary and financial policies, taxation systems, labour, agriculture, industry 
and even insurance systems (NAD 1994). Although implicated in the negotiation 
of this protocol, thence PA Minister of Economy and Trade  Maher alMasri 
noted that ‘All economic agreements following the Declaration of Principles were 
dangerous and have had a negative impact on the economy’ (Samara 2000:23). 
Two decades past, this is proving to be ‘an enduring legacy’ by which ‘development 
came to mean that Palestinians became closely monitored guests in their own 
economy’ (Lagerquist 2003:8).
This non-winning trade-off is often referred to as ‘Economic Peace’ by 
Israeli politicians10 (or as ‘hush money’ by Amira Hass and as ‘pacification money’ 
by Jeff Halper). These arrangements could be considered derivatives of Tilly’s 
stipulate that ‘war makes states’, where monopoly over violence remains a priority 
post the establishment, while governments gradually espouse characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and ‘legitimate racketeers’ (Tilly 1985:170). The neoliberal economic 
policies which celebrate the free-market ideology and were ‘admired deeply’ by the 
‘PA leadership’ conceived what Samara calls a ‘casino economy’. Citing data which 
indicated unemployment rates amongst Palestinians sextupling from 5% to 30% 
in the years between 1994 and 1996, plundering GDP rates and the corresponding 
US$ 2.45 billion in disbursements by international donors between 1993 and 1996, 
Samara indicated the obvious:
The PA’s corruption, by now almost universally recognized, and financial 
mismanagement of donor funds flow from the mentality of a guerrilla 
organization that continues to prevail, wherein the leadership cannot be 
questioned and operates in secrecy and without accountability. Hence the PA’s 
parallel budgets, one public and one covert, the latter containing hundreds of 
millions of dollars of public money distributed to buy loyalty for the regime 
rather than going into development or building infrastructure. Hence, too, the 
PA’s creation of a huge bureaucratic structure, now [year 2000] numbering more 
than 100,000 civilian and military personnel totally depend on and therefore 
loyal to the regime. In this the PA resembles the Arab regimes, but unlike them, 
it lacks the resources to sustain such a ‘state’ apparatus. (Samara 2000:24)
The same guerilla mentality has significantly limited private investments 
to a coterie of ‘profiteers’ whose interests coincide with the discourse of the PA 
leadership. Atop the investment risks poised through political instability and 
corruption, investors have to navigate through legal and regulatory mélange 
of Turkish, British, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli and PA legislation. Moreover, 
they have to manoeuvre the ‘excessively interventionist policies of the PA’ 
which translated with quasi coercive partnerships in the form of semi-public 
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or semi-private monopolies over basic economic sectors among others (Brynen 
2000:119).  
While pre-Oslo domestic politics and policies were sustained by swift 
accountability to the public, the bureaucratic mechanisms of quasi state-
institutions dismantled the trust in the PA and corollary PLO figures. In 2010, 
13% of Palestinians claimed to have witnessed an act of corruption, 76% said it 
is difficult to report a case, and 60% of public officials in the WB assessed the 
reporting between difficult and very difficult (PCBS 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Siding 
opinion statistics, the corruption of the PA is conclusive in discrepancy in figures 
of expenses; were in 2011 the PA had a total of US$ 3,403.5 million in expenses11 
of which 92% spent by the central government and less than 8% by local ones 
(PCBS 2011a). Palestinians find themselves caught between the anvil of their 
political actuality as colonized subjects of Israel and the hammer of the PA which 
exercises a mutated form of guerilla-state-power and perpetuates its subsidiariness 
through policies of decision-making centralization, uncalculated dependency, 
and socioeconomic stratification. Prior to the OAs it was the occupier against the 
losing occupied, while in the Oslo era there are the winners and the losers (Bryner 
2000; lagerquist 2003) – the ones powering and those being squelched. In reference 
to the financial crisis which was triggered in 2011 with the retraction of foreign 
aid12, Dr. Samir Abdullah – former Minister of Planning and Administration and 
Director of Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) – clarifies:
The status quo is prone to continue, as such the danger lies in the fact that 
in spite of the financial deterioration there are still people with consumption 
power, indicating the widening economic gap between social strata. This gap 
is more tangible in Ramallah than in other WB cities, and is fuelling feelings 
of jealousy and anger. Prior to the OAs the economic range was not large, 
whereby persons in camps, villages and cities lived in proximity, endured 
same conditions of oppression and the dominant behaviour was that of social 
solidarity. Today the colonial Israeli is not part of our daily screen in the sense 
that their physical presence has diminished; one doesn’t see the IOF taunting 
and fining Palestinian traders. This has been replaced by the image of public-
sector clique and top-tiers of associates living extravagantly, and this is very 
dangerous as I strongly believe that the PA security apparatus is incapable of 
handling the outbreak of riots in protest of corruption and discrepancy. Under 
such a scenario initial targets will most probably be the nouveaux-riches of PA 
elites and rich businessmen. (Abdullah 2012)
Ramallah has numerically benefited from being the status quo capital: 
leisure possibilities, lower unemployment- and higher growth rates than other 
PA-administered localities (Khoury 2010; Huleileh 2012). Nonetheless, these non-
qualitative figures diverge from calculating the discrepancy in distribution of 
wealth between higher and lower strata of the city and equally ignore the resulting 
process of reinforcement of feelings of marginalization (alKhalili 2012; Shaheen 
2012). Ramallah’s configuration as seat of PA and locus of horizontal sociopolitical 
relations is rendering its spaces the front lines of the battle against the PA’s 
systems of power – whether direct or indirect ones, public and private. Herein, 
the historical sociologist Michael Mann postulates the arrangement of any state 
around two power-trajectories (components determining the type13): despotic 
and infrastructural. While despotic power is more involved with the extent of 
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impunity of state elite; infrastructural power ‘denotes the power of the state to 
penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own 
infrastructure’ (Mann 2003:55). This is accomplished through ‘mundane registers, 
such as tax papers, census data and identity documentation, which predispose 
society towards certain forms of regulation’ (Neep 2013:4). As alAtar phrases it: 
‘we never had it that whenever an official steps out of the Muqata’a the entire city 
is shut down. What is the story? Are they trying to give us a new perspective, a 
new images of things? How to deal with those people [in power] and how our 
country should be like?’ (2010).
The PA as envisioned in the OAs is presumably an interim (five years, 
expired since 1998) operation system that would enable the emergence of a 
Palestinian state/government through gradual assumption of tasks relinquished 
by the COGAT, i.e. by stepping into the shoes of the ICA. Two decades erstwhile, 
in 2014, the PA has not been able to grow beyond this hypothesis. The ICA 
remains in operation, has not relinquished its kernel tasks nor superiority 
on decision-making, is maintaining the PA as a subdivision to which it can 
outsource tasks, as a front desk sort-to-speak which caters for the necessary 
initial processing of applications by the general Palestinian public (Kassis 2010; 
Barghouthi 2012). Rephrasing the aforementioned using the terminology of 
Mann: the PA enjoys limited infrastructural power hence radiates impressions of 
state-bureaucracy through the application of despotic power (neo-feudalism?), 
which in turn is a product of the marriage of colonial politics and economics of 
free market (Brynen 2000). 
 Abrams (1977) describes the idea of the state as a ‘message of domination 
– an ideological artefact attributing unity, morality and independence to the 
disunited, amoral, and dependents workings of the practice of government’, where 
the state is a ‘mask’ for the contested ‘exercise in legitimation, in moral regulation’ 
(Abrams 1977:81, 77).  This idea has found resonance in scholars of liberation 
movements, where Alvaro Reyes argues that ‘for many liberation movements 
striving for sovereignty, the assumption remains that exercising political power 
must translate into exercising a power that dominates’ which in turn entails ‘a 
radical separation between the government and the governed, whereby those that 
govern must comprise a privileged political class, wholly distinct from those they 
purport to represent’ (IN Quiquivix 2013:3). In this regard, the PA operates 12 
official policing institutions14 conceived by the OAs and whose headquarters and 
highest concentration rest at the seat of the PLO, Ramallah. These apparatuses 
are estimated to compose of a total of 58,000 official members15 (Elgindy 2013), 
excluding the paramilitias (Bocco et al. 2006). These conform with what Lefebvre 
described as the ‘hegemony of one class’, by which this class solicits persistence of 
its dominion via utilization of influence, repressive violence, and political policy 
(2009; and later elaborated and expanded by Harvey 1990, 2009). This hegemony 
‘is exercised over society as a whole, culture and knowledge, [...] therefore, over 
both institutions and ideas’ (Lefebvre 2009:10). The PA extends its legitimacy and 
continuation through loyalties whose kernel is dependency (fear), rather than 
successful politics (ideology). For significant numbers of Palestinians the PA is 
the last line before falling under poverty line (Botmeh 2012, FG 2011, no.6).
The security programs of the PA and its power structures lie at odds with 
its mantra of  ‘plurality; accountability; equal opportunity; the empowerment of 
[citizens]’ (Khalidi et al. 2011:9). Between its Palestinian Reform and Development 
Plan (PDRP) which was presented in 2007, and the more frequent two-year program 
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of ‘Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State’ in 2009 the PA articulated four 
components imbricate with the Israeli-American criteria of qualification for 
statehood hence supporting Tilly’s (1985) aforementioned hypothesis: 1. Security 
and the rule of law (36% of annual PA budget); 2. Commitment to building 
accountable institutions for higher transparency, efficiency and eradication of 
corruption; 3. Effective public service delivery to encourage investment towards 
fulfilling the fourth element, and; 4. Growth of private sector (Khalidi et al. 2011). 
The higher preoccupation with ensuring a Palestinian neoliberal economy than a 
reliable government is elaborated by Khalidi et al. :
Even if the PA had wanted to pursue an alternative strategy [to neoliberal 
economic structures], it would have been stymied by U.S. pressure, the 
structural realities of Israel’s occupation, dependence on donor money, and 
BWI [Bretton Woods Institutions] advocacy. All these factors contributed to 
minimal ‘policy space’ – the freedom to determine economic policies without 
external constraints being binding. This remains the situation today. [...] 
Remarkably, then, what the PA statehood plan represents, at best, is a strategy 
to expand policy space for the further implementation of the neoliberal 
framework in policy areas over which it has currently no control within the 
existing configuration of Israel’s occupation. In one sense, the current historic 
moment echoes the transfer in an earlier era of limited economic governance 
authority (within the Israeli occupation envelope) to the newly created PA. 
As has since become clear, the 1994 transfer amounted to little more than 
transferring the burdens, obligations, and financing of occupation to local 
shoulders. (Khalidi et al. 2011:12)
Fulfilling Abrams’ (1977) prophecies of the ‘disunited’ and ‘dependents’, 
the OAs have succeeded in transforming the Palestinian national movement 
from a popular collective struggle for liberation to a system of bureaucratic 
political organization and horrific economic dependency. The OAs legalized 
what Beall et al. (2011) describe as the post-conflict continuation and expansion 
of alliances between local political elites and the external power which remains 
in control over access to capital and local resources, which includes Palestinian 
‘national bourgeoisie’ and the international investors as beneficiaries from the 
political and economic status quo (Khalidi & Samour 2001). After two decades of 
planning, implementing, amending and financing the state-model envisioned for 
Palestinians, growth has been found to be highly limited to non-tradable sectors 
such as government services and real estate, while manufacturing and agriculture 
continued to decline (AP 2012). Meanwhile, ‘the disparity between Israel’s per 
capita GDP and that of the Palestinians has doubled, to $30,000’ (Cook 2013). In 
this regard the World Bank has admitted that: 
By 2012, however, foreign budget support had declined by more than half, and 
GDP growth has fallen from 9 percent in 2008-11 to 5.9 percent by 2012 and to 
1.9 percent in the first half of 2013 (with negative growth of - 0.1 percent in the 
West Bank). This slowdown has exposed the distorted nature of the economy and 
its artificial reliance on donor-financed consumption. For a small open economy, 
prosperity requires a strong tradable sector with the ability to compete in the 
global marketplace. (World Bank 2013:vii; emphasis added)
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Over a decade before the World Bank, Roy (1999) described the Palestinian 
post-Oslo discourse as that of de-development which ‘not only distorts the 
development process but undermines it entirely’ whereby such economies 
are systematically ‘deprived of its capacity for production, rational structural 
transformation, and meaningful reform, making it incapable even of distorted 
development’ (ibid:65). Herein, the triangulation of the global economic 
neoliberal discourses, colonialism and the local attitudes and (re)actions to both 
is causing an ‘urban-regional restructuring’ which involves ‘transformations in 
the nature of state power, [...] citizenship, nationalism, politico-cultural identities, 
localities, and architectural forms, among many others’ (Brenner 1999:39). 
The elevated growth rates and the fusion of the localities of the Ramallah 
agglomerate – physically but not operatively – into one another invited concepts of 
metropolitanism. For the homogenising state discourse found in the PA’s Ministry 
of Local Governance (MOLG) the favourite proposal grants the area the status 
of an Amaneh akin Amanet Amman elKubra (Amman Greater Municipality) 
(Barghouthi 2012). In contrast to the declared policy of decentralization (MOPAD 
2007), this proposition centralizes the circumscribed operations of Local 
Governments (LGs) of the agglomerate under one body which would substitute 
existing ones. 
Whereas the European greater municipality model generally centralizes 
regional politics, infrastructural projects, and administrative coordination 
amongst constituents while district-municipalities retain considerable power 
and relevance to locational policymaking; the MOLG systematically ignores 
the existing differences between the constituents whose centralization would 
only exasperate the contestation. For example, Ramallah  Municipality allows 
trade with and consumption of alcohol in liquor shops, hotels and restaurants, 
recognizes and boasts its regional sociopolitical lead, and its mayor-seat is reserved 
to Christians whom constitute a minority in the agglomerate. On the other side, 
alBireh Municipality prides its conservative-Islamic ethos and enjoys greater 
territory, population and accumulated capital. Herein, in place of cornering 
the municipalities at a negotiation table whose mechanism is compromise, the 
MOLG should seek a system that allows fluid-alliances that advocate coexistence 
of the different other. The exclusive nation-state apparatus which imagines a 
horizontal identity across the subjects it governs argues that minorities should 
respect the majority (e.g. Palestinian declaration of independence, Annex.4, p. 
392). In contrast, contestation-reduction in scenes of nonconformity of social 
ideologies and behaviour (hence needed spaces, social freedoms, self-image, 
etc.) requires the ruling majority to accommodate the varied needs of the state’s 
(political framework’s) constituent minorities.
Through a detailed study AbdelAaty (2005) traces the aforementioned 
narrow approach of the PA to LGs and defines it in four; first, the 
marginalization of LGs is sustained through their legal status as hay’at, bodies 
rather than sultat, authorities; second, their budgets remain fractional; third, 
their administration systems underdeveloped, and fourth; their operations 
are limited to construction, licensing transportation-infrastructure and green 
space while policy-essential sectors such as education, social affairs, health 
services and decisions on taxation and fees as income generation methods 
have all been suspended to other bodies. Even regional political positioning is 
suspended from municipalities in favour of an ambiguous body referred to as 
the Governor’s Office whom has a FaceBook page as its sole online presence. 
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When inquired about, answers range its duties between those of a Mukhtar 
(borough chief), liaison officer between LGs and security apparatuses, and a 
Public Relations department. According to Roy (1999), these PA frameworks 
which restrict the operation of its departments whilst systematically weakening 
nodes of communication and accumulation (through aggregations of rives) 
amount to a policy of de-institutionalization. The system remains justified 
under the misleading slogan of efficiency through specialization, in place of the 
evidenced ineffective bureaucratization. 
This internationally-financed operation continues in spite of both 
worldwide scholarship and practice evidencing that varied locational needs 
cannot be nationally factored. Borrowing an example from Europe, responding 
to social demand and the goal of increasing women’s participation in the labour 
market, on 1 August 2013 a new republic-wide legislation by the German Central 
Government came into effect which increased provision of Kitas (nurseries) for 
children under 3 years. The program pumps €5.4 billion into the sixteen states 
that compose the federation between 2013 and 2014, and commits to €845 million 
as continued annual financing starting 2015 (BMFSFG 2014). Nonetheless, on 3 
March 2014 a Spiegel Online coverage titled ‘Die 24-Stunden-Kita’ demonstrated 
that the central allocation of capital which largely corresponded to quantitative 
statistical data has resulted in a discrepancy between locational level of demand 
and that of supply. While some districts have received more Kitaplätze than their 
current need, others received too little. 
While Israel operates decentralized and geopolitically-sensitive systems, the 
PA has coalesced that of the PLO, assuming e.g. that the needs of the education 
systems in Ramallah (where missionary private schools occupy a significant 
space) and that of Tulkarem (who has none) can be met under the same general 
policies. Arafat’s need to control internal political opposition has laboured a 
governing system that is suspended from reality. For example and as illustrated 
in Diagram 3.1, for the fiscal year 2012-2013 the Municipalities Development 
and Lending Fund16 (MDLF) allocated 42% and 27% more for the municipalities 
of Qalqilya and Tulkarem (respectively) than that for Ramallah. If approached 
from the projected number of residents for the year 2012, then Ramallah ranks 
at second place with US$ 10.6 per capita. However, this analysis ignores factoring 
the accumulative pressure produced by hosting establishments (e.g. 41% of all 
WB establishment with more than 100 employees; PCBS 2013a) and the in- and 
outflow of about 100,000 additional persons whom live in other localities yet 
depend on Ramallah for public, financial and administrative services as well as 
work, retail and leisure among other aspects (Abdullah 2010). The intensity of 
population flow and corollary pressure on infrastructures and spaces of Ramallah 
is incongruous to that of Qalqilya and Tulkarem. While some argue further 
criteria as components of decision-making in regards to capital allocation by PA 
institutions, there are no public accounts on the process. 
In the same context, the PA constitution conditioned LGs’ financial strategies 
to the consent of the Minister of Local Government, whether in terms of budget 
allocation; adjunct expenses; internal by-laws; purpose, duration and payments 
mechanisms of loans; sale, rent or purchase of non-transferable property; etc. As 
for revenue through taxes and fees the LGs are limited to property tax, license 
fees, and transportation fines whereby some of these are collected by the central 
government which in turn deduces processing charges. Further, the central 
government which beholds the decision on the sizes of the anaemic budgets often 
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Diagram 3.1. (below) Illustration 
of total MDLF allocations for the WB 
cities in 2012-2013 (MDLF 2014) and 
the corresponding value per capita 
(demographic data from PCBS 2012a). 
On the map of the WB, the distribution of 
establishments per governorate for 2012 is 
demonstrated (PCBS 2013a).
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falls short of collecting due taxes from citizens and timely delivering the agreed 
upon amounts to the LGs (Abdullah 2010, AbdelAaty 2005).
Herein, it should be recognized that the failure of Palestinian politics to 
decelerate the Israeli colonial project is intensely connected to the distancing of 
LGs from policy-making. Central governments are elected every 4-5 years typically 
and in the case of Palestinians twice over two decades17. Meanwhile, quotidian 
priorities are time-factored, hence constantly shifting. LGs remain the major 
bridge between central governments and the population, they cushion differences 
and incubate pilot socioeconomically-led strategies for the axiomatically dynamic 
spatial as well as political policymaking. Under the auspices of this argument, in 
recent years international donors have been allocating considerable sums for the 
capacity-building of the LGs in programs such as the SDIP (see section 4.3.2, p. 
198) and put into force systems of fund transfers that detour from the PA treasury. 
Whereas the concept is plausible, the methods remained erroneous and counter-
effective (the dynamic and impact of these flawed cash-flow systems are addressed 
in the coming section). 
Further, it should be recognised that development cannot occur without 
accountability. Deferral from the PA does not solve the corruption furcating from 
it into the larger ecosystem any more than deferral from direct association with 
the Mafia has helped Sicily rise from its economic decline. World Bank indicators 
on governance (Diagram 3.2) demonstrate that after pumping US$ 23 billion in 
foreign aid to Palestinians, ‘Rule of Law’ declined from -0.11 in 1996 to -0.46 in 
2012 (-2.5 lowest, 2.5 highest), placing WB and GS at the 40th percentile rank 
(0 lowest, 100 highest). In the same time period ‘Voice and Accountability’ 
experienced a marginal improvement from -1.10 to -1.02, corresponding to the 
18th percentile rank; and ‘Control of Corruption’ likewise slightly rose from -0.93 
to -0.78, hence 24th percentile rank. In financial terms, this would be called a 
losing investment.
While the political tiers continue to follow the neoliberal discourse of 
nation-state, urban cosmopolitan societies – the loci of concentration of capital 
and political power – are questioning the need for such a political framework 
and even actively campaigning against it18. On Tuesday 6 May 2014 and as Israel 
celebrated it’s 66th Independence Day under the echo of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s motion to amend the Israeli Basic Law to ‘sufficiently express’ that 
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Israel is ‘the nation-state of the Jewish people’ and not a ‘bi-national’ one (MEMO 
2014a); in the Galilee about 8,000 Palestinian-Israelis gathered in Lubya (near 
Tiberias) which was ethnically cleansed in 1948, raising tens of Palestinian flags 
and names of other destroyed villages, demanding the right of return of refugees, 
and chanting their anthem, Mawtini (Khoury 2014). As Halper describes the 
current standings:
The Palestinians, Netanyahu [Israel’s prime minister] reckons, have nowhere 
to go. On the ground they are exhausted, politically and physically fragmented, 
and cannot resist to any significant degree; politically their cause is steadily 
losing ground as it ceases to be an international flashpoint and disappears from 
view – despite periodic initiatives [...]. Israeli leaders calculate, we can either 
enter into negotiations that will lead to de facto apartheid-by-consent, the 
preferred outcome, or drag them out interminably. It really doesn’t matter since 
either scenario leaves Israel in control, our major settlements intact. And if [no 
negotiations take place], well, we [Israel] can easily blame the Palestinians for 
that and return peacefully to the status quo ante. (Halper 2013)
In conclusion, the geopolitics of Palestine is incompossible with classical 
eurocentric definitions of political power-structures that emphasize ‘bureaucracy, 
territory, and the monopoly on legitimate violence’ (Neep 2013:3) as basis of 
functioning. The Palestinian state-making project has proved to be politically 
futile, economically deleterious, and socially derogatory. Comprehension of this 
notion is requisite shall Palestinian city-strategies aspire to be spatio-temporally 
relevant. Rephrasing Quiquivix (2013) contra Palestinian leadership-class work19 
while employing urban terms: practitioners and scholars seeking an urbanism 
of decolonization in Palestinian cities should manoeuvre, weaken and neutralize 
(where elimination is not feasible) the rigid frames of nationalism-oriented political 
parties/agendas, institutions, and curricula; as well as doctrines that dismiss 
planning possibilities and spatial reconfiguration beyond the colonial, functionalist 
and geopolitically militarized imaginations and tools. Decolonization commences 
in the cradle – the quotidian space whose extension is regional (whether Assyrian, 
Arab or Mediterranean). Hence, what are the specific systems of decision-making 
that have been shaping Palestinian urbanity since the OAs? What are the dominant 
power structures beyond those of the colonizer? And what are the economic 
features of the Palestinian economy today and that necessary for a viable and 
resilient (decolonized) economy?
3.1.2.   Framing the Neoliberal Development Industry, 
Decision Structures and Spatialization
Palestinian localities – e.g. Ramallah – are shaped and operated  through 
colonial (national?) imagination, legal temporalization, spatial militarization, 
economic dependency, political precariousness and social diversity. As chapters 
four and five demonstrate, the post-Oslo Palestinian state-building project 
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employed neoliberal (imperial) development and urban planning process whose 
doctrines assimilate the Palestinian case to that of Iraq or Bosnia or Afghanistan 
a.o. These systems of hegemony (World Bank, IMF, UN Security Council, a.o.) 
assume that the shared characteristics of, first, political discourse (imposed 
institutionalization of western democracy), second, religion (predominance 
of Islam among population seen as singular social dynamic by orientalists), and 
third, spatially enacted contestation (militarization and armed violence). The 
coincidence of these three variables (of the pool of hundreds) is argued legitimate 
grounds for ‘mass treatments’ that are aesthetically customized while essentially 
invariable (Anani 2010; Shaheen 2012). 
The OAs between the PLO and Israel are dominated by concepts of 
development economics whose main component is Palestinian urbanity; where 
it occurs (Area A, starting at 3% of total territory, now 18%), how it occurs 
(neoliberal development aid mechanisms), and the behaviour of the imagined 
Palestinian society (which partially coincides with what Taraki 2008a calls the 
‘new middle class’). Herein, the coming pages examine the Oslo Era as a project 
of development politics and economics which continues to perform through 
policy importation, while concomitantly producing new urban geographies and 
sociospatial dynamics. Ramallah is often – disingenuously – presented as the 
master-piece of foreign-aid-financed development in Palestine citing comparative 
lower rates of unemployment, cultural dynamic, and similar generic quantitative 
indicators rather than qualitatively relevant ones. Such claims are formed with 
audacious disregard to the frequently proven irregular local behaviour in response 
to, with, and against the imaginaries of colonial discourses, and continue to feed 
the accrued sociospatial contestation amongst the multiple forces. Escobar (2012) 
marks the arrival of the development industry and birth of the World Bank 
mission at Bogotá in 1979, where he quotes the Harvard economist Lauchlin 
Currie (Roosevelt administration) stating:
 [...] Colombia affected me. Such a marvellous number of practically insoluble 
problems! Truly an economic missionary’s paradise. I had no idea before I came 
what the problems were but that did not dull for a moment my enthusiasm 
nor shake my conviction that if only the Bank and the country would listen to 
me I could come up with a solution of sorts to most. I had my baptism of fire 
in the Great Depression. I had played some role in working out the economic 
recovery program in the New Deal for the worst depression the United States 
had ever experienced. I had been very active in government during the Second 
World War. (Currie IN Escobar 2012:55; emphasis added)
World powers returned Currie’s call, ‘economic missionaries’ were given 
license and operating systems, enormous fluid budgets, and political cover 
through what Margaret Thatcher called ‘popular capitalism’:
From France to the Philippines, from Jamaica to Japan, from Malaysia to 
Mexico, from Sri Lanka to Singapore, privatisation is on the move...The policies 
we have pioneered are catching on in country after country. We Conservatives 
believe in popular capitalism—believe in a property-owning democracy. And 
it works! ... The great political reform of the last century was to enable more 
and more people to have a vote. Now the great Tory reform of this century is to 
enable more and more people to own property. Popular capitalism is nothing 
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less than a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of the nation. 
We Conservatives are returning power to the people. That is the way to one 
nation, one people. (Thatcher 1986; emphasis added)
While those words are echoed with frowns, it would be ludicrous to 
beguile that development discourse has bequeathed its spirit, to the contrary, 
the international and local private ‘development agents’ are implicit beyond any 
fathomable imagination of Currie. Equally, as bitter as it happens, neoliberalism 
would not have ‘gone viral’ (akin the Palestinian sumud and the Israeli settler 
enterprise) had it solely appeased the profiting few and ignored caressing the 
reverie of the proletariat; a chain process through socioeconomic systems that 
culminates with the present-day globalization of national discourses (Martin 
1998). While Palestinian PLO politics was focused on achieving a recognition for 
the ‘nation state’, global players were already tailoring its figure and characteristics 
through systems of mass-solutions, and Israel concretized its Drobless Plan.
Neoliberalism echoes Zionism which sought to create a Jewish nationality 
that suits the reincarnation of an ancient mythology negligent of diverse loci-
induced cultures and insurgent sensibilities. Sous-prétext ‘liberation’ and ‘its 
underlying ideology of progress, that is, its implicit claim to be a neutral, value-free 
mechanism to help Third World countries to modernize themselves in order to 
catch up with West’ (Martin 1998:43); neoliberal development economics created 
national imaginations, which in turn engender the speculative mass-programming 
of worldwide policymaking (Ferguson 2009); Here it should be noted that: 
It might well be the case that development economics is nearly dead, and that 
neoliberal economics has been shaken to core by the financial crisis, but the 
economic imaginary in terms of individuals transacting in markets, production, 
growth, capital, progress, scarcity, and consumption goes on unhindered. 
(Escobar 2012:xii)
The perversity of this globalization of econo-politics can be compared to the 
2007 financial crisis that culminated as a result of exponential speculation which 
nonetheless remains in practice post the crisis (Collins 2011, Escobar 2012). In 
terms of urban administration, this dynamic is embodied through, on one hand, 
the resonant failures of  speculation on western parliamentary-democracy, its form 
of (de-)institutionalization, and nation-state-building projects as quintessential 
motors of socioeconomic prosperity (Jo Beall et al 2011); an on the other, the rise 
of de-centralized, multiethnic, global-cities. Thereof, the growth and gradual 
structural change in the administration of Ramallah since the signature of the 
OAs should be seen in reference to processes of ‘rescaling of production’ where 
‘the metropolitan scale is an expression of change’ (Smith 2002:434). 
Failures collected in Palestine by the imperial development economics 
have surfaced throughout the globe albeit in different contexts, variables and 
intensities. The common denominator remains though the byproduct of factional 
and sectarian violence in Iraq, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syrian, Lebanon, Sudan, 
Lybia, India, Pakistan, Burma, Tibet, Mali, Central African Republic, Georgia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and the list continues. Longevity of faith of populations in 
improved living conditions emerging in the near future is herein as well a subject 
of speculation, equal to that of investors with risky undertakings; to persist, both 
have to assume that speculative promises will deliver.
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Naming ‘immediate and visible benefits to the population’ (World Bank 
2002:10) as goal for the PP in general and the corollary Official Donor Assistance 
(ODA) in particular; between 1994 and 2000 the international community 
channelled annual sums equivalent to US$ 500 million (US$ 150 per person) 
to Palestinians through the various channels. In 2001 and 2002 this number 
doubled  to US$ 1 billion, which equalled US$ 300 per person annually. To place 
matters into perspective; during the Bosnia War (1992 - 1995) foreign donors 
contributed what is equivalent to (current-) US$ 215 per person per annum 
(Barthe 2011). In 2006 annual foreign aid to Palestinians reached US$ 1.36 billion 
at a time the Gaza Strip was repudiated in the aftermath of the coup by Hamas. 
Upon the approval of the PDRP in 2007 the ceiling was raised scoring close 
to US$ 3 billion – US$ 750 per person – in 2009 (Barthe 2011). According to 
World Bank data (2014a; Table 3.1) Palestinians have received an ‘unprecedented 
amount of funding’ for the period between 1993 and 2011 (World Bank 2002:10; 
also see Infographic 3.1, p. 130).
Table 3.1. Top ten recipients of net ODA per capita, 1993-2011 (World Bank 2014a)
Country Population size in 2011
Net ODA / 
capita, 
2011 
(current US$)
Net ODA / 
capita, 
1993-2011 
(current US$)
Net ODA
1993-2011 
(current US$)
Palau 20.956 1.330,90 50.662,13 945 million
Tuvalu 9.860 4.323,45 22.578,87 238 million
Marshal Islands est. 68.000 1.567,58 21.567,12 1.196 million
Federal Republic of 
Micronesia 106.104 1.294,48 18.823,71 2.113 million
West Bank *
& Gaza Strip 3.927.068 615,37 6.842,85 24.722 million
Tonga 103.036 895,80 6.317,88 711 million
Cape Verde 531,046 511,28 6.278,46 3.105 million
Dominica 71,293 341,17 5.945,82 446 million
Sao Tome and 
Principe 187.356 408,24 5.409,32 842 million
Samoa 194,320 532,15 5.184,55 1.046 million
* Number excludes Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem
In the initial phase after the signature of the OAs, foreign aid to Palestine 
was coordinated by the structure outlined in Annex.6, p. 397, whereby the Ad-
Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) conducted the major decisions and investment-
trailing (Brynen 2000, Barthe 2011). However, as PA corruption augmented and 
the desired ‘immediate and visible benefits to the population’ were progressively 
yonder, the international community sought an alternative for its direct 
entanglement with both, the dissolute PA and the undetected fraudulent NGOs. 
This became increasingly exigent with questions of association to financing 
of terror, as well as the growing account of foreign assistance, and corollary, its 
management. 
Consequently, donors referred to a Temporary International Mechanism 
(TIM) which contracts private international companies to manage the allocated 
foreign assistance (Le Monde, 2008; Barthe 2011). Citing inefficiency, over-sized20 
public institutions and corruption of PA amongst other factors, the international 
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community declared that financial assistance will derail from PA treasuring 
and instead be delivered directly to beneficiaries. Proclaiming effectiveness and 
transparency in management of complex and extended economic operations, 
global private players became subsidiaries for the World Bank; companies whose 
capital is flowing rather than accumulating, fragmented rather than calculated, 
and constituting an emergency-assistance rather than development (Zananiri 
2010; Barghouthi 2012; Shaheen 2012; a.o.); as the former PA Minister of Planning 
(MOPAD) and Advisor to the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF; see section 5.1.3, p. 
249), Dr. Samih el-Abed (1996 - 2007) states:
In regards to international organizations and the donor community I 
understand that their intervention is based on a desire to help the Palestinians. 
However, they do not approve the implementation of any project without 
previous coordination with Israel. If Israel says ‘no’, regardless of how vital the 
project is, the donor community will not take a step further. They do spend 
millions on diverse projects, but those do not necessarily fall under a strategy 
whether short or long term, except seldom. (elAbed 2010)
The aforementioned financiers promised good governance, capacity-
building of local professionals and security sector reform. They flashed their 
FAB21 terminology: state-building, bottom-up, local ownership, sustainability, 
transparency, accountability, participation and outreach a.o. Over the past years 
several of these management systems proved incompatible, consequentially 
wasting valuable resources and deepening bureaucratic barricades. Others openly 
granted supremacy to foreign consultants over local experience, squandering 
dazzling sums on hotels, translators, and fuelling the mechanisms of policy 
mobility, their mutated assemblages, and the corollary incompossibility to context. 
These processes have been described by Clarke as ‘(dis)organized, geographically 
extensive, fast, and anti-political’ (2012:25), an opinion with which local observers 
agree (Anani 2010, Rayyan 2010, Kassis 2010, and Barghouthi 2012 a.o.). The 
operations of these private third-party companies have played a significant role 
in cementing the PA’s central government systems of monopoly over targets of 
public-spending on one hand (in place of the regionally-sensitive LGs), and on 
the other aggravated the negative trends of socioeconomic – hence sociospatial – 
transformation of Ramallah. 
In terms of public spending, under the new arrangements the PA treasury 
receives sums designated specifically for its budget (central government & LGs) 
which mainly composes of salaries of public servants and government expenses. 
Meanwhile the larger sums designated for social, operational, economic, 
infrastructural and other sectors of development are disseminated through – 
mainly eminent international – third-parties depending on sector targeted by 
the grant e.g. IMG (Europe), Adam Smith International (UK), ICON (Germany), 
CHF and Chemonics (USA); and various other large, medium and small national 
bodies e.g. UNDP, EuroMed, USAid, SIDA, KfW etc. These bodies determine 
priority sub-themes in consultation with PA institutions, based on which 
involvement of predominantly-private sub-contractors is attended, in reference to 
selected proposals from prospective local beneficiaries (e.g. small NGOs, CBOs, 
LGs, etc) (Abdullah 2010, elAbed 2010, Barghouthi 2012). 
Along the course, neither the selection of priorities nor the application 
process are conditioned by neither pre nor post operation transparency to the 
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public. Clauses regarding project-justification and post-operation evaluation 
bind the involved parties to incorporate external and local stakeholders and 
sometimes a strategy for dissemination. However, this work has found neither 
a systematic nor a binding mechanism for the verification of the criteria of 
evaluation, nor its palpable (virtual?) relevance, not to mention publication and 
sharing as measures essential for synergy or involvement of institutionalized 
Palestinian think-tanks and CBOs in both ex ante and ex post evaluations. 
The German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) – 
for example – publishes its ex post reports on its web-page demonstrating 
transparency, nonetheless, their criteria of evaluation of funding programs is 
generic and statistical rather than qualitative; utilizing the OECD-DAC criteria 
which composes of six groupings of 19 indices: relevance, effectiveness, impact, 
efficiency, sustainability and gender equality, and overall assessment, on a scale 
of 1 (Very Good) and 6 (no impact or deterioration). Chianca summarizes22 the 
critique against this evaluation system citing its insensitivity to case-based needs, 
fragmented rather than integrated, cost-effective rather than systematically 
efficient, and lacking contextual variables of relevance such as ‘quality of process’ 
and ‘exportability’ (2008:44). Assessment of the DAC-criteria is not the interest 
of this work, however, it should be noted that although thousands of such reports 
have been produced theoretically, neither PA LGs nor Ministries have samples 
on their web-pages. E.g. the MDLF publishes its narrative and financial reports, 
few technical studies, some generic LG ranking criteria23, ‘success stories’, and 
claims to ‘lead local governments toward an exemplary level of transparency 
and draw the citizenry into active participation in municipal/town planning’ 
(Daoud 2008:3). Bearing in mind that 92% of its budget in 2012 was financed 
by international donors (MDLF 2012:12), notwithstanding, neither ex post nor 
critical comparative studies are available. Meanwhile, those published by the top-
tier (e.g. World Bank) remain a partial selection by non-Palestinian parties. 
Indeed, standards of micro-level management are equally applied in the 
donor countries, hence the conspiracy theory can be laid to rest. However, the 
neoliberal market-terminology which blends out geographically-sensitive 
variations (Anderson 2006; Ferguson 2009; Fainstein 2009) has on one hand 
systematically marginalized Palestinian knowledge, decisions and hence endemic, 
need-based design and prioritization of strategies. Dr. Samir Abdullah who 
directed the drafting of the PDRP in 2007, subsequently served as Minister of 
Planning and Administration between 2008-2009, and is currently a member of 
the Palestinian Monetary Authority stated in an interview with him:
The Fayyadism era was coined as such and marketed under this naming mainly 
by Fatah personnel who wanted to blame him [thence Prime Minister Dr. Salam 
Fayyad] as a party-outsider for the shortcomings and failures of the PA. They 
want to blame him for the dependency that was forged by Yasser Arafat and to 
do so accused him of having institutionalised the neoliberal economy and some 
go as far to call him a ‘neo-con’, neo-conservative. The plan that brought for 
Fayyad US$ 7.7 billion in 2007 was prepared by myself. We had prepared this 
plan already three years earlier in 2004, in which we argue that the Palestinian 
economy is not able to be competitive solely by the commodities it produces. 
Due to its attachment to and dependency on Israel the costs of production 
are high rendering cheap labour commodities non-profitable. Thereof we 
conclude that in order to succeed we need to move towards high-value-products 
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and gradually to knowledge-based economy, given that our only capital is the 
human-capital. This was our vision for which we got the money but not the 
approval for application. Today as the 2007-funds are paid out we are starting to 
hear international endorsements to this plan. (Abdullah 2012; emphasis added)
On the other hand, the neoliberal paradigm metaphysically re-asserts the 
incompossibility of the present-day European nation-state model, where beyond 
the aforementioned structural lacunae and under the slogan of ‘sharing of know-
how’ and ‘capacity-building’, international agents assume the ability to shorten 
the duration of the ‘journey into democracy’ neglecting the biological cycles of 
processes (Escobar 2012). Clarifying with another deutsch example; the relatively 
contemporary governmental transparency, data-sharing and participatory urban 
decision-making (e.g. Tempelhofer Feld referandum) in Germany was produced 
by merit of three; First, by the early 1990s the Cold War was over, significant 
numbers of surviving Nazis had aged or passed away, and the majority of voters and 
those elected into office believed in the principality of civil rights organizations as 
guard against radical groups and governments straying again. In other words, civic 
rights had become governmental, popular, and foremost constitutional priorities. 
The geo-temporal socioeconomic factor of preoccupation with victims of Nazism 
was the timely motive, yet given the tree-effect (or again, Gehl’s concept of self-
reinforcing processes) these extended to other civic rights such as employment 
conditions, consumer-rights, and freedom of expression and diversity among 
many others. Palestinians generally feel as victims, not as guilty. Second, the 
former was enabled by its economic compatibility with the endemic systems 
which historically invested heavily in research and development – laboratories, 
think-tanks, research institutes, universities, etc. New knowledge (which requires 
varying perspectives) was and remains the fuel for this production-based economy 
which enjoys freedom of decision-making and free access to resources, intra- and 
extra-territorially, in stark contrast to that of the socio-economic conditionality 
of Palestinians. And third, over the four decades preceding the surge in so-called 
political transparency and participatory democracy (post GDR and FRG24), the 
predominant social ethos of guilt had nurtured an independent judiciary system 
enforcing accountability. The post World War II generations were burdened by 
the racism and failures of their forefathers, and recognized the importance of 
locational civic agency as early detection and hindering systems against radical 
(and economically destructive) ideologies. 
In financial terms, a decision on an investment is based on marketability 
(achieved through locational socioeconomic demand, supply and cultural-
sensitivity feasibility studies), ability to operate in the particular sector (existing 
networks, infrastructures, limitations), and the trust in the capacity of the 
system to hold contract-breachers to their terms hence protecting one’s capital. 
Investment necessitates speculation whose patterns are factored by intensities 
of uncertainty. In Palestine and under the auspices of the World Bank the item 
of ‘security’ (sharing of monopoly over violence) is omnipresent in the politics 
and budgets of the ODA (ratio of civilian to security public servants is 3 : 225). 
Meanwhile, the Palestinian constitution remains a patchwork of six regimes, 
basic education stagnant26 while higher education limited to private providers, 
public R&D departments predominantly cosmetic, human rights considered an 
NGO preoccupation (rather than governmental or popular), accountability is 
conditioned by loyalties of a hegemonic regime, and the colonial project continues 
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uninterrupted as demonstrated in Infographic 3.1, p. 130 (Halevi 1998; Kelly 2004; 
Kassis 2010). In this regard As’ad states:
It’s like a cake of which each person wants a piece. Foreign cultural centres 
here are mainly European, there is no share for the Americans in that piece. 
Those are the people who are paying money, but are not being an effective 
force. They decided to be effective in ‘culture’, but what do they do? Some film 
screens, exhibition’s, but they introduce nor induce a change, they are more like 
the cultural officers in an embassy, nothing more. They do not ask what are 
our needs, or what is the approach we prefer. Someone has decided that those 
are the kinds of activities that should run, and that’s the direction in which 
the wheel spins. The main sector into which the majority of foreign funds are 
directed is that of construction, but not the individual. Fine, they do contribute 
somehow, but they do not help in changing the bitter in our reality because they 
are a component within the crisis if not a driving force in it. (As’ad 2010)
Through an extensive review of works on post-Oslo power structures, 
economic shifts and the sociopolitical transformations, Tamari (2002) identifies 
the Palestinian decision-making elites (hegemonic class) in four: 1. PA-affiliated 
executives and heads of PLO market arms e.g. Petroleum Authority, PECDAR; 
2. PLO and PNC members and executives; 3. heads of security apparatuses, and; 
4. the Council of Governors and Mayors. While no clarification has or is being 
provided on ‘how presidential decision making is exercised within this elite given 
its contending factions and competing loyalties’ (ibid:105), ten decades post 
Tamari’s analysis, elites of the PLO, PNC and the PLC have been progressively 
marginalized and de facto losing relevance in favour of a growing coterie of 
private investors. The 2007-coup polarized the Palestinian politics into Fatah 
(WB, backed by World Bank, Saudi Arabia) and Hamas (GS, backed by Muslim 
Brotherhood, Qatar). It suspended the activities of the PLC and contending 
parties instated emergency laws to justify their violations against civic rights, and 
among many other aspects, created a back-channel allowing private investors to 
court the PA (see chapter 5, pg. 243). 
Meanwhile, the hegemony of the ‘Old Guards’27 on decision-making is under 
attack from the amorphous ‘Young Guards’28 who are contending their peripheral 
placement in regards to political hierarchies (Tamari 2002:107). This is emphatic 
in the ongoing public confrontation of PLO President Mahmoud Abbas and the 
former  National Security Advisor (a.o.) Mohammad Dahlan29. The latter had 
enjoyed a ‘supreme reign’ on the GS between 2000 and 2007, when he fled to the 
WB in the aftermath of the coup and found it difficult to retreat to the second 
row of command (Baroud 2014). This confrontation of two elite divisions (and 
subgroups) translates with a substratal spatial contestation throughout the de 
facto political and economic capital. These are marked by concentrations of arms 
and security personnel, whether public or private, overt or covert.
Summoning (irrespective of group size) near either of the geographically 
central governmental properties will swiftly be attended, and photographing 
buildings and personnel is prohibited and has lead to arrest. Neighbourhoods 
of PA personnel are regularly patrolled, and the romantic solitude of persons on 
any of Ramallah’s peripheral ridges (enjoying raw nature given the lack of public 
spaces) will rapidly be censored against political or social ‘mischief ’. While PLO 
institutions and loyalists enjoy free range to practice and propagate their opinions 
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(Image 3.3), demonstration by opposition is either neutralized by counter-
rallies or violent termination by police as witnessed in July 201230, July 201331, 
and December 201332 (alAtar 2010, Halevi 1998, Image 3.5). Some interviewees 
described the intensity of policing as proportional to the political size and argued 
an improved rule of law (Zananiri 2010, Khouri 2010). Nonetheless, this opinion 
does not take into perspective neither the fact that systems relevant to civic ‘rule 
of law’ such as traffic police have failed to turn timely campaigns33 into sustainable 
systems, and that the proportion of armament associated to the non-civic security 
apparatuses neither prohibits nor solves contestation, yet certainly intensifies the 
militarization of the semi-eminent confrontation. 
As for Tamari’s (2002) fourth group of elites and given the paradigm of 
the 2003 compromise by Arafat of appointing a Prime Minister, the hitherto 
bureaucratic disjunction of LGs from politics was institutionalised, downscaling 
these bodies to administrative and technical concerns as exampled over the 
recent past months34. Moreover, the financially deprived municipalities (such as 
that of Ramallah) are further weakened by the growing pressure of the rapidly 
urbanizing A-Areas; a conditioned worsened by the crowding of their shrunken 
decision-making space by progressively affluent private investors (Anani 2010; 
Shaheen 2012). As former Mayoress of Ramallah Jeanette Michael (in office 2005-
2012) stated: ‘The normal trend is that investors seek the change and we follow’, 
where ‘as a municipality, we do not have the legal power to force an investor in a 
direction instead of another, or against his/her will’ (Michael 2010).
In conclusion, PLO and PA policymaking lies in the hands of two: that of the 
former PLO guerillas who are in average more than sixty in age, and the PA’s young 
‘generals’ whose maturity culminated in the Dayton Era35 and continues along the 
Image 3.3. Billboard campaigning in support of the PLO’s bid at the UN, October 2011
Image 3.4. Billboard with pictures and names of ‘martyrs’ (members of one of Fatah’s 
security apparatuses), February 2010. 
Image 3.5. (below) Members of the Palestinian security forces attack demonstrators in 
Ramallah on 1 July 2012 (Torokman 2012)
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EUPOL COPPS program36 (Barthe 2011). Both advocate nation-state programs 
and terminology, security as kernel achievement, and in effect are leading the 
de-development process of de-institutionalization through bureaucratization 
(Roy 1999; Tamari 2002). Meanwhile, spacio-economic policies remain factored 
by donor and private agendas (emergency- and profit- charactered respectively), 
within parameters laid out by Israel, and through non-transparent generic TIM 
systems of decision making. In this equation LGs – and hence the wider public – 
remain a minor variable. 
In contrast to the numerous official statements and programs by international 
parties demanding the reform of the PA, respect rule of law, expanding roles 
of local governments, reduce corruption and hold elections; nonetheless, no 
punitive measures have been exercised in response to the PLO’s continued 
disregard of fundamental concepts of democracy. Further, international politics 
did not hesitate in refusing to financially support or diplomatically engage with 
the democratically elected Hamas government in 2006; sending the Palestinian 
economy into crisis for some months before offering to compensate the WB-
bound PLO with US$ 7.7 billion in December 2007, at a time the PDRP had 
requested US$ 2.1 billion less37. While frameworks such as the MDLF have been 
established to improve the performance of the financially and administratively 
marginalized LGs, their work remains dominant by imperial agency tools and 
discourses which are incompossible to locational geographic, economic and 
social complexities and variations; as expounded in global scholarly work (Fanon 
2004; Martin 1998; Escobar 2012; Shaheen 2012; a.o).
Although local economic studies stipulate a viable Palestinian economy 
under the continued colonization can only be achieved through investment in 
human capital towards a knowledge-based economy of high-value products; 
nonetheless, foreign aid investment in essential infrastructures such as research, 
health, education and vocational training remain limited while shares of the 
inflated public (and highly militarized) sector loiter. Since the coup in 2007 scores 
of Fatah-loyal employees in the GS continue to receive benefits from the WB-PA 
in spite of being dismissed from service in the aftermath of Hamas’ ascension into 
hegemonic power. Beyond circumstantial in- or under-productivity significant 
numbers of public servants – amongst which those of LGs – constitute what is 
often described as ‘masked unemployment’, where the capacities of the employee 
fall short of these necessitated by the attributed position (FG 2011, no.6; Anani 
2010; Huleileh 2012). As Diagram 3.3 demonstrates, since the signature of the OAs 
the only sector which has experienced considerable growth in terms of size of 
employment is that of services (bureaucratisation?). Sectors of communication 
and commerce grew slightly, while construction, manufacturing and agriculture 
(tradable sectors) declined significantly. In this regard Abdullah elaborates:
According to our plan [the PDRP] the education sector was to receive higher 
budgets, yet the problem lies in the PA budget, 60% of which is salaries (40% is 
security-apparatus salaries), 15% for education and 7% for the health sector. The 
human capital lies in the latter two, and to increase expenditure in health and 
education the budgetary increase can only be done gradually; for example by 
raising the share of education from 15% to 20% over a ten-year period. This is 
caused by the fact that reform includes public servants whose capacity building 
and/or early retirement comes at a high expense and cannot be conducted in 
short periods of time. And we are stuck in this process. (Abdullah 2012)
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Here it should also be noted that the growth in the services sector has chiefly 
been in either central government bureaucracy apparatuses, security, or private 
business services, whereas basic civic services have in effect contracted; e.g. while 
in 1994  the per capita governmental expenditure on healthcare amounted to US$ 
42.70, it deflated to US$ 30.40 in the year 2000, which is lower than that of the 
ICA rate of US$ 33.80 in 1993. Like transportation, education and research the 
health sector is dramatically dependent on the nongovernmental sector which 
had emerged in the pre-Oslo era ‘in order to fill acute needs that were not satisfied 
by the Civil Administration while simultaneously serving as a form of resistance’ 
(Gordon and Filc 2009:467).  
Notwithstanding, as Halevi wrote sixteen years ago, ‘the question is not 
how to rationalize a state of affairs that is in itself perfectly unacceptable and 
unjustifiable, but to understand its genesis and identify the conditions needed 
to transcend it’ (1998:48). Therein, Ramallites in general and municipalities of 
the agglomerate in particular enjoy a minimal formal decision-making space, 
which is highly militarized and crowded due to the customary concentration of 
elites, their symbols and subgroups in the quasi capital. Thus, strategies aiming at 
enhancing resilience should develop mechanisms that overtly respect the present-
day hegemonic power structure, yet covertly aim at reducing spatial monopoly 
and sociopolitical contestation through endorsing endemic ‘neutralizing agents’. 
The significance of these is highlighted in the normalization of social ethos of 
Ramallah post the OAs, where:
In the entire world, the upper hand is for economy over politics. The latter 
follows the earlier but not vice-versa. What conditions the USA politics 
is its economic interests, same with China, etc. Here our situation is a bit 
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different, but not the extreme. Because of the occupation politics plays a big 
role, but never underestimate the role of the economic aspects. I would like 
to remind you about the fights that broke out between Palestinians here after 
the establishment of the PA, about who will take the agency contracts for the 
Israeli companies; starting with the prime minister and the ladder down. And 
what is happening today is connected to this. We cannot remain nostalgic to 
the political work, dedication of the masses, the secret underground activism 
and the romance of the process [of the First Intifada]. This was an exceptional 
process and happening, but not the norm. The norm is what we are gradually 
heading to, particularly here in Ramallah, with freedom of expression and 
choice amongst other aspects. This is not as rosy or romantic as the times of the 
1980s, but it is nevertheless the human norm that is dictated by human nature; 
the human wants to relax and enjoy his or her time, and if that means they will 
have to overlook the occupation, they will. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 yrs)
Although continuation of despotic power and decision-making dependency 
of the PA is socio-economically threatening, notwithstanding, attempts at direct 
elimination from within are likely to result in high casualties whether human 
or capital given the alarming levels of armament of the post-colonial regimes 
– as recently exampled in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria; a risk that 
Ramallah is aware of and prefers to avoid. In this context neutralization (hence 
balanced sociospatial transformation) necessitates gradual cooptation of three 
economic groupings; first, powerful private investors who are married to the 
PA which composes the ‘most privatized political entities in the world’ (Gordon 
and Filc 2009:467), whom are concerned about the growing risks thence 
‘looking for a role to play’ according to Khoury (2010), and whose ambition 
remains profit accumulation; second, ‘the intellectuals, professionals, business 
people, and others who have hitched their fortunes to Ramallah’ and are ‘in fact 
underlying its secularism’ (Taraki 2008:14), who are genuinely concerned about 
the regionally growing radicalism and are primarily concerned with maintaining 
their sociospatial freedoms whether ideological or behavioural, and; third, the 
rapidly growing poor strata whose existential worriments are those of improving 
their living conditions. Systematically similar to nationalism and neoliberlism 
yet parametrically varied, a viable resilience strategy should orient the role and 
gain of the powerful, be popular as capitalism yet inclusive as socialism, and grant 
space and access – not virtual hope – to the underprivileged and marginalized.
Whereas speculation on Ramallah’s financial elite defending its ethos is 
legitimate, none should be placed on neither a ‘potentially’ rationalizing foreign 
aid nor the non-democracy (hence political promises) of the colonizer. On one 
hand, the past two decades have proven the state-building in Palestine to be an 
‘expérience virtuelle’ (Barthe 2011:82). In practice, Palestinian development plans 
and budgets are periodically and systematically rendered obsolete whereas Israeli 
colonization progresses unhindered, as illustrated in Infographic 3.1, p. 130. 
Short after the PA elections in 1996 MOPAD conducted studies and developed 
a proposal for a Jerusalem metropolitan area bound by Bethlehem in the south 
and Ramallah in the north. The intensified colonization around Jerusalem had 
this proposal shelved by 1998. The Sharm elSheikh Memorandum38 of September 
1999 and the consequently lined development projects were suspended a year 
later with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. Similarly, plans prepared 
following the redeployment of the IOF outside Areas A in 2004 were shelved by 
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the coup in 2007. In its turn, the extensively financed PDRP of 2007 has been 
devoid by 2012 with the Israeli sanctions on the PA in response to the PLO’s bid 
to the UN, the retraction of international funding starting 2011 with the outbreak 
of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, and the resulting financial crisis which the WB has 
been enduring since. The proposal of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s of US$ 4 
billion (announced in May 2013) did not evolve beyond that state. Infographic 3.1 
and Diagram 3.3 illustrate this futile process, which Le More summarizes with:
The result has been an incredible amount of tax payers’ money being wasted on 
attempting to keep the peace process politically alive and to cushion the shocks 
to the Palestinian economy induced by Israeli policies rather than on fostering 
growth, development and the institutional basis for a state. There has also been 
a failure of ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to induce major policy change on the part 
of the parties. In so doing, the international community has absolved Israel of 
its obligations vis-à-vis the Palestinian civilian population as the Occupying 
Power under international law, encouraging further Israeli violations of 
humanitarian norms and condoning Israeli territorial expansion into the 
Palestinian territories. In the process also, the international community’s 
intervention and assistance programme has turned increasingly surreal: donors 
are today providing short-term, unsustainable emergency assistance and 
pumping large sums of money into an ever more aid-dependent territory which 
has become ever less viable geographically, economically and politically. (Le 
More 2005:998)
In view of this, the epistemological difference between the candidates of 
the proposed speculation lies in a the simple equation: while Palestinian private 
investors ‘have a lot to lose’39, Zionists and international donors ‘have little to 
lose’. Herein, average Ramallites and their LGs would have improved chances of 
a balanced bargain with the – in any event – sine qua non local private investors. 
This is further rationalized by the current standings, where social inequalities 
are deepening and ‘wealth is increasingly being confused with corruption, 
business with theft. For if wars always find their profiteers, reconstruction does 
too’ (Halevi 1998:42).
Thereof, what are the current social dynamics, outlines and imaginations in 
Ramallah? How do citizens perceive their city-space and what are their timely 
socioeconomic characteristics and needs? And which points constitute potential 
common grounds for the diverse Ramallites and investors under a future scenario 
that aims at decolonizing the quotidian space and social ethos within this locality? 
Infographic 3.1. (right) Comparing net official 
development assistance received by WB & GS in the 
years 1993-2011 to settler colonialism tools of closure, 
demolition and illegal construction.
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current US$ 1.000.000.000
US$ 22.694.860.000
Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
received by WB & GS 1993-2011 (World Bank 2014)
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3.2.   RAMALLITES: 
NGO-IZATION, 
OTHERNESS, AND THE 
CREATIVE YUPPIES
The hitherto elaborated political, territorial, structural and economic 
shifts of Palestinian livelihoods over the past century have expectedly been 
accompanied and factored by social adjustments; which are globally tempered 
and locally engendered. Dominant ideologies perceive nations, states, and cities 
as homogeneous units, where stereotypes are casually constructed and furthered 
(among other processes) through traditional urban planning and zoning tools that 
institutionally homogenize zones whose contours are referenced to topography, 
infrastructures and quantitative statistics. These two-dimensional visions 
have little (if any) consideration to social sub-categories although accumulated 
knowledge has established urban conflicts as predominantly ‘internal to what on 
the surface appears homogeneous and coherent - and presents itself and behaves 
as though it were’ (Lefebvre 2009:352). 
In analysing its urbanity ‘most scholarship on Palestine remains caught 
up in reductive binaries’ that are ‘heavily reliant on rigid and aggregated 
categories, the bulk of it unable to capture entire assemblages of action, subjective 
dissonance, productive ambiguities and contingent vitalities that inflect so much 
of contemporary quotidian life’ (Abourahme 2011:453). Beyond the routine of ad 
hoc manoeuvring of rooted and branching colonial systems, nouveau-Ramallites 
remain what Gordon and Filc call a ‘risk society’, where:
By risk society, we mean a society that develops a system of strategies and 
technologies to secure and manage the lives of its members by anticipating 
hazards, in this way surviving to domesticate the future. Regardless of whether 
risks are real or constructed, they are rendered calculable and governable, and 
the calculability of risks has become an important element of the rationality 
through which society and its institutions are organized, monitored, and 
regulated. (Gordon and Filc 2009:458)
Herein, Gordon and Filc argue Israel’s responsibility for the systematic 
undermining of calculability of risk for the colonized subjects and the exasperation 
of uncertainty as causes of the (assumed) destruction of Palestinians as a risk 
society, hence giving rise – among other impacts – to the Palestinian ‘postmodern 
religiosity’ embodied in Hamas. They claim that ‘most Palestinians are currently 
driven by the imperative of securing life’s necessities – defence, food, shelter, and 
reproduction – a task that is accomplished on a day-to-day basis by the family, 
which is frequently aided by charity organizations’ while ‘work and action, are, 
in turn, undermined’ (2009:479). Their myopic hypothesis accentuates the 
inapplicability of established risk prediction and management paradigms on 
one hand, while on the other the failure of the PA to provision parameters for 
the curtailment of uncertainty (e.g. healthcare infrastructure). Nonetheless, 
this opinion is based in reference to eurocentric logic on strategy, planning and 
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accountability at a time the majority of the world’s populace lives the realities of 
limited governments and affluent sedition; e.g. lobbyists working the US Capitol, 
proliferation of armed groups e.g. the maras in central America, etc. Further, it 
falls short of factoring the nonconformity of the ‘quotidian Palestinian’ which is 
axiomatic in casual comparisons of Gaza, Jerusalem, Hebron and Ramallah; not 
to mention the urban, rural, Bedouin communities and refugee camps; the areas 
A, B and C. Reiterative to the trend, their work – though interesting in terms of 
approach – relies on subjective generic discourses which depict Palestinians – not 
only as conforming to horizontal identity and ethos, but also – as passive victims 
rather than active subjects, denying their ability to engender endemic forms of 
risk calculation, prediction and management (alKhalili 2009). Herein Abourahme 
challenges such approaches by arguing that ‘people are using the different 
constitutive nodes of the present — even the checkpoint — to reproduce their lives 
in ways that do not correspond to anything we might recognize as resistance or 
anything we can reduce to survivalism’ (2011:455). Highlighting the rise of new 
modalities of production and relationalities, he writes:
How do we make sense of the colonial subject that is neither in revolt nor in 
open crisis? How do people reproduce their lives, fashion routines, etch out 
some meaning when the political is evacuated, when time is on hold? These 
questions loom over a contemporary disjuncture in Palestine, marked in part 
by the splintering and opening up of the field of subjective bonds, attachments 
and associations to new modalities of production, less circumscribed by 
previous normative parameters and engendering a host of complexities and 
ambivalences in politico-social relationalities. (Abourahme 2011:453)
In her study of the Ramallah agglomerate Taraki (2008; 2008a) trails the 
evolution of social ethos in Palestine in general and in this mise en scène in 
particular. The Nakba marks the ‘abortion’ of Palestinian modernity through 
the hijacking and subjugation of their main cosmopolitan cities along the 
Mediterranean coastline, the erasure of their identity through looting and 
enshrouding40 (Pappe 2007; Brunner 2010), and the militarization of their 
geographies intra- and extra-localities in utter disregard to the resilient power of 
memory, narrative and continued regeneration of conceptions of space. However, 
after the spacio-cultural marginalization was cemented through the COGAT first 
and later jointly with the ICA, Palestinians laboured the afore-described civic 
mobilization, the ‘politico-social relationality’ of sumud, and brought about the 
sitting room as living space substituting for the red-tapping of the Grand Hotel, 
Cinema Dunia, and Birzeit University campus (see section 2.2.2.i, p. 83). 
The launch of the Peace Process in 1991 was a logical consequence 
following two and a half decades of settler colonialism, and four years of the 
First Intifada’s intensive civic disobedience which exasperated the precariousness 
of the population, and lowered their morale. The scores of materials from local 
intellectuals and politicians highlighting the perils of the OAs – under Cartesian 
logic – should have caused the reception of Yasser Arafat in Gaza in July 1994 to 
be a protest had the population not been, in effect, enervated. The schism and 
fatigue of the Palestinian national liberation movements (inside and outside, 
upper and lower tiers) alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about 
the USA monopoly over international politics and the marriage-arrangements 
between the ideologies of the pragmatic and maximalist Zionists. Following the 
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outlines of the decade-earlier prepared Drobless Plan of 1983, the Palestinians 
were given a nonsovereign authority and no territorial concessions. According to 
interviewees  the population, in spite of the contra evidence, wanted to believe 
that they found the end of the tunnel. In spring 1993 Palestinians from the 
WB and GS – though banned from changing locus of residence – still casually 
strolled the Mediterranean coast, conjoined with their relatives and political 
comrades who had been classified as Israeli citizens, and familiarized with the 
non-Palestinian Israelis either through politics or work (see section 2.2.2.ii, p. 84). 
The applications of a shrunken geography while at the time a third of Palestinian 
active labour force was operating within the Israeli economy, the thought was not 
on the discussion table. Further, the four main Palestinian parties41 pronounced 
the same target, a nation-state, albeit with different arrangements. Therein, 
‘government’ was both popularly and politically perceived as the panacea, where:
The mentality of the Cold Way required that people in both the East and West 
subscribed daily to the myth that power resided with central governments, 
while the life of cities was understood narrowly as an arena of municipal affairs 
under central control. It was this same mentality, in many respects, that blinded 
the modern dictators of the Middle East and the urban renewal planners of 
America’s inner cities, to the shifting sociopolitical tectonics of the Urban 
Revolution. (Brugmann 2009:76)
The combination of weariness and forlorn faith allowed the disclosure of the 
– till then – secret OAs and the popular adoption of its politics of unintelligent 
compromise, signifying that the politicians of the NGCs had overestimated 
the people’s capacity to endure evermore deteriorating living conditions; even 
sumud has needs. This strategic failure remains the congenital trait of Palestinian 
political paradigms, which Ramallah is contending today. The transition from the 
1993 state-making to today’s -unmaking has occurred over four phases, in each of 
which a particular social risk-strategy was identified, social behaviour prevailed, 
and a spatial translation constructed; as alKhalili narrates:
There are several of these moments with the city, but are they emotional 
moments, those of reference through which I define my relationship to the city? 
No, they aren’t.  I am observing this gradual change of pivotal spaces such as the 
Muqata’a whose history for me started in 1995 when I visited it as Arafat arrived 
and the festivities over the departure of the Israeli army from it were taking place. 
The second instance was in the year 2000 with the visit of the French Foreign 
Minister Lionel Jospin in the aftermath of which I was imprisoned in it. Then I 
witnessed its destruction over the years from 2001 to 2003 until it was turned into 
rubble atop which the new monumental compound continues to be erected. Each 
of these phases lasted over a couple of years thence forging some kind of ease 
with the happenings, and eliminating reminiscence that would’ve been lasting if 
produced under shock. Part of the normalization of these event in the memory 
is one’s integration into the processes unfolding within the space. (alKhalili 2012)
In two decades Ramallah matured from disjointed boroughs to a cosmopolis. 
Akin humans, as this era turns twenty it is questioning and re-defining its 
distinctive persona. Hence, how did Ramallah evolve into its nowadays character? 
What were the main political-, economic-, and spatial- components of the social 
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behaviour producing the new agglomerate? What are the lessons learned and 
predictable future processions of events? And thereupon, what could possibly 
await Ramallah at the end of its current chapter? What elements of today’s 
precariousness can planners integrate into their spatial approaches to scale 
tomorrow’s uncertainty? The coming pages address those issues while integrating 
contributions and narrations of a selection of the interviewees of this work, with 
an accentuation on that with the architect, curator, and artist Yazan alKhalili.
3.2.1.   1994-2000: Colonization is 
Provisioned Internally
I came back to Ramallah when I was 15 years old in 1996 [...]. For me it was not 
about moving to a city since as a child my family relocated a number of times. 
It was about the return to Palestine, and the aura not only of the supposed end 
to the gipsyesque trail, but more importantly, of arriving to the place that is 
supposedly my homeland. (alKhalili 2012)
The early years of the OA’s featured the confusion and chaos of tailoring 
the Palestinian government and the subject of its operation; the readjustment of 
affinitive politicians from guerrilla-insurgency to audited bureaucracy, and the 
readaptation of a citoyen whose colonial presence is managed by a suited comrade. 
This (new) politico-social discordance materialized spatially in the postscript 
of the settling of PA returnee top-tier politicians in existing neighbourhoods 
in proximity to brethrens (e.g. Mahmoud Abbas in elBalou’, alBireh; Nabil 
AbuRudaineh in elTireh, Ramallah); while Arafat resided in the fortified British 
hill-station and the few of them who feared Israeli assassination appointed mêlée 
guards. This illusion of integration of authority (nonerudite colonial agency) and 
populace would disintegrate by the turn of the century. In Ramallah more than 
any other city in the WB, the ‘elaboration and normalization of a hierarchical 
culture of officialdom’, corruption and hegemony fuelled cultural and ideological 
differences, hence exasperating social disparities, where ‘Palestinians who had 
spent all their lives under occupation were especially unnerved by the plethora 
of bodyguards, security men, aides, doormen, chauffeurs, and coffee servers 
springing up in and around official institutions’ (Taraki 2008a:68).
As aforementioned, Ramallah’s geography, low social hierarchy, moldability 
and inherent diversity where the elements enabling initially the placement and 
later the expansion of PA apparatuses within its space. As its economy was 
predominantly reliant on low-scale commerce and white-collar employment, the 
distress caused by the Israeli closure of the WB and the replacement of Palestinian 
labour in Israel with imported ones from – chiefly – south-east Asia had negligible 
impact on the living conditions of Ramallites. This was due to four; first, the 
establishment of the PA granted an alternative for those who worked in (as of 
then) inaccessible Jerusalem and the unemployed; second, typically some of the 
flowing capital into the treasury of the PA from the international community 
was spent in the spaces of the city e.g. purchase, rental, and services; third, 
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enthusiastic and patriotic Palestinian bourgeoisie had confidence in their ability 
to play a role in the construction of a strong economy and were starting to make 
investments, and; fourth, the real estate market had all conditions necessary to 
boom: high demand, available capital, and the ICA’s restrictions on construction 
in the islands of Area A were suspended (Taraki 2008a; Khoury 2010 a.o). 
Notwithstanding, within these few years the combination of the Arafatian 
autocracy and absence of both strategy and depth in the PA’s decision-making 
resulted in the alienation and/or marginalization of, again, four; first, private 
investors that refused to associate with the profits of engagement with the 
PA’s corruption e.g. Hasib Sabbagh (Brynen 2000; Arouri 2010); second, local 
governments had to forsake more of their aspired decision-making capabilities to the 
central government that possessed minimal authority beyond the very same spaces 
of LGs (Barghouthi 2012); third, youth and civic voluntary frameworks whose 
operations were either annexed by the PA or as of then categorized, institutionalized 
and archived in ministerial files (As’ad 2010), and; fourth, intellectuals and 
opposition politicians who refused cooptation, some of whom consequently 
assumed that they could continue their constructive involvement in the stirring of 
the course of Palestinians through creation of NGOs for ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, 
‘social justice’, ‘rule of law’, ‘social services’ and similar concepts; whose ideological 
agendas were soon after subjugated by dependency on continuation of external 
funding and lack of constitutional systems of accountability (Barthe 2011). Kassis 
(2010) describes these entities as pertaining to ‘high employment, low productivity, 
and expenditure on areas that are not exactly clear’, where:
The problem is the perception of what is an NGO. Palestine has no NGOs; what 
is in Palestine are vehicles and drivers of foreign aid. They are not voluntary 
nor sustainable. Their Agenda in the best scenario is a compromise between 
the local and the international ones. They are solidarity components in regards 
to the relationships between the Palestinian and international organizations; 
a role that they played much more than they did with the assumed business 
component. If you examine the NGOs, their role is actually insignificant when 
it comes to the business attitude in development of the services sector. The 
NGOs think and plan in the terms: ‘We have a project which we can finish, we 
have criteria and indicators which should show a success story, and we have to 
make sure this project runs so that we get money for the next one so that we can 
expand horizontally and vertically, etc’. (Kassis 2010)
 The World Bank argued its large allocation to Palestinian NGOs by citing 
their essential role in alleviating the impact of Israeli colonization on quotidian 
lives pre-OAs, their assumed ability to enhance the capacities of the PA, and the 
politico-economic rationale of inability of the latter to meet its responsibilities 
(Sullivan 2001). In presented justifications then and today the Bank systematically 
refrains from recognizing the idleness of transfer of neither know-how, (see 
section 3.1.2, p. 118) nor exchange of capacities and skills between government 
bodies and NGOs. Barthe cites a Palestinian former NGO worker on a USAID-
financed nursing workshop in Ramallah at the time Hamas (considered as ‘terror 
organization’ and hence boycotted) commanded the PA:
I asked them [two attendants] where they work. They answered ‘in the Ministry 
of Health’. I had to ask them to leave, and that I am unable to allow their 
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attendance. I hated myself, and that was the most bitter moment of my career. 
Nonetheless, it is not easy to leave such a position, because one gets used to a 
very high income and accordant living standards. Ministries and even [average] 
NGOs pay two to three times less. People like myself, who were trained outside, 
move from one such project to another. We are supposed to develop the 
public sector, but under no circumstance would we agree to work in it. Our 
competences are used in serving the donors more than Palestine. It is sad, but 
this is the reality. (Barthe 2011:116)
Although the impact of the NGO industry in Palestine became tangible 
only in later phases of the Oslo era (post 2000), nonetheless, its seeds were 
planted already in 1995 with the design – and by 1997 the establishment – of the 
Palestinian NGO project (PNGO) by the World Bank; an event that Sullivan 
describes as ‘groundbreaking’ where ‘For the first time in its history, the World 
Bank established a project to support NGOs directly, without going through 
‘normal’ channels - i.e., representatives of a State’ (2001:1). While scrutinizing this 
particular project is not an interest of this work, the change in living standards 
– the socioeconomic polarization – resulting from the exasperated financing of 
NGOs (beyond this one project) is.
The salaries of the NGO sector in Ramallah average around US$ 1,500 
monthly and reach up to five-digits. In comparison, the average public salary 
ranges between US$600 - US$700 and e.g. newly graduating architects have their 
union-approved minimum salary starting at less than US$ 300. Further and in 
contrast to logic and established knowledge, expert opinions for evaluation of 
performance, strategy and relevance of these NGOs are customarily produced 
by foreign consultants whose analysis is unable to surpass the narrow recycling 
of materials compounded in genealogically different geographies (Escobar 2012; 
Martin 1998). The drive of Palestinian NGOs to contract internationals is, like 
many Israelis moving to the colonies, chiefly budgetary; whereas payment scales 
of local consultants are relatively low, those of foreign experts are three to four 
times more. In combination with the thence justifiable logistical expenses of 
transportation and accommodation, NGOs are able to inflate their budgets and 
therewith the real-value of the 5% ‘running costs’ or ‘contingency’ items whose 
purpose of expenditure is mercurial (Barthe 2011; Kassis 2010). 
Beyond de-development of economy (Roy 1999), these mechanisms have 
far reaching negative impacts on the living conditions and sociospatial dynamics 
of Ramallah, internally and regionally. While no data is available on neither 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in relation to governorate nor wages paid by NGOs, 
statistics on average daily wage of wage-employees are implicit (Diagram 3.4). 
In 2011 average daily wage in Ramallah had reached, respectively, 7%, 32%, 28%, 
and 18% more than those in Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, and the WB in general 
(PCBS 2011b). Combined with the increased presence of agents of international 
organizations whose salaries are scaled to western standards (e.g. diplomats, 
UN officers, GIZ staff a.o.) and in the absence of strong consumer protection 
apparatuses; the high purchase power of the few became the benchmark for costs 
of services and commodities throughout the city. While annual apartment rents 
average around US$ 1,500 in Hebron in 2013, in the Ramallah agglomerate this 
figure stands at US$ 3,600 and in Ramallah-city it rises to US$ 6,00042. Whereas 
the costs are shared by all residents of the space, the wealth is the privilege of a 
clique; as one participant in the FG 2011, no.2 expressed:
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With Oslo and the creation of the NGO industry, a new class of citizens was 
founded that differs from the hitherto norm or average [...] for they have a 
particular mode of life, mode of consumption, mode of thinking. [...] They 
enjoy an income that is significantly higher than the average, and that in 
addition to their closeness to the ‘foreign’. They visit a different set of cafés and 
restaurants, and enjoy activities that are catered for by their level of income and 
the accompanied privileges. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)
As mentioned, these expressions of the socioeconomic and corollary spatial 
polarization resulting from the expansion of the NGO sector commenced in this 
period but materialized in later phases of the Oslo era. 
In this prime phase, 1994-2000, the spatial change was chiefly in the skyline. 
Given the (then still) limited banking services, investment required availability 
of capital before commencement. As a town, Ramallah’s tall buildings ranged 
between three and four stories while the built-up surfaces were scattered. 
Moreover, given the pre-OAs shortage produced by ICA repression and the 
post-OA increase in demand, construction in this period had the character of 
deregulated ubiquitous infill regardless of the surroundings (Image 3.6 - Image 
3.12). Designs were mirrorings of the entrenched austerity through half a century 
of Zionist colonialism. Therein, buildings generally composed of a ground floor 
with shops, repetitive apartments atop, carefully calculated sizes of openings 
and highly resemblant of the architecture employed in rural areas. Here Anani 
remarks that ‘for a long time I was wondering why are people constructing in 
villages using the same pattern present in Ramallah, until I looked at it from 
a different angle, and the opposite is the reality’ (Anani 2010). Investors were 
chiefly wealthy diaspora arriving from the USA, stemmed from surrounding 
villages, and the demands of whose younger offspring soon had the first chain 
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branch opened, Checkers hamburger and real American doughnuts. In the city 
centre and in light of the PA’s laissez faire policy many characteristic modern 
and historic buildings were demolished to make space for dumb buildings 
dubbed ‘commercial centres’, that were then perceived by pre-OAs residents as 
skyscrapers and today an average.
In regards to the cultural scene, this period was that of reopening and 
gradual expansion. Cinema’s like elWalid and elJameel (a.k.a. alSiraj) resumed 
screening in their halls which had been vandalized by the decay of years of 
abandonment. Baladna Cultural Centre renovated its early twentieth century 
building and reopened its doors. The National Conservatory of Music and 
the Centre for Popular Art elFunoun expanded their operations. The latter 
established the Palestine International Festival for Music and Dance bringing 
to entire generations the experience of large-scale concerts for the first time. In 
June 2000 the meticulously refurbished alKasaba Theatre and Cinematheque 
celebrated their opening, and a month later the Khalil elSakakini43 Cultural Centre 
followed course under the auspices of Arafat, whose popularity had plunged by 
that time as poverty levels amongst Palestinians rocketed. Observers argue that 
Palestinians were frustrated with the deteriorating living conditions, increasing 
socioeconomic gaps, expanding colonialism and political stagnation whose latest 
round of diplomacy brought about the nonviable Clinton Parameters (Map 1.22, p. 
38). They indicate that streets were charged, and Ariel Sharon’s armed entry into 
Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 deflected the target to Israel thence saving 
the PA the embarrassment of an open internal confrontation (as Anderson 2006 
predicts) which could have replaced what is known as the Second Intifada (Kassis 
2010; Arouri 2010 a.o.).
Here it should be noted that although the aforementioned various cultural 
institutions as well as leisure facilities (restaurants, hotels and its Rumors 
discotheque) were rooted the 1980s acquired ‘collective symbolic capital’ and 
culture; owned and managed by and served a crowd of Ramallites (Taraki 2008a; 
FG 2011, no.6); notwithstanding, these spaces and activities were soon commonly 
attributed to the returnees whom in reality composed a minority, were not 
sufficiently strong socially to induce such a scale, and where onto themselves 
different within the imagined category (liberal, conservative, (non)engagement 
with the PA, etc). According to Harvey this schism in perception resulting from 
the socio-ecological transformations of communities can be explained through 
the Marxist ‘relational, process-based, and dynamic’ dialectics, which concedes 
that the relation between environment and culture is shifting and ‘apt to produce 
contradictions and continuities’ (2009:233). Thereof, the ‘coevolution of nature and 
culture’ should be recognized, wherein:
Environment may initially shape the range of choices available to a people at 
a given moment but then culture reshapes environment responding to those 
choices, the reshaped environment presents a new set of possibilities for cultural 
reproduction, thus setting up a new cycle of mutual determination. Changes in 
the way people create and re-create their livelihood must be analyzed in terms 
of change not only in their social relations but in their ecological ones as well. 
(Harvey 2009:233; emphasis in original)
Lefebvre (2009) indicates that as a transposing medium (city-)space is a tool, 
factor and target onto itself. Similar to and as constituent of social – collective 
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Image 3.6. A view onto the Old City from alRajaa’ Street.
Image 3.7. Main Street, centre.
Image 3.8. elItha’a Street, centre.
Image 3.9. Main Street, city centre.
Image 3.10. George elSaa’ Street, centre.
Image 3.11. alNuzha neighbourhood, centre
Image 3.12. A view onto Ein Minjed from Omar alMukhtar Street.
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and individual – identity, it is constructed, shaped, presented and manipulated 
using mythology and ideological symbols, beliefs and practices. These tactics of 
producing and defining space and identity are often employed in reductionist 
paradigms in a process that Chardin dubs ‘reflexive invention’ (Harvey 2009:235), 
where prerogatives and markers of inclusion/exclusion are rendered non-
negotiable behavioural parameters. As such, ‘each social formation constructs 
objective conceptions of space and time sufficient unto its own needs and 
purposes of material and social reproduction and organizes its material practices 
in accordance with those conceptions’ (Harvey 1990:419). Harvey elaborates 
that ‘personal space and time do not automatically accord with the dominant 
public sense of either’, and further, ‘class, gender, cultural, religious and political 
differentiation in conceptions of time and space frequently become arenas of 
social conflict’ (ibid:420).
The first phase of the Oslo era marks three; first, the exposure of the short-
sightedness, unpreparedness and narrow concepts of Palestinian factional and PA 
politics; second, fostering the first calls for the abandonment of the Peace Process, 
its exclusive devices and czarist symbols – induceding (a.o.) Fatah’s defensive 
employment of the slogan ‘guard of the national project’; and third,  harbouring 
the aggressive imposition of the exclusive neoliberal socioeconomies, thence 
exasperating Palestinian premonition of disenfranchisement, thereof distrust 
and uncertainty. In contrast to the script, the ‘threat’ was emanate from within, 
erecting a second (akin the colonial first) existential predicament. The centre 
of radiation, exposure, and thereof highest intensities of alteration in the WB 
continue to unfold in Ramallah; as Abourahme phrases it: ‘If the occupation has 
been subcontracted to the Authority then Ramallah is the factory’ (2009:503). In a 
sardonic turn of events, this constellation laboured a redefinition of ‘risk strategy’ 
from the collective state-building as mechanism of controlling uncertainty, 
to the prioritization of the individual resilience through the eminent internal 
contestation of Palestinian ideologies. Ramallah’s transforming middle class had 
in effect adopted a new strategy, as the sociologist and researcher Dr. Lisa Taraki 
stated in an interview with her and in reference to her study of the agglomerate:
The nationalist movement like the Communist Party and others played 
a significant role in the creation of this educated class [...]. However, the 
Oslo process has led to a transformation and change in the awareness and 
consciousness of the people. Here I would like to emphasize the role of 
education in the formation of this new middle class, and not any education, it 
is the education that you received and I gave to my son, which is a globalized 
education. You are capable of travelling anywhere and communicate with others 
using the same language in the sense of concepts. We send our children to 
private schools, but also not any private schools, not the Islamic private schools 
or like those in Nablus and Hebron. In Ramallah some of the private schools 
which the new middle class associate with are of a different sort, they promote a 
different culture in terms of connection and orientation. If we are talking about 
social groups and how they can define the character of a city or a space, those 
active agents whom I describe in my work as the ‘new middle class’, they are also 
not homogeneous. They truly grasped what this stage in the history of Palestine 
requires. The national movement died, Oslo is over, and it is the same in every 
other country in the region, people are starting to think individually and about 
guaranteeing their own future instead of the past collective. For example, the 
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Conservatory of Music, why was there no conservatory 30 years ago here in 
Ramallah? Go and look who is studying there. Based on my research, the 
children studying there are mainly composed of those springing from new-
coming families to the city and not the traditional bourgeoisie; those are people 
who have a believe in this education, and that is why they send their kids to the 
conservatory, and to private schools and often another third activity. It is all 
part of the whole thing, of the new vision and mode of social behaviour. While 
some people perceive those families as a product of Oslo, personally I have 
a different opinion. Personally I think this is a process taking place in cities 
all over the Middle East, look at Amman and the events there which are far 
more exaggerated than the case of Ramallah, or Cairo. This is due to the state-
building project, there is a transformation going on and not only in Palestine. 
And I do refer these shifts to education, because without education of a certain 
kind these changes in social behaviour would not take place. In Egypt, Jordan, 
Beirut and Syria there is a significant independence as well as tendency towards 
foreign schools, particularly those with connections outside. High school 
diplomas with international recognition such as IB and IGCSE, the ones people 
could use outside of national boundaries are becoming more attractive. And 
this is not a coincidence. It is an expression of global and regional development, 
and Ramallah is not isolated from this world. (Taraki 2010)
3.2.2.   2001-2005: Sumud requires Morale, 
Avant-garde Sensibilities
The new-comers of which Taraki narrates her observations are a major 
factor in Ramallah’s transformation; they were the drivers of its growth in this 
period as other WB cities stagnated, they engendered its cosmopolitan mien, and 
are actively claiming the right of participation in reshaping its spaces. However, 
why did they relocate into the city? What keeps them in it? Their aspirations?
 The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 gave the short-
after elected Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon44 the excuse to place into effect a 
strategy for the de-moralization of Palestinians. Starting towards the end of 2000 
and exponentially intensifying in 2001, a chain of physical translations of the Oslo 
maps commenced. The IOF deployed outside of cities (Area A), erected basic and 
elaborate checkpoints, dug up streets, placed mounds of earth, cement blocks 
and metal gates caging Palestinians in their localities according to IOF temper. 
Airborne assassinations and bombing of PA facilities became a periodic event, 
and locals gained knowledge of the various kinds of military aircrafts: the spying 
plane (a.k.a im Rabee’) whose presence is detected by the interruption of waves 
of television receivers meant an attack is under planning; the Apache helicopter 
indicated either a manoeuvre or a limited target; and a circulating F16 meant 
an eminent and highly destructive raid. Tens of days45 of curfew and 244 days 
of closure were imposed on the WB and GS in this one year (B’Tselem 2014a), 
sentencing the weak Palestinian economy into crisis and inviting a 45% increase 
in international aid for the emerging humanitarian crisis (Infographic 3.1, p. 130). 
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In response and focused on highlighting himself and the PA as pivotal for 
Israel’s security on one hand and on the other wishing (or not?) the depletion of 
internal opposition to his rule; Arafat (proving yet again his inability to conduct long-
term impact analysis of his strategies) granted free range to all forms of resistance in 
spite of their axiomatic incompatibility. Here Hamami and Tamari note:
Stone throwing kids, mass peaceful marches echoing the strategy of the first 
intifada, and military attacks targeting the army or settlers in the occupied 
territories contrasted with Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel – and then 
got overtaken by them. Not reigning in the latter before September 11th 2001, 
was already a huge miscalculation but after it – one of catastrophic proportions. 
(Hamami and Tamari 2008:37)
The militarization of Palestinian resistance by Fatah and Hamas (opposite 
to the First Intifada) gave the IOF the immoral excuse to respond to popular 
demonstrations with live ammunition, causing severe losses in lives, incapacitating 
injuries, and thereof rapid withdrawal of quotidian Palestinians from the 
scene. This failure of synchronizing the political and quotidian components of 
Palestinian pursuits for equality are eloquently captured by Yazan alKhalili, where 
he stated:
A couple of weeks ago it was – 28 September – the anniversary of the Second 
Intifada. I browsed through YouTube material of both the First and Second 
Intifadas, and I realised that the captured images bear high resemblance of the 
two events. In the process I became convinced that the Second Intifada is a 
replica of the image of the First, but lacked the structure and depth of the latter. 
As a child in the end of the 1980s – as I was 8 to 9 years old – too often I heard 
the phrase ‘you are the children of stones’ in reference to the stone-throwing at 
the IOF. I believe this is due to the fact that this was the only aspect they were 
able to capture in an image at a time everything else – the non-photographable 
elements – were the essence of the First Intifada; the reclaiming of lands, refusal 
to pay taxes to Israel, boycotting COGAT-affiliated institutions, etc. Thus 
when the PA leadership – which in 2000 was composed mainly of returnees 
– attempted to repeat the events of the First Intifada, they pushed the only 
image they knew, which was far from the reality. This explains why the Second 
Intifada lacked political, economic and social projects and thus failed to have 
an impact beyond the destruction inflicted by the Israeli brutality. The pivotal 
element that lead to the success of the First Intifada was the conscious and 
planned creation of alternatives. People were not just asked to boycott the Israeli 
economy and its products solely for the ideology of weakening the occupation; 
rather, the strategy stretched further. People were given commodity-alternatives 
through whose production neighbourhoods were consolidated by the forged 
cross-dependency. A Hara [neighbourhood] raised a few sheep together for 
the milk, planted and harvested the close-by lot of land together; in short, 
the Hara worked, produced and existed as a unit with a consciousness of its 
impact... I visited Bil’in [village] once, and I was shocked. There was a powerful 
revolutionary surge aimed at reaching and breaking through the Separation 
Fence. As we returned to the village, all shops were full of Israeli products!! I 
wondered how these two aspects function alongside one another, and I wonder 
if the Bil’in process is that of creating a mere image of a political struggle. They 
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understand that there are cameras capturing images, and those images create 
pressure. But what is this pressure for? In order to move the Separation Wall 
few hundred meters backwards onto other lands that actually are also yours? 
What is the purpose of this weekly exercise? (alKhalili 2012)
The election of George W. Bush, the events of 11 September and the 
subsequently justified ‘war on terror’ provided Sharon with the political cover 
he needed to push the Palestinians into primal fear through what the IOF calls 
Operation Defensive Shield (ODS), and what West Bankers46 still refer to as 
their worst trauma since the Nakba. Holding the mantra of ‘Arafat is no partner 
for peace’ and a ‘sponsor of terror’, on 29 March 2002 and employing a deadly 
suicide attack in Netanya (coastal Israeli city) as justification, Sharon commanded 
ODS into execution, effectively redeploying Israel’s army in Palestinian cities, 
starting with Ramallah and spreading into all major localities. This transgression 
manifested Israel’s spaciocide strategy, at the time focusing on compromising PA 
institutions and infrastructures (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Weizman 2007). 
Enjoying an unprecedented impunity, IOF imposed a strict full-scale curfew 
banning Palestinians from leaving their homes while soldiers raided random 
selections of houses, held tenants of entire buildings hostage in single rooms, 
used civilians as human shields, displaced families while converting their homes 
to encampments and defecating everywhere except inside the toilet. Soldiers 
vandalized and looted private and public properties alike, homes, shops, and 
workplaces. Tanks drove over vehicles rather than the empty streets, deliberately 
destroyed basic infrastructures, and injured and arrested civilians, reporters 
and armed men with neither reference nor accountability. The Jenin Refugee 
Camp was literately razed. A neighbourhood of Nablus’s dense historic centre 
was targeted with an F16 missile. Internal walls of dwellings became the new 
deployment IOF route, with no regard to the massive destruction of habitats 
(Graham 2006a). This was an all-out war by a highly advanced military against 
a predominantly bare population and handful of under-equipped militias; a 
thoroughly planned and meticulously executed tragedy that today still haunts 
the traumatized generations of Palestinians. No international ‘condemnation’ 
or monetary aid or projects of reconciliation can undo the, still, living trauma 
of the collective trepidation and de-moralization of April 2002. This traumatic 
experience fostered new sensibilities, mutant references to logical analysis, and 
hence risk strategies that are alien to eurocentric paragons.
This assailment shattered the illusion of the PA’s mastery on the dwarfed 
territory and the preparedness of its various heavily-financed security apparatus 
to deter the violations against the population it represents; a reality that has been 
repetitively on exhibit since (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Weizman 2007). In the 
same line, Arafat’s popularity continued to plunge, the diplomacy of the OAs 
and what Hamimi and Tamari call the ‘lynchpin of bilateralism’ commenced 
its deliquesce. Utilizing the shock and focus of Palestinians on rehabilitation 
in the aftermath of their anew calamity and geographic shrinkage; the Israeli 
government put forth its newest installation in June 2002, the apartheid 
Separation Wall (Map 1.25, p. 41; Image 1.7 - Image 1.10, p. 43). This wall which 
was first deliberated in the mid 1990s had its western front detailed to stretch over 
709 kilometres, double the length of the Green Line, while its eastern segments 
continue to be deliberated47 (B’Tselem 2014e) in correspondence with the 
politico-territorial concepts in Map 1.21 - Map 1.24, p. 39. On the southern edge of 
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Ramallah, between elRam and Kufur Aqab (Image 1.7, p. 42) the wall is composed 
of concrete blocks ranging between 6 and 9 meters in height (for comparison, the 
Berlin Wall was 3 meters). Towards the west, on the lands of Beitunya it composes 
of trenches, fences, and a buffer stretch averaging 60 meters in width. This wall 
should be understood as an element complementary to the earlier elaborated 
colonies and checkpoints, which combined form a closed system.
For Ramallah, the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the ODS marked the 
commencement of three; first, the USA designed re-organization and physical 
materialization of its PA-provisioned militarization; second, the alteration 
of its demographics and sociospatial dynamics, and; third, the fortification 
of the neoliberal nonproduction-based – thence inferior – economy, which 
was introduced in the former phase. While Israel upscaled its strategies of 
obliteration of Palestinian modernity and the PA proved the incompossibility 
of state-building and continued colonization; notwithstanding, the economic 
project was to resume its course in a criminal carelessness to the evident 
induction of treacherous sociospatial contestation (alAtar 2010; Anani 2010).
As a result of George W. Bush’s Road Map which was signed on 4 June 2003, 
a year later the US Security Coordinator (USSC) team was agreed upon between 
the PA, USA and Israel. Residing in Tel Aviv and setting main camp in the knelt 
Jenin, the USSC generals supervised the ‘re-construction’ and re-organization of 
the Sharon-decapacitated and -delegitimized PA security apparatuses, or what 
Palestinians refer to as the Dayton Army. The fine training of this sector which 
enjoys more than a third of the PA’s budget was – and progressively continues to 
be – articulated in the de facto capital. 
In this phase the division between commander and the commanded 
crystallized through – among others – the accentuated deployment of guards 
within Ramallah; a security apparatus whose mission was chiefly the protection 
of a coterie rather than the whole. The Dayton era calibrated these genealogically 
self-targeting systems of monitoring and abortion of resistance through personnel 
deployment plans; which pseudo-comically parade the movement of assumed 
important PA personnel through the limited street networks of the agglomerate, 
casually hindering that of the average citizen. In terms of physical structures, 
while sidewalks narrowed the Palestinian generals oversaw the instalment of 
metal-sheet eyesore cabinets as guard posts throughout the city; in front of PA 
facilities, foreign agencies, and dwellings of officials and few of the private clique. 
These – akin their occupants and the properties they guard – have proliferated the 
agglomerate yet can only be photographed illicitly, as in Image 3.13. Noteworthy, 
to the left of the PA’s Prime Minister’s Office shown in the image lies the Ministry 
of Justice and the Nations Garden (one of the largest of the few green spaces 
provisioned by the municipality). The sidewalks leading to it are 50-60 cm wide, 
barricaded from the street, and blocked with a power pole (Image 3.14). Although 
this arrangement most probably resulted from an unintelligent planning rather 
than intentionally, and whether former Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad or 
nowadays Dr. Rami Hamdallah did not notice or did and ignored this failure in 
their front-yard; under either scenario, this demonstrates the irrelevance of public 
accessibility to decision-makers. The epitome of intra-city securitization can be 
found within a radius of ± 300 meters around the villa of President Mahmoud 
Abbas, where multiple checkpoints and barriers heavily control every movement; 
searching cars, identification papers, and banning both, vehicle and pedestrian 
access except to (unlucky?) neighbours of the President and their confirmed 
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Image 3.13. (above) A 
guard outpost (red) in 
front of MOPAD (further 
to the left), facing the PA’s 
Prime Minister’s Office.
Image 3.14. (left) Sidewalk 
at Jabra alAnkar Street, 
which connects the 
Ministry of Justice with the 
Ministries Complex, The 
Prime Minister’s Office, a 
UN training facility and 
two banks.
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guests. Herein, as the archetypal authoritarian Arab political scene gained shape 
and presence through ‘surreptitious arrests, torture, beatings’ and a ‘draconian 
overview’ in a process of ‘derationalization of a coherent Palestinian national 
political community’, and while this process has been an ‘overriding imperative 
of the Israeli colonial regime’; nevertheless, ‘that the current movers and shakers, 
policymakers and powerbrokers in Ramallah passively or actively feed into this 
logic, however, is a shocking development’ (Abourahme 2009:503). 
The events of the two years between September 2000 and 2002 put forth, 
and the following years stigmatised Palestinian security apparatuses as ‘against’ 
rather than ‘for’ the people; the ODS had effectively and irreversibly destroyed 
the respect for and faith in – fellow – members of these systems. As alAtar states:
93,000 Policemen serving the PA, when you calculate that number per capita 
it turns out higher than that in Germany and France and the majority of the 
countries; and those are there to provide security to whom? We the citizens 
pity them when the IOF decides to take a stroll into town. I was coming back 
from Qalandia one time and there was a Palestinian patrolling unit down here 
around the corner, so I rolled down my window and informed them. They 
jumped into their Jeep and went off. And this is our dilemma, I wish they 
were for my protection, but I also understand their conditions and that’s why I 
warned them. (alAtar 2010)
In the same line As’ad said:
In regards to the security apparatuses, unfortunately I do not feel that they are 
there for my service as a citizen. When I look into a policemen’s eyes I see two 
things: First, that he is there because he needs the salary at the end of the month 
for the entire family relying on him for food and shelter; and Second, they 
know that we as citizens know that they have no authority; like the woman who 
gets beaten up by her husband every night and each morning tries to play an 
authority role with the children who hear her screams every night. (As’ad 2010)
Therein, the first decade of this millennium tailored a burlesque costume to 
the hegemonic PA whose response to the evident nonmonopoly over violence was 
higher investments in policing apparatuses sous-prétext reform. Commencing 
then, exasperating in the third phase with the coup of Hamas, and continuing 
through the fourth phase; the PA has been resonating the conduct of the soldiers 
of the Soviet Union in their fall and that of the USA (even more post 11 September 
2001). Brugmann writes:
The final collapse of the world’s most authoritarian regimes was a logical 
consequence of their own centralized designs. Though state police tried to 
track every movement, open every letter, and record every conversation, the 
uncontrollable life of the city and its raw economics of association just unfolded 
around them. [...] For the sake of official status within the system, most people 
played along, but their hearts were no longer in it. When they went home 
from the May Day parades they resumed the constant probing of the system’s 
limited control over their increasingly bolder forms of independent association, 
weaving myriad parallel webs of unofficial social life and political thought at 
the system’s margins. (Brugmann 2009:76)
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Although Ramallites are, indeed, weaving parallel webs against those of the 
system, nonetheless, these remain highly determined by their pregnability and 
economic vulnerability. While the future is unpredictable, the contemporary 
translations of regional feudalism, nepotism, dependency and fear have revived 
the pre-OAs dynamic of fluid alliances, albeit, from an individual rather than 
collective perspective. The lack of even political accountability for involvement in 
partnerships of colonial profit under the post-trauma politico-social relationality 
freed and gave excuse to the (till then relatively) controlled commercial 
opportunism, as prophesied in classic scholarship over colonizer and subject 
binaries (Fanon 2004; Anderson 2006; Escobar 2012). While PA figures such as 
once Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei’48 sold cement to Israeli developers of colonies 
through the company his family owned, Palestinian businessmen such as Bashar 
alMasri hired radical Zionists – e.g. Dov Weissglass49 – as legal advisors and 
middlemen. In this context, scholars, intellectuals and anti-PA politicians alike 
tend to focus on the destructive impacts of this conduct onto Palestinian politics, 
relate it to the demise of the Palestinian state-project, and point accusations of 
exclusive conspiracy rather than invoke the inclusive right to varied sensibilities. 
These intellectuals debate the shape of the weed, in place of tackling the root that 
is the absence of accountability. Therewith, exploration of post-national political 
paradigms remains anaemic and limited in scope, imagination and audience.
Definitive to the unfolding political, social, economic and spatial contestation 
in Ramallah has been it’s demographic reconfiguration. As elaborated in section 
2.1, p. 47, Ramallites have been and continue to be a mixture of backgrounds: 
few original families from the time of its establishment, new comers in the early 
1900s with the expansion of its Friends Schools, more new comers in the 1930s 
under increased British institutionalization, refugees escaping the terror of Jewish 
militias in 1948, educated professionals in the 1970s, and the returnee and diaspora 
families arriving in the 1990s. As Taraki notes in this context, ‘the intellectuals, 
professionals, business people, and others who have hitched their fortunes to 
Ramallah are in fact underlying its secularism’ (2008:14). The outbreak of the 
Second Intifada in 2000, akin former events, played out demographic – therefore 
social – transformations within the city.
The combination of Arafat’s confinement in Ramallah (as the IOF deployed 
at entrances and peripheries of Areas A and destroyed his helicopter) and 
his fixation on control rapidly lead to the centralization of PA ministries and 
departments in the city starting winter 2000. Employees initially attempted to 
commute, yet the high costs of privatized public transport systems and risks 
of the long waiting hours at checkpoints invited the relocation into the seat of 
government (Khoury 2010). The colonial strategies of territorial fragmentation, 
land alienation, militarization, political- and demographic control (Graham 
2006a; Hamami and Tamari 2008; see section 2.2, p. 73) succeeded in convincing 
Palestinians into a self-censored confinement in the shrunken loci of their 
livelihoods. In this regard the various participants of FG 2011, no.6 confirmed 
their mentally exercised spatial dismemberement as transcribed in Box 3.1, p. 149. 
Control over the basic right of movement through an ethnocratic logic (Yiftachel 
1999), complex systems of inclusion and exclusion (Ophir, Givoni and Hanafi 
2009), and spatial valves of unpredictable nature (Weizman 2007) incubated 
‘distorted basic conceptions of time and space’; where ‘even during curfews, when 
people are confined to their homes, uncertainty is not as potent as it is at the 
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Box 3.1. Extract from conversation amongst participants of FG 2011, no.6 
Question: what do you think about the territorialization of the WB?
• It is the case, we are now accustomed to limit our thinking, plans and actions within 
the cities. We do not think about leaving them because with that comes the question 
of how many checkpoints, the mood of the Israeli settlers, whether I will make it to 
my destination or not, etc. 
• But this is indeed a factor of what I was referring to earlier, in the sense that because 
of this state of normalcy within the borders of the city, people do not leave it, and 
hence their expenditure remains within Ramallah, and this contributes to the 
circulation of capital within Ramallah causing it to grow at this rate.
• Indeed, people who do not have to leave Ramallah for some need, months could 
pass before they actually reach the checkpoints around it. I myself is the biggest 
example, I postpone leaving Ramallah as much as I can every time.
• Before the Intifada Nablus was very prosperous financially and lively, countless 
people went there for visiting, shopping or eating Knafeh regularly. But then with 
the checkpoints all those trends seized. Today with the checkpoints having become 
relatively easier some people resumed the practice of going to Nablus, but it is 
only those who have some work or commitment to carry out, at a time Nablus 
geographically is not that far, it is a mere half hour. My family is from Al-Thahrieh 
near Hebron. Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada I used to go back to visit 
twice and minimum once a week. In the first 5 years of the Intifada I did not go 
there once. Since a couple of years I have to force myself to think about visiting it 
every 3-4 months. 
• We have a psychological change regarding travelling, you can even call it a phobia. 
• I always have a question on my mind: I keep on saying that people lived between 
1994 and 2000 as if they were in a dream. People were forthcoming towards life, 
the country open to one another and to the outside, investments, etc. Simply, 
people wanted to live and were open to whatever is coming their way. On a random 
morning on the 29th of September 2000 the Intifada breaks out, daily clashes, 
checkpoints start to pile up, and we start literately to get screwed. We have seen such 
misery in the 5 years up to 2005, that when later things came better we all started 
claiming we’re alright; at a time if we compare it to the early years post Oslo, we are 
now miserable. We were open and full of hope, where are we now from there? and 
why? why? why this 2000?
checkpoint [...] one tends to lose one’s sense of control. It is as if one is left at the 
mercy of fate, charity, and faith’ (Gordon and Filc 2009:471).
The relocation of government necessitated that of its officials as well as clerks. 
Whereas for the former the process was catered for by their relatively high levels 
of income, for the arriving proletariat ‘fate’ is the hymn for the broken dignity 
under a hegemonic regime and another colonial one; ‘charity’ is what many have 
to accept in this city where living costs seem to double annually and concepts 
of social welfare are a distant memory; and ‘faith’ in the ability to change one’s 
future within these very same spaces is what keeps the internal emigration train 
running. Beyond the quotidian aspirations of the ‘new middle class’ transcribed 
by Taraki, ‘it was in the ambience of Ramallah that many youths from villages first 
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experienced the heady mix of politics, urban lifestyles, and different sensibilities’ 
(Taraki 2008:11). 
Between 1997 and 2014 the population in the Ramallah agglomerate increased 
by 81%, while those of Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus grew, respectively, by 46%, 
77% and 46%; as demonstrated in Infographic 3.2, p. 177. The 2007 population 
census had established that internal emigration rates remain rational when 
compared to regional ones. The same study revealed that whereas in Nablus and 
Hebron (the largest WB cities whose economy is highly production-based) the 
population living in the locality since birth stood at 74.6% and 87.5% respectively, 
in contrast, only 48% of Ramallah’s population in 2007 was born in it. Following 
physiological logic in 2014 this number must have further decreased. Here 
Taraki also highlights that ‘for each ascending age group, the proportion of the 
population resident in the city since birth decreases, with the highest proportion 
(73 percent) in the zero-to-fourteen age group and the lowest (16 percent) in the 
population over fifty’ (2008a:67). A similar observation was produced by the 
participants of the eight focus groups conducted within the course of this work, 
and 60% of the interviewees stemmed from other areas. As in other cases of 
societal and demographic change the othering of new comers gained resonance 
with time, thereof shall be discussed in the coming section.
Before ending this section two auxiliary happenings during the ODS must be 
highlighted. First, for the first time operations of evacuation of ‘foreign nationals’ 
from the endangered zone were declared. Although negligible in size, nonetheless, 
these strongly echoed the salient new reality of individual differentiation under 
colonization. In the same sense, IOF administration and soldiers consciously 
invoked religious tension by occasionally allowing Palestinian Christians to pass 
at checkpoints while leaving Muslims to wait for hours, and granting the former 
extended permits to enter areas beyond the Green Line on their holidays while 
depriving the latter of a similar opportunity. Attacks by Zionist radicals on 
Christians on both sides of the Armistice Line reveals the synthetic favouritism. 
However due to; first, the absence of a conscious PA; second, the dominance of 
compromised perfunctory public education; third, false presentations of those 
as non-Arabs (despite the significant role of their intellectuals in the evolution of 
Pan-Arabism and historic lineage to the birthplace of their faith); and fourth, the 
emergence of traits of Talibanism encouraged by Hamas’s lineage to the Muslim 
Brotherhood; combined, these are creating an imagined Palestinian Christian 
community whose projected ethos are presumably closer to western rather than 
regional ones. Preachers of such reductionist binaries downplay the role of class, 
gender, environment and education in the formation of behavioural patterns, 
hence intentionally or otherwise forging new solidarities amongst seculars of 
either religion and of any multiple possible spatial backgrounds. Such relational 
alliances dominate the sociospatial dynamic of Ramallah since and forth, 
manoeuvring the incalculable risks through rapidly changing politico-social 
sensibilities. 
The second happening worthy of notice; during and after the ODS several 
NGOs were caught under accusations of partisan provision of emergency relief 
and / or exploitation of circumstances for accumulation of either gains or favours. 
Such incidents accelerated the stigmatisation of the wider NGO sector – the 
implicated and innocent – under an industry of opportunism, or Dakakeen as 
commonly referred to them. On the margins, there were groups of youths that 
mobilized themselves to voluntarily aid in tackling the physical and mental 
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damages bestowed by the IOF while borrowing frameworks metaphorical of civic 
engagement in the First Intifada. Expectedly, as the trauma moved from actuality 
to memory the romantic exercise followed course. However, these experiences 
gave birth to a new consciousness that grasped the politico-economic as well as 
sociospatial incompossibility of former civic engagement tools to contemporary 
ecologies. These understood the importance of positive morale for endurance 
under heightened uncertainty, and the need for avant-garde sensibilities for the 
creation of a new self-identity, where:
In reality, and despite its small size, Ramallah is acquiring most of the attributes 
of contemporary metropolises in the region, including a visible globalized 
lifestyle and new sensibilities whose most enthusiastic carrier is the aspiring new 
middle class. This is happening despite the fact that death and destruction are 
not far away; in some respects, the new urban ethos in Ramallah is reminiscent 
of the mythic resilience of Beirut, a war-ravaged city that nevertheless ‘knows 
how to live’. (Taraki 2008:11; emphasis in original)
3.2.3.   2006-2010: Otherness, new Solidarities, and the 
Culture engendered by the Anti-Politics Machine
The death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 and the ousting of Ariel 
Sharon from office fourteen months later by the power of a hemorrhagic stroke 
brought into office politicians that enjoy less popular support amongst voters and 
political comrades and (hence?) higher belief that sustainment of their positions 
requires de-escalation, or to phrase it differently, better living conditions. The 
Israeli-Lebanon War in summer 2006 had left the Israeli economy and confidence 
in Ehud Olmert’s leadership shaken. Meanwhile and akin his counterpart 
Mahmoud Abbas, he recognized that the exhausted Palestinian economy loomed 
with vengeance for both, colonial and subsidiary. 
The peril in effect materialized in the 2006 PLC elections which pitied the 
evermore diminishing Palestinian Leftist parties with 4.73% of the votes while 
granting independents 8.05%, Fatah 41.43%, and a crowning 44.45% of the votes 
to the presumed uncorrupted and resistance-embodying opposition party Hamas 
(CECP 2014). In an explicit demonstration of the fragmentation of the ruling 
party, its swollen numbers of regional candidates dissipated the ratios of direct 
votes, resulting in 34% of parliamentarian seats, while Hamas mistakenly thought 
it could enjoy the stable majority of 56% (ibid). Upon its continued cornering by 
Fatah cohorts, in 2007 Hamas lead a coup thence triggering the dichotomization 
of the PA between WB and GS, respectively. Gazan top-tier and some of the 
agents of Fatah were soon after relocated (expelled?) chiefly to the city of new 
comers, Ramallah. 
As aforementioned, against this backdrop the PRDP was adopted by 
international donors, triggering the flow of unprecedented amounts of capital 
into the WB, and therewith the growth of services and real estate sectors. As 
all interviewees and FG 2011 no.2, no.3, no.6 and no.8 indicated, a coherent 
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official strategy by either central government or LGs cannot be identified, and 
municipalities suffered exasperated pressures that overburdened their limited 
capacities (Khoury 2010; Huleileh 2012). Anani described the municipal 
methodology as that of ‘patching’ where: 
[...] we need to expand, ok let’s go in this direction, we need more commercial 
space, ok change the classification of this street, we need to expand more, then 
go in that direction, and so on. In terms of problem treatment I personally 
do not see attempts by the municipality to understand existing problems. 
E.g. people do not want to build in the city centre because land prices are sky 
high, so the municipality provided alternative territory instead of addressing 
the growing phenomenon of rocketing land prices. There should be attempts 
to understand the existing context and the complex, and then planning an 
appropriating for solving existing problems instead of ignoring them, and 
instead creating new problems elsewhere. (Anani 2010)
On the other side of the same discourse, Ramallah Municipality (RM) and 
in spite of statistically articulated growing numbers of its lower and middle class 
strata in correlation to expanding economic disparities; notwithstanding, in 
the revision of its Master Plan between 2005 and 2009 it requested preserving 
the ‘uniqueness’ of the city via allocating space for low density housing, and 
particularly ‘villas’, while not bearing mention of affordable housing areas 
(Khamaisi 2006; see section 4.3.1, p. 191). In other words, Ramallah Municipality 
unilaterally decided to export the affordable housing responsibility to its 
neighbouring municipalities of alBireh and Beitunya. While public policies and 
private undertakings are elaborated in the coming two chapters, here it should be 
noted that the marginalization of underprivileged strata is not limited to selective 
temper, rather, articulated by public figures. In an interview at the Policies 
Department of the MOLG its head described Ramallah’s problem as the lack of 
class-based spatial differentiation, where he said:
Ramallah is indeed expanding in the direction of a metropolitan region 
nonetheless it does not conform to standard patterns, making it impossible 
for municipalities to set criteria for the growth. Another result is the lack 
of geographic traits for social strata, for example in Amman the western 
part of the city is designated and regulated to suit the desires of the upper-
middle and higher classes, where the neighbourhoods gradually rise in value 
until ultimately one reached Abdoun and DeirGhbar which are inhabited 
by rich families. Popular strata are oriented towards the east. Together, this 
assembles as a clear geographic distribution. In Ramallah we lack this. You 
can live in elTireh neighbourhood and build a high-class villa, yet if you stroll 
short down the street you will find popular neighbourhoods. The Masyoun 
neighbourhood has turned the same. So there is no room for us to make an 
urban or metropolitan plan that tackles this negative aspect which disrupts the 
socioeconomic consistency and harmony between residents of the same area. 
[...] A method of limiting the differences lies in equal provision of services 
across the city. Yet again, members of the upper class have the right to live – and 
this is an international phenomena – in organized neighbourhoods that one 
finds in the countryside or suburbs. The city becomes the locus of work, but 
not living. (Barghouthi 2012)
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This physiologically impaired hypothesis of separation creating harmony 
rather than the scholarly and empirically exhibited alienation, otherness and 
ultimately violence are commonplace amongst decision-makers and marketeers 
of investors, yet weakly shared by citizens and strongly opposed by researchers. 
Here it should be noted that such practitioners – in the largest part– received 
their education in past eras of suburbanization, master-planning, and today 
work in organizations (public and private alike) where R&D is an alien concept 
and practices such as ‘continued education’ are associated to interest and luxury 
rather than professional essentials; as equally demonstrated in the medical 
and education sectors. Fatalities due to newly-established incompatibility of 
prescribed medication is not an accident in Palestine. Preaching rather than 
exercising remains the main education tool as exampled through the fact that 
up to the date of this work the leading Palestinian university – Birzeit University 
– has not adapted its accreditation system to accept workshops and excursions 
as scholarly activities. Here it is important to recognize the responsibility of the 
system rather than the individual in breeding shortcomings and failure, and this 
is where Taraki’s focus on education choices of the nouveaux-Ramallites gains an 
additional dimension of importance.
In FG 2011; no.3 (25-30 years old) a participant said: ‘We as people are miles 
ahead of the planning processes, and as long as this pattern remains we will 
always end up with negative results’. When asked about their opinion regarding 
the rapidly emerging phenomenon of exclusive satellite neighbourhoods (e.g. 
Diplomatic Quarter, elReehan Neighbourhood, alGhadeer Neighbourhood; see 
chapter 5, pg. 243) the vast majority of interviewees and participants of focus 
groups described them as potential reducers of intra-city elevating densities, 
yet more intensely criticised them as financially, contextually and ecologically 
uncalculated, and constituting a reflection of the ‘ongoing processes of segregation 
within the community and the rise of individuality’ (FG 2011, no.3; 25-30 yrs). 
The architect Ali Ziadeh stated:
Given the price range they offer they attract certain social strata but repel 
others. An established person is able, but his son or daughter still can’t purchase 
in these neighbourhoods in spite of the prices being tangible lower than those 
in Ramallah. I don’t think these neighbourhoods are a result of social change, 
rather, due to geopolitical conditions. If Ramallah had the potential to grow 
freely then the next expansion areas would have been Ramallah’s C-Areas 
and not these satellite neighbourhoods, and Ramallah’s prices would not have 
inflated this much. [...] The location of alReehan is simply a result of financial 
calculations  – a good deal that PIF stumbled on – and not some spatial plan 
that someone had in mind. (Ziadeh 2012)
Low (2000), Lefebvre (2009) and Gehl (2011) and others demonstrate 
that spatial boundaries are not necessarily physically articulated (e.g. masonry 
barriers); rather, could be ideological, financial, or judiciary. Abourahme adds 
that disparities between Palestinian official discourse and the quotidian space 
have laboured an ‘acute break in the representational landscape’ whereby ‘political 
culture itself can no longer produce spaces’ that are ‘capable of supporting 
mutuality, solidarity and productive intersubjectivity’ (2011:455). The direct 
impact is the alienation of social groups who are unable to entertain the lifestyle 
of the wealthy and powerful. The selective amnesia of Ramallites oft limits 
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victims of PA policy in their city to new comers, at a time several pre-Oslo 
neighbourhoods still stand witness to continued financial aridity in the various 
liminal valley-fringes of Ramallah-city; in Ein Misbah, elTireh, and Ein Minjed 
– not to mention the refugee camps. Inquiry over spaces of disenfranchisement 
yield naming of neighbourhoods chiefly in alBireh and Beitunya (Image 3.15, 
Image 3.16), and seldom in the direct space. Describing them as ‘scary shanty-
towns’ inhabited by ‘Ru’a’ ’ (mobs), a participant in a focus group said:
In world-cities they call them shanty-towns, the Ru’a’ within a city space, like 
in Im elSharayet, Beitunya, and others. These are not exactly shanty towns with 
tin roofs, but the living environment reminds me of such, [...] where the worker 
cannot afford bringing his family with him, and hence we find entire streets 
where there are only males. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)
Confirming what Taraki refers to as ‘the salience of place-based class and 
status differentials’ (2008:15), another participant in the same activity added:
The Ramallites including those who came and have been living in the city 
since 20 years, are now subtly fighting against the intruders. It has become 
about maintaining a form of existence. Loci in which the so-called intruders 
inhabit, are deserted by those who consider themselves natives to the space. 
Some openly say that they do not want the culture of Jenin or Hebron or other 
moving to Ramallah. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)
The intensity of othering of post-2000 newcomers was inversely proportional 
to age in the conducted focus groups. Although these nouveaux-Ramallites 
include businessmen, professionals as well as proletariat, younger generations 
focused on a presumed inferiority as explicit in Box 3.2, p. 156. In contrast, older 
ones described the dynamic as idiosyncratic – e.g. ‘we are all refugees or emigrants 
or newcomers!’ (FG 2011, no.6) – and regarded the systematic disenfranchisement 
of disadvantaged ones as a collective shortcoming. The main concern for those 
was not the act of relocation, rather, the fear of a changed ethos and nostalgia to 
the intimacy and familiarity of the town, as expressed in Box 3.3, p. 157. In the 
same context the financier Samir Huleileh who moved to Ramallah in 1972 stated:
If I want to speak of most notable changes [...] I would also talk of the social 
freedoms that were present within its manifolds; all these delightful aspects have 
receded now. There are large numbers of strangers – allow me to use the term 
strangers, by which I mean non-locals; whether from villages or other regions. 
The former social harmony and consistency has seized to exist, rather, it has 
become more cosmopolitan composing of varying genres, classes, individuals 
and families that had no history in this region. Hence Ramallah has become 
a large mixed city, which comes at the price of losing what once-upon-a-time 
was its characteristic feature. [...] I don’t feel estranged, but I do feel to an extent 
lost in its missing harmony. It is neither as small as it was, nor as consistent 
as it was, and that’s it, now why does one romanticize about what once was, 
the answer is simple: it was easier, more comfortable, more secure, safer for the 
children and family. But now it is over, it is becoming a big city now, and that 
means grandeur and extravagance on one side, and on the other corruption and 
diminishing morality. It is quiet a divergence from the past. (Huleileh 2012)
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Such testimonies of othering and societal evolution are classical for human 
scientists whom also stress that ‘for ‘the stranger’ all the locals are strangers as 
well’ (Yuval-Davis 2003:316). Ramallah’s dilemma with its newly crystallizing 
modernity lies in two: the relationality between social-identity and sacrifice on 
one hand, and on the other the persistence of the town-mentality of consistency 
as the utopian. Regarding the first, aspirations to as well as systems of normalcy 
– vis-à-vis the pre-Oslo austerity – are required to intelligibly demonstrate an 
anti-colonial relevance, or are otherwise – too often – framed as delinquency; 
as idealized in focus groups no.2 and no.6. The chiefly urban-based (post-)
colonial hegemonic regimes – which boast the mantra of sui generis nationalism 
imagined through narrow selections from cultural and / or religious symbols 
(ibid) – continue to employ concepts of what Anderson cynically refers to as 
‘the beauty of gemeinschaft’; wherein through language the ‘nation’ is invoked as 
‘interestless’ and thereof drawing grandeur and purity to ‘self-sacrificing love’ and 
‘dying for the revolution’ (2009:141-4). Thereof, it indirectly criminalizes the – in 
parallel praised – freedoms and alteration. In other words, while decolonization 
necessitates imagination beyond the constraints of the colonial, dominant 
discourses demand conformity to compromised game-rules. AlKhalili captures 
the ongoing casting of the ‘national concern’ by stating:
For a long period of my life I got an edge of identifying myself as a Palestinian, 
an additional dimension that is different from being – for example – a 
Jordanian. It stemmed from the conviction that the individual carried a 
concern larger than the self, by which any step was weighted against its political 
interpretations and its relevance to the cause, etc. This feeling doesn’t exist 
today, or if it does, then it is paralyzed while undergoing a slow death process. 
One wants to live as the person, the individual, as Yazan, as Natasha as anyone 
Image 3.15. Beitunya as seen from elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012.
Image 3.16. Im elSharayet, Ein Misbah, Kufur Aqab triangle (north edge of 
Jerusalem) as seen from west, October 2013.
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else. This is concomitant with the estrangement from the Palestinian cause on 
which we throw glances from afar; we speak about it, we produce art about 
it, we conduct research about it, but the direct political relationship with it is 
diminishing. (alKhalili 2012)
In regards to the second fold of the dilemma, the nation is neither 
homogeneous nor consistent. The Cold War has laboured – and the succeeding 
intensification of globalization of econo-politics has given rise to – new generations 
of political leaders; whom re-employed the same limited ‘national’ features to 
argue and encourage the imposition of alternative radical constructions, which 
reject symbols of cosmopolitan modernity as western imperialism; e.g. Hamas. 
These, akin their preceding ‘national liberation’ constructs do not relate ‘to 
the ways people used to live historically in these societies’ nor have as political 
projects ‘abandoned modernity and its tools, whether they be modern media or 
high-tech weaponry’ (Yuval-Davis 2003:315). 
Through the dialectic mapped in this work hitherto, it is legitimate to 
conclude that the partial cover of anonymity in the lbig city-space has in effect 
Box 3.2. Extract from conversations amongst participants of focus groups who are 
17-18 years old, regarding Ramallah’s new-comers.
PS: These were born around the same time the OAs were signed, thence 
gaining consciousness in the period post the entrenchment of its systems 
and ethos.
FG 2011, no.2:
• Yes, when the people of Jenin all end up here then it will be over.
• Instead of making the State larger we make it smaller: Ramallah becomes the whole 
thing - The State of Ramallah.
FG 2011, no.4:
• Life is differing. Before we used to do almost whatever we want. Now family says 
‘don’t dress that short, because there are people in the streets that are ‘mish hal ‘ad’ 
(Arabic for: not as worthy) that will start looking at you and harassing you, and this 
could lead to bad things.
• The main reason is not that we cannot dress short. When they come from Nablus 
and other areas it is because they are being suppressed by the Israelis. So we host 
them to help them make their lives easier... but dressing shorter or not is not what 
disturbs me (emphasis added).
• There is a set of traditions and habits that the original families of Ramallah have 
abandoned. But then there are those who come from villages or other places more 
conservative, and then they start imposing on us some of their traditions. Both of us 
should adapt to one another, to be able to live together.
FG 2011, no.5:
• In Ramallah our intellectual abilities grow faster than in villages for example. 
• In other cities like Hebron the majority of the girls are veiled and the families 
are generally more ‘committed’ or ‘conservative’, while here in Ramallah, it is the 
opposite. 
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– and in contrast to the majority of interviewed opinions – given rise to new 
‘freedoms’ and sensibilities in Ramallah in both antagonistic directions, liberal 
and conservative. For example, on one side ideologies entertaining long-term 
dating, or pre-marital sex, or accepting homosexuality are planting their pioneer 
seeds in selected micro-ecologies, and on the other side a tangible increase in rates 
of registered incidents of forced veiling of women, ‘honour-killing’ and group 
verbal- and physical-confrontations due to a casual expression of differentiated 
opinions on religious and political figures. Traditionalists on both sides of the 
spectrum view their chosen social ethos as threatened by the ‘new other’. This is 
paralleled on the political dimension with pro- and an-tagonists of the nation-
state project and militarization of government.
Exemplifying the problematic of the ‘system’ yet again, seculars flash  historic 
accounts of Ramallah’s liberal provincial mien often as justification for the lived 
contemporary translations, in place of emphasising the timely constitutionally-
protected right of choice and differentiation. This conduct appeases social and 
ideological nepotisms and furthers dependence rather than invoking an individual 
culture of freedom and accountability; thereof forging a mutated ‘normalcy’. In a 
Box 3.3. Extract from conversations amongst participants of focus groups who are 
+50 years old (FG 2011, no.6), regarding Ramallah’s new-comers.
• I am the daughter of Ramallah, I like walking in it, I have my memories here. The 
streets of Ramallah are where I walked as little scouts-group girl, walked in funerals 
and attended weddings and lovely occasions. But today, it is impossible to walk in 
these streets, we became strangers in our own city. Even the names of the streets 
are changing. I live in this paradox, in this conflict with myself. On one side this 
is my city, on the other I do not relate to the people walking in its streets. Even 
though the city has grown a lot and now there are many more options whether 
for shopping or leisure, I find myself visiting only those places and shops which 
have always been there, the old ones with the memories. In former times when 
one bought a commodity but realized s/he is short on cash, the seller used to say 
‘it is okay, no trouble, we’ll deal with the money later!’, there was trust amongst the 
people, but that is almost in-existent today.... Lovers used to have the Library Street 
as their promenade. Today with the cars parked on both sides, a Ministry here and 
a multi-story building there, taking a stroll there has lost its joy... And this is what 
on the other side of the coin makes this residential complex special. The streets are 
not crowded, they are wide and clean. One can walk at ease and enjoy the nature 
and trees, also feel assured about the kids on the streets, and that the girls will not 
be harassed...  I think I can summarize my point with ‘the opportunity to exercise 
some normalcy of life’. Our friend here described pre-Oslo Ramallah as ‘romantic 
nostalgia’, but nonetheless, the relationships between the people were real, based on 
pure emotions not profit. We might be romanticizing about it now but it was real.
• At some point it was a struggle to get my children to escort me when I needed to 
run some errands in the centre. They would repeatedly voice their annoyance that 
every couple of meters I stop to great someone, or enter a shop just to say ‘hello’. 
This familiarity within the space, recognizing people and getting recognized, this 
does not exist anymore.
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classical reaction, conservatives use those as evidence as well, albeit, of endemic 
moral corruption thus propagating the ‘Change and Reform’ – electoral-list name 
used by Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections. 
One’s fear of the other and being othered and the shrinking of familiar 
mental and lived space within the city-scape (due to public space erasure, 
militarization and privatization) has lead the varying ideological camps to 
circulate symbols praising the one and denying the lineage of the imagined other’s 
ideology; a terrifying city-dynamic that demonstrates the depth of infiltration of 
the Zionist colonial thought into the everyday perception, terminology and logic 
of argumentation of Palestinians. Today Palestinian popular politics, too, takes 
selective leaps into the mythical past to justify mutated politics as representations 
of aspirations of an imagined population, and thereof distancing itself from the 
complex realities and sensibilities most exhibited in Ramallah. 
Although roots of the alarming rise in Ramallah’s sociospatial contestation 
have been repeatedly diagnosed and traced back to the ‘development industry’, up 
to date participatory non-eurocentric spatial treatments to civic marginalization 
aspects described by this work remain absent (Rayyan 2010; Anani 2010). LGs 
are still holding the course outlined by the central government, with which their 
work is presumed technical, suspended from ‘interim’ timely geopolitics and 
constraints, and focused on ‘fostering’ the prosperous post-colonial state. Their 
discourse is based on the economic prescriptions of the World Bank in continued 
disregard to intensifying politico-social opposition to the nation-state model. 
This foreign-aid financed system is in effect producing what Ferguson (2009) 
calls the ‘anti-politics machine’. Through his examination of the impact of the 
intervention of the international community in the conceptually comparable case 
of state-making and development practices in Lesotho, he concludes that poverty 
was merely a ‘point of entry’ to an operation of ‘reinforcing and expanding the 
exercise of bureaucratic state power’ (2009:255). Here he argues that by, first, 
‘uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem’ through de-
politicizing it; second, ‘by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of 
powerless and oppressed people’, and; third, through ‘making the intentional 
blue-prints for ‘development’ so highly visible; therewith, ‘development’ projects 
had in effect performed ‘extremely sensitive political operations involving the 
entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under 
cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object’, at least not 
officially (ibid:256). 
Expectedly, similar ‘development’ operations in Palestine have mobilized 
excluded social groups in Ramallah into elaborate or casual ‘rallies against the 
hypocrisies’ of presumed horizontal national-citizenship, therewith making  new 
claims to the ‘ideology of universal equality and respect’ (Holston and Appadurai 
2003:296). Herein Holston and Appadurai describe the role and impact of these 
groups on the urban by arguing that:
[T]hey generate new kinds of citizens, new sources of law, and new participation 
in the decisions that bind. As much as anything else, these conflicting and 
disjunctive processes of change constitute the core meaning of modern 
citizenship, constantly unsettling its assumptions. [... Herein] concentrations of 
the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed, and the public, cities engage most palpably 
the tumult of citizenship. Their crowds catalyse processes which decisively 
expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship. Their streets 
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conflate identities of territory and contract with those of race, religion, class, 
culture, and gender to produce the reactive ingredients of both progressive and 
reactionary political movements. Like nothing else, the modern urban public 
signifies both the defamiliarizing enormity of national citizenship and the 
exhilaration of its liberties. (Holston and Appadurai 2003:296)
In agreement with Holston and Appadurai’s claim that twentieth-century 
concepts of national societies have been discredited by cosmopolitan forms of 
urbanity, Ferguson states that in the particular case of post-colonial state-making 
projects: ‘if the ‘instrument-effect’ of a ‘development’ project end up forming 
any kind of strategically coherent or intelligible whole, this is it: the anti-politics 
machine’ (2009:256). Further, the inflated size the PA encouraged it to retained 
monopoly on territorial decision-making minimalizing role of independent 
parties; as elaborated in the coming chapter. Besides the voiceless researchers and 
practitioners; the CEO of Palestine Development and Investment Ltd. and Vice-
Chairman of the BOD of Palestine Real Estate Investment Company (PADICO, 
PRICO respectively; chapter 5, pg. 243); Mr. Samir Huleileh stated in this regard:
In our market the municipalities and relevant ministries have a monopoly on the 
provision of urban infrastructures, thence PRICO does not provide infrastructure 
services. In some cases, they approach us for partnership, but only after the bold 
lines have been predefined. [...] Legally, the laws are neither coherent nor regular 
regarding public-private partnerships in the provision of public services. Hence 
in my personal opinion, joint undertakings with local authorities, particularly 
municipalities, is a very risky business. In the same line of the aforementioned, 
we as PRICO have never been approached by any municipality to provide a 
neutral or independent professional consultancy on any of the projects they 
decide to undertake. We are approached if they are looking for implementers, 
but not in the conceptualization phase. (Huleileh 2012)
On the other hand, this approach of the PA to managing the city-space does 
not factor the new risk-strategy – hence spacio-economic behavioural logic – of 
Ramallites. These re-employ re-configured fluid alliances in socially kosher and 
non-kosher forms under arguments that are economically calculable. Beyond 
aforementioned examples here are a few more; while association with Israelis 
is frowned upon as an act of normalization50 of colonization, nonetheless, the 
weekly demonstration against the Separation Wall in Bil’in prides itself with Israeli 
‘peace activists’ who engage in co-resistance; while a significant number of the 
PFLP members and leaders are Christians, nonetheless, they signed an alliance 
with Islamic Shari’a propagating Hamas in the 2006 LG elections; while NGOs 
and neoliberal corporates are customarily cursed as organisms of entrenching 
economic exclusion yet these remain the favoured job-providers; while the Boycott 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign is gaining footing and generating 
pro-Palestinian empathy globally indirectly serving the declared agendas of the 
PLO, the PA arrests and trials its members on refutable charges of ‘disturbing 
public peace’, and not last; while suffering from othering is a copious common, 
nonetheless many nouveaux-Ramallites have a particular attachment to this city as 
expressed by a participant in FG 2011, no.2; 35-35 yrs: ‘I only like the atmosphere of 
Ramallah!.. Even when I am in Jenin with my family, I constantly have the feeling 
that I need to get back to Ramallah. I have been in Ramallah for 12 years now’. 
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This participant belongs to a pre-Oslo established group that has been 
gradually growing over a century of time. She explained those sentiments with 
the classical arguments of social dynamics, openness and concentration of 
opportunity in contrast to other WB localities. What is significant here is that 
those same genomic traits started – in this phase of 2006-2010 – engendering 
similar sensibilities with yet another newly nascent Ramallah-minority: 
Palestinian-Israelis. The unintelligently invited and hitherto officially unaddressed 
(by neither the PLO nor Israel) political impact of increased presence of 1948-er 
voices (as commonly referred to them) in the lived spaces of Ramallites is that 
of reactivation of solidarities with the larger geography of Palestine. Today the 
mental spaces of some Ramallah sub-groups spacio-economically overlap with 
those of the unappointed ambassadors; cross-border, against hierarchies and 
physically materializing (Image 3.19, p. 163). 
Beyond re-familiarizing the sequestered landscape, this synthesis is down-
scaling and neutralizing archetypal associations to ‘self-sacrificing heimat love’ 
as Anderson (2006:141) depicts it. Their mundane narratives of search for spaces 
of individuality and expression against the limiting social-familial (Holston and 
Appadurai 2003) and the exclusive colonial-state (Anderson 2006) are bridging 
the categorical differences that the Israeli administration logic of imaginary 
ethno-fragmentation induces; through what Chardin calls ‘reflexive invention’ 
as elaborated earlier in this section (Harvey 2009:235). The names of 1948-er 
performers whose ‘gig’s are frequent in Ramallah (e.g. Toot-Ard reggae band 
from Golan; Walla’at popular music band from Acre; DJ Bruno from Haifa; Dam 
HipHop band from Jaffa, a.o.) have indeed become a cognizant association whose 
presence embolders works of Ramallite counterparts (e.g. Asifeh-Stormtrap; DJ 
Marwan As’ad; Yalalan Choire; a.o). Relevant to this process is the tedious work 
of  a handful of artists, scholars and intellectuals who are mobilizing opinions of 
micro-freedoms through critical exhibitions, biennales, and street-art installations 
(The Cities Series by Vera Tamari and Yazid Anani; Civic Encounter Symposium 
by Shurouq Harb; Qalandia International by seven leading foundations and 
centres a.o). 
The articulated coalesces of some Ramallites niches with their 1948-er 
parallels is highly factored by shared socioeconomic needs; first, the need for 
spaces of empathy that enable both survival and evolution under the restrictions of 
resonant accusations of ‘alien ethos’ and ‘corruption of traditions’, and; second, the 
need to access larger crowds that cater for financial feasibility for both, performer 
and incubating spaces. Herein it should be noted that the othering of emerging 
groups of alternative sensibilities is not unique to Ramallah, as evident in volumes 
of scholarship, e.g. in his work on Berlin’s turn into metropolitanism in the late 
nineteenth century Kaschuba notes on political mechanisms of administering the 
city stating that ‘work on the city therefore also frequently became ‘social work’, 
Work on an urban ‘people’ who had apparently lost their ethics and morals in a 
big city environment allegedly bereft of traditions and taboos’ (2012:241; emphasis 
added). In the same context and describing following decades:
This omnipresence of ‘strangers’ and ‘otherness’ became a sort of Berlin 
trademark, albeit one apparently taken quite lightly, because in Berlin, this 
constant coming and becoming now seemed almost normal. [...] [C]hange 
had come to define the rhythm of the city, and it could be felt in the streets, 
squares, railway stations, and newsstands; in the department stores and 
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pubs; everywhere people, groups, and languages gathered and attempted to 
communicate. In many cases, the milieus and differences mixed in such a way 
that in some districts, it was precisely this social blend that became the new 
common ground: a demonstrative unity of difference. (Kaschuba 2012:240)
Agreeing with Kaschuba in his analysis of Ramallah’s evolution patterns 
alKhalili adds:
The new Palestinian is a breed of his/her city and not his/her Palestinian-ship. 
Ironically, for the longest time I’ve had this imagination: the very next moment 
after Israel withdraws form the WB, Ramallah draw the Separation Wall to 
wrap itself tight, and will appropriate – yet reverse – the checkpoint structure 
making the exit from Ramallah uncontrolled but the entry scrutinized. In my 
mental trip Ramallah will find itself one day in need of protecting its political, 
economic and cultural receptiveness from the new comers who desire to 
benefit from the opportunities it offers, and this is particularly the catch point: 
Ramallah’s continued economic susceptibility relies on its political castration. 
The Palestinian economy is relatively a rich one; whether due to in-house 
capitalists, expatriates that regularly make transfers, or the international donor 
that has been pumping considerable amounts of cash. Ramallah’s economic 
prominence originates from all three, and their continued flow is factored 
by the ongoing political castration. Ramallah cannot end the latter without 
reinventing itself economically, and in turn, this requires a political decision. 
(alKhalili 2012)
Sharing the conviction that decolonization requires the questioning of 
entrenched systems, The Decolonizing Architecture programme (stationed 
in Beit Sahour, Bethlehem Governorate) was launched by three architects: 
the Palestinian Sandy Hilal, the Italian Alessandro Petti, and the Israeli Eyal 
Weizman. Empowered by a network of colleagues and intellectuals they have 
been re-addressing and re-engaging with concepts of territory and borders 
through a discourse that combines ‘spatial intervention, education, collective 
learning, public meetings and legal challenges’ (DAAR 2014). In Ramallah, the 
‘Ramallah Syndrome’ forum commenced holding unorchestrated meetings 
between scholars, intellectuals and artist many of which interviewed in 
this work. They produced discussions over their lived spaces, opinions and 
aspirations which they later transcribed and published online51. In this phase 
Palestinians did not just survive, rather, they actively appropriated a new 
perspective on their subsistence. 
Today, liberals and talibanists, globalists and conservatives, original 
families and new comers, refugees, returnees, expates, 1948-ers, internationals, 
profiteering businessmen, anti-colonial intellectuals, anti-nation-state politicians 
and many others are all minorities of varying scales, perceptions and operations 
in Ramallah. Whereas the PLO is typically exasperating its hegemony through 
unlawful oppression of expression, prosecution of activists, and red-tapping 
of their potential representation spaces through centralist policies of imagined 
homogeneity; meanwhile, these minorities are forging highly unpredictable, 
rapidly shifting alliances (and spaces) that are quintessentially based on 
fundamental – and to an extent predictable –  socioeconomic needs. Hence and 
in effect they are driving ‘a deeper wedge between national space and its urban 
162 |   100 × RAMALLAH
Image 3.17. A graffiti in Ramallah reading ‘queers passed from here’ (Hilal 2013). This image 
is taken from an article titled ‘Eight questions Palestinian queers are tired of hearing’ by the 
activist Gaith Hilal.
Image 3.18. Part of the poster of the exhibition ‘Ramallah – the fairest of them all?’ which was 
curated by Vera Tamari and Yazid Anani over five months in 2010. 
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Image 3.19. A banner prepared by Association for Arab Youth – Baladna which was established 
by Palestinian Israelis and with its headquarters in Haifa. The text reads: ‘No borders for our 
identity, mobilized for Palestine’. The signs carried by those in the image read their first name 
and locality of origin; Palestinian cities on both sides of the armistice line (Baladna 2014).
Image 3.20. A digital advertisement for a literary evening by Shurouq Harb, that chose to 
place itself beyond organized space, in the relevant, residual and liminal urban space of a 
neighbourhood staircase.
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centres’ (Holston and Appadurai 2003:297) where cities like Ramallah which 
conform to what Appadurai (2003) calls translocalities; these demonstrate:
a growing number of societies in which cities have a different relationship 
to global processes than the visions and policies of their nation-states may 
admit or endorse. [...] Cities have always been stages for politics of a different 
sort than their hinterlands. But in the era of mass migration, globalization 
of the economy, and rapid circulation of rights discourse, cities present the 
localization of global forces as such as they do the dense articulation of national 
resources, persons, and projects. (Holston and Appadurai 2003:297)
This calls back the hypothesis of this work which stipulates that Ramallah’s 
urbanism is a product of its colonial genealogy and existence, and thereof its 
spatial decolonization requires socio-political intoxication from the limiting 
colonial imaginations, paradigms and tools. The afore described de novo 
interpretations of sumud have the potential of growing into dynamic engines of 
decolonized (non-hegemonic, -militarized, -exclusive, -centralized) production 
of lived, mental, and representational space, in face of what alKhalili (2012) coins 
fremd politics. However, what are their characteristic sociospatial dynamics, 
approach, and weaknesses?
3.2.4.   2011-today: ‘Moments’ of Human 
Labour and the Creative Class
As Abourahme (2011) elaborates Ramallah’s unfolding ambivalence is 
unorthodox – hence uncalculable – given the ecology of complex filters, valves, 
and stratified systems of colonial administration. Thereupon, what is needed in 
place of the rigid spatial and master-planning is a ‘cybernetics-based’ systems 
of decision-making on case-specific issues. These operate through continuously 
growing sets of flexible parameters and conditionality (Hall and Jones 2011) which 
in turn gain their orientation from socio-ecological transformations (Harvey 
2009). In this regard Harvey argues that Karl Marx suggested ‘six distinctive and 
identifiable ‘moments’ revolving around the organization’, i.e. planning, ‘of the 
human labour process’ (ibid:237). He lists these as:
• Technology; encompassing both hard- and soft-ware, equipment and 
intelligence which are constantly re-defining challenges, limits of human 
knowledge and innovation;
• Nature; wherein urbanism and its sociospatial manifestations are seen not 
as synthetic rather as integral process of natural history in which intended 
and unintended consequences and risks of human undertakings are 
examined as byproducts and retrospectively traceable practices;
• The activity of production; as processes that labour utility and market-
value; from raw or pre-processed material to tools whether mechanic (e.g. 
hardware), administrative (e.g. programming), symbolic (e.g. art objects), 
infrastructures (e.g. connecting urban resources), etc;
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• The sustenance of daily life; quotidian processes ‘both social and ecological, 
through which individuals and social groups reproduce themselves and 
their social relations, [...] what Gramsci refers to as the ‘practical activity’ 
of ‘the man in the mass’, Lefebvre refers to as ‘everyday life’, Braudel calls 
‘material life’, and Hebermas depicts as ‘the lifeworld’ ’ (ibid);
• Social relations; the mediums and doctrines channelling behavioural 
patterns whether hierarchies; gender and racialized distinctions; place-, 
family-, and political-loyalties; religious and linguistic affiliations, a.o.; and,
• Mental conceptions of the world; which ‘refers not only to how individuals 
think on a day-to-day basis but to the whole inherited arsenal of language, 
concepts, and stored symbolic, cultural, religious, ethical, scientific and 
ideological meanings and aesthetic and moral judgements’ which ‘guarantee 
not only a remarkable amount of conflictual intellectual activity, but also 
a capacity for thought experimentation that has powerful reverberations 
across all the other moments’ (ibid).
In regards to establishing comprehension of process whether in terms 
of ingredients, scale, timing, length and intensity of impact among other 
constituents of a happening; Harvey argues the quintessence of a logic of causality 
that observes and maintains the listed six ‘moments’ in ‘dialectical tension’ 
with each other while factoring their asymmetries. To demonstrate this logic 
the problematic of narrowness of the cultural sector is examined. Herein, all 
opinions collected through this work whether scholarly or empirical indicate that 
although foreign aid for cultural foundations, centres and activities is relatively 
high, nonetheless their outreach is limited in range, wherein the larger sum of 
events is geographically limited to Ramallah, and significant segments of the 
crowd are ‘frequent visitors’. Interviewees described the cultural scene as an 
unsustainable bubble, a crowd of an elite minority, composed predominantly of 
non-endemic forms that appeasing and conform to donor’s sensibilities, and are 
conducted in exclusive spaces. Through the coming paragraphs and following the 
Marxist dialectic of ‘moments’ it is argued that Ramallah’s cultural scene is; first, 
not a bubble rather a scene of nascent seeds that are both pregnant and highly 
pregnable; second, not an elite crowd rather assemblages of solidarities; third, 
that the initial exclusivity of spaces is an essential condition of ecology, and; 
fourth, that indeed the donor-culture has mutated the process and impeded the 
organic growth of this sector, nonetheless, rooted and innovative concepts have 
been evolving and increasingly taking shape.
Taking Marx’s ‘technology’, a necessity for the advancement of the majority 
of arts genres is the availability of infrastructures whose provision, maintenance 
and growth is costly. The decision on whether to assume financial risk is based on 
a calculation of the projected return in investment, which in turn is factored by 
the five other domains of analysis. First and starting with the element of ‘nature’; 
the plethora of archaeological and architectural evidence supporting the argument 
that Palestinian cities had a form of cultural scene before the Nakba (many of 
which are abandoned structures) falsifies the argument of lack of fertile grounds, 
more so as statistically speaking, Ramallah has lower numbers of both events and 
registered cultural spaces when compared to Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem52. In 
order to scale the setting, Tulkarem will be borrowed as a socio-demographically 
comparable case. The 1931 British Mandate Census indicates that it was a typical 
pre-Nakba Palestinian city with a majority and minorities, where it counted 4,540 
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Muslims, 255 Christians, 18 Jews, 12 Samaritans and 2 Druze (Mills 1932:58). At 
the time Ramallah had 519 Muslims and 3,766 Christians (ibid:50). Tulkarem 
has an iconic theatre with elaborate and rare woodwork on its facade eyeing the 
city’s main street. Attracting funds for its renovation and reactivation – as was the 
case with the majority of cultural spaces in Ramallah – is theoretically strongly 
justifiable by its heritage and socio-economic components. Nonetheless it has 
not, yet. The causes of this disparity can be traced to the varying topographies 
of the Zionist colonial geo-economy – as explained in section 2.3, p. 91 – which 
incubated disparate and sometimes antithetic ecologies. 
The logic of causality points towards the second line of ‘tension’ – the 
‘sustenance of daily life’, wherein Tulkarem’s economy was and remains based on 
blue-collar labour. Agriculture, its largest home-sector, has not stopped shrinking 
since the 1967 Six-Day War, and the signature of the OAs triggered the same effect 
into its functioning as cheap-labour reservoir for Israel as the latter intensified 
its closure policy and revoking of working permits (here it should be noted that 
Tulakrem lies at 15 kilometers from the Mediterranean coastline, spearing deep 
into Israeli concepts of geographical buffering). In contrast, Ramallah’s white-
collar economy was growing as explained in section 3.2.1, p. 135. Hence while there 
was and remains a wide segment of Ramallites who can afford NIS 10 (€2) for 
the public transportation to attend a donor-sponsored free-entry cultural event, 
the same did not and does not apply to Tulkarem whose average daily wage in 
2011 was 42% less, and whose unemployment rate was 35% more than Ramallah’s 
respectively (PCBS 2011b, 2011). Further, the response of local decision-makers 
to the closing of markets of ‘blue-collar’ jobs was the switching to exportation 
of ‘white-collar’ labour. Tulkarem has four universities within its agglomerate, 
Ramallah has only one. Ontologically, large segments of the youth of the former 
has migrated to the latter, amongst which those aspiring for engagement in 
cultural production and consumption. Formations of ‘places-of-origin’ of 
members of Ramallite performing arts groups is an omnipresent testimony of 
the mixture of the city, and an indicator of the growing number of Ramallah’s 
‘yuppies’, young urban (upwardly mobile) professionals.
This brings us to the third element of ‘social relations’. Tulkarem’s tight 
family structures are sustaining vertical social hierarchies, which when combined 
with its contemporary conservative nature yields the framing of cultural events as 
‘luxury’ rather than ‘need’. This creates an order by which – the indeed possible – 
self-financing of a personal ‘hobby’ is socially judged as ‘Aib’, a shame, given the 
shadow of an unemployed cousin, a neighbour, a friend, or the needy family of a 
‘martyr’ from the city. Palestine is a ‘aib’-culture, one word serving as universal 
answer: it is aib for men to cry, it is aib to disobey wishes of elderly,  it is aib 
not to help a person in need, it is aib for a girl to walk alone after dark, and it 
is aib to engage with cultural forms that are not approved by the tribesmen. In 
contrast, Ramallah’s horizontal social hierarchies and absence of regencies of 
extended families is enabling the continued challenging of austerity and self-
sacrificing discourses. In the same line, while politicians – whether of the central 
government or LGs – are often seen enjoying the front-rows of Ramallah’s events, 
however, they are reluctant in assuming similar stances of public demonstration 
of support of cultural production in other regions, hence enabling the persistence 
of a conservative grip on forms of societal interaction and production.
Feeding into this dynamic is the fourth point of ‘mental conceptions’. 
Performing arts are a central object in depictions of Ramallah as a morally 
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corrupt habitat, given the close and sometimes physical interaction of both sexes. 
Unlike Tulkarem, in Jenin considerable financial as well as human investments 
by local artists and enthusiasts were made in its cultural infrastructure. In 2006 
the Freedom Theatre was established and Jenin’s old cinema was restored with 
a budget exceeding €400,000 between 2009 and 2010. However, incitement 
against these institutions culminated with the assassination of the Palestinian-
Israeli director and activist Juliano Mer-Khamis on 4 April 2011, and a line of 
accusations of mischievous conduct against the cinema which has had to shrink 
the scope of its activities since. Moreover, arts and culture are not perceived as 
a life-sustaining, ‘real’ profession. One of Ramallah’s leading pianists today is a 
son of an elite Jerusalem family that refused to allow him to accept scholarships 
for further mentoring, insisting that he acquires a ‘profession’ first. After serving 
the sentence of five years of Architectural Engineering studies he was able to 
gain the confidence necessary to pursue his passion. Being an artist, including in 
Ramallah, is not an easy choice regardless of financial status, however, the essential 
difference between it and other WB localities is the presence of micro-solidarities 
that challenge societal norms; as Rayyan (2010) stated, the growth of the cultural 
sector in Ramallah was fuelled by foreign aid, yet was enabled due to ‘the presence 
of people with such tendencies, who wanted to pursue such an agenda’.
Arriving at the fifth element of ‘activity of production’ and in line with 
Gehl’s postulate on the self-reinforcing character of urban happenings; the 
compatibility of nature, availability of engaged persons, higher individuality and 
lower hierarchy, and the ability to challenge common paradigms; together these 
have created a system where enacting solidarities is considered the motor for 
their sustenance first, and second, the hope of their expansion. While various 
WB cities periodically organize events that include cultural paragraphs e.g. 
the omnipresent Dabke (Palestinian folklore dance) performance by a school’s 
group in the event of a graduation ceremony; nonetheless, classical arts such 
as orchestra or jazz concerts remain almost entirely limited to the geography 
between Ramallah and Bethlehem, with an outward reducing intensity. 
Ramallah’s domination on this form of expression is a product of the ‘labour 
processes’ of its minorities. Examining such an event in Ramallah one notices that 
the demand for afore-stage prosecco has not accumulated sufficient momentum 
yet. The result is that during the thirty minutes preceding the commencement 
of the performance the space – whether auditorium, hall or garden – radiate 
the impression of a university reunion; people constantly squeezing between 
shoulders and chairs, shaking hands, smiling, kissing, laughing, and occasionally 
hugging. In the one space gradually highly differentiating relationalities emerge. 
Whereas the summoning occasion remains fondness of the advertised product; 
for a nouveaux-Ramallite or a tourist, at most, the contours of an indistinct 
relationship are detected through the salutations. For romantics, these resemble 
a flashback down the memory-lane of social intimacy. For cultural practitioners, 
this is an assembly, a proof of presence by the few hundreds of dedicated 
comrades. For those involved at higher tiers of the PA this is an uncommon 
setting of intense concentration of opposition intellectuals. For former leftist 
who are predominantly graduates of European universities and the generation 
of commonly accessible classical arts – whether western or oriental – this is 
the unintelligent contemporary replacement of collective and political-party 
activities and meetings, along with now-adult offspring, and with calculated 
exchanges about the political. For a couple of hours these sub-groups enact and 
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actively reproduce a shared ethos publicly. It is effortless to limit the justification 
of the frequent visitation of this particular (non-homogenous) audience to this 
expression of arts to taste. However, the additional perspective is the Marxist 
determinate, which argues that ‘labour processes’ are ‘required to produce and 
maintain spaces, places and built environments’ (Harvey 2009:238), here active 
labour rather than taste is the central concept. Other constellations of varying 
relationalities and enactment of social ethos surfaces in hiphop events, theatre 
pieces, modern-dance shows, and sports events. The prominence of activities in 
Ramallah was triggered by the ‘chance’ of availability of donor money as Rayyan 
(2010) describes it, however, its continuation and growth over the past decade is 
a direct product of the ability of different minorities to interact and reproduce 
their interests at overlapping spatial points.
Calculating these five ‘moments’, the forces sustaining the concentration and 
higher growth rates of cultural infrastructures in Ramallah become lucid, and 
beyond being reduced to the donor-effect, as Bethlehem and Jenin demonstrate. 
For provision of costly ‘technology (the sixth moment), indicators of risks and 
return on investment are not only most comforting in Ramallah, but also fall deep 
into the minus in few other localities thence feeding into the vicious cycle.  
As noted, the primitive spaces of organized cultural activities which were 
established in the first three phases of the OAs in Ramallah are indeed exclusive 
as described by some interviewees. Their advertisement circulates in certain 
networks but fails to reach others, they appease selective tastes rather than popular 
ones, and participation entails a particular cost beyond the capacity of many of 
the agglomerate’s inhabitants. Notwithstanding, following ecological patterns 
which advocate careful and protected nurture of nascent living systems, cultural 
practices in Ramallah needed some years to grow a base sufficient for adventurous 
discovery of new territories. Over the past few years and beyond the countless 
micro to small scale cultural undertakings by private parties throughout the city-
space; the Municipality of Ramallah has been organizing increasing numbers of 
street festivals for children, trade and celebration of religious occasions which 
extend over several days and whose accessibility is equal for all social strata. 
A new street-culture is starting to emerge in the city, whereby pedestrians and 
informal economies reclaim the streets from vehicles on periodic bases e.g. in the 
final nights before alAdha or alFiter celebrations.
Abourahme notes that ‘the most fetishized of contexts, the art scene, a bit 
deradicalized but diverse and markedly contemporary, buzzes and shoots above 
its weight, and the parameters of a kind of subculture, even a counter-culture 
can be traced’ (2009:502). Predictably, the spatial articulation of the ethos of a 
minority draws a reaction from its opposition. On 21 April 2014 and following 
the termination of the traditional Easter scouts groups parade, about two-dozen 
females and male dancers from the First Ramallah Group surprised the compact 
masses at alManara Square with a flash-mob performance that employed folklore 
moves on the tunes of the scouts-band which played the tunes of ‘Wain A 
Ramallah’ (popular song ‘Where? to Ramallah’). Flash-mobs are hardly known 
to Palestinians, and the (naturally) unannounced introduction of this form of 
expression yielded two main reactions; from one side a hail of praise of Ramallah’s 
openness, innovation and joie de vivre, and from the other an avalanche of 
accusations of further breaching of ‘traditional norms’, of bringing ‘disgrace’ to 
the ‘sacrifices’ made for the ‘homeland’ by these girls dancing on open streets 
and under the eyes of hundreds of stranger males. This episode of contestation 
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was not the first and along with the preceding dozens provides promises of many 
to follow. Ironically, the colonial geo-fragmentation and the ODS in 2002 have 
unintelligently created a protective ‘dome’ (to invoke the Israeli Iron Dome anti-
missile system) around the city. The trauma of checkpoints and closures has 
rendered Ramallah a distant geography rather than an easily accessible place 
whose ethos can be corrected through engagement. A tangible deterrent for 
regional conservative groups however is the city’s high militarization through 
the deployment of the Dayton Army in this quasi-capital. An attack on an event 
would be considered an attack on the state’s sovereignty, as exampled in the arrest 
and prosecution of contending BDS activists in April 201453.
In her study in Costa Rica, Low (2000) found that the word ‘culture’ is used 
as an expression for subjectively desired and romanticised conceptions of social 
values from the past. Cities become havens for individuals escaping commitment 
to that same ‘culture’, utilizing social anonymity and the fluidity of exposed 
and hidden space. According to Lefebvre (2009) counter-culture and -space as 
expressions of resistance to prevailing orders are onto themselves articulations of 
overbearing neo-bourgeoisie. He maintains that spaces of leisure are a form of 
division between social and mental spaces and realities, between the censorship 
and intellectuality, and between everyday modes of life and those considered 
out of the ordinary. Lefebvre considers these spaces as revealing of the schisms 
between traditional and contemporary modes of life, describing them as the 
‘epitome of contradictory space’ (2009:385). 
As scholars have repeatedly showcased, the relationship of tensile induction 
between socio-economic needs and practices on one side and on the other people’s 
attitudes to events of history breeds collective memory and fluid transitional 
spaces. These ‘collective’ perceptions are sensitive to space-time dimensions, 
personal ideology, and ethos of the social medium of circulation (Lefebvre 2009; 
Harvey 2009). When activism, cross-cut social solidarity and sacrifice for the 
collective cause were central to socio-economic sustenance, refugee camps were 
depicted as central spaces of sumud; a perception partly encouraged by the cover 
their morphologies gave to the production of resistance practices. The death of 
the national movement, the shift to preferential neoliberal economics and the 
rise of class-based spatialization (among a complex web of other factors) has 
reproduced the conceptions of refugee camps to spaces of disorder, chaos and 
insecurity (alKhalili 2009, Anani 2010). These spaces of exception from – among 
others – PA services and engagement are also reproducing a new kind of counter-
culture and -space within the agglomerate based on a risk-strategy that no longer 
factors the PLO as its protagonist, as painfully exhibited by the documentary ‘A 
World Not Ours’ by Mahdi Fleifel (bearing in mind the contextual elements of 
Ein elHilwe camp in Lebanon). 
Gordon and Filc argue that the new alliances ‘represent a form of interage, 
interclass, intergender and interethnic solidarity’ in face of exasperated 
uncertainty (2009:460). These are nonetheless ‘contractual’ solidarities ‘based 
on narrow interests’, a situation under which ‘accentuation of faith becomes 
commonsensical’, feeding into a ‘fundamentalist worldview based on the adoption 
of a logic’ that ‘highlights divine ordinance’ (ibid). In turn, this renders the new 
prudential ‘conception of the individual as a free agent who can both choose 
among different providers of risk-management services while at the same time 
managing himself or herself becomes meaningless’ (ibid). Thereupon they 
conclude that the ‘destruction’ of Palestinians as a ‘risk society and the emergence 
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of a postmodern religiosity’ lead to the ‘de-individualization’ of Palestinians and 
the rise of Hamas (ibid:461). Appealing to the same concepts utilized by Gordon 
and Filc this work has hitherto contended that the convergence of neoliberal 
systems; dense hegemonic national politics; social diversity; low social hierarchies, 
and colonial strategies have together induced diverse, inverse and individualized 
sets of ethos in Ramallah. What is herein referred to as new ‘sensibilities’ and 
‘solidarities’ combined with the unfolding of ‘postmodern religiosity’ in the Gaza 
Strip, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have in effect broken Hamas’ monopoly on ‘selling 
hope’, as proven by the – since 2009 growing – attempts by the long-contending 
Fatah and Hamas to unify against the growing popular opposition to both; 
culminating in the recent signature of a reconciliation agreement by the two on 
23 April 2014. 
Indeed, Hamas’ popularity stems largely from its ‘social security’ services 
as Gordon and Filc elaborated with statistical numbers; including among certain 
groups in Ramallah. However, their claim that the Oslo Era conditions and events 
have ‘diversified the social groups requiring such assistance’ where ‘these new 
groups are not just the poor’ (Ibid:473); this argument reflects the widespread 
myopia of main-stream scholarship whose generalist paradigms fail to factor 
quintessential sociospatial determinants; namely, the pre-Zionist Palestinian traits 
and contemporary socio-economic contexts of Ramallah. The birth of the State of 
Israel has long-marked the entrenchment of Palestinian cross-class dependency: 
starting in 1948 and continuing through the 1950s fleeing Palestinians – rich and 
poor – needed the assistance of the natives of their places of refugedom; since 
the 1960s Palestinian families – rich and poor – search for assistance to receive 
confirmations whether their missed loved-ones are buried in Israel’s number-
graveyards54; since the 1970s university students – rich and poor – studying 
abroad need assistance to guarantee returning home; since the 1980s Palestinian 
economic labourers – rich and poor – need assistance to acquire permission of life 
for their intended production; since the 1990s every Palestinian – rich and poor – 
requires a form of assistance to access care-intensive medical services for complex 
cases (e.g. Cancer treatment), and; since the 2000s every Palestinian – rich and 
poor – needs the continued flow of foreign capital. Dependency in Palestine is not 
just financial or bureaucratic, rather, it is a genealogically colonial, socially lived, 
and spacio-economically reproduced system. In his work ‘Global Palestine’ John 
Collins postulates that:
Far from simply being shaped by global and globalizing processes, Palestine 
has been and continues to be an often prophetic index of and shaper of these 
processes, a kind of monadic unit that contains important clues to a series of 
much broader realities. [...] the two basic sides of this complex relationship: the 
globalization of Palestine and the Palestinization of the globe. (Collins 2011:2) 
As a work that seeks to contribute to investigations of future forms of 
urbanism based on ontological and Marxist dialectics; here I argue that – in an 
abstract paradigm – what Palestine is exhibiting through the intra- and extra-
relationalities of Ramallah is a micro-ecology of lived post-nationalism. While 
this field has been long discussed and its elements surveyed; nonetheless, its 
urban translations (revolutions) are just starting to unfold in Ramallah’s pre-state 
reality. Here it might be important to note three; First, up until the signature of 
the OAs WB and GS Palestinians were only exceptionally allowed to officially 
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change locus of living from that of birth; Second, the banking system was kept 
in primitive state and the financial sector of stock-markets was inexistent, and; 
Third, overt profiting from economic engagement with the colonial faced swift 
popular prosecution. 
The commercialization of technology in the 1990s and subsequent space-
time compression (as coined by David Harvey) added an exponential multiplier to 
the equation of globalization which had commenced with human history (Smith 
2002; Sassen 2000). That was the era of translocalities, multiplying numbers of 
mega-cities, the emergence of the urban-poor, the devaluation of the rural in 
favour of the urban, and the era of ‘cherry-picking’ of investors regardless of 
political borders (Appadurai 2008). In today’s post-national era capitalism bends 
bureaucratic systems of organic nationalism, expands scholarship and incubation 
programs, traineeships and multi-national innovation centres. Frameworks 
such as the ‘World Social Forum’, ‘Cities Alliance’ and ‘United Cities and Local 
Governments’ indicate a changed dynamic in creation of official (non-state) 
consciousness. The ‘city’ which marries regionally supplied production to the 
demand of global markets is able to press claims to political decision making, and 
mayors today are leading the ‘decentralization’ camps through direct partnerships 
with the private sector. 
The 2007 international financial crisis placed post-nationalism in face of 
an embryonic challenge that the neoliberal system survived, yet with permanent 
impairments and an irreversible reality of extra and intra contestation; 
whose kernel is economic disparities and political expressions are territorial. 
Impoverished provincial areas are voicing their opposition to globalized urban 
systems which ‘allow emigrants to steal the opportunities of the local’, wherein 
upgrade and infrastructures programs close several cycles in the urban while 
the rural receives budgetary residuals (Beall and Fox 2010; Escobar 2012). This 
is giving rise to conservative opposition politics as demonstrated in the latest 
EU Parliament elections in May 2014 whose results are highly resemblant of the 
Palestinian Legislative Elections of 2006. Another rising force is that of the urban-
poor whose socio-economic conceptions adhere to globalized systems; whose 
named offender is neoliberal coteries; and whose omnipresent motto is that of 
‘the right to the city’. The ‘Occupy’ movements in New York and Frankfurt could 
find some resemblance in the growing anti-Oslo activism. Whereas Fatah and 
Hamas loyalists are maintaining a relatively strong grip on localities, Ramallah’s 
awareness has grown to recognize the fremd politics and economy of the PA and 
their consequences; as alKhalili (2012) describes:
[I]n my opinion Ramallah – in its current political and cultural dynamic and 
positioning – allows for and is on itself an opportunity. There is a comfort in 
this city that originates from a self-enforcing reality: if you are doing well, you 
are doing well. If one is able to differentiate oneself a little from the common 
then s/he will not be hindered by masses of competition, because the latter 
does not exist, at least not as in global metropolises. Notwithstanding, these 
offered opportunities do come at a price, where these individual successes are 
built on a collective destruction, namely, the failure of the Palestine project. 
[...] At the same time, does consciousness to this reality translate in naming 
Ramallah as culpable and leaving it? This is possible. It is not the physical space 
of the city that is to blame, but the new fremd political project inhabiting it 
with its economic as well as social folds. Ramallah is not the only Palestinian 
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city with an economy, but it is the one that will be affected most shall political 
turbulences occur because its growth is neither natural nor sustainable; it is 
merely political, and this sad reality is common consciousness. As an individual 
I oppose this project, nonetheless I am not oblivious to the fact that I am a 
beneficiary of its presence. Further, my ability to criticise it emerges from 
my presence within the city; derived from the reality that the highest level of 
Palestinian youth activism is located within this space. Here you might ask 
me: ‘how come Ramallah features the highest level of youth activism opposed 
to this alien political project at a time it is the prime beneficiary? Shouldn’t 
other areas that are benefiting less lead the opposition?’. In reality, each project 
creates its opposite as well as internal problematic as defects in systems are 
internal not external. In other words, Ramallah as a city with certain economic 
susceptibility retains a particular cultural receptivity, and thus political 
permissiveness that were all enabled by being devoid of influential rhizomatous 
families such as elNatsheh in Hebron or AbdelHadi in Nablus. If you are from 
Rafidia then you are a stranger in Nablus, while this is not the case in Ramallah 
as the opposite is the truism. [...] Thus, this fremd political project was able to 
make footing and exist because of this social abnormality, and concomitantly 
created its antagonism. On the other side of the same coin, the anti movement 
is genuine as youth is not mobilized by considerations of family and its power. 
Naturally these youth are partial, but here the differentiating factor – from the 
wider Palestinian context – is that it is not tribal. This opposition is weak and 
small but growing and developing. (alKhalili 2012)
While alKhalili belongs to a Ramallite clique of intellectual pessoptimists55, 
Newton’s Third Law of Motion has long indicated that each action has a reaction 
equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. The post-national surge of politics 
of cosmopolitan urbanism has laboured its opposition of exclusive provincialism. 
Issacharoff (2002) describes the contemporary gerrymandering of electoral zones 
in the USA as driven by ‘perverse incentives’ of ‘political cartels’ whose pretense 
is freedom through exclusivism. The Catalan plight for independence from Spain 
and the desire of Marie Le Penne to withdraw France from the EU pertain to the 
same discourse. Thereupon, the rise of conservative, anti-national, anti-neoliberal 
and anti-‘foreign’ ethos in Palestine and their accented sociospatial articulations 
in Ramallah should not be suspended from global events. Concomitantly, 
comprehensions of the determinants labouring the particular processes, their 
characteristics and (in-)predictable behavioural patterns can only be achieved 
through the lens of the colonial ecosystem. 
Dependency cannot be reduced to a top-down process, and it is not just 
Palestinian. Without foreign aid and capitalist investments Israel, too, could 
and can not finance its colonialism, a premise which bred and fuels the BDS 
Movement. These politically antagonistic tides have configured a manoeuvre 
space wherein Palestinians can experiment urban systems of decolonization 
through the employment of (temporal, makeshift) antivenoms which could 
tame and reorient the Palestinian-Israeli-International interdependency. The 
coming two chapters will identify such possible points through revision of 
works on this era of trans-territorial socio-economic alliances, whose epitome 
is found in the urban.
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3.3.   FRAMING RAMALLAH’S 
MOMENTARY SOCIO-
ECONOMICS
It is in Ramallah with its myriad of international (and internationalizing) 
organizations that a kind of diversity, even cosmopolitanism some would 
(hyperbolically) say, inflects the social atmosphere. In the haunts of the 
upwardly mobile, bilinguality and macaronic exchanges are commonplace 
and inebriated conversation flows and oscillates freely and late into the early 
hours of the morning. Musicians, intellectuals, artists, filmmakers, activists 
pepper the place all centrally situated to ride the fundraising ‘gravy train’ 
that a distilled, serially imaged and feverishly peddled ‘Palestine’ has become. 
In this, the most fetishized of contexts, the art scene, a bit deradicalized but 
diverse and markedly contemporary, buzzes and shoots above its weight, and 
the parameters of a kind of subculture, even a counter-culture can be traced. 
(Abourahme 2009:501)
The pioneer flash-mob in Ramallah was an extension of the decades-old 
parade and borrowed its moves. The question is, will it happen again? And if so, 
will it evolve to include other Ramallite minorities or will it remain limited to the 
few? The number of restaurants, bars and luxury services has grown sharply in 
the third phase of the OAs (2006-2010) and has – among others – encouraged the 
behavioural framing of Thursday nights56 as the time to shed-off the week’s work 
through partying; a highly visible activity yet shared amongst very small groups. 
The most recent economic crisis which commenced in 2011 is echoed with the 
stagnation of this sector and a tangible increase in levels of hostility against its 
highly exclusive spaces, prompting the widespread employment of private 
security. Few tens of meters from such places young males of excluded stratas 
meander, observe the alien ethos, and sometimes vandalize. Thereof, was the 
growth of liberal leisure spaces in Ramallah a temporary out-surge or are there 
indicators that these forms of spaces will persist? And more importantly, is this 
sector capable of growing a wider base, or will it remain exclusive? 
Constructing a cynical yet metaphoric scenario, in the third phase of the 
OA’s the archetypal old house which for decades hosted the Communist Party’s 
headquarters at the heart of the Ramallah agglomerate was demolished. The 
excavated site which reached approximately 10-12 meters in depth accumulated 
rainwater for years as the investor pondered the next move; he who is said to be 
a heavily USA funded former party member and head of an NGO. Regardless of 
the truth of the rumours; questions of how will the cultural practices and scene 
evolve in Ramallah mirror those of the site of the once-upon-a-time popular 
headquarters. The socio-political consciousness of Ramallites and their spacio-
economically articulated changed ethos should be understood as ecological 
processes whose birth-to-death cycle is aphoristic, and whose components and 
intensities of processes are manipulations of contesting ideological groups. 
Abourahme notes that ‘how we plan and articulate Ramallah has much to do 
with how we construct and articulate ourselves. The design of this city and its 
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relation to Palestine’s other urban spaces is inexorably linked with, not only how 
we confront an inescapable ‘colonial present’, but also with what kind of society 
we end up living and dying in’ (2009:508). 
As Taraki (2008, 2008a) indicates, regional sociospatial happenings in 
Beirut, Cairo and Amman provide strong evidence that suggests the persistence 
of these exclusive spaces, in direct relation to widening economic gaps. In 
context of the cultural sector, yet another form of solidarity is emerging between 
Palestinian artists and intellectuals of varying genres with their counterparts from 
neighbouring Arab capitals. Internationally active musicians such as elFar3i, 
Maryam Saleh, 3al Raseef and Su’ad Massi among others have found eager 
ears in Ramallah and thereof setting in motion the sustainable cycle of positive 
trade-off. While Ramallah is gradually yet systematically divorcing from its 
‘national’ surroundings, it is actively constructing new commons with urbanisms 
of similar ecologies. In a questionnaire distributed at the end of every Focus 
Group participants were asked to arrange four categories in order of importance: 
Palestinian, Arab, Ramallite and (one’s) Religion. While acknowledging that a 
more diverse sample is needed for the data to be representative; within this sample 
the largest group, 22.2% of questionnaires ordered them as listed earlier. Whereas 
63.5% placed ‘Palestinian’ first, 31.7% placed ‘Arab’ first, and while 38.1% placed 
‘Ramallite’ fourth, 34.9% did the same for ‘religion’. These numbers do not proof 
but do attest to the aforementioned argument that Ramallites are rooted in their 
local and regional identity, where religion plays an important but not leading role.
The creation of spaces of entente cordiale and quasi freedoms and their 
propagation is a natural product of the globalized and cosmopolitan generations 
(Harvey 2009) whose socio-economic cliquish characteristics, mechanisms and 
outputs exasperate the phenomenon of the urban-poor. The latter are persons 
whose average income is above regional poverty ranges, yet insufficient for a 
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dignified life in pricey urbanisms (Beall and Fox 2010). While the salary of an 
average PA public servant (US$ 650-700) can cater for a satisfactory middle-class 
lifestyle in Tulkarem (or low-income lifestyle in case of a family); in Ramallah this 
level of income amounts to precarious survival minimum which could slither into 
poverty at turns of emergency e.g. arising medical needs (and could constitute a 
solid poverty in case of a family). 
In terms of economy the signature of the OAs triggered a process through the 
WB similar to that in the four Asian Tigers, where generic positive development 
statistics and higher GDP per capita values mask the stark income inequalities 
and resulting purchasing power disparities among a singular population. In 
addition, this form of development has turned singular urbanisms to the financial 
lungs of entire territories. Whereas more than a quarter of Singapore’s economy is 
dependent on manufacturing taking place outside of the capital city, it is the latter 
that brokers the necessary demand, sale and capital circulation. As Infographic 3.2, 
p. 177 demonstrates, Ramallah hosts the largest concentration of establishments 
with 10 or more employees, and in seven major sectors: Foreign organizations and 
bodies (41%); Information and communication (31.8%); Professional, technical 
and scientific practices (26.6%); Construction, real estate and infrastructure 
(23.1%); Finance and insurance (21.4%); Leisure private services (food and 
accommodation, 17.2%), and; Arts, entertainment and recreation (16.5%). This 
clustering is substantially enabled by two; first, the imported labour whose 
left-behind-families depend on for sustenance, and; second, the thousands of 
resource and manufacturing demand and supply chains that pass through or 
converge in Ramallah, hence tethering West Bankers to their most contested city.
 The decade-long military closure of the largest WB city of Nablus at the 
beginning of this millennium weakened its economy, where it lost much of its 
contracts to Hebron and significant segments of its wealthy and educated strata 
to Ramallah. In contrast and as the rise of the so-called Arab Spring diverted the 
attention of the international donors away from the PA; starting 2011 Ramallah’s 
economy has entered a progressively aggravating crisis. The continued colonial 
piracy over Palestinian growth resources, the shrinking size of aid and the 
occasional withholding of PA import/export tax money by Israel who collects 
it has indebted the PA to implementing private parties, while aid-dependent 
organizations had to curb their operations and expenditures. The crisis which 
infected the services-sector first was soon after contracted by others in the locality, 
and later throughout the WB. In this phase the repertoire of punitive measures 
by Israeli government (e.g. IOF demolishing monadic infrastructures) and private 
actors (e.g. radical settlers’ periodic vandalism of agricultural fields) reached a new 
level with the collapse of the latest round of negotiations, where additionally in 
May 2014:
Israel informed the Palestinian side that it would no longer allow Palestinian 
banks to transport their surplus Israeli currency to the Israeli Central Bank, an 
act that is unheard of in the world of banking. Israel is refusing to serve its own 
currency. In effect, Israel is declaring war on the Palestinian economy, risking the 
collapse of the thriving Palestinian banking sector, and disrupting the flow of basic 
goods such as electricity, petroleum, and natural gas into Palestine. (Bahour 2014)
While Israel might retract this decision, the message has been re-conveyed. 
The economy of Ramallah is controlled from Tel Aviv. Therein, the Palestinian 
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economy tailored by the World Bank is a system where any shiver in Ramallah’s 
politics and / or its sectors due to internal or external factors resonates throughout 
the entire WB. Hence the same questions posed pre the OAs remain open: how 
can Palestinians decrease their dependence on Israeli authorization? Particularly, 
how can the financially strangulated LGs in the Ramallah agglomerate foster a 
resilient urbanism? 
Former UN secretary-general Boutrous Ghali had defined post-conflict 
peacebuilding as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’ (Brynen 
2000:7). Nonetheless, as Roy phrased it, ‘peace must be predicted on dignity, but 
Oslo has never been that kind of peace’ (1999:79); rather, an unjust and partisan 
‘trade-off that happened between what we refer to as right to self determination 
with the improvement of living conditions’ (Kassis 2010).
In reference to the hitherto mapped and discussed ontological analysis of the 
ecological evolution of Ramallah’s urbanity; this work expands its kernel postulate 
to argue that future planning (imagining) of Ramallah’s resilient urbanism should 
recognize the rapid pace of reconfiguration of social ethos and risk strategies 
of Palestinians, and thereof seek to create personalized understandings of 
frameworks that are:
First;  characterised by policy-making as a process of social-puzzling and 
-learning as argued by Hall (1993); 
Second; guided by Gehl’s (2011) methods of incremental undertakings with 
careful scrutiny and constructive critique; 
Third;  employing Trancik’s (1986) principles on antispaces as abundant loci of 
socio-economic synthesis, and Abdullah’s (2012) identification of high-value 
products and knowledge-based economy as the only viable options under 
colonial precariousness; 
Fourth; taming neoliberal practices through cooptation, thereof creating a 
positive trade-off and coalesces between the public good and private benefit 
(Brugmann 2009); 
Fifth;  foreshadowing the impacts of the ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 2009) 
and nurturing them in micro-ecologies of fluid sensibilities, relationalities 
and temporalities (Taraki 2008, 2008a; Abourahme 2011); 
Sixth;  factoring the space-time compression of globalized localities and policy-
mobility (Harvey 1990), and the symbiosis of decolonization on one hand 
and the hegemonic colonialists and their – willing or unintelligent – agents 
on the other (Appadurai 2003, 2008); and,
Seventh; oriented towards improving the mental (security, accountability, 
freedom), lived (dignity, connectivity, satisfaction) and representational 
(rooted, inclusive, accessible) spaces of Ramallites.
Whereas these frameworks will be put to test in the last chapter of this 
work;  the following two chapters focus on mapping, visualizing and discussing 
the physical spatialization of Ramallah, the decision-making systems, actors of 
formal production of space and their projects. In the close of this chapter, the 
following extract from the interview with Yazan alKhalili captures the sentiments 
of this work:
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In the same line of thoughts, it must be noted that in the post Oslo era 
Ramallah experienced a number of lapses; in 2001-2002 with the massively 
destructive military operations and again in 2006 with the election of Hamas 
and the halting of international funds. In both cases the city found ways to 
cope and re-adapt with the evolving program whose sustainability depends 
on factors other than the Palestine project. We are threatened with being cut 
off from this international program, but we also know that this is equally their 
program as much as it is ours. Ramallah is not just a PA project, but equally 
an Israeli one under which economic gains are conditioned with the political 
stagnation. And in spite of the estrangement of Ramallah in comparison to 
the wider WB geography, it has become the model other cities look up for. In 
the current composition, cities like Nablus and Hebron are restricted by the 
status quo which is limiting their economic potential that is production-based 
while equally catering for Ramallah’s economic growth; yet here also it is only 
a matter of time until this same status quo turns non-satisfactory to Ramallah 
as well. What will Ramallah do then? And this is the missing link, which is 
the discussion on alternatives. This does not mean that the general Palestinian 
public has no alternatives, rather, that there is fear of them. Alternatives require 
turning to times of hardships. 
[...] Ultimately, what is the goal of all of this? There is an unfolding futility in 
the sense of ‘what is next?’. Let another thirty bars and forty Shawarma shops 
open doors, and then what? We have neither accomplished a State and ended 
our existential enigma, nor are we a non-state. Consequently, we are at a stand 
still, here, in the middle. We must recognize that since we are unable to move 
forward, we need to regress. Moving backwards does not mean retreating, 
rather, making a move. At some point we must make a move. We need to 
abandon the futile absurdity of the laissez faire mechanism. Yes, one could get 
a newer car, but one should instead worry about the persisting wider concerns; 
and this is what I mean when I say there is a cross-cut collective destruction. 
The lived individual success is based on the collective destruction. At a certain 
point the common consciousness should prevail over the individual gain, 
thence will a movement emerge in one form or another.
[...] What scares me most is the stagnation; the political castration; and the 
collective destruction. This constant uncertainty by the force of which one is 
fearful of making a move in either direction. I want the fremd political project 
to come an end, yet scared of the consequences as it is bound to create a void, 
and I doubt our ability to stir and govern this void into the better next phase. 
We are living the evolving of critical awareness, but this is not accompanied by 
a practical political movement, and this is scary... I am afraid change will arrive 
and we are still not prepared for it. (alKhalili 2012)
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4  | PA INSTITUTIONS, 
DISCOURSE, PROJECTS,  
AND IMPACTS
In Palestine the decision-making matrix is quiet complex, bureaucratic, 
chaotic and social. While official levels may assimilate aspects of state apparatuses, 
a stark multiplicity in roles and responsibilities is omnipresent, and overruling 
manoeuvres via caudal paths seem to be the norm rather than the exception. 
Corruption in PA institutions can be directly linked to the lack of accountability 
produced by the systematic weakening of the judiciary system (Kelly 2004). It is 
also rooted in popular conceptions which lack respect for and trust in the capacities 
of the PA on one hand; on the other, it could be understood as the expression 
of incompossibility of central government with continued metamorphosing 
colonialism, where the absence of sovereignty induces sociospatial counter-
currents to the establishment of quasi monopoly over violence, which in turn 
impedes the development of nonpartisan systems for judiciary accountability. 
Recognizing the quintessence of equitable accountability to human-
security and economy, in the first phase of the OAs (1994-2000) a coalesces of 
professionals-practitioners and institutions of law produced scripts for improving 
the civil character of the Palestinian constitution therein the modernization and 
unification the Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli components 
which hitherto were the reference. Here Dr. Mudar Kassis – Director of the 
Faculty of Law and Administration at BZU and Prof. of Philosophy and Political 
Science – narrates:
The Europeans came towards the end of the 1990s to Abu Ammar [Yasser 
Arafat] – who was receiving the laws and putting them in his desk drawer 
instead of passing them – and told him that this will not work: ‘the Legislative 
Council is working and you are stopping the processes instead of signing the 
papers and making the laws public’. After some pressure and indirect threats 
in cash flow related to the wages of the PA employees; Abu Ammar had to give 
in, but fought them on the priorities, choosing from the list the ones common 
to both [parties]. As a result of those happenings the Base Law was not passed, 
the law related to judicial independence did not pass either, Labour law neither. 
On the other hand, within that package the law of marking precious metals 
was passed. Turned out to be a priority!.. I personally found it strange, so 
upon examination it turned out that there was a problem in smuggling cheap 
gold from Jordan into the Israeli market through the WB. Since there are tax-
mandated borders between the WB and Jordan, but none between the WB 
and Israel, and since the gold made in Ramallah cannot be banned from being 
sold in Tel Aviv but that made in Jordan is; thus, it became necessary to mark 
the gold produced in the Palestinian Territories. So the solution was found: to 
protect the Israeli market of precious metals the Palestinians had to introduce 
a law! This is one of the extreme and absurd models, but it demonstrates what 
kind of development was taking place. What is noteworthy here is that it wasn’t 
the Israelis who asked Abu Ammar in this case, rather the EU on behalf of 
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Israel. [...] Europe is not obliged to defend Israel’s interests on the expense of 
Palestinian interests, and nobody can stop them from doing so, but it doesn’t 
have to be on the Palestinians’ bill. Here we start talking about lobbies and 
balance and issues that do not necessarily have to make sense or be convincing. 
(Kassis 2010) 
Upon its establishment the PA maintained the native system of arbitration 
referred to as 'Asha’iri (pertaining to the ‘clan’), whose dynamics are sensitive 
to social conceptions and hierarchies. In case of dispute contenders are given a 
choice between the constitutional or 'Asha’iri tracks, wherein regulation is limited 
to the binding nature of the final ruling and inability to switch tracks or appeal to 
the second system post verdict. The Asha’iri system has a wealth of knowledge, 
heritage and tradition and it’s elimination would constitute a loss of popular 
intellectualism. Nonetheless, the colonially-inherited PA legacy of fragmentation 
has effectively sustained a legal disjuncture whose impacts on urban governance 
are catastrophic. In 2011 a scandalous corruption case caught fire in Ramallah, 
where a Christian member of the Municipal Council was caught red-handed in 
blackmail and religious incitement. The successful real estate broker was identified 
beyond doubt by the criminal police as the author of threat-letters to the – also – 
Christian owner of a valuable piece of land while posing as a radical Muslim. The 
involvement of the police came as the victim is socially tied to a respected and 
high-ranking judge. In a surreal turn of events, no charges were pressed at the 
Attorney General’s office, the 'Asha’iri system was enacted with the presence of 
several progressive intellectuals, and the collective sin was rapidly brushed under 
the carpet of newer misdemeanors against the public-good of citizens. 
A study of Systems of Integrity in LGs (i.e. accountability and rule of law at 
municipal levels) states that although Anti-Corruption Law stipulates a verdict 
within ten days, nonetheless this has not been applied (AMAN 2014). By the 
end of 2012 sixty-six cases were presented to the Municipal Court, of which 
only eighteen were processed with accusations standing grounds in seventeen. 
Further, delays in executions of verdicts and lack of cooperation between bodies 
of the judiciary and penal systems have severely shaken citizens’ trust in state-
institutions and the rule of law.  
The majority of Ramallites cross-faction do desire the long-term security 
of the universal definitions of citizenship as status that ‘erodes local hierarchies, 
statuses, and privileges in favour of national jurisdictions and contractual relations 
based in principle on an equality of rights’ (Holston and Appadurai 2003:296). 
However under hegemonic forms of accountability and the colonially-catered 
eternal temporalization, the socio-economic web of fluid interdependencies 
is exasperated. Decision-makers, employees of LGs and professionals alike are 
members of this self-reinforcing ecology. The uncongeniality of central authority 
model to spaces of uncertainty and disparate relationalities is herein placed on 
public exhibit. Not only in the arid mountains of Hebron but also in the quasi 
capital there are clans, tribes, and semiopaque associations governing decisions, 
employing networks and influence to achieve partisan best-interest, indirectly 
feeding into the destruction of the collective. Thence, chaos in Ramallah is a result 
of shortcomings by legislative, judicial and executive arms of government that are 
socially reproduced through engendering nepotism, fear, rationalized (limited) 
vision and disqualification of rule of law (Kassis 2010, Shaheen 2012). 
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Achieving a safe – hence resilient – urbanism commences with nurturing 
awarenesses that are able to conceive and foster positive spatial trends, which 
can be measured through accessibility to service-providers; quality and security 
of journey; availability of integrated emergency and support frameworks; socio-
economic compatibility of private and public realms; forging constructive 
relationships between built and natural landscape; between the local and the 
regional among many other aspects which fall within the mandate of and range 
of influence of LGs. However, these bodies lie at the bottom of PA command 
chains which itself composes the third tier of overall decision making. The 
second conforms to donor agenda and their respective priorities, while the first 
tier and ultimate decision maker on the ground remains the Israeli government 
and its specialized arm: the COGAT (Annex.5 Regulatory Framework and 
Authorities for Planning in the West Bank, pg. 395). Therein, proposals aiming 
at the reform of LGs in terms of approach and operations must take their 
inferiority into account.
In addition, analysis of Ramallah’s city-discourse should establish the 
causality between chronology of individual happenings and their conditioning 
factors. While these shall be gradually constructed over the sections of this 
chapter, here it should be taken into account that prior to the signature of the OAs 
and within the processes of the Partial Regional Master Plan for Jerusalem1 in 1981, 
the Shamshoni2 local planning schemes were produced categorizing the territory 
into: 1. Arab Development area; 2. Special Use; 3. Future Planning; 4. Nature 
Reserve; 5. Agricultural; and, 6. Roads. While categories two to six are designated 
to the use of the colonial, the first category – the only space in which Palestinians 
can operate – was restricted to timely either built-up areas or even cut into them3. 
These plans served – in combination with COGAT overall activities – preventing 
horizontal expansion and socioeconomic growth of Palestinian villages, towns 
and cities. Needless to say, the Shamshoni plans were produced with neither 
reference to surveys, nor statistics, or consultation with local councils. Due to the 
fierce Palestinian response4 the Shamshoni plans were officially shelved, yet ‘have 
in fact been put into effect by the Israeli Central Planning Department; building 
permits have been and continue to be granted on the basis of its regulations and 
restricts (Abdelhadi 1990).
The Oslo Accords did not eliminate the planning parameters set by the 
successive colonial regimes, rather, it cemented and politically legitimized them 
as foretold by accounts of post-colonial regimes (Fanon 2008; Harvey 2009), 
with the anomaly of persistence of the colonial condition (Anani 2011). While 
anteriorly the comparative and (informal) professional space for Palestinian 
planners and architects extended over historic Palestine, the OAs reduced this 
sphere (Anani 2010) and locked it into the cantons of 1981 Drobless Plan5. This 
dogma is prescribed in the post-Oslo limited imagination of average Palestinian 
planners and decision-makers – of the various PA institutions operating within 
the urban landscape – in terms of both schemes and ventures; as demonstrated in 
this chapter which maps two: the Palestinian public actors and in parallel the most 
important of their undertakings within the realm of the Ramallah agglomerate 
since the signature of the OAs.
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4.1.   BRIEF OVERVIEW: 
INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION-
MAKING HIERARCHY
There are 15 PA ministries in total, amongst which are the Ministries 
of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD) and that of Local 
Government (MOLG). While the MOPAD is the entity setting the overall 
government priorities and strategies pertaining to development (in the 
wider definition of the term), the MOLG is the entity in charge of detailing 
those strategies in light of the allocated funds, and supervising the work of 
municipalities. Floating in an opaque legal space under the MOPAD and 
above municipalities, Governorates exercise planning-related decision-making 
(Anani 2010; Abdullah 2010). Acquiring information about the exact role of the 
Governorates was impeded by the lack of transparency of these units, which 
was demonstrated in the limited knowledge of this works’ interviewees about its 
operational scope, and whose singular online presence is a FaceBook page which 
announces the Governor’s meetings agenda, but no other substantial information.
Within MOPAD there are two bodies that highly influence decisions made: 
The Higher Planning Council (HPC), and the Municipal Development & Lending 
Fund (MDLF). The latter is a semi-governmental bureau that was established in 
2008 in line with the Palestine Reform and Development Plan, PRDP6. It is solely 
concerned with municipal projects, their respective funding from international 
donors, and the enhancement of municipal capacities7. Meanwhile, the HPC 
was formed through a presidential decree in 1995 (MOLG 2013a), at the time to 
facilitate acquisition of properties for public benefit. Its mandate reaches beyond 
though, giving it the cogency to make binding recommendations, revise and 
amend approved urban projects, and overturn decisions pertaining to licenses, 
programs, etc. Both – the MDLF and HPC – have the power to influence decisions 
made by MOLG departments and Municipal councils8. For example, in 2009 
alBireh Municipality declined to grant license for the construction of the 26-floor 
Palestine Tower (Image 4.1) on elErsal Street due to concerns over pressure on the 
already fragile infrastructure and mobility in the vital urban vein. The investor 
appealed to the Presidential Office and was granted permission (Shaheen 2012). 
On the level of municipalities, departments of Engineering Works and 
Projects are responsible for preparing Master Plans (under supervision and 
conditioned with the approval of the MOLG and MOPAD) and monitoring the 
physical growth of cities accordingly. Notwithstanding, the Municipal Council has 
the power to influence and change decisions made by this department. Thus, even 
though decisions on individual projects are the domain of the Engineering Works 
and Projects Department at the municipal level, those decisions can be appealed 
at any of the higher levels whose hierarchy is illustrated in Diagram 4.1, pg. 186. As 
indicated in section 3.1.2, pg. 126; former Mayoress of Ramallah Jeanette Michael9 
(2010) stated: ‘The normal trend is that investors seek the change and we follow’, 
where ‘as a municipality, we do not have the legal power to force an investor in 
a direction instead of another, or against his/her will’. In this context member of 
Municipal Council Mahmoud Abdullah10 elaborates:
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The city is developing at a speed beyond the control of the municipality. [...] 
The factors behind these developments are mainly external and not internal, 
which makes the control impossible e.g. when foreign donors support the 
Fayyad government in a certain project; which has been happening on more 
than one level lately; we as a municipality cannot reject that. In addition, there 
is the human factor in play where project proposition takes place based on 
personal perception and conviction. (Abdullah 2010)
Inspired by the repetitive complaints of RM and its exchange of accusations 
with the MOLG regarding responsibility for the disarray of growth patterns 
of Ramallah – chiefly and alBireh and Beitunya in a lesser degree; a plan to 
render the agglomerate an Amaneh (i.e. Greater Municipality similar to that of 
Amman, capital of Jordan) is said to be well underway by Dr. Bashir Barghouthi 
(head of Policies Department at MOLG; 2012), wherein this status would grant 
municipalities independence from the MOLG. Nonetheless, this is easier said than 
done. The three municipalities of Ramallah, alBireh, Beitunya and councils of 
neighbouring towns and villages have – at some points – antagonistic regulations 
and by-laws. Combined with socio-political power-balance considerations, a 
merger into a single entity is remote if not futile.
Analysis of happenings cannot disregard the imbalance between the growth 
of the Ramallah region in terms of size and population on one hand, and on the 
other that of institutional capacity. Beyond aforementioned institutional and 
sociopolitical limiting factors, it is important to recognize that the pace of growth 
reached radical records (Barghouthi 2012, Shaheen 2012). As Anani states:
[... The] increased capital in the city and expansion in real estate construction 
[has] increased the pressure on the municipality who had a capacity of ‘X’ 
persons corresponding to a growth speed of ‘Y’, and suddenly had to deal with 
a growth speed to ‘10 × Y’. So basically there was a gap between the speed of 
growth of the city and the municipal capacity to understand and administer 
those processes.  (Anani 2010)
Similar experiences worldwide – from Amman to Mumbai – have showcased 
that under such conditions the bureaucracy of governmental organizations paves 
way for the private sector to take command of the wheels of growth.
Image 4.1. Palestine Tower  
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4.2.   MOPAD & MOLG’S 
PLAN: RABMA
Soon after the signature of the OAs Norway financed the preparation of 
the National Policies for Physical Development (NPPD) proposal. Nonetheless, 
this study remained ink on paper in the archives of MOPAD13 as it was never 
detailed to applicable scales and areas of jurisdictions. This further encouraging 
municipalities to continue using their Master Plans as major reference (Anani 
2010). In light of the densification of Palestinian localities in the OA’s A-Areas, 
MOPAD and MOLG prepared the ‘Ramallah, AlBireh & Beitunya Metropolitan 
Area’ Plan (RABMA) in 2009. This proposal includes 3 municipalities: Ramallah, 
alBireh and Beitunya; and six villages: Rafat, Ein Areek, Ein Qinya, Surda, Beiteen, 
and Kufur Aqab14 (Map 4.1). While the study emphasizes the contiguity from 
southern Bethlehem – through Jerusalem – to northern alBireh/Surda, given the 
geopolitical conditions this pilot plan restricts its parameters to OAs-outlined loci 
of influence and activity. 
According to the publication, the synthesis of; first, the RABMA agglomerate 
into a physically continuous fabric; second, the ongoing accumulation of 
population; third, the centralization of major economic decision makers within 
its geography; fourth, its retail and leisure vents and cortege, and; fifth, being 
the mart of public service qualifies its coining as a metropolitan area. Thereupon, 
beyond the need for a contiguous local government, the study proposes:
• Unification of regulations and governing laws;
• Establishment of a Metropolitan Council with representatives in each of the 
RABMA local government units (LGUs) with ten tasks the main of which 
are: synchronized provision of infrastructure; maintenance of a unified 
database; representation of RABMA’s LGUs at the MOLG; and management 
of joint finances; and,
• The Metropolitan Council consists of 21 members, proportional to 
population size of each of the LGUs.
While the RABMA plan presents a vision for the area and elaborate 
proposals (particularly on technical matters such as management of waste water, 
unification of industrial zones, etc.); the established Metropolitan Council – 
whose executive arm is called the Joint Coordination Unit, JCU – remains weak, 
ineffective, and in reality absent15 (Shaheen 2012). This unfolding was transcribed 
within the plan itself, where differences and the prioritized individuality is 
evident as exampled in Box 3.1.
Beyond executive shortcomings, the RABMA proposal fails to strategize 
beyond the narrow geography dictated by Israel. While proponing a Centric-
Linear expansion pattern (Map 4.1; was considered a challenge by the three 
municipalities in their SDP document; section 4.3.2, pg. 198), the designers also 
criticise its incompatibility, surprisingly, attributing it to these disadvantages: 
‘Traffic jam; Dense corridors between the city and the village [sic]; mixing 
identities of the city and the village [sic]; Problems from the social aspect [sic]’ 
(MOPAD 2009:29). While the first argument is capable of standing scientific 
argumentation, the latter two have been falsified by Chapters 2 and 3 of this work.
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Box 3.1. Outlines for future development of the three RABMA cities as stated in 
MOPAD’s publication (2009:39):
•  Ramallah’s vision is to be an administrative, services, and cultural centre.
•  alBireh’s vision is to be an administrative city and trading centre.
•  Beitunya’s vision is to be a recreational and attraction centre for diversity of 
services, investments, and future development projects [...].
While the three visions might sound different, in context they are not. First, both 
Ramallah and alBireh want to be administrative centres, which they are already. Second, 
all three wish to be centres for services, where alBireh named it ‘trading’ though knowing 
that over 60% of the economic activity in the area lies in the services sector. Last, cultural 
activities (term used by Ramallah) cannot be stripped of their recreational (term used by 
Beitunya) dimension. In addition, these visions coincide with those officially stated on the 
web-pages of those entities prior to the RABMA plan.
In conclusion, the pre-existing visions and self-definitions of the three municipalities have 
been carried through without alteration, reflecting limited willingness to compromise on 
this issue, and probably in scope of visions as well. The question remains whether the 
weakness and relative absence of the JCU is caused by similar stances on other issues.
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These named disadvantages demonstrate that; first, the RABMA planners 
have neither theoretically nor cognitively understood the modes of functioning 
of social pluralism within growing metropolitan areas. Village and city identities 
in large urbanisms that encompass both geographies are constantly redefined in 
a wider spectrum of spacio-relational alliances that are interest-, ideology-, and 
finance-dependent, amongst other equally important factors (Lefebvre 2009). 
This aspect of planners’ shortcoming grows increasingly problematic when 
examining spaces this proposals featured as necessary along the coming process 
of (what in reality is a socio-) spatial transformation. 
Second, the geographic vision for the growth pattern limits itself to 
the legally-rational scenario within geo-temporal colonial parameters. This 
approach unintelligently reproduced mutated imaginations of urban ecology 
on one hand; and on the other ignored the condition of absolute precariousness 
that governs the geography, by which criteria and parameters are constantly 
shifting. This methodology could be explanatory for the disjuncture between 
the RABMA proposal and the sidelined – pending Israeli consent – Ring Road 
proposal (Map 4.2). Noteworthy, the latter conforms as well to Oslo’s A-, B-, 
C-Areas, distancing itself from crossing geopolitical lines wherever possible (e.g. 
some segments run parallel to the Israeli Segregation Wall) rather than assuming 
the optimal course for integrated long-term development.
This evaluation of failure of the RABMA plan is shared beyond these pages 
(as aforementioned), where both MOPAD and MOLG are currently drafting a 
new plan in which the Metropolitan Council is not an element, rather, the merger 
of all LGUs into a singular unit. The features of this proposal remain concealed.
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4.3.   RAMALLAH 
MUNICIPALITY: ROLE, 
PLANS AND STRATEGIES
In light of the OAs municipalities in Areas A experienced considerable 
shifts in role and morale, yet not as significant in terms of mandate. Pre-Oslo 
these bodies answered to the ICA and followed the narrow policies set by the 
Israeli COGAT. As such, Mayors – though officially elected by population – are 
in reality figures far from the PLO and generally perceived by the population as 
collaborators with the occupation regime; which intentionally and systematically 
deprived Palestinian localities from resources and infrastructures necessary for 
healthy integrated growth (Zananiri 2010, Barghouthi 2012). 
Today municipalities fall under the garment of the ‘national project’ of 
establishing a Palestinian State and boast images of leadership. Nonetheless, their 
mandate remains highly restricted and limited in scope where; first, general 
strategies are set by MOPAD and MOLG; second, significant infrastructure 
projects are dictated by donor priorities, MOLG partnerships and Israeli consent 
if they extend beyond the contours of Area A; third, collection of taxes, fines 
and enforcing respect of urban construction regulations is managed by the MOF 
and police departments; fourth, though municipalities are in charge of issuing 
licenses for construction and urban projects in general, the MOLG’s HPC has the 
power to overrule decisions made at municipal levels, and; fifth, decision making 
regarding urban basic services sectors (e.g. education, health, environmental 
programs, etc.) has been suspended to other PA institutions leaving LGs with the 
role of providing the real-estate property. 
In the case of metropolitan Ramallah these aspects are exasperated due to 
its character as seat of government and the accompanying influential entourage 
and persuasive investors (Michael 2010, Abdullah 2010). These aforementioned 
aspects – particularly with the persistence of patronage – render municipalities 
futile, serving as an interim offices rather than cogent decision makers. This 
constellation could be argued as motive for Ramallah Municipality’s (hereafter 
referred to as ‘RM’) increased focus on social, cultural, and spatial organization 
programs. The latter activities are relatively more independent of PA hierarchies, 
and their financing is provisioned via direct partnership whether with local or 
international parties.
RM’s Engineering Works & Projects Department is constantly labouring 
to maintain a footing via preparation of physical expansion plans and the like. 
Nonetheless, beyond the pressure of subjugation and scarcity of finances, the 
departments operate under internally-generated sociopolitical coercion. Given 
socio-political dependencies, RM’s staff features many creative hard-workers yet 
also a significant number of free-riders who fill positions for considerations other 
than productivity. This has been further limiting the municipality’s efficiency as 
well as effectiveness (Khamaisi 2006, Arouri 2010). 
The aforementioned does not refute the implementation of positive projects 
and strategies, some of which mapped in the following pages that summarize the 
planning-related highlights since the signature of the OAs. This section addresses 
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municipal official strategies and plans, in the process revealing deficiencies in 
comprehension of scale, scope, orientation and potential impacts of happenings. 
Thereupon, the last section focuses on the established municipal shortcomings 
in terms of invoking a proactive and resilient city-space, and argues alternative 
frameworks through a discourse of causality.
4.3.1.   2005/9 Master Plan: Expansion of Ramallah
Ramallah’s pace and conditions of growth translated with limited history of 
Master Plans. Under the Ottoman Empire it was an insignificant village, under 
the British Mandate some start-up growth and expansion plans were drafted, 
but it wasn’t until the Jordanian custody (1948-1967) that it received it’s first 
city-scale Master Plan. The following 37 years of Israeli administration featured 
minimal provision or urban services and thorough strategies for disintegrated 
and fragmented development, or as Roy (1999) coins it: de-development. Up 
to the date of entry into force of the PA the escorting Master Plan was that set 
by the Jordanian Government in 1963 (Anani 2010, Abdullah 2011). In 1997 
RM requested the revision and expansion of its Master Plan. The Nazareth-
based Rassem Khamaisi was the contracted planner who considered the rapid 
unplanned construction following the signature of the OAs and the decades-long 
absence of system-based regulation as major obstacles; he states:
Many private and public developers initiated preparations for a local and 
detailed plan of their private land [sic]. The municipality lacks a general plan 
to cope with the increase of building permit applications, nor does it have a 
mechanism for accepting or rejecting, or giving guidelines for local public and 
private developers [sic]. (Khamaisi 2006:11)
Later on in the process RM restricted the mission to unplanned expansion areas 
opting to maintain the city core unaltered. The deficits of the former Master Plan 
turned bearable when compared with the necessity of managing legal consequences 
that accompany alteration. Beyond the city-core, RM placed the following guiding 
principles for the development of the new Master Plan (Khamaisi 2006:14):
• Preserving the ‘uniqueness’ of the city via allocating space for low density 
housing, and particularly villas; 
• Physical expansion should avoid valleys which shall remain as green zones 
for environmental considerations;
• Avoid creation of a new centre which could compete with the existing core. 
As such, expansion shall be chiefly for residential purposes which in turn 
remain dependant on the existing core;
• Expansion and adaptation of transportation arteries from the varying 
neighbourhoods to the core as well as the regional and national networks;
• Development of a regional government and public service centre;
• Re-parcelation; and,
• Phasing of execution.
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The planning team used these seven principles to construct their ten-point 
program, which culminated with the Master Plan shown in Map 4.4, pg. 194 and 
the spatial allocation for the varying zones in Table 4.1 (derivative editions 
from original by author) in 2006. This incremental plan was approved in 2009 
rendering the planned area of the city about 13,000 dunoms (13 sq.km.) of the 
total 18.6 sq.km (Abdullah 2011). 
The first principle set for this Master Plan encourages suburbanization and 
hence pressure on mobility infrastructures in spite of the continued absence of 
coherent and efficient public transportation systems. The second point provides 
excuse for delayed provision of open spaces in the current built-up areas 
sentencing those to the waiting room of the future – when Ramallah’s urbanisation 
reaches the valleys. The third principle which resembles the decision to retain a 
singular centre has no logical explanation, as the urban strategist Jan Gehl states:
They [Copenhagen City] decided very early that we are not doing highrise. They 
refused to densify the centre and by doing that all the offices and administrations 
have been scattered around, which also scatters the traffic. If you build up a 
fantastic centre, then of course there will be a lot of traffic going to the centre, 
and thus high concentration. (Discovery World 2012, minute 7:00) 
It should be noted that in their initial proposal in 2006 the planning team 
indicated that in the year 2004 the services sector grew to occupy 33% of the 
Table 4.1. Suggested Zoning in Ramallah (Khamaisi 2006:16; expanded version of original)
Category
Master Plan 1999 Master Plan 2009 % of 
Area of 
City
Area
dunom
Area 
%
Area
dunom
Area 
%
Residential-AA 422 4,5% 1460 42,2% 14,6%
Residential-A 1943 20,5% 0 0,0% 15,0%
Residential-B 1681 17,8% 0 0,0% 13,0%
Residential-C 370 3,9% 0 0,0% 2,9%
Residential-Agriculture 723 7,6% 804 23,3% 11,8%
Commercial zone 73 0,8% 34 1,0% 0,8%
Exhibitions zone 136 1,4% 0 0,0% 1,1%
Industrial zone 379 4,0% 0 0,0% 2,9%
Mixed uses zone 665 7,0% 0 0,0% 5,1%
Public building zone 353 3,7% 536 15,5% 6,9%
Open public zone 70 0,7% 2 0,1% 0,6%
Cemetery zone 31 0,3% 0 0,0% 0,2%
Tourist facilities zone 60 0,6% 0 0,0% 0,5%
Archeological zone 16 0,2% 0 0,0% 0,1%
Technical Engineering z. 53 0,6% 0 0,0% 0,4%
Transportation center 31 0,3% 0 0,0% 0,2%
Roads 1425 15,1% 610 17,6% 15,8%
Existing roads 850 9,0% 0 0,0% 6,6%
Pedestrian roads 25 0,3% 12 0,3% 0,3%
Future development zone 154 1,6% 0 0,0% 1,2%
Total 9460 100,0% 3458 100,0% 100,0%
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overall economic activity of the city from a mere 8% in 1996. As a result several 
areas were re-classified from residential to commercial or office-areas. As for 
construction licenses issued between 1994 and 2004 they totalled 2,343 licenses, 
of which 2,021 were residential and 135 commercial; forming an approximate ratio 
of 15:1 respectively (Khamaisi 2006).
Meaningful analysis of impacts of the Master Plan requires addressing its 
dynamic with other regulatory components and strategies, hence is conducted in 
the closing section of this chapter. Here it should nonetheless be noted that in spite 
of the organizational character of the exercise the Master Plan is an exhibit of five; 
first, the limited ability of the many Palestinian planners to envision three and four 
dimensional urbanisms, not to mention the incorporation of non text-book factors. 
The expansion of retail services and relief of congestion in mountainous topography 
cannot coincide with the endorsement of a singular area (in this case Ramallah’s 
core) or few distanced nodes; not to mention the ongoing socioeconomic processes 
and their respective spatial requirements e.g. the growing demand on mixed-use 
areas corresponding to the size of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). 
Second, influential stakeholders are able to lobby irregular changes to the Master 
Plan hence diluting its organizational character as demonstrated in Map 4.3. Third, 
in spite of the incompossibility of conditions and rigidity of the outdated Master-
Planning tool nonetheless it remains the ideology though which the spatial needs 
of Ramallites is tackled. Fourth, an acute lack of open public space including green 
areas, which justifies itself with land ownership complications rather than labouring 
an alternative as outlined in Map 4.6 and Table 4.3. And fifth, the systematized 
spatial marginalization through designating a mere 5% of the total residential zones 
to low-income housing, as demonstrated in Map 4.5 and Table 4.2.
Map 4.3. Selected enlargements from Master Plan demonstrating approved violations. 
above: In 2005 this neighbourhood was planned as Residential-AA corresponding to low-rise 
villas. In 2011 the owner constructed high residences in violation of the regulations for this area 
without attaining the necessary licenses either. In retrospect the classification of his property 
was changed to Residential-A rather than issuing a correction / demolition order. below: 
responding to the request of the investor, the lot was reclassified from Residential-A to Office-
buildings in spite of mass public objections as well as the fragility of present infrastructure.
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Residential-AA Public open space & 
Gardens
Office-Buildings
Residential-A
Residential-B
Residential-C
Residential-
Agriculture
Old City
Public facilities & 
services
Leisure & Tourism: 
zones, facilities, & 
archeological sites
Non-planned areas
Exhibitions 
Commercial / Retail
Mixed use 
Industrial 
Map 4.4. 2005 and 2009 Master Plans combined (RM 3). 
This edited version of the plans narrows down the number of zones from 77 typologies to 15 
by clustering zones with highly similar regulations. This applies chiefly to commercial areas 
represented below using shades of blue. 
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Map 4.5. Filter ‘1’ of Map 4.4 : Spatial allocation for residential purposes for varying social 
strata (RM 3). 
The map and table below demonstrate that the financially underprivileged have a mere 5% 
of the total residential area of Ramallah designated for them. This translates in their absolute 
exclusion from about 55% the city-space, hence they are cornered to search for housing in 
other localities (mainly the poor neighbourhoods of alBireh and Beitunya).
Residential-AA
Residential-A
Residential-B
Residential-C
Residential-
Agriculture
Old City
Table 4.2. Spatial allocation for residential purposes for 
varying social strata (corresponding to regulations and value16).
Category
Master Plan 1999 + 
2009 % of Res-idential 
areaAreadunom
% of city 
area 
Residential-AA 1882 14,6% 25,4%
Residential-A 1943 15,0% 26,2%
Residential-B 1681 13,0% 22,7%
Residential-C 370 2,9% 5,0%
Residential-Agri. 1527 11,8% 20,7%
Total 7403 57,3% 100,0%
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Old City
Public open space & 
Gardens
Public facilities & 
services
Leisure & Tourism: 
zones, facilities, & 
archeological sites
Non-planned areas
Map 4.6. Filter ‘2’ of Map 4.4 : Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism and 
greenery (RM 3). 
The map and table below demonstrate two: 1. As lands in Ramallah are chiefly privately 
owned, public open spaces and gardens are modest and limited extracts through reparcelation 
that fall below conservative urban needs, where they spread over a mere 0,6% of the total city-
area and amount to 0,03 sq.m. per person (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007); 2. Assuming 
that tourism spaces can be used by city-inhabitants as public space for leisure purposes – 
which is not necessarily true and again excluding the financially underprivileged – nonetheless 
this is also a narrow 0,6% of the total city space. 
Table 4.3. Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism 
and greenery (corresponding to regulations and value17).
Category
Master Plan 1999 + 
2009
% of 
Pub-
lic-use 
area
Area
dunom
% of city 
area 
Public facilities & 
services 920 7,1% 86,1%
Public open space 72 0,6% 6,8%
Tourism zones & 
archaeological sites 76 0,6% 7,1%
Total 1068 8,3% 100,0%
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Office-Buildings
Exhibitions
Commercial / Retail
Mixed use
Industrial
Old City
Map 4.7. Filter ‘3’  of Map 4.4 : Spatial allocation for commercial areas (RM 3). 
The map below reflects the planner’s concept of creating nodal commercial points around 
the city while maintaining the old-city-core as the chief retail area. One could argue that this 
arrangement protects residential neighbourhoods against traffic pollution. On the other side 
of the same coin, given the acute lack of a public transportation system such a model becomes 
the particular engine behind the continued traffic jams and accompanying forms of pollution. 
Meanwhile, the PCBS (2013) data on forms and characteristics of commercial activities in the 
city calls for a spatial arrangement that aligns office and commercial areas along existing traffic 
arteries; which reduces commuting distances and simultaneously contributes to balancing 
real-estate values.
Table 4.4. Spatial allocation for commercial purposes for 
varying forms of production (corresponding to regulations and 
value18).
Category
Master Plan 1999 + 
2009 % of Res-idential 
areaAreadunom
% of city 
area 
Exhibitions zone 136 1,1% 10,6%
Commercial zone 107 0,8% 8,3%
Office + Mixed uses 665 5,1% 51,7%
Industrial zone 379 2,9% 29,4%
Total 1287 9,9% 100,0%
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4.3.2.   Strategic Development and Investment 
Plan (SDIP), 2007-2011
While MOPAD and MOLG drafted their RABMA proposal, at a lower level 
of the command-chain the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ) 
conducted a WB-wide program through which the municipalities of Ramallah, 
alBireh and Beitunya held joint meetings facilitated by a team of GIZ and 
alNajjah University experts, towards setting a SDIP for the three municipalities. 
The priorities of the strategies were named as: 1. Infrastructure, Services and 
Environment; 2. Institutional Structure and Public Partnership; 3. Sociocultural 
Aspects; and 4. Economic Aspects. Through a series of workshops and meetings 
– following eurocentric guidelines on strategic urban development practices – the 
three partner cities articulated their vision as:
Together we seek a prosperous area built on service-based economy with 
reliable infrastructure, adopts good governance and assures efficient public 
participation, respects diversity and citizens’ rights, and preserves its 
environment and heritage. (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007:10)
Translating their vision and named priorities the partners agreed on a set 
of goals and strategies (Table 4.5). Corresponding to the four-pillar framework 
a total of 36 projects were identified (Table 4.6) for the period 2007-2011 with an 
approximate total budget of US$ 64 million. Potential sources of funding varied 
between inhouse, private sector, donor community, and mixture variations of 
the three (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007).The named strategies and goals 
might seem coherent and founded at a first glance, nonetheless this impression 
is reversed once the plan falls under scrutiny. First, regarding the thematic pillar 
of infrastructure and environment; while traffic continues to form a circadian 
nuisance the SDP doesn’t include any proposals regarding provision of efficient 
public transportation. Although this problematic falls under the mandate of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, municipalities should participate in 
the articulation of approaches and implementation of schemes hence integrating 
the efforts of the two bodies. Rather, a number of points address the issue of 
waste management at a time decision in this regard lies exclusively in the hands 
of Israel’s COGAT which in turn has repeatedly turned down relevant proposals. 
Notwithstanding, up to this date neither issues have bordered a solution. It is not 
a matter of prioritizing either subject over the other; rather, about planning action 
in accordance with available tools and within the continued colonial conditions in 
lieu of standardized guidelines.
Second, while the partners are indiscreet about the inefficiency of their 
institutional structures and ‘lack of qualified employees’ at their departments (an 
opinion shared also by Anani 2010, Kassis 2010, Huleileh 2012, Shaheen 2012), six 
years later the change has been minimal. The JCU remains absent, planning joint 
organizational structures – e.g. joint Master Plan, traffic plan, cultural programs, 
etc. – are frozen, and therewith the joint Capital Investment Plan (CIP, Table 4.6) 
has turned obsolete.
The third pillar which is concerned with sociocultural activities and forging 
feelings of belonging to the wider city-space was appropriated by RM which as 
of 2010 has been increasingly investing in organizing public events; such as the 
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Table 4.5. Derivative edition from : Developmental Priorities, Vision & Strategies (Ramallah, 
alBireh & Beitunya 2007:10)
D
ev
elo
pm
en
t 
Pr
io
rit
ie
s
Infrastructure, 
Services and 
Environment
Institutional 
Structure 
and Public 
Partnership
Sociocultural 
Aspects
Economic 
Aspects
M
ai
n 
Ch
al
le
ng
es
• Radial-concentric 
road network 
resulting in 
problems;
• Inefficient 
transportation 
infrastructure;
• Insufficient waste 
water treatment;
• Weak solid waste 
collection system;
• Mixed land use 
(recreational 
and industrial) 
resulting in 
environmental 
problems;
• High rates of 
migration to the 
cities.
• Weak institutional 
structure;
• Lack of 
cooperation 
between 
municipalities;
• Absence of joint 
strategic planning 
policies;
• Unavailability 
of municipal 
programs 
targeting the 
community;
• Lack of qualified 
employees at the 
municipalities;
• Low citizens’ trust 
& loyalty to cities.
• Lack of green 
and public spaces 
(0.03 sq.m. / 
person);
• Limited social 
and cultural 
activities services 
(around 37 
cultural societies, 
2 public libraries, 
3 cinemas and 12 
sport clubs).
• Very limited 
municipal income 
sources;
• Inability of the 
municipalities 
to operate and 
maintain large-
scale projects;
• Israeli restriction 
on expansion and 
accessibility;
• Absence 
of penalty 
regulations for 
unpaid revenues;
• Few light 
industries and 
lack of job 
opportunities;
• High land prices.
Ta
rg
et
s b
y 
20
13 • Develop an efficient and joint 
infrastructure for 
the three cities;
• Contribute in 
providing a better 
environment.
• Enhance 
integrated, 
mutual, and 
sustainable 
developmental 
work.
• Capitalize on the 
cultural and social 
diversity;
• Preserve cultural 
heritage / seek 
social equity.
• Promote the area 
as an attractive 
service-center;
• Improve 
municipalities’ 
financial 
sustainability.
St
ra
te
gi
es
• Upgrading and 
developing joint 
integrated master 
plan for the 3 
cities;
• Developing 
and executing 
comprehensive 
traffic plan;
• Focusing on 
implementing 
joint 
infrastructure 
projects.
• Institutionalizing 
mutual 
cooperation 
between the 3 
municipalities;
• Implementing 
institutional 
development 
in the 3 
municipalities;
• Institutionalizing 
councils’ relations 
with CSOs and 
the public;
• Building the 
capacity of 
municipal 
employees.
• Establishing 
cultural & social 
facilities to be 
distributed 
equally in the 3 
cities;
• Raising citizens’ 
awareness of 
their rights and 
responsibilities in 
the framework of 
diversity;
• Organizing 
cultural and 
recreational 
activities in 
partnership 
with cultural 
organizations.
• Developing 
municipal 
regulations that 
provide incentives 
for investment in 
Service Economy;
• Promoting 
the area as an 
attractive and 
integrated services 
center;
• Building human 
capacity in fields 
related to service 
economy and 
municipal self 
financing.
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Table 4.6. Derivative edition from : Capital Investment Plan, CIP (Ramallah, alBireh & 
Beitunya 2007:11)
Pr
io
rit
y 
#
Project Title
Implementation
Completed 
in 2014?20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
1 Solid waste collection, treatment, & management program ×
2 Establishing a Joint Cooperation Council ✓
3 Preparation of a comprehensive traffic plan ×
4 Preparation of a joint Master Plan ×
5 Establishing children branch libraries n.a.
6 Waste water network and treatment plant ×
7 Constructing 3 public parks in marginalized areas ✓
8 Institutional development and capacity building for the 3 municipalities ×
9 Establishing a National Museum ×
10 Establishing an investment incubator ×
11 Construction of a slaughter house ×
12 Computerization of municipal database & service systems ✓
13 Execution of joint streets ✓
14 Improving traffic environment on Yafa-Irsal street ✓
15 Construction of an international stadium ×
16 Activation of Schools’s sociocultural role ✓
17 Campaign to change the renting/leasing regulations ×
18 Establishing “Partnership with Public” unit at each municipality ✓
19 Developing building regulations ×
20 Establishing a joint cultural and social activities database ×
21 Storm-water Master Plan for the 3 cities ×
22 Cleaning walls & signs from posters & stickers ✓
23 Construction of the National Park ×
24 Establishing a unified industrial zone for the 3 cities and reorganizing the existing areas ×
25 Constructing a commercial centre for the 3 cities ×
26 Study of handicapped accessibility & rehabilitation structures n.a.
27 Joint cemetery ×
28 Arts and culture show ×
29 Establishing a joint Voluntary Works & Public Services unit ×
30 Construction of a new vegetables market ×
31 Study the potential use of storm-water ×
32 Organizing cultural festivals in public areas ✓
33 Construction of tourist resort area ×
34 Central children facility for culture & art activities ×
35 Wireless internet services for the 3 cities ×
36 Construction of a municipal buses & trucks station ×
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annual illumination of the Christmas Tree, Local Crafts Festival, and Nuwwar 
Nisan (April’s Blossom) educational and entertainment festival for children, to 
mention a few. While this aspect is making progress towards meeting needs, the 
creation of necessary social infrastructures has fallen short of expectations.
In the fourth – economic – pillar of the SDIP challenges are coherently 
articulated yet remain unresolved in the strategies and planned projects. In 
the absence of a genuine will to forge a balance, prices of property in Ramallah 
continue to inflate under speculation reaching levels comparable to Berlin and 
Beirut while salaries stagnate, thence placing hundreds of vacant apartments 
beyond the feasible range of the majority of seekers (Image 4.2, pg. 202). By 2014 
the pace of penetration of the city-skyline by apartment buildings has slowed 
down; but not that of the violations to the construction regulations which awaits 
an applicable penalization scheme that would hinder violations on one hand, and 
generate revenue to the municipalities on the other. 
Under the same strategy-category the partner municipalities agreed on 
‘providing incentives for investment in Service Economy’. This ignores the reality 
by which over 60% of the total employment in the area lies in the – naturally 
and rapidly growing – services sector (MOPAD 2009, Huleileh 2012). Further, 
deepening entanglement with the donor-dependent services sector compromises 
rather than endorses financial sustainability and expanding municipal 
returns. Such a policy aggravates the status quo of the city lying hostage to 
political wishes of Israel and western priorities (alKhalili 2012, Shaheen 2012). 
Examples of such incidents include the year 2006 when Palestinian localities 
found themselves at an impasse as the elected government of Hamas failed 
to receive the blessing of neither Israel nor the international community, and 
consequently economic agreements were annulled causing an extreme financial 
crisis19. Similarly, starting 2011 as the Arab Spring events unfolded the donor 
community had their attention caught away from Palestinians, triggering 
a diminuendo in aid and equally a perpetuating crescendo of crisis by which 
unemployment rate increased from 20.9% in 2011, to 23.0% in 2012, to 27.1% 
by the third quarter of 2013 (PCBS 2011, 2012, 2013b). Meanwhile, industry and 
production are further constrained by the geopolitics of the Israeli colonial 
discourse of closures, confiscation of resources, denied access to international 
markets, repeated destruction of infrastructures, etc.20. Thereof, the geopolitical 
and economic conditions of Palestinian localities dictates pursuit of stability 
beyond conventional neoliberal tools, and maybe taking the PRDP advice of re-
orienting towards high-value, knowledge-based economy.
Last in this limited revision of the SDIP it ought to be noted that the CIP’s 
(Table 4.6) ranking of priorities lacks traceable logic. For example, while waste 
treatment and traffic are evident priorities, scientific and logical arguments fail 
to provide explanations for why the construction of an International Stadium 
(rank 15) is of higher priority than preparing a storm-water master plan (rank 21) 
and the corollary study of the potential use of storm-water (rank 31) – nor does 
it explain why the planning of the ‘use’ is ten ranks below that of provisioning 
the infrastructure. Scientific and professional logic would have, at least, reversed 
the order of these two. This ranking becomes increasingly  puzzling when taking 
into consideration that, first, the three cities spread over a series of hilltops and 
valleys which witness annual losses, damages, and occasionally human casualties 
in winter seasons as water accelerates down steep cliffs and roads which often lie 
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at inclination reaching 40% (see section 2.1.3.iii, pg. 65); and second, as these 
cities happen to suffer greatly from Israel-induced water shortages. 
In the same line of thought – given the shortage in land, swelling of 
population, poverty of municipalities and high values of property – it is 
incomprehensible why new unified industrial zone (rank 24), shared commercial 
centre (rank 25), and vegetables market (rank 30) have to be established rather 
than sufficing with reorganizing and enhancing the connectivity and performance 
of existing ones. Nonetheless, when re-examining these three along with projects 
in ranks 9, 15, 20, 22, 23, 28, 32, 33 and 35 (a third of CIP); a non-declared strategy 
crystallizes by which the cities are striving for higher visibility driven by the 
conviction that an image of uniformity and tidiness is essential for international 
promotion of the space (further elaborated in following section).
Before closing this section, it is worthy to note that the SDIP process – under 
the leadership of the GIZ and alNajjah University experts, being financed by 
generous donors – lacked the quintessential customization to context and capacity 
building (Shaheen 2012), and equally the realism of urban strategies (Barghouthi 
2012) – as exhibited in the fact that the majority of named projects were not 
executed up to date (Table 4.6, pg. 200). When asked about the program Shaheen 
stated that ‘our problem [as Palestinians] remains that we have been importing 
models and pasting them into our very different context’ (Shaheen 2012), while 
the head of the Policies Department at the MOLG answered:
The SDIP Program is nothing more than a donor-imposed fashion. The program 
made LGs draft five-year strategic plans. Meanwhile, the PA – under which these 
LGs operate – does not know whether it will be able to pay the public-salaries 
next week! It is no more than an exercise in writing standardized proposals. It 
is a theatre play in which everyone involved is happy about the character they 
play, and meanwhile valuable financial and human resources are wasted. These 
plans will remain on shelves accumulating dust, simply because these LGs have 
Severely unaffordable
> 51% of average household income
Seriously unaffordable
41%-50% of average household income
Moderately unaffordable
31%-40% of average household income
Affordable
< 30% of average household income
2005 2011 2016
Image 4.2. Derivative edition from : Ramallah - Affordable Housing Crisis (Anani 2011a)
Curated by Yazid Anani, BZU architecture students researched affordable housing in the 
districts of Ramallah in light of ongoing inflation and stagnating wages. Categorization is 
based on the average value of household income as calculated by the PCBS. 2016 is a projection 
based on established trends.
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no financial resources to execute. Furthermore, normally strategic plans are 
made based on studies of resources in order to manage efficient and effective 
allocation. Here I will ask: what are the resources of the Palestinian LGs? [...] So 
they ran this program and got everyone excited about participatory approaches, 
meetings between X and Y, priorities, PRA - Participatory Rural Appraisal, 
SDIP and ‘you have to follow the manual’, etc. I do believe in the importance 
of dreaming and future visions, and I also believe in the importance of being 
realistic and true to existing conditions. (Barghouthi 2012) 
4.3.3.    Beyond Manuals: Municipal Programs, 
Approach and OAs Legacy
Following the municipal eras of pre-Oslo institutionalized discrimination 
(by ICA), the 1994-2000 confusion21, and the 2001-2005 emergency22; in 2006 
the first Palestinian municipal elections – based on agendas and targets – took 
place. The elected RM Council perceived institutional and spatial organization 
and order as the kernel of their role (Michael 2010, Abdullah 2010). This ideology 
translated in pursuit and accentuation of projects contributing to – what they 
perceive as – an image of modernity (Anani 2010). In 2008 and after three years 
in office the municipal council capitalized on the occasion of the centennial to 
announce 58 projects varying across six themes (Ramallah Municipality 2008:11):
[1] Development of infrastructure and environment;
[2] Protection of cultural heritage;
[3] Promotion of culture and science;
[4] Strengthening of pluralism and community participation;
[5] Comprehensive institutional development of RM; and,
[6] Promotion of tourism and investment.
Within the framework of the ‘Development of Infrastructure and 
environment’ category RM proposed and conducted numerous projects that 
classify under infrastructure-upgrade, service-provision, and beautification. 
Some of these projects are: rehabilitation of water networks (significant stretches 
of which dated back to the 1960s-Jordanian era); rehabilitation of existing 
streets and provision of new vital connections; side walks, and illumination; 
designing and implementing comprehensive street-naming, house numbering 
and a postal-code systems; traffic re-organization and installation of parking 
meters; rehabilitation and creation of new connecting staircases, public (vehicle 
not pedestrian) squares and several neighbourhood gardens; comprehensive 
revitalization of city core, and the 15,000 Trees campaign (Ramallah Municipality 
2008:12). The implementation of these projects has had a significant impact on 
the livelihood of residents and within parameters forged feelings of pride and 
reference as articulated in focus groups and by some interviewees (Abdullah 2010, 
Zananiri 2010, a.o). On the other side of the same coin these projects coupled with 
demand on the city further encouraged the orthodox price inflation and initiation 
of socio-spatial segregation.
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Projects planned within the second theme of ‘Protection of cultural heritage’ 
are in fact limited to archaeological preservation and city-image presentation 
as a space with lineage. Beyond the enriching ability to trace and consciously 
experience the growth and layering of an urban space, there is another factor 
feeding this emphasis on the physical heritage; namely, the sociopolitical 
conditions created by the ongoing colonization which tallies the length of 
mythological narrative of a space as equivalent to the depth of its legitimacy. 
While Ramallah is being coined as the newly established locus of ‘fremd politics’ 
(alKhalili 2012) and corruption (Kassis 2010, Shaheen 2012), RM is resisting this 
branding by articulating the journey of the city into the present. However, the 
mental limitation is exposed by the fact that the concept of ‘architectural heritage’ 
remains short of including the characteristic modernist villas of the 1960s, nor the 
romantic Balcony-Street design of the fabric of the centre that developed chiefly 
in the 1970s; Image 4.3 to Image 4.5 below. 
The ‘Promotion of culture and science’ and ‘Strengthening of pluralism 
and community participation’ categories are focused on establishment of – 
much needed – social infrastructures and frameworks: theatre; library; two 
museums; school; media, sports and recreation centres, and four parks. The 
soft-side of these tracks include the formation of neighbourhood committees, 
an open wireless internet city-wide network (the digital stage), and organizing 
an undetermined number of arts and youth programs (Ramallah Municipality 
2008:18-21). Whereas pre-Oslo social activities took place predominantly in the 
private and semi-private spaces away from the eyes of the colonizer and under 
Image 4.3. (left) alMa’ared Street, city centre, September 2014.
Image 4.4. (right) alMa’ared Street, city centre, wider view September 2014.
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the socio-political ethos of austerity; nowadays the differing spatial morphology, 
household typology and socioeconomic ideologies and dynamics are gradually 
forging the emergence of public social spaces, services and infrastructures (Taraki 
2008a, Anani 2010); in a process resemblant of Lefebvre’s ‘social production of 
space’. While the larger segment of these projects is still pending, the municipal 
articulation of a policy prioritizing the provision of such social infrastructures 
reflects an evolution in administrative perception of the ‘common’ social and 
equally spatial spheres. On the other side of the same coin, the publications of 
the RM might give these undertakings an impression of developmental top-
down led initiatives, here it should be recognized that they are induced by socio-
economic needs and emergence of new variations of cultural ethos. Further, the 
absence of frameworks regulating, and channels connecting undertakings with 
other elements of the municipal system is narrowing the impact and growth 
possibilities of this sector; whereby programs of the cultural department might be 
growing and gaining a rhythm, nonetheless, they remain isolated from the spatial 
and infrastructural planning departments. 
The fifth category ‘Comprehensive institutional development of RM’ 
is neither comprehensive nor developmental, rather, pertaining to partial 
organization activities. The rehabilitation of the municipal building, creation of 
One Stop Shop for municipal services, establishment of a GIS23 Unit and Total 
Quality Management system are items that serve in-house spatial, information 
and procedural organization. Meanwhile, the 2008-2010 Strategic Plan and the 
Ramallah Zoning projects target city-wide spatial planning, and Measuring 
Image 4.5. A view over the Yasser Arafat Square direction alManara Square, city centre, 
September 2014. Notice the Balcony-Street design, and the rounded edges of the crossing.
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Citizen’s Satisfaction project is simply a performance indicator. The label of this 
category is tailored for the ‘FAB’ – Foreign development Aid Bingo24 – tautologic 
linguistic criteria, as is the sixth theme of ‘Promotion of Tourism and Investment’. 
The projects of the latter focus on forging a modern and attractive city image, 
hand in hand with private investment incentives through spatial enhancements. 
Herein, the Industrial Zone Rehabilitation and the alHarajah Commercial Area 
projects are clearly concerned with ameliorating spatial, infrastructural and 
aesthetic conditions for investors; while the National Exhibition Centre, Tourist 
Information Centres, Restaurants & Cafés, and alManara Parking Complex are 
concerned with investment-relevant factors of market visibility and facilitated 
client accessibility. Examination of each of the projects in both the fifth and 
sixth themes provides further evidence of the eclectic mode of decision-making 
within Ramallah’s municipality, as well as the depth of influence of mobile non-
customized international city-marketing policies, whether through international 
organizations such as the World Bank or dominant Eurocentric city management- 
and image-discourses (Colomb 2007). 
While RM remains distant from exhibiting capabilities of endemic analysis 
and customization of vision, nevertheless, these projects do constitute a step 
towards change. No observant can deny its organizational progress starting 
2006. At the time cash flows and pressure on services augmented with the 
signature of the PRDP (2007) the municipality started replacing the archaic 
public administration systems with those of the twenty-first century. Herein, its 
approach is based on a target which they phrase as:
To achieve the goal of transforming Ramallah into a model city in the 
region, and a city of international caliber, it was imperative that Ramallah 
experience [sic] a comprehensive renaissance. (Ramallah Municipality 
2008:11; emphasis added) 
RM’s target exhibits the product of what Ferguson coined as the ‘anti-politics 
machine’ (section 3.2.3, pg. 151); wherein it assumes political ability to exercise 
normalcy and economy, and thereof induce a ‘renaissance’  – assimilating free 
cities – regardless of the continuation of the colonial project. This is the byproduct 
of decades of shrinking and coping, and the corollary production of pedigree 
spaces. The post-colonial promotion of separation of national political affairs 
from the administration of milieus is astoundingly echoed in the terminology of 
municipal politicians and policies. Besides the incompatibility of the simile, this 
enthusiasm towards progress is fuelling process of re-invention of the wheel of 
urban cycles rather than innovation of new forms. Amman, Barcelona, Beirut, 
Cairo, Rome and others have all featured one or several of Ramallah’s physical 
trends and mistakes. For example, a Parking Complex at the busiest geography 
of the city has indeed in some cases contributed to alleviating parking shortages 
e.g. the subterranean Marktplatz Parking in Bonn or that beneath the busy Plaza 
Cathedral in Barcelona. Nevertheless, extensive available research has proven 
similar projects to be causes of further congestion where neither surrounding 
context nor traffic circulation knots were addressed concomitantly. RM’s 
proposed parking lies at the sole and busiest narrow artery of the city, and few 
hundred meters away from alBireh Municipality’s parking complex; a project that 
continues to form significant burden on the limited infrastructure and equally 
devastating impacts on the aesthetics and environment of the vital elManara 
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Square (Image 4.6, pg. 207). The National Exhibition Centre is another project 
with significant perplexity the least of which is the geographic isolation and 
impeded accessibility of the city. While the municipality has advanced on issues 
of service provision and administration, they remain oblivious to principles of 
customized, systematic, timely-sensible and integrated urban planning, and a 
fortiori, planning for uncertainty. 
On another level, this municipality has been target of heavy criticism by 
practitioners, scholars and citizens (majority of focus groups participants and 
interviewees) for lack of regulation of form, location, economic characteristics 
and time of placement of investments. On one hand, indeed in cities worldwide 
a process of ‘responsibilisation’ is taking place by which urban spacio-economic 
affairs are ‘left to the vagaries of market mechanisms and individual action [... 
where] the role of the state [is seen] as one of an enabler rather than a direct 
manager’ (Raco et al. 2013:4). On the other hand, RM suffers from significant 
shortage in financial liquidity due to inability of LGs to exercise direct taxation 
and their non-monopoly over income generation and expenditure methods 
(AbdelAaty 2005, AMAN 2014, Barghouthi 2012). Municipalities – akin 
their government – are highly dependent on foreign aid in the provision of 
their services and thereof the scope of their regulation power. Table 4.7, pg. 
208 summarizes RM’s expenditure plan as outlined in their Centennial Project, 
demonstrating how its budgetary contribution falls below 20%, and even then 
70% of this contribution is in the form of either real estate or land (Ramallah 
Municipality 2008). As such, dominion of private and foreign agendas can be 
neither capped nor altered. This reality invokes one of the central arguments of 
this work, whereby urban morphological change towards environmental and 
social resilience can only be achieved if made lucrative, and practicable by the 
masses not only a coterie.
Table 4.7 also highlights a municipal expenditure discrepancy, which in turn 
is an indicator of the OAs legacy. While high expenses of infrastructure provision 
are customary, the four categories – 2 to 5 – of public social and institutional 
infrastructures combined sum up to US$ 47.23 million; hence accounting to 85% 
of the amount  planned for expenditure in the sixth sector of tourism and private 
investment incentives, to which US$ 55.8 million have been allocated. 
Also quintessential to planning endeavours in Ramallah is comprehension 
of the tensile contemporary politics of its municipality. Embedded deep in the 
agenda and programs of the municipal council of 2006-2012 is a quiet – yet 
not necessarily intelligent – insubordination against the PA that had stripped 
alBireh 
Parking 
Complex
main and 
narrow 
traffic artery
RM’s 
Parking 
Complex
Image 4.6. RM’s proposed alManara Parking Complex (Ramallah Municipality 2010:18). To 
the left the context of the project is mapped. 
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municipalities of much of their orthodox mandates. As mentioned elsewhere, 
according to the PA’s arrangements the main task of Palestinian municipalities is 
concerned with regulating the built environment, and even then municipalities 
serve as a front-desk and liaison officers, as Barghouthi elaborates:
[customarily] the central authority’s job is to plan, administer and decide 
on budgeting while municipalities and LGs deal with populations and their 
needs. In our case, in order to justify their presence and size – while using 
the existing geographic fragmentation as grounds – ministries appropriated 
municipal powers. [... This] limited municipal powers and their development. 
Municipalities are unable to set future growth visions because simply they don’t 
call the shots. [...]. The situation is exactly like that of the terms of the OAs: 
Israel contracted the establishment of the PA but gave it only the dirty work of 
the COGAT, and in its turn, the PA contracted with the municipalities and left 
the latter with the dirty work. So practically, the PA is unable to develop itself 
due to the terms of contraction it undersigned with Israel, and simultaneously, 
it is maintaining legitimacy of continuity by having appropriated powers of 
municipalities rendering itself of necessity. If anyone speaks of visions s/he 
would either be delusional or lying, we are trapped at a point where moving 
forward necessitates breaking this vicious cycle. (Barghouthi 2012, Head of 
Policies Department at MOLG) 
Through implementing soft programmes (e.g. Environment Friendly 
Schools Project; running the hitherto most regionally advanced Palestinian 
‘Emergency Operations Centre’ for the massive 2013 snow storm) RM is crossing 
fences into mandates of other public bodies in pioneer steps towards reclaiming 
the confiscated dimensions of their institutional role. It has developed close ties to 
the much-larger Jordanian counterparts, improved their transparency by regularly 
publishing minutes of their council meetings and decisions online, holding public 
Table 4.7. 2008 - 2011 Projects  as stated in the Ramallah Municipality (2008) publication
Category
No. 
of 
pro-
jects
Total 
Budget
[US $ M]
Contri-
bution 
of RM    
[US $ M]
... of which 
Land 
[US $ M]
... of which 
Real-
Estate 
[US $ M]
[1] Development of infra-
structure & environment 20 69.00 7.50 1.70 -
[2] Protection of cultural 
heritage 6 7.95 0.90 - 0.40
[3] Promotion of culture & 
science 8 26.15 6.55 3.00 2.00
[4] Strengthening of 
pluralism & community 
participation
9 10.64 3.84 3.10 -
[5] Comprehensive institu-
tional development of RM 8 2.49 0.23 - -
[6] Promotion of tourism & 
investment 7 55.80 10.40 10.40 -
Total 58 172.03 29.42 18.20 2.40
100 % 17,10 % 10,58 % 1,40 %
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opinion assemblies, and receiving international guests with whom political and 
economic partnerships are explored. With the commencement of the – ongoing 
– financial crisis in 2011, the municipality has been increasingly outsourcing 
internal responsibilities (decision-making?) to the private sector manoeuvring 
around the legal and financial obstacles created by its subsidiary status. 
Like others, these processes are gaining size as that of a downhill rolling 
snow-ball, yet synergy-threads are absent. For example, lately the ‘Ramallah 
Developmental Planning Framework 2015-2035’ (RDPF) project has been declared 
which aims at re-designing municipal strategies and targets, for the coming 
twenty years. The images captured at the launching event and published on the 
municipality’s FaceBook page reflect the involvement of several public- and private-
sector institutions with their higher and lower tiers of command. What images 
also reveal is the absence of involvement of non directly-affiliated practitioners, 
researchers and scholars, which compose the larger pool of nonpartisan knowledge. 
Further, details beyond the caption under the name of the event are nowhere to be 
found, raising genuine concerns about the participatory dimension and the ability 
of this exercise to grow beyond the course of the SDIP; an attractive document 
structurally, yet technically void of relevance. Having said that, and while Ramallah’s 
growth and municipal policies are no paragon, nonetheless, assembling the pieces 
of the puzzle provide an image of a ‘legacy in the forming’, whereby Ramallah’s 
peu-à-peu social, economic and political divorce from the wider national context 
constitutes the initiation of the Palestinian post-national era.
The one variable that has been a constant in the life of Ramallah – citizens 
and municipal approach – is its rapid responsiveness to change. When the 
British eyed it as a ‘hill station’, the town grasped its tourism and administration 
potential as the viable alternative to its non competitiveness in either agriculture, 
or manufacturing, nor mythology. While Nakba fleeing Palestinians were allowed 
to settle close to the agricultural Jenin-city, the trade-centre Nablus pushed 
them as far away as humanly acceptable, whereas the wealthy Hebron denied 
them permission to approach city territory and peripheries. In that same event, 
provincial Ramallah opened arms to double its size integrating refugees into 
its labour- and intellectual-capital. This unorchestrated, varied, and paradoxal 
behaviour could – from a conceptual perspective – draw some parallels with 
the current dynamics in EU politics on emigration. While British politics is 
turning increasingly Zionist exampling higher levels of xenophobia and scripting 
mythological racial criteria for emigration (who is not British?); in contrast, 
Swedish politics is echoed in the Ramallite discourse, where today it is leading the 
efforts in the EU towards reducing border offensiveness and expanding the paths 
for legal emigration and therewith swifter integration. 
Although one of the smallest in size and shortest in age, nonetheless 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s Ramallah assumed a major seat in producing 
a new Palestinian consciousness which was rooted in comprehension of and 
responding to socio-economic needs (section 2.2.2, pg. 82). And again, although 
neither Ramallah’s municipality nor its citizens had planned to serve as seat for 
a hegemonic and centralized quasi authority; nonetheless they have identified 
the potential benefits, nurtured new risk strategies, and endured resulting 
problematics; which in turn today are pressing for solutions as the trajectory is 
posing genuine threats. How Ramallah designs its exit from the current financial 
and socio-political crisis is detrimental to the quality of life it would be able to 
offer to its citizens, hence its continuation as an attractive ecology.
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Image 4.7. Street network in elTireh 
neighbourhood (Oct.2012). RM is pre-
empting the rapid growth in the area, in a 
mode reminiscent of the ‘urbanizaciónes’ in 
Spain.
Image 4.8. Exhibitions Street in Ramallah’s 
centre after extensive upgrading works (2010); 
walls were cleaned, sidewalks widened, trees 
planted, and subterranean infrastructures 
placed anew (Agroffman2013).
Image 4.9. Qadura Garden in city centre 
(2011). This is one of a dozen small gardens 
and playgrounds established around the city 
between 2008 and 2013.
Image 4.10. Radana Park (2012); spreading 
over 7,000 sq.m. it is the only park in the city 
(RMfb 2013).
Image 4.11. alKamandjati Music 
Conservatory in one of Ramallah’s old-city 
extended family house (2008); what is locally 
referred to as ‘hosh’. This was a pilot after 
which the rennovation of a couple of other 
‘hosh’s was conducted by Riwaq Centre.
Image 4.12. [centre] Ramallah’s Tourism 
Information Centre (2010).
Image 4.13. [right] Street Naming project 
(2008). After a long pause the committee 
was re-formed and an extensive process was 
launched that included street naming, house 
numbering, and application of postal codes.
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Image 4.14. Memorial site of the late poet 
Mahmoud Darwish (2012). It includes a 
museum, the Birweh (village of origin near 
Acre from which he was displaced in 1948) 
Garden, and the tomb of the poet. 
Image 4.16. Ramallah’s popular Market 
(2012). It was established for street vendors 
simultaneously with the passing of  laws 
banning their activities on streets and 
sidewalks (RMfb 2013).
Image 4.15. Ramallah Cultural Palace (2004). 
When constructed it was at the outskirts, 
adjacent to the solid-waste collection point, 
and criticized by locals for being ‘too far out’. 
Today this area is under heavy urbanization.
Image 4.17. Nuwwar Nisan Children’s Festival 
(2012). This took place throught the old city 
core in an attempt to revitalize it on one hand, 
and on the other cater for emerging and 
changing social needs (RMfb 20134).
Image 4.18. Wain ‘a Ramallah Festival (2011). 
Many similar arts festivals are taking place 
throughout the city, throughout the year 
(RMfb 2013).
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Image 4.19. Illustration of winning design 
for the Exhibitions Centre (Ramallah 
Municipality 2010a:81).
Image 4.20. Illustration of chosen design for 
the extension and upgrading of the municipal 
building and surrounding area (Ramallah 
Municipality 2011)
Image 4.21. Illustration of proposed re-
design of alManara square to incorporate 
subterranean passages and a tunnel 
connecting to the nearby Parking Complex 
(Ramallah Municipality 2010a:78).
Image 4.22. Illustration of the traditional crafts 
alHarjja Market renovation and upgrading 
project; located at outskirts of Ramallah’s old 
city (Ramallah Municipality 2010a:77)
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Image 4.23.  Mahmoud Darwish Square (2010). 
This is one of 14 squares around Ramallah (map 
above) that were either established or upgraded 
between 2008 and 2013. Errection of squares 
falls under the larger framework of traffic 
organization. Given the topography, the decades 
of COGAT deprivation, the incompatibility of 
morphology and spatial characteristics, and 
the uncontrolled growth in the early years of 
the OAs the city is suffering from a genuine 
mobility crisis which the squares fall short from 
addressing. Notwithstanding, the squares are 
indeed serving as landmarks for orientation and 
–through their names – proponents of the city 
identity that RM wishes to consolidate; which is 
that high political and cultural consciousness as 
well as presence.
214 |   100 × RAMALLAH
Image 4.24. Main Street in Ramallah centre 
(Odeh 2012). Two high-rise commercial 
buildings erected short after the signature of 
the OAs, notice how basic the designs are.
Image 4.25. Main Street in Ramallah centre. 
Image demonstrating contrast in height, 
form and finishing  between former and new 
constructions.
Image 4.26. (today) National Bank 
headquarters (2004). First commercial 
headquarters built with investment in facade 
beautification elements.
Image 4.27. Grand Park Hotel, 5 stars 
(Grandpark 2013). Originally constructed 
short after the OAs; fully refurbished, exterior 
redesigned and reopened in 2012.
Image 4.28. PRICO headquarters, 
constructed in 2010.
Image 4.29. [centre] Office building 
constructed in 2009, first to be cladded with 
metal sheets in place of the traditional stone.
Image 4.30. [right] Yasir Arafat Mausoleum 
within the Mukata’a (Wikipedia 2013). 
Significant sections of the Mukata’a have 
been reconstructed following flagship designs 
by the renowned architect Jafar Tukan. 
Noteworthy, taking photographs of the 
compound is banned.
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Image 4.31. Prime Minister’s office (left) 
and one of 3 massive buildings forming the 
Ministries complex.
Image 4.32.  Presidential Guest Palace under 
construction in 2014.
Image 4.33.  Birzeit University Housing 
Cooperative complex in elTireh 
neighbourhood. Composes of 89 units, even 
though it is not the first housing cooperative 
to be constructed in Ramallah, nonetheless, 
many consider it the inspiration for the 
following wave of similar mass housing 
projects. 
Image 4.34. Diplomatic Quarter units 
(housing project). Noteworthy, this project 
is an exclusive gated community for persons 
affiliated with PA top tier, or wishing foreign 
diplomats.
Image 4.35. [bottom] Illustration of the 
Palestinian National Museum (designboom 
2013). Following an international competition 
the design of the Irish architects Heneghan 
Peng were chosen. Construction commenced 
in 2013.
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Image 4.36.  [above] Panorama of Ramallah 
westward, taken from atop Palestine Tower, 
elErsal Street.
Image 4.37.  [below] Panorama of elMasyoun 
neighbourhood, taken from EinMinjed 
neighbourhood.
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Image 4.38. [left] Ramallah’s centre as seen from elMasyoun neighbourhood.
Image 4.39. [right] Ramallah centre as seen from elTireh neighbourhood.
Image 4.42.  [above] elTireh neighbourhood as seen from the Diplomatic Quarter.
Image 4.43.  [below] elTireh neighbourhood as seen from its northern valley.
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Image 4.40. [left] Im elSharayet & Kufur Aqab neighbourhoods with Jerusalem in the back.
Image 4.41. [right] elQudaira neighbourhood.
220 |   100 × RAMALLAH
4.4.   ALTERNATIVES TO 
HIERARCHY, GENERIC 
POLICY-MOBILITY 
AND ANTISPACES
As confirmed in each of the eight focus groups and the twenty interviews 
conducted within the framework of this work; Ramallah’s municipality and 
citizens are – legitimately – more concerned with the  quotidian and individual 
welfare than the revolutionary collective cause of achieving statehood. While the 
Palestinian official political discourse and politicians remain unaltered since the 
Cold War, nonetheless, the residents of Ramallah – regardless of origin and status 
– are pursuing socioeconomic norms of the twenty-first century that include – 
among other aspects – right to ideological differentiation, where one of every 
two participating in the focus groups named freedom (from social pressures), 
openness, pluralism and living conditions as ‘the most positive aspect of Ramallah’. 
While the municipality seems to be aware of this reality, yet it needs to fathom 
that endorsing these aspects is neither limited to sporadic and confined spaces as 
it proposes in its fourth category, nor to private leisure and entertainment spaces. 
The private sector is universally the largest provider of socially- and culturally-
exclusive services particularly because they are free to chose their sectors. Yet 
each municipality beholds the responsibility for establishing positive connections 
and thereof the decision-making on regulations for sectoral prioritization, 
subsidization programs, and detailed licensing and construction parameters. 
Here Trancik points out:
Most striking has been the unwillingness or inability of public institutions to 
control the appearance and physical structure of the city. This has resulted in 
the erosion of a collective framework and visual illiteracy among the public. 
The government must institute strong policies for spatial design, the public 
must take part in shaping its surroundings, and designers must understand the 
principles underlying successful urban space. (Trancik 1986:18)
Knox and Ozolins (2007) describe the built environment as bearer of the 
zeitgeist, the ‘spirit’ that evolves through events and accumulation of souvenirs 
from passing times and changing relationships, wherein they equate city-space 
to a readable ‘biography of urban change’ (ibid:313). Negating the ‘readability’ of 
Ramallah, a participant in the FG 2011, no.3 said:
Normally if the planning process is correct, then the image of the space is also 
correct. For example when one says New York, one immediately thinks of the 
skyscrapers regardless of whether this is a positive thing or not. Here we ask: 
where is the identity of Ramallah? the image? how do I feel when I am in the 
city?... In Ramallah I jump from an old-city area, to high traffic zone, then I 
get to Masyoun, an area that is ‘wow’, then to the refugee camp, then back to 
elTireh which is split between nice areas and not exactly nice, etc. So what is 
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Ramallah in all of this?... Diversity is good, but there should be a common title 
to all of this, not like now, not like a text with no title.  
Another participant elaborated:
I agree with you on the issue on the ‘title’, but I disagree with that being 
as ‘planning’. It is not about the processes of growth and whether they are 
spontaneous or planned, it is about how much awareness is there. What is 
missing is a collective sense that articulates the identity of this city. 
Financial power resembles the electric switches in a circuit, which in the 
absence of a network are neutralized. In this sense, RM should relinquish its 
proponing of financial strangulation as excuse for its weak command on the 
impacts of private initiatives. Sometime between 2008 and 2010 an investor was 
granted (or almost granted) permission to construct a high-rise of 15-20 stories 
on a site located at the Library Street; one of the few remaining tree-shed stretches 
and the one coined as the most romantic in the city. It became public that safety 
regulations would necessitate enlarging some segments of the street and hence 
the destruction of its atmosphere. As a result of popular pressure the municipality 
had to withdraw its approval and the investor had to change his plans. This event 
demonstrates the significant power of the masses in taming the direction of 
change pursued by private investors, if they find the chance. The Neighbourhood 
Committees suggested by the municipality are similar to the inactive Ramallah 
Beautification Committee, wherein the role imagined for them is that of 
consultants whose opinions are not binding. If RM wishes to utilize the masses, 
it has to give its representatives a share in executive decision-making power. As 
Rayyan notes:
There are lots of committees and they are trying to involve people, but it was 
more about taking part in the activity rather taking part in the decision making. 
And yes, at the municipal level there might be some of these rare occasions 
where the public is involved, but on the higher levels of governance and political-
decision, they are still hesitating to give this to the public. (Rayyan 2010)
Yet again, decentralization does pose the threat of discontinuity equal 
to that by bureaucratic systems. Hence what channels and frameworks are 
necessary for the utilization of the power of the masses without causing territorial 
and administrative fragmentation? How can the various urban layers be 
consolidated into self-reinforcing cycles? What elements are necessary for time-
sensitive systems that adapt to changing socio-economic needs? How can RM 
bridge locational economic production modes with factors of improving living 
conditions of the various social strata? These are voluminous questions that no 
singular party can answer, yet must be digested. The final chapter exhibits few 
exemplary alternative approaches to framing time-sensitive channels of positive 
spatial  (hence social, economic and political) relations. Meanwhile, based on 
the conclusions of the precedent chapter of Ramallah’s transformation into a 
globalized translocality; therein, the coming pages establish the argumentative 
base for the forthcoming conceptual proposals through discussing; first, dynamics 
and shortcomings of existing planning systems employed by RM, and; second, the 
limitations of employed policies.
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Table 4.8. Number of newly registering engineers at the Engineers Union per year 
(Engineering Union 2014)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
No. of newly registered 
engineers 922 737 878 764 1198 1209 1092 1344
New registration as com-
parative percentage 
with preceding year
104%* 80% 119% 87% 157% 101% 90% 123%
* in 2004 there were 450 newly registered engineers.
Table 4.9. Regulations on practice of urban consultation and design by the Engineers Union 
(Engineering Union 2009:22-26, 46).
Category
No. of 
years of 
experience
Minimum 
staff size / 
specialty- 
unit
Maximum 
area / 
project 
(sq.m.)
Max. area / 
year: 
Architec-
ture, Urban 
(sq.m.)
Consultant Office (only 
category authorized 
to conduct urban-
scale projects)
12 4 8,000 45,000
Eng. Office 1st level 8 2 6,000 25,000
Eng. Office 2nd level 6 2 4,000 18,000
Eng. Office 3rd level 3 2 2,000 12,000
Opinion Office 15 1 - -
Table 4.10. Regulations on ‘work load shares’ per project by the Engineers Union (Engineering 
Union 2009:42).
Qualification Arch. Eng. (sq.m.)
Civil Eng. 
(sq.m.)
Bachelors of Engineering 6,000 8,000
Per year since graduation (max. 15 yrs) 250 350
Per year of experience since graduation (max. 15 yrs) 450 650
Per year of experience post 15th year (max. 10 yrs) 200 250
Per year of experience since graduation and affilia-
tion to an office (max. 15 yrs) 300 400
Per year of experience in public sector or abroad 
(max. 15 yrs) 200 250
Per year of experience in discipline-related practices 
of management, teaching, subcontracting regard-
less of geography (max. 15 yrs)
100 150
Masters Degree 400 500
Doctoral Degree 1,200 1,600
Upper limit per engineer 18,500 24,000
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4.4.1.   The Patriarchal Coterie, 
Construction Regulations and the 
Authority of the Master Plan
Quintessential for resilient planning is flexibility as highlighted by the IFRC 
(2012) among several specialized organisations, practitioners and scholars (e.g. 
UCLG’s annual Global Forum on Urban Resilience & Adaptation; Anani 2010; Gehl 
2011, etc). As elaborated in the previous chapter and evidenced in this one; master 
plans and zoning schemes are outdated and incompatible urban management 
practices. They are two-dimensional impositions on a four-dimensional context; 
they are generic rather than locational; their integration of corollary and varied 
economic and social systems is cosmetic; they require extensive preparation 
durations that dilute their relevance as they are based on start-line knowledge 
while intelligence is continuously and rapidly evolving and shifting; they assume 
stability at a time uncertainty is the global prevalent circumstance, and; such 
tools lack the flexibility and re-adaptation features necessitated by mechanisms 
of resilience. While RM’s recent RDPF project indicates a positive shift towards 
discussing ‘frameworks’, yet the selected time-frame of two decades seems to 
miss the annual breakthroughs of the technology sector, its rapidly unfolding 
management potentials, newly introduced fields of customized optimization, and 
mostly, since 1914 no political strategy – hence relationalities between economy, 
society and space – survived its decade.
The exclusion of young independent professionals from the RDPF meeting 
can be traced back through the Marxist dialectics of ‘moments’ elaborated in 
section 3.2.4, pg. 164. Mental conceptions of planning regard it as limited task 
executed by engineering professionals, just like baking is conducted by a baker. As 
a result, the nature of the field is patriarchal and exclusive which in turn is (re-)
produced by hierarchical relations. While the minimum salaries for the sustenance 
of life start at less than US$ 300 monthly (45 hours per week) for graduates, they 
only rise to US$ 930 by the sixth year of experience (less than what a junior 
coordinator at an NGO, regardless how productive, would typically earn). This 
feeds into an ecology of self-reinforcement which nurtures and re-breeds the 
protagonists of this system of hierarchical and financial discrepancy. Living at 
existence minimums is normalized, ability to self-invest and co-create is curbed, 
and the ongoing braindrain will persist unless the cycle of tensions is interrupted. 
While there is no statistical data enabling the comparison of numbers of 
university graduates with those licensed by the Engineering Union, it might be 
helpful here to note three; first, that the percentage distribution of persons with 
minimum a Bachelors Degree in the West Bank has grown from 5.3% in 1997 to 
10.8% in 2012 i.e. a rise by 104%, while population increase for the same period 
accounted to less than half, 48% (PCBS 2014h, 2013); second, a study by the Union 
had registered the number of licensed engineers as shown in Table 4.8, which 
corresponds to a mean value of 107% annual increase in number of registered 
engineers between 2005 and 2012; and third, the continued strangulation of the 
Palestinian economy has been mirrored with a 27.6% decrease in the percentage 
distribution of employees in the construction sector, as Diagram 3.3, pg. 128 
demonstrates (ibid: 2012b). Following economic fundamentals, the combination 
of high supply and low demand yields a low market-price i.e. range of salaries 
for engineers. On the other side of the same coin, this yields high vulnerability 
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Table 4.11. Site and construction regulation applied by Ramallah Municipality (Khamaisi 
1998, 2005). These dimensions are ultimately proportional to the end value of properties due 
to the inflated land values in Ramallah.
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Residential-AA 500 25 4 5 5 9 3 90% 30%
Residential-A 1000 25 4 5 5 15 4 144% 36%
Residential-B 750 18 3 4 5 15 4 168% 42%
Residential-C 500 15 3 4 4 15 4 192% 48%
Residential-
Agricul. 5000 50 7 7 12 8 2 20% 10%
Office Buildings a.a. a.a. a.a. a.a. a.a. 18 5 a.a. a.a.
Commercial 
Buildings 400 15 4 4 n/a 23 6 420% 70%
Commercial 
Compound 800 22 n/a 6 10 23 6 330% 55%
Exhibitions 
Buildings 1000 25 4 6 10 23 6 252% 42%
Industrial zone 1000 25 6 8 10 23 6 300% 50%
Industrial 
compound 2000 40 6 8 10 n/a n/a 300% 50%
Industrial/crafts 600 20 3 4 6 16 4 200% 50%
Public Buildings 2000 40 8 10 10 22 6 216% 36%
Tourism 
Buildings 1000 25 5 5 10 22 6 180% 30%
 
Table 4.12. Alternative to current site and construction regulations applied by Ramallah 
Municipality for residential areas, while maintaining the same upper limits.
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Residential-AA 500 16 4 7 3 9 3 90% 30%
Residential-A 500 16 4 7 3 15 4 144% 36%
Residential-B 500 16 4 6 2 15 4 168% 42%
Residential-C 500 16 4 5 2 15 4 192% 48%
Residential-
Agricul. 750 22 7 16 3 8 2 20% 10%
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which reduces articulated objections to the hierarchical system. As patriarchalism 
is not limited to the Engineering Union rather spread throughout the majority of 
city-systems; of those answering the questionnaire inquiry ‘do you think you have 
the possibility for a prosperous career in Ramallah’ two out of each five replied 
with ‘No’ citing nepotism and structural restrictions as cause. Further, excluding 
participants above 50 years in age; i.e. youth, each fourth participant indicated the 
possibility of emigration.
Under the same discourse, the activity of production in the field of urban 
planning is highly regulated, whereby ability to practice is defined by the 
numerical value of years of experience, capital and compliance to accredited 
practice parameters (Table 4.9). Herein precedence becomes a determinant 
for the ‘working load share’ per project (hence financial remuneration) inside 
the practice itself, as demonstrated in Table 4.10. The various clauses and 
paragraphs in the 154 pages Manual of Engineering Practice (2009) reveals a 
system that does not consider urbanists and researchers who did not practice 
two-dimensional design – regardless of accumulated knowledge – as apt to 
setting urban strategies and schemes; because the end-product of Master 
Planning is two-dimensional. In other words, the technical pre-digital tool 
continues to have a higher order of importance over cognitive analytical abilities. 
Visualization of relations, overlays, distribution and other aspects are axiomatic 
to comprehensive analysis and communication; however, when the flow of lines 
in a visualization overrides the specificities of the four-dimensional reality – 
which cannot be captured only in drawings – the results are often catastrophic. 
Three decades ago Trancik argued while echoing Lefebvre’s (2009) critique on 
homogenization practices of planners:
Zoning legislation was drafted to protect citizens under the slogans of ‘health, 
safety, and welfare’ – as perceived by the planners. The result has been cities 
subdivided into homogeneous districts separated by traffic arteries. [...] The 
social impact has been to ban ‘non-conforming’ activities from each district, 
thereby excluding the variety that gives life to the traditional, pre-industrial 
city. Bureaucratic rigidity forbids Mom and Pop from living above their shop. 
Zoning operates under normative assumptions about human welfare and 
happiness. The complexity of social and functional relationships in the urban 
setting was incompatible with Modern Movement planning, which required 
aesthetic completeness for visual graphic effects. The ‘messy vitality’ that is the 
essence of urbanism has been sterilized by holistic planning models. Whatever 
could not be drawn in plan was omitted. (Trancik 1986:12)
Car-mechanics plan their interventions, entrepreneurs plan their risks, 
and families plan the balance between resources, wishes and needs – yet the 
Engineering Union by-laws (which stem from pre the Oslo era) limit decision-
making over the collectively lived space to a handful of persons. While on 16 
December 2013 Austria appointed then 28 years old Sebastian Kurz as its Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Integration; meanwhile, the only authority providing 
urban planning practice rights necessitates that independent planners are at least 
35 years old – assuming one graduates with a Bachelor’s degree in Engineering 
when 23 years old and faces no obstacles in her/his career. This feeds into the 
sixth Marxist ‘moment’, technology, whereby the aforementioned engenders a 
self-reinforcing system of technological-gap (soft and hard). While locationally-
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available, sectorally-diverse, present-day, case-sensitive knowledge in Ramallah 
is comparatively advanced and experimentation of new concepts is popular; 
nonetheless the lack of trust in (fear of competition from-?) the capacities of 
‘start-ups’ is systematically hindering the evolution of channels of cross- and 
multi-disciplinary operation and management. 
RM’s urban planning operations and management approaches are extensions 
of the aforementioned programming failure, as evident in the features of its spatial 
regulation paradigms. Elaborating on the analysis of the impact and dynamics 
of the Master Plan coupled with spatial regulations, the current site-retention 
and height upper and lower limits (Table 4.11, pg. 224) practically translate with 
a formula that provides better sun-exposure and air-circulation environments 
for the rich in comparison to the poor. Beyond the fact that the basic right of 
equal protection to all citizens is violated by such laws, and although engineers 
are mathematicians, physicists, and knowledgeable of dynamics and impacts 
of climatological forces; nonetheless, the planners who set those parameters 
ignore the banal knowledge that larger volumes with narrower retention spaces 
induce compressed wind flows at the ends and through the ‘tunnel effect’. While 
few households might tolerate the slamming doors – by daily western winds 
of the Mediterranean – for the sake of a breeze in the summer, all through the 
year these are currents of street-trash and sometimes harmful projectiles. In the 
same discourse, front retention in Residential-Agricultural areas is specified at a 
minimum of 12 meters, meaning those planning to construct should calculate an 
additional cost of at least 240% more extra meters of infrastructural connections 
to outlets than other residential areas. A safer (social guarding of low-populated 
areas), space-efficient approach (non fragmentation of space), cheaper and more 
environmentally friendly (efficient resource use) would have been to place those 
buildings at a minimum distance from the street.
A distancing of built-up volumes based on principles of resource-efficiency, 
spatial integrity, and socializing the impact of nature e.g. wind, would have 
produced a different numbering, as shown in the example of residential areas 
in Table 4.12, pg. 224. This suggestion (which is neither based on studies 
nor promoted as the best-solution by this work) advocates the creation of 
morphological pockets which would; first, cater for higher levels of contiguity of 
non-built volumes, pedestrian mobility; second, neutralization of accelerating 
currents (wind, stormwater, etc.), and; third, takes into account higher prices 
of square meter of living space and the concomitant increased appreciation 
of public events and spaces, which induces spatial austerity for private-use in 
urban areas. These concepts and their potential employment modes are further 
explored later in this work.
In terms of built-up versus open volumes, under current regulations 70%, 
64%, 58% and 52% of Residential-AA, -A, -B, and -C site volumes respectively are 
not addressed. These antispaces – as Trancik (1986) refers to them – correspond 
to 28.87% of the total city area. As Image 4.47, pg. 229 demonstrates, they are 
predominantly abandoned excavations with load-retention walls reaching 
alarming heights (e.g. 20 meters, Image 2.11, pg. 65). 
Meanwhile, when asked about ‘most negative aspect of Ramallah’ (Diagram 
4.2, pg. 230), an overwhelming majority of almost 70% of participants in Focus 
Groups answered by naming spatial issues, chiefly describing it as ‘overcrowded’ 
and ‘congested’. A glance at Map 4.8, pg. 227 would clarify beyond doubt that 
Ramallah’s density is comparatively (e.g. to Nablus, Hebron, Beirut or Tunis) low 
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Map 4.8. A rough overlap of 
the nolli-plan of the (existing) 
agglomerate with that of the street 
network outlined by RM’s (future)
Master Plan.
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Image 4.44. elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012.
Image 4.45. elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012.
Image 4.46. elMasyoun neighbourhood, October 2013.
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Image 4.48. elTireh neighbourhood, October 2013.
Image 4.47.  elMasyoun neighbourhood, October 2013. Notice 
how the regulatory side-retention spaces – what Trancik (1986) 
would call ‘antispaces’ – are abandoned, lifeless residuals.
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with majority of neighbourhoods featuring sporadically built-up areas or none 
still. Excluding the two historic cores of Ramallah, alBireh and few stretches 
around alManara Square and the Main Street, the agglomerate constitutes 
a provincial distribution of buildings. Nonetheless, feelings of tightness are 
constructed by the reduced space of movement of individuals. The new economy 
and demography of the agglomerate lowered rates of social-visitations; former 
back-paths within neighbourhoods have been eliminated by ever-higher walls and 
mounted spear-headed fences between neighbours; open public spaces remain 
deep below satisfactory rates; alternatives offered by the private sector are costly, 
and; sidewalks have been placed ‘out of service’ by trees which are customarily 
centred on the pedestrian path whose average width is 1.2 meters. 
As explained in section 2.1.3.ii, pg. 60, the Israeli militarization of the 
geography and surveillance policies impeded the expansion of the pedestrian 
network of vertical connections around the concentric rings carved by asphalt 
streets along ridges. Concomitantly, the absence of a coordinated public 
transportation system has exasperated the use of cars on an infrastructure that 
converges at alManara Square and its liminal surroundings. 
For further discouragement, the PA police has made it a duty to chase 
Ramallites who use the city-space in modes that cannot be contained in a 
legal clause. Ramallah’s west-facing ridges are 900-meter-high balconies over 
a breathtaking view of a landscape that dips its feet into a sparkling horizon of 
the Mediterranean, and later the lights of coastal Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Enjoying the 
largest open-air theatre in the agglomerate should be a public right, however, 
the PA police patrolling units are on constant search for friends, lovers and 
meditators who sought change from the walled private spaces; those exploring 
the view from one of the many lots to whom construction and fencing has not 
arrived yet. Reminding of its evolution under and as an element in the colonial 
system, Ramallah is cloning and re-scaling the Zionist strategies of land alienation 
and surveillance. It’s citizens whose mental space shrunk to 22% of the British-
Diagram 4.2. Illustration 
of answers of 74 questionnaires 
to ‘most negative aspect of 
Ramallah’.
Israel
4 %
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Newcomers / social diversity
Social polarization, intolerance & loss of traditions
Economic
16 %
Unemployment
Capitalism / consumerism / individualism
Poverty & economic discrepancy
Spatial
69 %
Insufficient infrastructure & transportation systems
Lack of open spaces & activities
Overcrowded, pollution & traffic congestions
Lack of organization / order / chaos
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imagined size and shape of Palestine and down-scaled further to the OAs cantons 
starting in 2000, they are now being chased throughout the city-scape by agents 
of ‘law and order’ and pushed into discontinuous pockets.
According to the Master Plan of Ramallah, 28.9% of the city’s area has been 
reduced to deregulated retention, 22.4% dedicated to vehicle-roads, 0.6% to open 
public spaces, a mere 0.3% to pedestrian networks, and while the majority of the 
city-space has not been developed still the police apparatus bans citizens from 
interim, passive use; or what in the case of Berlin was called Zwischennutzungen 
(elaborated in the following section). 
Under the same discourse RM prides itself for the design and execution of 
about a dozen ‘squares’ around the city. As Image 4.23, pg. 213 demonstrates, in 
reality these are lifeless traffic roundabouts whose characteristics are antithetic to 
those of public squares, where people congregate and engage with the space and 
one another. 
In 2013 Copenhagen earned the title of the ‘World’s Most Livable City’. One 
of its lead-planners Jan Gehl describes the dramatic shift in the friendliness of the 
city-space as unexpected, where ‘nobody had believed such events were possible’ 
(2011:50) in the once automobile-dominated city. While Gehl advocates the 
concept of ‘cities for people not cars’ through various concepts of enabling healthy 
living between buildings; former Mayor of Bogotá and President of the Board of 
Directors of the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, Enrique 
Peñalosa underlines that mobility networks are expressions of democracy or its 
absence. Pointing at images of extensive asphalt-paved vehicle roads and their 
narrow, unpaved, assumed-pedestrian, liminal shoulders while speaking of his 
experience, Peñalosa states:
We fought not just for space for buses, but we fought for space for people, and 
that was even more difficult. [...] Here, what you see is a picture that shows 
insufficient democracy. What this shows is that people who walk are third-
class citizens while those who go in cars are first-class citizens. In terms of 
transport infrastructure, what really makes a difference between advanced and 
backward cities is not highways or subways but quality sidewalks. Here they 
made a flyover, probably very useless, and they forgot to make a sidewalk. This 
is prevailing all over the world. Not even schoolchildren are more important 
than cars. (Peñalosa 2013)
In light of the aforementioned, feelings of overcrowdedness in Ramallah 
are a result of the Modern Movement which regards city-space as a static object 
that could and should be tamed, categorized, and given definitive utilizations. 
Under such planning approaches, ‘mobility’ in the neoliberal ethos is limited 
to its technical dimension of getting from point A to B regardless of the quality 
of the journey (Trancik 1986). It conceives Ramallites as a society of distinct 
homogeneous classes, where the ones whose satisfaction is sought are the 
few of the coterie rather than the masses of proletariat. Regulations curtail the 
involvement of the informed quotidian residents and trap technical engineers 
into a mission of predetermined failure. Rassem Khamaisi has a record of 
success, however the continued deterioration in Ramallah’s living environment 
over a time-lapse in which he has prepared three proposals and designs (first one 
submitted May 1998) is an accumulating evidence that neither the produce nor its 
maker are compatible for the goal.  
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Ramallah’s fame as the masyaf (summer residence) was attributed to its 
pleasant climate and flâneur, and up to date it forms a reiterating argument by 
RM which periodically highlights tourism potentials as central to official spatial 
policy. Nevertheless the city’s landscape is becoming increasingly discontinuous, 
obstructed with high walls and deep excavations; and the omnipresent 
panopticon-surveillance of the street network is discouraging to engage with the 
city-space, hence familiarization with the ‘other’ (section 3.2, pg. 132). Herein, the 
municipality seems to undermine the relationship between crowds of tourists, 
their spending into local economy, and their ability to enjoy the walk and making 
several stops between their destinations.
When asked about the significance of the city-centre to them, participants 
of focus groups aged 35 years and older described the triangle composed of 
alManara Square, the Main Street and the Mughtaribeen Square (Arabic for 
‘expatriates’, recently re-named into Yasser Arafat Square) as their frequent and 
Mecca-style pilgrimage course, of lingering and socialization as youth. However, 
today it has been reduced to an unattractive services centre visited when 
alternatives secede. Younger generations (who predominantly do not own a car, 
yet) described it as an unpleasant transit connection, a narrow stretch of abuse 
for the economically underprivileged masses and those whose livelihoods are 
earned within the vicinity. The alienation of the city’s heart from the mentalities 
of its residents as a common, and the lack of substitutes hinders the establishment 
of relational solidarities. 
Underlining today’s dynamics of post- (continuing) crisis of neoliberalism, 
the rise of cities as independent decision-makers, and the technical breakthrough 
of cyber-operation and -collaboration. Inderpaul Johar notes in a piece on the 
changing tools, roles and forms of planning, architecture and civic economy – as 
substitutes for ‘popular capitalism’ – by writing:
This is a future focused on ‘more operational ingenuity, less three-dimensional 
ingenuity, and more social structure’, to quote Cedric Price. This future is not 
for the proponents of ‘committees’ and decision-making power brokers, but 
[...] where social validation is an integral part of every step of the process: 
conception, investment, execution, and governance – not only of the decision 
making. This is a future driven by the rapid and liquid democratisation of 
the means of production [... and] consumption. [...] This is a future in which 
architecture and our role as designers are changing; we are being invited to 
be protagonists, to be the change-makers and the propositioners. This is a 
future where we must become the makers of platforms – not the designers of 
containers for corporations. (Johar 2014:204)
Among others in Ramallah, the urbanist, curator and architect Yazid Anani 
is embodying this contemporary approach to the practice, where he reduced 
detailed design to the minimum while dedicating the larger segments of his time 
to researching, curating, education and public-debate. Anani enabled by and 
along with a handful of self-motivated colleagues and comrades are stimulating 
new perspectives and conceptions for Ramallah’s space, whose evolution is 
dependent on the ability to co-opt existing power and policy-making structures. 
While the coming section will elaborate on contemporary global approaches to 
urban policies; here it should be noted that the variety of socio-economic ethos 
and capabilities of Ramallites compose a potential for alternative forms of spatial 
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utilization and organic economic production that are worth investigation. Against 
the ‘backdrop of crisis and austerity’, the new formations, re-adaptation, and re-
orientation of ‘approaches to spatial design’ are bound to ‘disrupt the ‘normal’ 
logic of development; seeking to rewrite the standard urban scripts pertaining to 
property, credit, labour, and housing’, hence tools and organisational structures of 
decision-making, property forms and ownership, and what constitutes legitimate 
resources and modes of their employment (Tonkiss 2014:165). 
Starting in 2007 the ‘dual crisis – of property and credit – has shown the 
extent to which ‘normal’ urban development processes have been financed 
by debt all along the speculative chain: from sub-prime mortgage lenders to 
insolvent developers, bad banks, and overleveraged governments’ (ibid). For 
Ramallites, the financial crisis that commenced in 2011 can be traced on its streets 
– dozens of either semi- or completely finished apartment-buildings pending 
tenant and buyers. An experienced civil engineer indicated in October 2013 that 
although the high demand for apartments in Ramallah persists, nonetheless 
there are about 1,000 empty units whose construction came as a result of the 
wide-spread speculation on real estate; a phenomenon that echoes too many 
places around the world. 
The site construction regulations – namely, parcelling laws which identify 
minimum values for length of front façades and plot area – distributes investors 
into distinctly segregate and imbalanced categories, wherein the minimum 
baseline-investment (size and hence value of land) in areas categorized as ‘A’ or 
‘AA’ is too high for middle income families (51.6% of total housing areas). Similarly 
and given the current land values which average around US$ 100 per square 
meter of land in Ramallah, those desiring to live in Residential-Agricultural areas 
must own or purchase a property of at least 5,000 square meters, hence US$ 0.5 
million in land value only. This category constitutes 11.8% of the total area of the 
city, and 20.7% of the total residential areas. In comparison, areas categorized as 
Residential-B and -C are 22.7% and 5.0% of the total residential areas, respectively 
(Table 4.2, pg. 195). That said, the current system (whose accreditation lies in the 
hands of the municipality but the responsibility is shared across the planning 
community) in effect places more than two thirds of the areas designated for 
residential purposes (41% of total city-space) effectively beyond the reach of 
middle and lower classes of Ramallites.
The current morphological dichotomy of either suburban spacings or 
discontinuous rows of crowded matchboxes is evidence that the variety of 
circulating citizens and their needs is not equalled in legal construction parameters. 
Change of minimum site-area and facade length criteria is necessary – but not 
sufficient – for achieving higher levels of social justice, access to the land resource, 
improved living conditions, and would give rise to more individualized, carefully-
calculated, need-based purchases, and designs. This process of re-imagination of 
shapes and four-dimensional characteristics of components of the city landscape 
necessitates the rescaling of Master Plans to their real size, from being ‘spatial 
solutions’ to constituting a piece of the much larger puzzle. Regardless of the 
adopted approaches and employed concepts, a review of Ramallah’s morphology 
is a prerequisite for generating rhythm, harmony, and environmental resilience 
to built-up and free-space volumes (as elaborated in section 2.1.3.iii, pg. 65). 
Here and to bring this chapter to a close, the coming few pages frame Ramallah’s 
official urban development practices in relation to global ones, and therewith the 
contemporary discussions and concepts being debated in the field.
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4.4.2.   Resilience and Urban Commons as 
Anti-venoms to Policy-Mobility?
If we talk about governmental procedures and measures one feels as if there is a 
catalogue and people are trying to follow instructions, the only problem is that 
the catalogue is for a different kind of device that the one we are trying to run 
and nobody is noticing that problematic. There is a clear case of antagonism 
and conflict between the surgery and the case of the patient, but the operation 
is still going further without anyone screaming ‘stop!’. (As’ad 2010)
Tools and strategies of urban design and planning principles are 
continuously evolving, gaining and losing importance in response to changing 
modes of economic production, social norms and political priorities. In the 
aftermath of the suburbanization surge in preceding decades, many communities 
of the 1980s (whose memories of cities as loci of urbicide were faint and ethos of 
bon vivre intense) raised the battle-flags of urban regeneration to reinstate the 
city as space for dignified living. These ultimately fuelled existing engines of 
sociospatial exclusion giving rise to the widely researched term ‘gentrification’ 
(Smith 2002). In this period Ramallah’s socio-politics of austerity and its 
colonial isolation from the global impeded its participation. The 1990s era which 
laboured the OAs was that of ‘participatory’ and ‘developmental’ planning in 
which societies (including Ramallah’s citizens and municipality) enacted their 
reductionist convictions of the need to ‘de-underdevelop’ oneself (Escobar 
2012), hence feeding into oriental, colonial and neoliberal approaches of mass-
treatments under persistent imperial imaginaries and politics of ‘infantilization’ 
(Harvey 2009). By the turn of the millennium ‘sustainability’, ‘good governance’, 
‘decentralisation’ and ‘participation’ became the key words and universal answers 
to accumulating perils of corruption, disenfranchisement and globalization. 
This phase featured accentuating urban-power and acceleration of processes of 
detachment from the ‘national’ (Sassen 2003; Appadurai 2008; Ferguson 2009). 
In this 2010s phase where economic – hence political – strategies continue to 
progressively down-scale from the national to the locational; vulnerability to 
components of the – still relevant macro and increasingly complex micro – 
ecology are advocating ‘resilience’ as the panacea for financial dependencies, 
environmental impacts of climate change, and ideological otherness, exclusion, 
and ultimately radicalism. 
While the trend indicates that by the turn of this decade a new set of 
terminology and tools will evolve and assume lead in operations, Ramallah’s 
presence in the caravan of globalized translocalities yields participation in its 
activities. Exemplary, Ramallah is part of the ‘100 Resilient Cities’ program of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, where Byblos (Lebanon) and Ashkelon (Israel) are 
the only other cities from the region among the selected league of 32 from nearly 
400 applications. Expectedly yet still disappointingly, its profile has been hitherto 
focused on technical infrastructures of storm water. The ‘moments’ of causality 
of the infrastructure that are to be found in the ecology (social-economic-spatial) 
breeding and governing it nonetheless are not named as priorities. There is 
little doubt that engagement in a scholarly activity of such a scale will produce 
new knowledge hence adding a dimension to the scope of those involved in the 
planning scene in Ramallah. However, the SDP, RABMA, Amanet Ramallah, 
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recently the RDPF and many others are proposals that have and are being 
developed through varying initiatives and stakeholders are also pending answers 
to the same questions: Why does it matter? and Then what?  
This calls back Escobar’s argumentation (2012; see section 3.1.2, pg. 118) that 
although neoliberalism has received a significant gust, it remains the governing 
ideology, structure and overall system. Since 2007 the anathema of banking 
systems and neoliberal corporations whose greed has triggered this modern 
tragedy of shattered livelihoods has become a global prayer. Nonetheless, 
austerity measures composed of cuts into rights and securities of average 
citizens are expanding while the financial coterie continue their operations 
uninterrupted. In Ramallah, the bearers of the PA’s financial mal-planning 
and crisis are the lowest tiers of civil servants e.g. municipal staff. Meanwhile, 
international organizations whose mechanisms have hijacked the development 
process remain in operation employing NGO-ized modes of production of 
‘specific targets’, standard procedures and ‘check-boxes’. Starting in January 2014 
and over three years the ‘100 Resilient Cities’ program in which Ramallah is 
taking part will enable cities:
to better address the increasing shocks and stresses of the 21st century [... 
wherein they] receive technical support and resources to improve their urban 
resilience over three years. In addition to membership in the newly formed 
100 Resilient Cities Network, the selected cities will receive support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to create and implement a resilience plan and to hire a 
Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) to oversee the resilience strategy. The first class 
of 32 cities was announced on December 3, 2013, selected by judges with unique 
expertise on tools and strategies that make a city better prepared to face natural 
and manmade disaster. (Rockefeller Foundation 2014; emphasis added)
Akin the RDPF, up to date there is no available information about the 
details of the project from RM, and local observers know about this happening 
are few. Items available on the official website of the program constitute – at 
best – a medium-sized library of scholarly and blog opinions on the topic of 
urban resilience. Unintelligently echoing Lauchlin Currie’s approach of the 
knowledgeable-givers, yearning-receivers, and the end-form product, the 
program named five ‘pillars’ for resilience:
• Constant Learning: The ability to internalize past experiences linked with 
robust feedback loops that sense, provide foresight, and allow new solutions.
• Rapid Rebound: The capacity to re-establish function, re-organize, and 
avoid long-term disruptions.
• Limited or ‘Safe’ Failure: Prevents failures from rippling across systems.
• Flexibility: The ability to change, evolve, and adapt to alternative strategies 
in the face of disaster.
• Spare Capacity: Ensures that there is a back-up or alternative available when 
a vital component of a system fails. (Rockefeller Foundation 2014a)
Under each of these pillars few dozens of short pieces on experiences of 
some cities can be found. Embodying the anaemic, philanthropist neoliberal 
attempts to tame urbanisms, the available information features neither the 
concept of ‘integrity of strategy and urban ecology’ nor that of ‘civic equality’ 
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or synonyms among keywords, menus and subtitles. Combined with the 
wording of identified pillars, a silhouette of a corporal risk management strategy 
emerges whose essence is containment of events rather than preventing them 
via treatment of the source. Through expounding the leading global initiatives 
on urban resilience, Evans argues that the neoliberalisation of resilience is 
calculable, where: 
[T]here is a clear political ecology to resilience. Transformed from an ecological 
theory into a socio-ecological governance framework in some 20 years, it 
constitutes a pseudo-scientific policy discourse that (wittingly and unwittingly) 
exerts considerable power over how things should be done. For example, in 
presenting us with a world in constant flux, where periodic crisis and change 
are inevitable, it accepts change somewhat passively. Rather than question the 
all too-human causes of crises (whether of the climatic or economic variety), 
resilience emphasises the need for individuals, communities or cities to simply 
get on with adapting to them. This tendency to naturalise crises resonates with 
neoliberal discourses of capitalism, which preclude political debate concerning 
the wider causes and desirability of change. (Evans 2010:224)
Neoliberalisation of professional practices – including municipal policies – 
in Ramallah is provisioned through the political discourses on the varying levels. 
The strategy of normalization of crisis – rather than eliminating its causes – 
constitutes the spine of Zionist ethnocratic systems which continue to dominate 
operations on both sides of the Armistice Line as showcased in preceding chapters. 
The trickle-down effect nurtured a PA that suffices with pointing the obvious 
blame over shortcomings – irrespective of nature – on Israeli colonialism; falling 
short of pursuing alternative solutions, and sentencing change to an imaginary 
waiting room, until a sovereign and independent Palestinian state is established.
RM’s overall choices of strategies and projects brings forth the increasingly 
discussed ‘policy mobility’. It promotes its generic ‘profile projects’ (e.g. National 
Exhibition Centre, Stadium) as building-blocks of ‘distinctive aspects’ which 
are necessary for ‘transforming the city into an attractive city for investment’ 
(Ramallah Municipality 2008:24). The policies and marketing rhetoric 
discussed through this chapter reflect eagerness for joining the ‘pop-culture’ 
of uncalculated Guggenheim-experiences, at a time Valencia is staring from 
the other side of the Mediterranean with its deserted America’s Cup sailing-
harbour, it’s underused Convention & Exhibition Centre – Feria Valencia, and 
the lavish Calatrava-landia25 – City of Arts and Sciences complex – whose 
maintenance costs exceed revenues by scores. The disintegrating Seville-Expo 
pavilions, the desolate Amman Expo Centre, and the controversial London’s 
Olympic complex are few of hundreds of constructions that were inspired by the 
aforementioned ‘standardization’ and ‘check-box’ discourses, where marketing 
of international cities is reduced to monumental architecture and mega events; 
rather than existent engines of differentiated economic competitiveness, and the 
attractiveness harnessed by virtue of a cosmopolitanism enabled by civic rights 
and accountability (Colomb 2012; Escobar 2012). For Lefebvre monumental 
architecture is a tool for enforcing a collective identity that citizens might not feel 
so attached to after all, where such projects ‘bestow a cohesiveness it utterly lacks 
upon a totality which is in fact decidedly open – so open, indeed, that it must rely 
on violence to endure’ (2009:11).
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While it is effortless to attribute this typical example of policy-mobility to 
ingenuity and globalization; in reality these processes are engendered through the 
many tentacles of neoliberalism which has succeeded in penetrating all mundane 
aspects of living and the making of lived space. Herein ‘professionalization’ 
has conceived ‘subdisciplines’ e.g. ‘development studies’ which tackle ‘the new 
problems which the discourse has constructed’ as definite sets with prescription 
treatments (Martin 1998:45). Through elaborate capacity building programs 
higher education institutions in countries of the Global South have been 
reorganized to the intellect of World Bank missions, while scholars from these 
geographies are socialized ‘in the West into the developmentalist paradigm’ (ibid); 
as formerly discussed in section 3.1.2, pg. 118. 
Through revision of a wide range of relevant scholarship Colomb (2012) 
summarizes criticism of aforementioned neoliberal city-development and 
-marketing policies in five:
First, eclectic commodification and sanitization of some local expressions 
of identity(s) and history(s), causing the loss of authenticity, outright 
displacement of the disenfranchised, and the suppression of socio-historical 
characteristics that are deemed ‘undesirable’; E.g. starting February 2013 the 
municipalities of Ramallah, alBireh and Beitunya, the Governorate, Police 
and Trade Chamber launched the ‘Our Country is an Image of Ourselves’ 
campaign, which primarily sought to erase the presence of the vernacular 
street vendors, whose operations were deemed as ‘crowding’ of side-walks 
and posing a threat to public health as quality is not institutionally controlled 
– in spite of increasing economic disparities and acute lack of social securities.
Second, articulation of ‘city vision’ – hence order of prioritization of particular 
economic domains and spatial characteristics – is typically conducted by few 
affluent stakeholders while public involvement is either marginal or absent. 
Therein, marketing projects and activities remain restricted to public-private 
partnerships which are exclusive in nature and lack transparency; E.g. the 
RM Centennial Projects (section 4.3.3, pg. 203) were centrally designed 
and announced as a package with no deliberation with neither nonpartisan 
professionals nor the public.
Third, impacts of these kinds of activities are socially and geographically uneven, 
concentrating investments in certain sites – and gains to exclusive parties 
– rather than equitable and balanced distribution throughout city-space 
and social strata. For example, at the time pressure on pedestrian mobility 
has reached alarming levels in built-up areas, heavy investments are wasted 
in opening streets in liminal uninhabited areas in place of re-designing an 
ameliorating the basic space. What Image 4.7, pg. 210 demonstrates is an 
activity of inflating property value speculation, rather than controlling it to 
affordable and economically healthy levels.
Fourth, such policies and activities are mainly ‘geared’ to external parties whether 
investors, tourists or certain groups of prospective residents. Along the 
process local communities are homogenized through imagined ‘collective’ 
identities that are in effect globalized and ‘place-less’, while claiming a 
socialization of benefit that neither materializes nor produces long-term 
solidarities. In this respect, Ramallah provides many exhibits through the 
afore-discussed spacio-economic segregation mentalities, the logic of 
residential zoning of Ramallah, and the following chapter which elaborates 
on the undertakings of the private real estate sector.
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And Fifth, neoliberal place-marketing policies are ‘highly inefficient and 
speculative’ in nature whereby paradigms endanger and too-often erase 
endemic ‘monopoly advantages’ that evolve through place-sensitive 
urban entrepreneurialism. These policies replicate urban development 
undertakings that homogenize urban landscapes, thereof reducing 
competitiveness and attractiveness (Colomb 2012:22).
While RM’s quest for international positioning continues along the 
aforementioned tracks unhindered, Evans (2010) emphasises the quintessence of 
integrated social-ecological systems to emerging futuristic forms of governance 
and claims of resilience. Here Francesca Ferguson argues that accentuation in 
perceptions and management of cities ‘as enterprises for economic growth, creative 
entrepreneurship, and competitiveness’ constitutes a ‘strategic turn’ in hierarchies 
and tools of governance; where success in converting ‘public responsibility’ into 
an ‘economic ally’ necessitates ‘making social engagement profitable’ (2014:14,16). 
Citing a number of interventions in European cities, she showcases that premature 
gratification strategies can channel civic participation into following profit-
driven logic of investors, hence engendering ‘more persuasive, lasting claims’ to 
experimental urban disruptions. 
Coined by Katherine Shonfield, premature gratification describes activities 
which are propositional, locational, seek long-term consequences while 
constituting ‘brief disobedience’ undertakings as ‘means to advance proposals 
in advance of advancing proposals’ (Thomas 2014:150). For Ferguson (2014) 
urban interventions of this nature are platforms for the urgent renegotiations of 
resource-allocation, social and political principles in spaces that are both real and 
symbolic. While the former is acquired from their interactive characteristics, the 
latter radiates from their success (or failure) in forging new solidarities amongst 
the variety of ethos occupying the particular micro-space. In some respects, these 
concepts echo Trancik’s (1986) advocacy of producing ‘figurative space’ out of the 
‘lost landscape’ through an urban design attitude of urbanism as connections. 
In her argumentation Ferguson elaborates on the concept of gemeinschaffen, 
or ‘commoning’, as a process emerging from conditions of exasperated 
precariousness, insecurity, and scarcity. Here Harvey (2013) points out that this 
term is a descendent from a ‘history of arguments and debates concerning the 
creation and utilization of common property resources’ where it:
[...] reflects the seemingly profound impacts of the recent wave of privatizations, 
enclosures, spatial controls, policing, and surveillance upon the qualities of urban 
life in general, and in particular upon the potentiality to build or inhibit new 
forms of social relations (a new commons) within an urban process influenced if 
not dominated by capitalist class interests. (Harvey 2013:67)
While urban commons are often presented by leftists as nonhierarchical; 
Harvey points out that ‘collective organization of small-scale solidarity economies 
along common-property lines’ under larger scales requires coordination, hence 
hierarchy (ibid:70). Herewith, the binary of either state or market monopoly 
is also dismantled through the ‘scale problem’ where ‘what looks like a good 
way to resolve problems at one scale does not hold at another’ (ibid:69). While 
mixtures of economic public and private instruments are the systematic spaces 
in which commons could arise, these are a two-edged sword that can serve in 
either direction; inclusion (community urban garden) as well as exclusion (gated 
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rich communities), liberal or radical. Ultimately, commons are laboured through 
social practices and political action by citizens who have to decide ‘whose side 
are you on, whose common interests do you seek to protect, and by what means?’ 
(Ibid:71). Here Harvey also highlights that the rise of commoning as alternative is 
a Cartesian product of the scarcity of public goods orchestrated by neoliberalism. 
Activities of commons could be seen as appropriation of responsibility, as 
decentralization, privatization, hence capitalism at its lowest scales. So how 
effective are insurgent urban commons as antivenoms to disenfranchisement?
Unfortunately the idea of the commons (like the right to the city) is just as easily 
appropriated by existing political power as is the value to be extracted from an 
actual urban common by real estate interests. (Harvey 2013:87)
Contemporary urban experiments on commons should not claim the 
creation of a new discourse of negotiation with the larger city space; for like 
globalization is historically traceable in internationalisation and trade, urban 
commons are rooted in centuries of social practice and fluid civic economies. 
Therein, the problematic does not lie in the presence or absence of commons; 
rather, in the unbalanced channelling of the produce between capital holders 
and its labourers. The social creation of support alternatives to public services in 
some sense invokes the Marxist notion of ownership as ‘vested in the collective 
labourers producing for the common good’ (ibid:77). Here he explains:
While this idea sounds outrageous, it lay behind the Swedish Meidner plan proposed 
in the late 1960s. The receipts from a tax placed on corporate profits, in turn for 
wage restraint on the part of unions, were to be placed in a worker-controlled fund 
that would invest in and eventually buy out the corporation, thus bringing it under 
the common control of the associated laborers. Capital resisted this idea with all its 
might, and it was never implemented. But the idea ought to be reconsidered. The 
central conclusion is that the collective laboring that is now productive of value must 
ground collective not individual property rights. (Harvey 2013:77) 
The mutated separation of the soft and hard infrastructure management 
and planning systems under the PA has resulted in spatial policies (and therewith 
practices of developers) that further disenfranchise a growing urban poor on one 
hand, and exasperated the inefficient use and destruction of expensive resources; 
particularly land and the city’s marketing engines of attractive environment and 
ethos (drivers of speculation and investment). Climate change is translating 
(a.o.) with rise in global temperatures and – without doubt – the circulation of 
more (liquid) water at a still (if ever) shaping rhythm (frequency and volume 
of storm-water in the varying areas of the earth). Unless the city has a desire to 
undermine itself, it is time that both official and private practitioners pay more 
attention to micro and macro morphological features and systems, particularly 
those concerned with; first, heating vs. cooling (e.g. wide asphalt roads or narrow 
shaded passages), and; second, storm-water canalization vs. absorption (e.g. 
integration of different scales of channels and wells into city’s private and public 
infrastructures). Up to date Ramallah continues to exhibit Harvey’s argument that 
‘capitalist urbanization perpetually tends to destroy the city as a social, political 
and livable commons’ (Harvey 2013:80). The dynamics of the quartet of the PA, 
foreign donors, Israel and private investors (as aforementioned and elaborated 
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further in the coming chapter) is structurally incapable of driving the much 
needed morphological change. What about paradigms of urban commons?
Investigating the strategies and politics of urban reinvention in Berlin since 
the German reunification, Colomb (2012a) highlights the significant role of the 
policy of Zwischennutzung (interim-, temporary- use) in enhancing attractiveness 
as well as living conditions in several neighbourhoods. She found the main 
actors to be non-institutionally motivated Berliners who could be categorized 
under start-ups where persons seek innovation and economic advancement; 
part-time activists seeking to enrich their lives; migrants searching for methods 
of employment and social integration; drop-outs who constitute institutional 
outcasts and are rejected in common spaces, and; system refugees which are 
persons or groups creating an ideologically-motivated ‘alternative universe’ 
(ibid:136). Under this framework, about a hundred initiatives were (sometimes 
retrospectively) granted permission to establish temporary uses of otherwise-
abandoned sites with minimal regulatory conditions. The novelty of the 
unintended policy – which evolved from the squatting ideology and over a period 
of time – lies in having activated otherwise marginalized actors (therein enabling 
public satisfaction and reduction of unemployment) to produce neighbourhood-
based services (relevant to varying spacio-social needs). This system manoeuvres 
around exclusive property prices while politics lingers on addressing the topic, 
and it reduces intensity of demands on municipal offices without additional public 
expenditure. While this strategy has its vulnerabilities (e.g. can be liquidated by 
property owner), it has demonstrated considerable ability to induce a constructive 
negotiation in appropriate scales.
Organized experiments and informal cases of urban commons in the 
twenty-first century invoke Anderson’s (2006) theories on the dismantling of 
the national-gemeinschaft in favour of localized solidarities, such as the sub-
Ramallite sensibilities traced by Taraki (2008, 2008a) and Abourahme (2009, 
2011) among others. Combined with Lefebvre’s (2009) postulates on the necessity 
of spatial articulation for social movements to sustain, persuade and evolve on 
one hand, and on the other the centrality of socio-economic needs to discourses 
of production of space; it can be concluded that the ecology of Ramallah is 
ripe grounds for what Brugmann (2009) would call an ‘urban revolution’ that 
materializes the articulated contention of the polemic OAs legacy. 
While it is still to be witnessed whether ‘urban commons’ are able to sustain 
longer than precedent policies; Ramallite variations of ‘urban commoning’ could 
serve as catalysts for reinstating a shared sense of purpose, a new breed of sumud 
that spatially transcribes democratic engagement. Essential to this processes is 
the reconfiguration of the system, whereby up to date urban planning education 
and practice is provisioned through the study of architecture at a time ‘It takes 
more than good architects and landscape architects to create good cities’ (Trancik 
1986:20). Johar argues that ‘this is a future’ of knowledge-based creativity, 
puzzling, and innovative crafting beyond rigid disciplinary boundaries; where:
This is a future in which we must address the challenges and responsibility of 
soft power – architects and all those who practise this architecture we will need 
to rediscover the essence of ‘professionalism’ [...] towards the public value of 
welfaregood [sic]. This is a future of design and architecture that is both open 
and data-driven – which are becoming iterative, and curative, and micro-
evolving continuously to optimise their performative impact. This is a future 
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where we are invited to be craftsmen and craftswomen, not designers from a 
distance; where we are invited to continuously evoke, discover, and curate [...]. 
(Johar 2014:204-205)
The curation that urbanists today are requested to perform will not stop 
global urban policy mobility, and in the case of Palestinian official planning 
bodies, neither their inferiority in face of Israel’s fragmentation and containment 
strategies. However, successful curation means taming them. The unfolding 
technologies since the popularization of the digital world akin former ones are 
inducing an economic shift by which for the first time natural, tangible, and 
mobile resources are not an absolute requirement for economic production. This 
financial system is part of the larger urban ecology in which the individual is 
mobilized for discussing his/her role in (micro) city-formation; voicing relational 
claims of space and ethos. How protest urbanisms operate in a digital ecology is 
fresh grounds for scholarship of spacio-behaviour and tactic, nonetheless, ‘there 
are abundant signs in the urban social movements occurring around the world 
that there are plenty of people and a critical mass of political energy available to do 
it’ (Harvey 2013:88). Meanwhile and taking the larger perspective, contemporary 
history evidences that a city’s ability to be and remain successful (attractive and 
dignified living conditions) is conditioned by its competences in re-adapting to 
changing politico-economic orders as they unfold. 
That said, Ramallah’s future will be largely shaped by the ability of the 
municipality to grasp the new circumstance, namely five; first, its limited 
infrastructures and resources; second, its structurally fragmented and outdated 
nature of operation; third, the current spacio-political relations as the state-
making project is declared clinically-dead, and features of a more acute system 
of apartheid are looming; fourth, the shifting socio-economic priorities of its 
residents with the shrinking of public-provisioned services, higher diversity and 
lower social hierarchy, and heightened otherness and contestation, and; fifth, its 
ability to understand,  negotiate and process contemporary debates and variables 
of city discourse and changing roles of urbanists are all essential factors for its 
sustenance as an attractive district within the Jerusalem metropolitan area.
In light of the discussions of this chapter, it is trivial to conclude that the 
bulk of physical change in Ramallah was and is being created by – relatively free-
handed– private actors. There are countless small- and medium-scale developers 
and investors whose projects are chiefly (one after and/or next to the other) singular 
apartment buildings whose accumulative impact on the city-space is dramatic. Yet 
as the operation of these can be re-oriented through systematic planning reform 
– which is not per se the interest of this work – the coming chapter will be limited 
to projects that are conceived and executed by influential real estate corporations 
whom are genealogically reliant on innovation, hence co-optable.
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5  | REAL-ESTATE 
CORPORATIONS AND 
URBAN LANDSCAPES 
OF RAMALLAH
As indicated in the previous section, the emerging patterns and physical 
forms of spatial development in Ramallah were led by private initiatives. A fast 
play of the past twenty years reveals three main – and tangibly phased – urban 
development typologies. The first phase spanned from 1993 until 2003, where 
the predominant pattern was that of mushrooming amorphous matchbox-
shaped multi-story apartment buildings. It was a period of significant population 
growth where fast solutions were necessary; the existing shortage in housing 
units produced over four decades of Israeli COGAT rule was deepened upon 
the seating of the PA in the city, the rejoinder of the returnees, and the influx 
of international offices and NGOs. Pressure was furthered when PA-institutions 
– thence employees – were centralised in Ramallah with the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada at the end of 2000 (see Chapter 2). In spite of the construction 
boom the dominant social discourse was still fixated on austerity rather than 
luxury-oriented mode of life, rendering exterior features of secondary relevance 
even to the architect who most probably wished for looser budgets. This shape 
of neighbourhoods was neither erudite nor intentionally solicited; yet social 
articulation of claims regarding spatial preferences and quasi-normalcy arrived 
only later. Further evidence is exampled in the uniformity of form between 
urban and rural spheres, whereby in the early post-Oslo years the majority of 
construction was conducted by tenants of Ramallah’s surrounding villages and 
towns whom have long standings of wealth accumulated through emigration and 
business in – mainly but not solely – the USA. As Anani notes:
Ramallah was created through a village mentality, and the architecture we have 
today is a reflection of this reality. Upon Oslo many people from the villages 
moved to the city and invested their assets in our main industry: construction. 
For a long time I was wondering why are people constructing in villages using 
the same pattern present in Ramallah, until I looked at it from a different angle, 
and the opposite is the reality. The architecture of Ramallah is just starting 
to change due to increased exposure and mingling with the international 
markets and communities. They are just starting to discover that by using 
some beautification elements the financial gain would be much higher than the 
traditional ground floor of stores and then repetitive apartment floors. This is 
like any process is demand-led by companies who are also just starting to realize 
that the shape of their headquarters is a reflection of them as well, and also to a 
lesser extent led by the city’s demand to compete globally. (Anani 2010)
Indeed, by 2005/2006 the second phase was institutionally grounded and 
confident of showing face as the culture of leisure and capital accumulation had 
found a footing and was bound to expand. With a solid neoliberal economic 
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system in place1, by 2008 Ramallah put on its long-fantasised cocktail dress to 
attend the all-American ball taking place on its own grounds. It was time for 
monumental governmental buildings of the strong (non-)state (Image 4.31, 
Image 4.32, p. 215); iconic office towers for the companies whose values mount 
to millions of dollars (Image 4.26, Image 4.28, p. 214); exclusive leisure spaces and 
fancy service possibilities for the bustling crowds (Image 4.27); and last but not 
least, peaceful suburban complexes of detached houses with the fence, lawn, and 
pet that are enabled by an easily obtainable bank credit (Image 4.33, Image 4.34, p. 
215). While apartment buildings continued to mushroom and be occupied (Image 
4.38 - Image 4.43, p. 218), by this point in time architectural attractiveness was a 
requirement for accommodating the clearly articulated desires of the emerging 
‘new middle class’ as Taraki refers to it (2008, 2008a, Abourahme 2009, Anani 
2010, Shaheen 2012). In turn, this mentality and mode of expenditure gave further 
impetus and momentum to the growing real estate corporations.
The third and last phase commenced soon after the second, around 
2008/2009 resulting in yet again different typologies that could be described as in-
vitro cloned satellite townships. Here real estate development is driven by a coterie 
of Palestinian heavyweight financial players who understood the limitations 
and bureaucracy governing the Ramallah area and the shortcomings of local 
institutions in responding to growth pace and pressures. They also foresaw what 
they consider a non-utilised potential for investment. This phase is a derivative 
of the second and a reinterpretation of the first. The named clientele remains the 
coined ‘middle class’. Yet in order to achieve financial targets, these mass projects 
could not take place within or close to built-up areas due to the aforementioned 
bureaucracy and institutional limitations, as well as the established urban 
regulations, restrictions, and the inflated land values, among other factors. 
Thus, bidders chose to construct beyond, in the only direction allowed by the 
Israeli colonial infrastructure – locations of settlements, military bases, C-Areas 
– that being northwards. This move is conditioned by speculations of Ramallah 
remaining attractive for Palestinian internal relocation and continued horizontal 
northward expansion. Examples are presented in this chapter.
Following the entrenchment of geographic fragmentation and 
incarceration of Palestinian population mentally and physically in cantons; the 
second main impact of the OAs has been the creation and entrenchment of a 
coterie whose interests are not hindered by the continuation of the colonial 
project, as Fanon’s (2004, 2008) theories of (post-)colonialism stipulate. 
Besides the tangible socioeconomic stratification resulting from the presence 
and practices of this clique, those involved in real estate and public spaces 
have been at the forefront of forging new urban forms in the Ramallah region. 
The coming pages hence map the most notable actors of this voluntary 
sector; namely, the principal four companies and corporations involved in the 
transmogrification of the urbanity of Ramallah. Therein, their visions, heavy 
operations and respective projects are discussed. 
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5.1.   RAMALLAH’S MOST 
AFFLUENT VISIONARIES
The phenomenon of large and transregional real-estate corporations is not 
new, it was born with the first colonialists. Like any organism, it requires agents 
for its motors to operate. Until the 1980s the maximalist Zionists were focused 
on inducing Palestinian emigration, a point at which their infrastructure had 
reached maturity and their state-affairs became stable with the signature of the 
Camp David treaty with Egypt in 1978. Here Israel discovered that it could also 
mass-capitalize on their established supremacy. However, with the exasperated 
emergency and the by-produced ethos of sumud, the neocolonial agency failed 
to find footing inside Palestinian urbanisms. In that decade of the Drobless 
Plan Zionists focused their attention on rural areas, establishing tens of small-
sized colonies and hundreds of kilometres of exclusive road networks, farms 
and factories that are subsidized with capital and cheap labour (Hamami and 
Tamari 2008). As time lapses the colonial organism grows and throws its tentacles 
deeper into Palestinian presence, and it was time to tap into the urban wealth 
of Palestinians, which up to that point was stashed in the Khabieh2. There were 
neither banking systems nor a stock-market, no permits for construction and 
open borders giving Palestinian leisure destinations within 15 kilometres in either 
direction. The low levels of investment were imposed not chosen, nonetheless, 
this did not impede the accumulation of wealth.
As former chapters discussed, this reality underwent the failing plastic 
surgery of the Oslo Accords, which created many blisters. In addition to the socio-
economic transformation outlined in Chapter 3, the OAs created a significant – 
and irreversible – shift in the mode of production of quotidian Ramallite space; 
the pillar of which was the licensing of large-scale real-estate corporations. As 
Diagram 3.3, p. 128 demonstrates, this sector – which is the third largest in the 
Palestinian economy – had a dramatic boom in the early years following the 
signature of the OAs, then plunged with the outbreak of the so-called Second 
Intifada. While statistics prove that the growth of this sector is negligible, the 
significant expansion of Ramallah’s landscape provides an argument for the 
geographic imbalance of distribution of resources. That said, what are the visions 
of some of these bodies? How do they operate and what were their major projects?
5.1.1.   Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR)
PECDAR was established in 1993 short after the signature of the OAs 
by the PLO. It was provisioned as the transitional conduit for international 
assistance in support of the peace process, pending the establishment of the 
agreed upon governmental institutions. Meanwhile, it has been over eighteen 
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years since the establishment of MOPAD, MOLG, MOF and other public offices 
and the registered private investment company PECDAR remains unresolved, 
in operation, and a beneficiary of uncontested direct contracting from the PA. 
According to its home page, PECDAR’s domains of work cover:
[...] a wide range of responsibilities including aid coordination, economic 
policy, project management, coordination with NGO‘S and UN specialized 
agencies, technical assistance and training as well as IT. (PECDAR 2013)
Also on its website PECDAR names its objectives3 which resemble 
an arbitrary mixture of tasks – ranging from provision of mega non- and 
infrastructural projects, to coordination of international aid and further to 
social, economic and capacity building programs – all currently falling under 
mandates of operating PA ministries. Even though PECDAR was established by- 
and receives its official directives from the PLO, it still is a private company with 
an independent hierarchy and non-government supervised decision-making. 
It portrays an example of the PA-orchestrated potpourris of influential – not 
necessarily allied – actors, the list of which continues in this section.
In the specific context of Ramallah PECDAR has provisioned the 
implementation of several landmarks (e.g. Arafat’s Mausoleum; the Prime 
Minister’s Office; the Presidential Guest Palace) and social infrastructures (e.g. 
National Medical Compound, vocational training centres) and publications. More 
importantly, PECDAR is in charge of the development of the Palestinian National 
Garden (PNG) which lies at the highest point and heart of Ramallah-alBireh and 
extends over an area of 210 dunums4. This exorbitant state-owned land was in-
arrears dedicated to this vital urban function by power of a presidential decree 
by President Mahmoud Abbas in 2005 (PECDAR 2013). Through an open 
competition PECDAR acquired a master plan (Image 5.1) for the project and 
described it as: 
A beautiful design has been prepared through which a number of entertainment 
and recreational facilities will be constructed such as resturants [sic], cafeterias, an 
amphietheature [sic], a swiming [sic] pool, an aviary, camping area, tennis courts, 
a cycling route, a handicrafts market, an open park area, a barbeque [sic] area, 
and a botanical garden featuring the wild flora of Palestine. (PECDAR 2013b)
The project was welcomed by all sectors as this – physically and 
demographically – rapidly growing agglomeration remains scene to acute lack 
of open public spaces; a deficit caused by lack of governmental strategy and 
furthered by the reality that inside localities majority of lands remain privately 
owned. Notwithstanding, today about 30% (officially, and initially) of the area 
of the PNG – estimated to exceed US$ 50 million in value – has been already 
withdrawn in favour of the private business district proposal by PIF (section 
5.1.3). Meanwhile, one of the four planned entrances has been executed, though it 
constitutes a dead-end as no segment of the park has been opened to public yet.
PECDAR’s role and significance lies in its control over capital flow, the 
designation of it, and the power to disregard LGs in decision-making over public 
urban projects. Its continuation as a framework is one of many living testimonies 
incriminating the PA in using gratuitous politics for personal economic gains 
of its top tiers. The latter was an argument for many independent businessmen 
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to create private frameworks for the circulation of their capital and further 
accumulation of wealth. These structures present themselves as non-PA-related, 
nevertheless, they sustain strong lobbies and remain the chief beneficiaries of 
continued and unjustified proximity of private capital and government. PADICO 
and its arm PRICO are an example.
5.1.2.   Palestine Development & Investment Limited 
Holding (PADICO) and the Palestine Real 
Estate and Investment Company (PRICO)
PADICO is a public shareholding company established in 1993 with a 
capital of US$ 250 million (PADICO 2013). It collocates a significant number 
of Palestine’s wealthiest as its board of directors. In 2013 it had acquired total 
assets of US$ 775.18 million, and total equity of  approximately US$ 498 million 
(PADICO 2013a). It operates in the five main sectors of Palestinian economy: Real 
Estate; Financial & Services; Infrastructure, Environment & Agriculture; Tourism; 
and, Industry. Within its framework and corresponding to each of the sectors 
PADICO owns either shares in or the entirety of a number of companies, the most 
notable of which are ‘PALTEL Group (32% ownership), PRICO (71%), Palestine 
Industrial Investment Company (57%), Jerusalem Development & Investment 
Company (100%) Palestine Exchange (76%), and Palestine Poultry Company 
(89%)’ (PADICO 2013a). PADICO is, indeed, the heavy-weight champion of the 
Palestinian league of affluent private investors. 
Of PADICO’s multiple tentacles PRICO is the one most relevant to this 
work. It was established in 1994, and in 2011 became ‘[...] PADICO HOLDING’s 
investment arm in the real estate sector. PRICO now specializes in three main areas: 
Image 5.1. Master Plan of Palestinian National Garden (PECDAR 2013b).
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real estate development, property management, and contracting’ (PADICO 2013b). 
In this system PADICO’s projects are implemented quasi internally, and PRICO’s 
involvement in the shaping of the spatial environment is rendered imperative. The 
CEO of PADICO and vice president of PRICO Samir Huleileh said:
Larger investors have clear visions and strategies. [...] In my opinion, without 
a doubt the larger investors do play a role – not in the formation of the official 
city-strategy, but – in influencing the form of growth of the city. Simply, the 
scale of these investments is too large to be ignored. These conditions induce 
an obligatory process of deliberation while acquiring the necessary licenses, etc. 
(Huleileh 2012)
The profile of PRICO exhibits its vision and scope of impact where it has 
designed and implemented several voluminous projects such as residential 
neighbourhoods with capacity reaching close to 2000 persons5 in the West Bank 
(Image 5.2), while in Gaza the exclusive compound of 162 Chalet’s directly at 
the shores in addition to the 550 apartments (approximately 3,300 persons6) in 
the Pearl Towers. In terms of heavy infrastructure it has constructed the Poultry 
Slaughter House for the National Poultry Company and it is well underway with 
the execution of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park over an area of 615 dunum7 
(expandable to reach 1115 dunom) as well as the Gaza Industrial Park over an area 
of 485 dunum (PRICO 2013). 
PRICO’s significant real estate development remains thematically limited 
within residential, industrial and office-space. However, it has also executed – as 
contractor – numerous flagship- and ponderous projects in the public services 
and tourism sectors such as the Prime Minister’s Headquarter’s, the Presidential 
Guest Palace, the Ministries Compound in Ramallah; the Central Stations in 
Nablus and Bethlehem; a number of office towers throughout the city; in addition 
to several hotels like the Mövenpick, Days Inn, and the recently concluded 
renovation and expansion of the Grand Park Hotel (Image 4.27, p. 214) earning 
the latter the 5-star title. PRICO was also the implementer of PIF’s (section 5.1.3) 
sizable elReehan residential neighbourhood (a mere 6 km away from Ramallah’s 
centre) which has a total capacity of 2,000 units corresponding to 10,000 residents. 
PRICO has concluded and signed off Phase one, which corresponds to 400 units 
and respectively 2,000 residents (Image 5.8). As for its third pillar – property 
management – the company remains the operator of a number of public service 
Image 5.2. elGhadeer Neighbourhood under development in October 2013. Upon completion 
it shall compose of 374 apartments in 34 buildings with a capacity of approximately 2,000 
residents. It hosts two services buildings as well. 
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facilities such as Bethlehem’s Tourism Compound, alBireh’s Commercial Centre, 
and a Parking Compound in Amman, among others.
While the aforementioned is evidence of the level of affluence and influence 
of PADICO and its arm PRICO, connections between executed projects that 
could attest the claimed ‘strategy’ remain undiscovered, if we exclude the shared 
geography and profit production. This constellation is exemplary of reiterative 
partnering systems that operate within the city-scape of Ramallah. Inquiry about 
cooperation and exchange of knowledge between corporations and municipalities 
were answered by Huleileh (2012) through citing political strife, institutional 
bureaucracy and PA hierarchy as obstacles to achieving municipal visions and 
necessary competitiveness; where according to his estimate ‘an organized and 
clear vision was lacking’ (Huleileh 2012) – an opinion reiterated by Kassis (2010), 
Khoury (2010), Shaheen (2012) and Barghouthi (2012) among others. 
Huleileh added that PADICO and PRICO have indeed negotiated with 
PA institutions on implementation of projects conceived by either party, yet 
he confirms that they were not invited to give consultancy to LGs in neither 
strategy nor technical aspects (Huleileh 2012). Meanwhile the term Public-
Private-Partnership is fashionably flagged at events of commissioning or 
coercion, and social responsibility programs are flowing according to personal 
winds. On the other side of the same coin, heavy-weight investors practice urban 
eclecticism and repetition of inveigling models that captured their interest and 
imaginations in the absence of ‘curators’ who investigate whether the particular 
piece suits the collection or not. These hasty – and not necessarily educated – 
processes are enabled by the minimal (if any) regulation-induced deceleration. 
These voluminous urban projects are disconnected from context, partial in 
character and extent, and pertaining to fragmented development (Scholz 2002). 
Their main product is the physical translation of the corollary socioeconomic 
polarization (Graner 2008), rather than the provision of need-based, integrated 
and complimentary spaces. These dynamics, aspects, and resulting spaces are 
echoed in the yet higher level of capital and business complicity, in the Palestine 
Investment Fund.
5.1.3.   Palestine Investment Fund (PIF)
As the peace process approached the age of 10 international donors expressed 
increased discomfort with the unmasked corruption of the PA. In a move to re-
gain trust former president Yasser Arafat appointed Dr. Salam Fayyad8 as Minister 
of Finance in June 2002. In light of the targets for his recruitment he restructured 
the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) which was initially established in 2000 by the 
power of a presidential decree, yet remained ineffective until Fayyad’s financial 
reform plan came into effect (AbuKhater 2003, Khatib 2012, Abdullah 2012). 
PIF was provisioned as the framework which would assemble the countless, 
uncontrolled and unaccounted for assets and investments of the PLO9. In 2003 a 
statement by Fayyad declared that the capital channelled into PIF exceeded US$ 
600 million in value (AbuKhater 2003). Dr. Ghassan Khatib – former Minister 
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of Labour (2002-2005), Minister of Planning (2005-2006), and Director of the 
Palestinian Government Media Centre (2009-2011) – explains:
[W]hen Fayyad was appointed Minister of Finance [...] he ran the financial 
reform project. This project covered the unification of bank accounts, 
termination of monopoly-supporting regulations, and many others. One of 
the pivotal moves was that of the creation of the Palestine Investment Fund 
(PIF) which in its forefront served to tackle corruption and mismanagement. 
For example, there was an arrangement by which the PA established a company 
called the Palestinians Services Company (PSC). This private company had 
a monopoly on importing some commodities such as petroleum products, 
cement and tobacco. These basic commodities composed naturally a significant 
market and generated immense profits. These sums were not part of the PA 
budget, and this company did not answer to neither the Legislative Council 
nor MOF. This generated accusations of lack of transparency, corruption 
and the like. The reform processes banned monopolies – with the exception 
of petroleum – and the PSC was transformed into an investment fund 
that has known boards of directors and trustees, its accounts are audited by 
internationally accredited companies, and whose budget pumps into that of the 
PA by which any profits are transferred to the PA Treasury. 
PIF as the PSC is a private company owned by the PA. At the beginning the 
Minister of Finance filled the duties of the head of board of trustees of PIF, 
which lead to harmony between- and integration of PIFs projects with plans 
of relevant ministries and LGs, by which the relationship was complementary. 
Nonetheless when Hamas won the elections in 2006 – to ban the latter from 
controlling the fund – PIF was detached from the cabinet; the Minister of 
Finance had no more powers over its work while it became attached directly 
to the president’s office. I believe the consequence of this move is the nowadays 
distancing of PIF’s operations from debates ongoing in ministries and LGs. 
(Khatib 2012)  
In other words, by 2006 PIF became legally beyond answering neither to the 
PA, nor its parliament, nor the people that legally own it, and by default beyond 
being influenced by LGs whom have no representative amongst the eleven 
members of its board of directors. In the same line, the formulation of the vision10 
falls short of mentioning LGs as partners in the process, hence re-casting shadows 
of earlier forms of biased capital circulation and neoliberal management in the 
era of the PA. In this regard Anani points out that
After the creation of PIF with one year, a law was passed rendering all state-
owned property under the custody of PIF for investment one way or another. 
So PIF basically has the power to decide on urban projects such as residential 
neighbourhoods, industrial zones, whatever, and no one could or would object, 
for even though it is a private company it has governmental blessing and a carte 
blanch. And whether PIF likes this or not, but their independence in terms of 
decision making from the planning authorities limits the capacity of the latter 
in terms of comprehensive planning in addition to cutting down resources that 
should be theirs. (Anani 2010)
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On the ground PIF has indeed executed countless heavy projects across 
six main categories: 1. Micro, Small and Medium sized Enterprises Portfolios 
(MSMEs); 2. Real Estate and Hospitality; 3. Infrastructure Program; 4. 
Large Caps; 5. Capital Markets Portfolio; and, 6. Aghwar (Jordan Valley) and 
Dead Sea Development Initiatives. According to its 2012 Annual Report 
PIF had transferred a total of US$ 30 million in the form of dividends to the 
Palestinian Treasury11, rendering its contribution to the latter since inception at 
approximately US$ 683 million (PIF 2012). Further, ‘PIF’s assets [have] reached 
US$ 782.8 million by the end of 2012, while owner’s equity reached US$ 709.4 
million’ (PIF 2012:10), and through the process of re-orienting its investments 
(PLO had considerable assets in different and remote places around the 
world, see Calabresi 2002) by the end of the same year 84% of the accounted 
PIF investments were in Palestine. In practical terms this translates into the 
investments described in the coming paragraphs. 
Under its first category PIF has committed to US$ 90 million over the 
span of five years from 2012 to 2017. This fund will be utilized in either of two 
forms: investment in or loan for MSMEs which today constitute 85% of the 
total employment in private sector, and contribute 55% to the Palestinian GDP. 
Beyond the numbers, PIF justifies its program by stating that ‘MSMEs have 
managed to build significant resilience in the face of political uncertainty and 
volatile market conditions’ (PIF 2014a:18). While this vitality touches on topics 
addressed in this work, it gains further value when considered in light of three; 
first, the policy papers highlighting the significance of the Palestinian social 
capital12 and the corollary knowledge-based13 economy which were produced by 
MAS14; second, the statistics which indicate that 55% of the Ramallah-alBireh 
governorate economy lies in the private services sector (TVET Labour Market 
Program 2011), many of which correspond to PIF’s thematic15 criterion; and third, 
the relative competitive capacity of this region in comparison to others in the WB 
(Infographic 3.2, p. 177). Thus, even though the Ramallah region is not a declared 
PIF priority in its MSMEs program, nonetheless, there are strong indicators that it 
shall emerge as a primary beneficiary, thence bringing forth questions of potential 
forms of utilization and modes of capitalizing on spatial impacts.
The paramount impact of PIF on the city-scape of Ramallah was achieved 
through two of its multiple projects under its second category ‘Real Estate and 
Hospitality’. Like PADICO – whether in terms of themes addressed or modus 
operandi of ensuring profit remains in-house – PIF established a real estate 
investment and development arm called Amaar Real Estate Group (AREG). Today 
the highlight is elErsal Centre which is under construction (since 2012) following 
designs by the internationally renowned architect Jafar Tuqan on grounds 
originally designated for the Palestinian National Garden (Image 5.1, p. 247). In 
spite of its scale and predicted impact, up to date details of the project have not 
been disclosed to public, and the only trace is few images (with no description) 
on the web-page of AREG16. Notwithstanding, this work was able to acquire an 
unaccounted-for copy of the Design Proposal dating to May 2010, herein referred 
to as ‘CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010’. 
The CEO of PIF referred to elErsal Centre as the future prime ‘point of 
attraction for the financial and commercial institutions in Palestine’ (PIF 2014b). 
In technical terms, this project aims at creating a Central Business District (CBD) 
in line with examples such as the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin and La Defense in 
Paris. For this purpose PIF has allocated US$ 45.5 million as start-up capital 
252 |  100 × RAMALLAH
(AREG 2014a) in a bet on the willingness of local and international investors to 
acquiesce covering the remaining significant costs. It is provisioned to include 13 
towers with varying heights reaching up to 2017 floors for office, retail, residential 
and pedestrian purposes as well as a hotel (Image 5.3, Image 5.4). In total, the 
project envisions 224.948 sq.m. of constructed space, and a population of 11,907 
persons (CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010), i.e. 10% of the population of the Ramallah 
agglomerate today.
Spatially, elErsal Centre consolidates a change in construction regulations 
that has been crawling onto the city for a couple of years whereby skyscrapers 
and towers are becoming a norm; e.g. Palestine Tower (Image 4.1, p. 185) and 
the Media Tower with their 23 and 12 floors respectively. Further, it penetrates 
a neighbourhood of relative quiet – where the main characteristic is low-rise 
residential units – that hitherto has been concealed by the low- profile and 
activity commercial buildings situated linearly along elErsal Street. Given the 
rapid pace of urban transformation across the agglomeration the alteration 
of the trend was bound to take place sooner or later, thence the fact that 
elErsal Centre is the ground-breaker constitutes a void reason for criticism. 
However, developers again fail to provide solutions for worriments created by 
their projects beyond their marked borders. The property lies at elErsal street 
(Image 5.5) which is the narrow yet main artery of the agglomerate direction 
north, and the runway for over 30.000 vehicles on Thursdays18 between 
14:00 and 17:00 – according to the survey of Khaled Batrawi in 201219 (Civil 
Engineer, co-founder of the Palestinian Centre for the safety on Roads and 
Environment, and consultant for alBireh Municipality). Since the reopening of 
Image 5.3. elErsal Centre internal view (CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010)
Image 5.4. elErsal Centre aerial view (CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010)
Image 5.5. elErsal Centre site in October 2011. To the right is the property while undergoing 
excavation works, and to the left is the narrow Ersal Street.
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the Nablus Road20 traffic levels have decreased, yet remain problematic given 
the inadequate infrastructure and augmenting pressures. elErsal Centre designs 
fall short of addressing or proposing solutions to this traffic predicament, and 
similarly, to the expected significant increase in demand on the currently limited 
water supply, waste-water management, and electric power provision in this 
neighbourhood of underdeveloped infrastructure. Given PIF’s status, declared 
vision, capital in possession, its claimed work in infrastructures (addressed later 
in this section), and having obtained licenses through the HPC in defiance of 
the reservations of alBireh municipality21; given those aspects, failing to declare 
a position in regards to potential impact on living conditions in the surrounding 
neighbourhood leaps beyond the label of a shortcoming to that of indifference 
and impunity. 
Beyond the various criticism of CBDs22, the execution of the latter was 
generally promoted under the headlines of accreted productivity rates and 
the parallel provision of lacking and quintessential – both soft and hard – 
infrastructures in the targeted regions (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011, Knox and 
McCarthy 2005, BPF 2008). Evaluated from this perspective, elErsal Centre 
proves to follow the aforementioned mode of eclectic, partisan and fragmented 
rather than the sustainable, inclusive and integrated form of urban development; 
evidenced through the neither partial nor complete incorporation of the PNG in 
the master plan of the project.
Geographically, elErsal Centre constitutes first steps towards creating the 
prolixly deliberated de novo commercial centre for Ramallah-alBireh; albeit, with 
PIF as vanguard, private investors as choir, PA delivering the oration, and the 
Image 5.6. Internal view of elReehan Neighourhood (AREG 2014b)
Image 5.7. Plaza in elReehan Neighourhood (AREG 2014b)
Image 5.8. elReehan Neighbourhood, March 2013. In the shadows (left and right) are 
abandoned unfinished skeletons of neighbourhoods that were planned in the 1990s, but were 
never completed.
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respective municipalities axed and confined to the mission of policing existing 
(expired?) regulations. Regardless of dynamics of operation and consummation, 
this construction catalyses and materializes the – hitherto chiefly residential23 
– ongoing crawl towards the proximate northern localities. Further, it provides 
a physical reference for the true scaling for Rawabi (section 5.1.4, p. 256) which 
is hitherto presented and promoted as an independent city, while in reality it 
configures into a satellite-neighbourhood of the Jerusalem Metropolis.
PIF’s contribution to the northward sprawl is bolstered through its elReehan 
Neighbourhood which in 2012 delivered keys to some of its Phase One24 venturing 
residents. The neighbourhood lies mezzo between the (nowadays) northern 
edge of the Ramallah agglomerate and its main higher education institution, 
namely, Birzeit University (BZU). At approximately 6 km and 10-12 minutes 
from Ramallah’s centre25, the neighbourhood extends over 250.000 sq.m. more 
than half of which is dedicated to residential purposes26, while the remainder 
is ‘dedicated to commercial and community facilities, green open spaces and 
utilities, and residual land’ (elArd and CEP 2010:1-1). Noteworthy is the urban 
design and spatial distribution of this suburb (Map 5.1), whereby the best view-
location is utilized for the 11-storied hospital, the high-school, the community 
services lot, and 80% of apartment buildings rather than the presumably higher-
priced villas. In addition, rather than the typical two-direction short-intervals 
concentric rings of vehicle networks, in place, every second ring was interrupted 
by a pedestrian space thereof minimizing vehicle movement distances and periods 
within the residential space. Foremost, elReehan Neighbourhood sets precedence 
in its incorporation of a rhizomatous network of plazas, pedestrian passages and 
staircases which in total comprise almost 15%27 of the total project area (elArd 
and CEP 2010:3-2). Given the aforementioned factors as well as the incorporation 
of ten housing typologies28; adequate commercial and open spaces; the scarce 
Pedestrian passages, 
staircases, gardens & plazas
Community utilities
Wide two-way street
Residential, villas
Narrow dead-end street
Residential, 
apartment 
buildings
N
Map 5.1. elReehan Neighbourhood Master Plan. The neighbourhood is planned to include 
a regional hospital, a school, archaeological and mixed-use areas. (elArd and CEP 2010:3-11; 
modified by author)
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service of a hospital; proximity to a leading higher education institution; lying ten 
minutes from Ramallah’s centre yet surrounded by nature and premium scenery; 
and the attraction of an archaeological site are adroit promises of – comparatively 
– meritable living conditions.
Unlike elErsal Centre, elReehan Neighbourhood was designed, calculated 
and executed as an urban-growth catalyst project. In terms of infrastructure, 
this neighbourhood has introduced a valuable bypass vein for vehicles traveling 
through the north-west quarter of the agglomerate or further northwards. It 
has also incorporated water-recycling systems, waste-water collection network 
and treatment plant, and facilities for social services that can be shared by 
neighbouring localities (elArd and CEP 2010). Combining these two factors with 
its strategic location, it forms a balanced bridge between the formerly dead-end 
peninsular elTireh neighbourhood and the southwards growing AbuQash village, 
which in turn is an extension of Birzeit University and the town of Birzeit.
On financial levels, having incorporated varying housing typologies could 
seem as commission for accessibility among wider social strata, nonetheless, this 
impression is dubious as market price per unit remains the privilege of upper-
middle-class and yonder. In terms of morphology, the neighbourhood has re-
incorporated the socially-demanded pedestrian connections and social pockets. 
However, it remained hostage to parcel-borders and parameters of dominant 
construction regulations, namely, repetitive rows of buildings separated by a 
regular retention space. The combination of these two equations has physically 
translated in a space that considers pedestrian and open spaces as; first, additional 
rather than integral; second, external rather than internal; and third, as defined 
rather than diffusing and permeable.
In spite of named shortcomings elReehan Neighbourhood resembles 
missionary steps in revising and re-defining the dominant urban morphology 
in the Ramallah agglomerate, and has the potential of serving as a catalyst for 
municipal revision of construction regulations; particularly those pertaining 
directly to the city’s morphology. Even though it officially lies within borders of 
the town of Surda, nonetheless, it has recently requested and received consent 
for annexation to Ramallah’s municipal boundaries (AREG 2013). Given that 
elReehan Neighbourhood’s site borders Ramallah’s mandate area, this operation 
of custody transfer will provide legal precedence for other land owners to request 
the same in plight of the corollary increase in property-value29 and thus return on 
investment. While this will accelerate the process of legally merging the localities 
composing the Ramallah agglomerate thus reducing administrative bureaucracy 
and improving efficiency; on the other side of the same coin, without erudite and 
conspicuous by-laws this could result in the erasure of characteristic sociospatial 
identities of the involved localities, and furthering of inflation of property prices.
Seen from aesthetic and geographic perspectives, elErsal Centre and 
elReehan Neighbourhoods are significant contributors to the modern outline, 
image and spatial distribution of the Ramallah agglomerate. On one hand they 
provide reference points for Ramallah’s urban-scale and constitute powerful 
transit nodes. On the other, they propel the re-examination of dominant urban 
morphology apropos economic and social changes and newly arising needs. They 
are physical translations of the social values of individuality and the corollary 
spatial exclusion, thus bringing back to the forefront demand for spatial justice.
Beyond these two projects; within the framework of its second category ‘Real 
Estate and Hospitality’ PIF either owns the entire or majority of shares in hotels 
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in Ramallah (Grand Park Hotel), Jericho (Intercontinental Hotel), Bethlehem 
(Jacir Palace Intercontinental Hotel), and Gaza (Arc Med Hotel) (AREG 
2014). In addition to the two categories featured here PIF has ‘Infrastructure 
Programs’ which includes a number of profit generating basic services as in 
telecommunications and power30; ‘Large Caps Investments’ which stands for 
market shares in existing institutions31; ‘Capital Market Portfolio Management’ 
which operates within the framework of financial management32; and last, 
‘Aghwar and Dead Sea Investments’33 which involves – among other projects – the 
planning and execution of a new city in Jericho (PIF 2014c). 
Aside from reservations and shortcomings articulated over the past pages; 
the combination of the six tracks – impact of projects as well as the directly and 
indirectly involved personnel and capital – renders PIF an eminent actor in the 
local context, while its nature as an investment company – for the benefit of 
Palestinian people – could be considered as both opportunity and obstacle for 
inducing financially resilient urban undertakings.
5.1.4.   Massar International
Massar Associates, the predecessor organization of Massar International, 
was founded by Palestinian businessman Bashar Masri in 1994 as a vehicle to 
promote sustainable economic development in Palestine. Massar is an Arabic 
word meaning ‘path’.  The name symbolizes the vision of its founder – to create 
a company which would successfully link the very best of local professionalism 
in Palestine with international best practices and an understanding of Western 
management perspectives in order to integrate the Palestinian economy fully 
into the global economy. (Massar 2014)
Massar spreads over 15 subsidiary companies in the MENA region and 
eastern Europe (nine in Palestine), through which its core values of ‘honesty 
in decision-making, personal responsibility and accountability, and leadership 
by example [... lie] at the heart of our ability to create and respond to market 
opportunities and have fueled [sic] our dramatic expansion’ (Massar 2014a). In an 
exception (?) to these ‘core values’ Massar’s transparency is regularly placed under 
doubt34 given the orchestrated cloud – of bureaucracy and market manoeuvres – 
disguising its real capital size and extents of leverage on elites of national politics. 
An example is demonstrated through its Palestine Investment and Development 
Company (PID) which ‘owns a number of strategic plots of land mainly in the 
Ramallah area, earmarked for real-estate development projects’ and ‘is a major 
shareholder in a number of Palestinian companies’ as described on the Massar 
website (Massar 2014b). Nonetheless, there is no trace of PID anywhere else, 
neither on the world-wide-web nor in the Palestinian yellow pages.
Massar’s subsidiary companies operate in; first, Financial Services (e.g. 
Sahem Trading & Investment Company for brokering); second, Services & 
Development (e.g. Publicis Zoom for marketing and advertisement; ASAL 
Technologies for IT  support systems and services; and Alpha International 
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which focuses on data management and processes, including a.o. surveys and 
polling); and third, Massar is involved in Real Estate mainly through Bayti Real 
Estate Development Company (Bayti) whose ‘mission is to create affordable, 
accessible, family- friendly communities for Palestinians’ (Massar 2014b). 
Similar to aforementioned examples, Bayti-Palestine was established to oversee a 
pronounced project, in this case neither a neighbourhood nor a business centre, 
rather, a new city from cipher. Soon after, the Qatari real estate developer Diar 
joined the venture.
In the peak of the financial bubble that fayyadism35 created – and as Ramallah’s 
residents were for the first time confronted with the social transformation of their 
city and as construction sites seemed to add in numbers by the week – rumours 
of ‘Palestine’s first planned city’36 started to spread and be confirmed by popular 
news reporting significant purchase of land from the villages of ‘Atara, ‘Ajjul and 
‘Abwein (17 km north from Ramallah’s centre) by a member of ‘le Rothschild 
palestinien’ (Shaked 2006, Kristellimages 2011); namely, alMasry family37. Similar 
to other countless local and international media reports (Davis 2011, Yehya 2012, 
a.o.), The Guardian stated:
Legal proof of ownership [of land] is almost impossible to come by in the 
West Bank, where 70% of land is unregistered and ancestral property is 
inherited by dozens of heirs. [...] The urban project [Rawabi] benefited from 
major international support, primarily from USAid and Qatar, and Israeli co-
operation. Bashar al-Masry, the Palestinian businessman behind the private 
venture, was allowed exceptional privileges. The bureaucratic challenges 
[...] Palestinians face were pushed aside and title deeds for Rawabi land were 
granted in one bundle. Locals who owned land in three villages on the proposed 
site and refused to sell were forced to accept the market rate by the Palestinian 
Authority. A row about preferential treatment to well-connected individuals 
ensued. (Greenwood 2013)
Indeed, following the official announcement of Rawabi in 200838 and 
news spreading around the region, many owners refrained from selling their 
lands to Bayti whether out of principle or speculation over higher gains. These 
positions were shattered through a presidential decree by Mahmoud Abbas on 
15 November 2009 enabling Bayti’s sequester of approximately 118.000 sq.m. 
from ‘Abwain, 122.00 sq.m. from ‘Atara, and a swapping 1.532.000 sq.m. from 
‘Ajjul (Davis 2011, Greenwood 2013). Under the frequent descriptions of it being 
a ‘national project for Palestine’ (Purkiss 2013) and statements such as ‘increase 
affordable quality housing for low and middle income families’ Bayti was able 
to secure further privileges from the PA such as the signature of an MoU39 (20 
April 2008, Grand Park Hotel) with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
(Bayti 2014) through which Rawabi was declared as a Public-Private-Partnership 
(PPP) program:
The PA committed to the funding of necessary public services and off-site 
infrastructure development in Rawabi as promised in its pledge to ‘increase 
affordable quality housing for low and middle income families’ in the context 
of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). The partnership 
highlights PA guarantees of a government-supported enabling business 
environment to ensure Rawabi’s economic development. This partnership 
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will instill confidence in investors, business owners and entrepreneurs and 
hopefully facilitate rapid economic growth. (Bayti 2014)
From among the truncated observers following granules of information 
rose three major opinions; first, some propagate the pact as a conventional 
good-governance practice; second, others down-played its importance as the 
PA is financially strangulated, which was also used by some Rawabi-affiliates as 
argument for construction delays40; or a third group whose argument was that 
closeness of capital and politics in Palestine provides the permit for the private 
investment – Rawabi – to jump the waiting line for the scarce public services. The 
last opinion was the closest, as this PPP grants Rawabi the legal cover to apply 
for foreign aid that is targeted for PA public service provision, such as its current 
plight for the USAid to construct a portion of the eight schools provisioned in 
Rawabi (Rosen 2013). Yet foremost, regardless of the outline of the PPP and its 
legal parameters, through this official politics of propagating and promoting 
Rawabi as a PPP for a national project of affordable housing; Massar and Bayti 
have secured an exit shall this rashest venture miss its target. This conclusion 
implores the larger perspective over Rawabi.
Creation of new cities has been a core characteristic of humanity’s stories of 
achieved progress, a few aspects of which are eloquently captured in Lefebvre’s 
masterpiece ‘The Production of Space’ (1974; here 2009). Measured against 
this characteristic as well as the context of shock – that Palestinian  urbanity 
experienced in 1948 – and the corollary subjugation to systems of mutation that 
Israel has been knitting hitherto; together, these compose a ‘chapeau!’ for the 
enterprisers of Rawabi. This Palestinian project has crossed into a territory denied 
for sixty-two41 years, as this right was and remains – with Rawabi as sole exception 
– an exclusive privilege for Israelis42. Yet, while one might be able to accommodate 
the ‘means’43, however, one decidedly shall not habituate a compromised ‘end’44. 
Rawabi is envisioned to spare its residents the annual disruption of power- and 
telecommunication-lines accompanying the seasonal snow as they are utilizing 
the – late 20th century – strategy of subterranean infrastructure. It promises to 
provide order, organization, safety and quiet in contrast to the continued pollution, 
aesthetic mélange, endangerment to public safety45 and traffic disruptions caused 
by the random construction sites arising apace throughout Ramallah. It is testing 
and incorporating green materials and systems, and it has accounted for sufficient 
open and green space towards providing healthy living conditions and a sense 
of community (Rawabi 2014a). The city composes of 23 neighbourhoods with 
‘modern amenities’ and facilities such as:
• Ample, well-lit and secure underground parking areas with elevator access
• Neighborhood playgrounds
• Wide sidewalks and outdoor walking trails
• Pocket parks and green areas
• Convenience retail stores such as neighborhood minimarts and dry cleaners 
(Rawabi 2014a).
In its claim for diversity Rawabi incorporates seven main typologies of 
housing buildings and more than forty apartment patterns and sizes (Ziadeh 
2012) whereby the latter varies between 92 sq.m. and 340 sq.m. (Rawabi 2014). 
Nonetheless, and similar to elReehan Neighbourhood, the prices remain relatively 
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exclusive for lower-middle and underprivileged strata. As for elevation, buildings 
range between 8 and 10 floors46, corresponding to 24 to 30 meters in height. The 
buildings are aligned in concentric rows (Image 5.12) that constrict and converge 
to create neighbourhood spaces (Image 5.9). 
This model of mass-production of housing and the morphology of repeating 
residential high-rises has been applied several instances previously (e.g. Marzahn-
Berlin; Banlieues-Paris; among other post WWII districts in Europe which 
emerged in les trentes glorieuses47) and continues today (e.g. new districts and 
cities in China). What these typologies also share is functionality, uniformity, 
the cumbersome scale, and sub-optimal environmental conditions. In relation 
to the time of conception, these models were considered well designed and 
equipped, and were predominantly shaped by varying interpretations of utopia, 
philanthropy, and market-economics thus attracting working- and middle-
classes. Nonetheless, given the distance from working place (economic centres), 
lack of customization and the aforementioned physical factors rendered these 
neighbourhoods soon after into milieus of underprivileged strata (Wacquant 
2008; Lévy-Vroelant et al 2008; a.o.).
While Rawabi lies at a mere 15 minutes from the nowadays borders of the 
Ramallah agglomerate (Map 5.2) there are a couple of factors acting against it. 
First, the combination of poor public transportation, the dormant48 Israeli 
checkpoint to the north of Birzeit (‘Atara Checkpoint), and the fact that its main 
access road is conditioned by a yearly permit49 from the COGAT pose a threat to 
the accessibility of Rawabi (PBS 2013); and corollary, its attraction for middle-class 
employees and public-sector servants whose work is situated inside the Ramallah 
1 Mile
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N
Map 5.2. Location of Rawabi in respect to Ramallah and other Palestinian localities [red 
colour], as well as Israeli illegal settlements [blue colour] in the WB.
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Image 5.9. Animation depicting an aerial view of Rawabi (Rawabi 2014b).
Image 5.10. Animation depicting a street in a Rawabi neighbourhood (Rawabi 2014b).
Image 5.11. Advertisement bearing the slogan ‘nicest view atop the hill’ (Rawabi 2014b).
Image 5.12. Panoramic view of Rawabi’s Centre while under construction, October 2013.
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Image 5.13.  A view into a street in 
Rawabi. Notice the proximity of towers 
and resulting shade. 
PS. Image taken around noon on a 
typical sunny day in October 2013.
Map 5.3. Rawabi Master Plan (Shoshan 2013:5)
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agglomerate. Second, given its placement on the northern slopes of the mountain 
alongside the east-west orientation of its towering buildings renders exposure – of 
majority of apartments – to direct sunlight minimal, its streets often shaded, and 
thus concomitantly a high likelihood of accelerating wind-pull generated by the 
combination of shade, heat, and the typical western winds of the region.
Shall Rawabi achieve its goals and prosper, it will likely induce higher rates of 
development along the route connecting it to the Ramallah agglomerate; thence 
presenting further arguments for the pronounced demand of higher distribution 
of urban-development oriented investments beyond the northern municipal 
boundaries of Ramallah and alBireh (Shaheen 2012, Barghouthi 2012). However, 
shall Rawabi – given the aforementioned factors – face difficulties in recruiting 
residents, there is a high probability that it will employ the PPP signed with the 
PA to secure a profitable exit for Massar. In light of the slogans of the project of 
being a ‘national project’ and ‘affordable housing’ on one hand, and on the other 
the intimacy between capital and politics in Palestine, the doors remain wide-
open for the possibility of this satellite neighbourhood becoming the first state-
owned property for social housing in an operation similar to the purchase of 
the Mash’al-Tower by the PA50. Regardless of the end-form of Rawabi, Ramallah 
has to recognize and negotiate with this space as the former is bound to impact 
the latter, whether through forms of stimulus and complementarity, or through 
becoming the first banlieue of the region. 
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5.2.   PRIVATE 
SECTOR: MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES AND  
DENATIONALIZATION 
PECDAR, PADICO, PIF and Massar’s structures – neoliberalism as 
system, capitalism as ideology – are exclusive, limited, and fail to articulate a 
social vision along the economic. Their upper tier belongs to a global coterie51 
whose continued accumulation of wealth is symbiotic to absence of liability, and 
freedom to engage with oppressive, authoritarian and – in the non-exclusive 
case of Palestine – colonial regimes and imperial systems (Arouri 2010; As’ad 
2010; alAtar 2010; Kassis 2010; alKhalili 2012; Fanon 2008; Escobar 2012; a.o.). 
Mechanisms sustaining these systems deprive the locality and its natives of their 
defining characteristics limiting them to the narrow perspective of market-
value; the coins and bills that differ in the size and engravings, but remain, 
predominantly, a coin and a bill. This ideology – equal to others – translated onto 
the spaces which lent them a footing; in hundreds of cities there is a Zara, an Ikea, 
a trade centre, financial districts, and monumental phallic towers overlooking the 
landscape of their wealth; akin the enduring étoile centrale of colossal avenues 
dotted along the stretches of the puissant Greek Empire (Rossi 1982, Anderson 
2006, Fainstein 2009). Anani notes of the architecture of Ramallah by saying:
We suddenly woke up after nearly a decade of the Oslo Agreements to find out 
that architecture has become a means of transforming the urban realm into an 
assemblage of containers, stacking people, homes, businesses and companies 
on top of each other, and branding the city with what is available only via liberal 
market forces. The temporality of the urban space and the tendency to replace 
has become a norm. The liberal destruction of what has no exchange value 
strengthens and furthers this constancy of disposal and renewal.  (Anani 2011)
Here Brugmann argues:
A suburban residential city model might be called Deer Path Village, a shopping 
mall is now a ‘town center’, a multi-theatre movie complex is an ‘entertainment 
district’, or an office park an ‘innovation district’, but this landscape is not 
the carefuly crafted product of a community that has a shared strategy and 
method for building and maintaining urban advantage in the world. [...] The 
momentum of development has steadily shifted to the city, a territory still 
poorly understood by most nations [... and] throughout the world they have 
generally lacked a sufficient sense of urbanism to solve urban problems rather 
than creating new ones. (Brugmann 2009:273)
Brugmann points to considerations of densities, scale and relationality for 
urban economies as systems of either producing differentiation or ineptness, 
hence city-competitiveness or the absence of it. In effect there are no ‘world-
class standards’ and in order to ‘truly secure advantage, corporations must also 
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practice urban strategy’ (2009:275; emphasis in original). Global players have and 
are creating the – extensively scholarly discussed – global cities which in turn are 
charging the – neoliberal economy led – widening gap between the devaluing 
rural and the appreciating urban. This appreciation is factored by:
[the] multiple processes that constitute economic globalization [which in 
turn] inhabit and shape specific structurations of the economic, the political, 
the cultural, and the subjective. Among the most vital of their effects is the 
production of new spatialities and temporalities. These belong to both the 
global and the national, if only to each in part. This ‘in part’ is an especially 
important qualification, as in my reading the global is itself partial, albeit 
strategic. The global does not (yet) fully encompass the lived experience of 
actors or the domain of institutional orders and cultural formations; it persists 
as a partial condition. This, however, should not suggest that the global and 
the national are discrete conditions that mutually exclude each other. To the 
contrary, they significantly overlap and interact in ways that distinguish our 
contemporary moment. (Sassen 2000:215)
This postulate is achieved through Sassen’s reading of – among others – the 
Marxist Manifesto’s dialectic view of internationalism as inherently generated by 
localities whose aspired prosperity is conditioned by merits of production and 
trade (Sassen 1999, 2000, 2003). Auxiliary to profit opportunity, the same discourse 
requires thence urban cosmopolitanism as environment for attraction of desired 
alien resources whether human or capital; a concept that reaped the consent of 
Islamic preachers and Shari’a52 radicalists in Gulf countries to the consumption 
of alcohol within their territories by alien agents of TNCs and MNCs, proving 
that ‘the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country’ (Marx 
and Engels, IN: Harvey 2000:530). On another levels, such examples of adjunct 
accommodation of behavioural variation reveal the shortcoming of Martha 
Nussbaum’s postulate of practices of cosmopolitanism as ethos and a universal 
moral standpoint, and consequently the inability of such generic concepts to 
reduce neither social otherness nor (spatial-) conflict53; whether within a locality 
or internationally (Appiah 1997, Harvey 2009, Nassem and Margison 2006). The 
latter is furthered in works on colonialism (e.g. Fanon 2008), and in the particular 
case of Palestine it encroaches on ‘normalization’54 and therewith equate the 
colonised subject, the Palestinian, with the colonizing institution, Israel. 
As borders of territories are predominantly porous the culture, politics, 
ideology and their corollary translations in milieus are fluid rather than 
permanent (Lefebvre 2009, Harvey 2009). This constitutes one of the 
foundations on which Appiah (1997) writes his ‘Cosmopolitan Patriots’ in which 
he transcribes the concept of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ through an approach that 
differentiates it from ideology in favour of it constituting a sentiment (Box 5.1, p. 
265), thence variable in relation to individual circumstances, experiences, and – 
akin patriotism – is assumed to be a choice (Appiah 1997). The concept of rooted 
cosmopolitanism opposes the mutated capitalist consumption of cosmopolitan 
features, and follows a trajectory similar – but not identical – to Sassen’s (2005) 
global and national as ‘discrete conditions’ that are not mutually exclusive, and 
Appadurai’s work (2003, 2008) on translocalities and cultural dimensions of 
globalisation. In this regard Appadurai explains:
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Box 5.1. Extract from Appiah’s (1997) Cosmopolitan Patriots.
My father was a Ghanaian patriot. He once published a column in the Pioneer, 
our local newspaper in Kumasi, under the headline ‘Is Ghana Worth Dying For?’ and 
I know that his hearts answer was yes. But he also loved Asante, the region of Ghana 
where he and I both grew up, a kingdom absorbed within a British colony and, then, a 
region of a new multiethnic republic: a once-kingdom that he and his father also both 
loved and served. And, like so many African nationalists of his class and generation, 
he always loved an enchanting abstraction they called Africa.
When he died, my sisters and I found a note he had drafted and never quite 
finished, last words of love and wisdom for his children. After a summary reminder 
of our double ancestry-in Ghana and in England – he wrote: ‘Remember that you are 
citizens of the world’. And he went on to tell us that this meant that – wherever we 
chose to live, and, as citizens of the world, we could surely choose to live anywhere – 
we should make sure we left that place ‘better than you found it’. ‘Deep inside of me,’ 
he went on, ‘is a great love for mankind and an abiding desire to see mankind, under 
God, fulfil its highest destiny.’
The favourite slander of the narrow nationalist against us cosmopolitans is that 
we are rootless. What my father believed in, however, was a rooted cosmopolitanism, 
or, if you like, a cosmopolitan patriotism. Like Gertrude Stein, he thought there was 
no point in roots if you couldn’t take them with you. ‘America is my country and 
Paris is my hometown’, Stein said. My father would have understood her.
We cosmopolitans face a familiar litany of objections. Some, for example, 
have complained that our cosmopolitanism must be parasitic: where, they ask, could 
Stein have gotten her roots in a fully cosmopolitan world? Where, in other words, 
would all the diversity we cosmopolitans celebrate come from in a world where there 
were only cosmopolitans?
The answer is straight forward: the cosmopolitan patriot can entertain 
the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to 
a home of one’s own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from 
the presence of other, different places that are home to other, different people. The 
cosmopolitan also imagines that in such a world not everyone will find it best to stay 
in their natal patria, so that the circulation of people among different localities will 
involve not only cultural tourism (which the cosmopolitan admits to enjoying) but 
migration, nomadism, diaspora. In the past, these processes have too often been the 
result of forces we should deplore; the old migrants were often refugees, and older 
diasporas often began in an involuntary exile. But what can be hateful, if coerced, can 
be celebrated when it flows from the free decisions of individuals or of groups.
In a world of cosmopolitan patriots, people would accept the citizen’s 
responsibility to nurture the culture and the politics of their homes. Many would, no 
doubt, spend their lives in the places that shaped them; and that is one of the reasons 
local cultural practices would be sustained and transmitted. But many would move; 
and that would mean that cultural practices would travel also (as they have always 
travelled). The result would be a world in which each local form of human life was 
the result of long-term and persistent processes of cultural hybridization: a world, in 
that respect, much like the world we live in now.
Behind the objection that cosmopolitanism is parasitic there is, in any case, an 
anxiety we should dispel: an uneasiness caused by an exaggerated estimate of the rate 
of disappearance of cultural heterogeneity. In the global system of cultural exchanges 
there are, indeed, somewhat asymmetrical processes of homogenization going on, 
and there are forms of human life disappearing. Neither of these phenomena is 
particularly new, but their range and speed probably is. Nevertheless, as forms of 
culture disappear new forms are created, and they are created locally, which means 
they have exactly the regional inflections that the cosmopolitan celebrates. The 
disappearance of old cultural forms is consistent with a rich variety of forms of 
human life, just because new cultural forms, which differ from each other, are being 
created all the time as well  (Appiah 1997:617 ; emphasis in original).
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The isomorphism of people, territory, and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes 
the normative character of the modern nation-state is under threat from the 
forms of circulation of people characteristic of the contemporary world. It is 
now widely conceded that the world we live in is one in which human motion 
is more often definitive of social life than it is exceptional. [... M]any such 
locations create complex conditions for the production and reproduction of 
locality, in which ties of marriage, work, business, and leisure weave together 
various circulating populations with various kinds of ‘locals’ to create localities 
that belong in one sense to particular nation-states but are, from another point 
of view, what we might call translocalities. (Appadurai 2003:338)
Regarded from this perspective, projects pursued by the Palestinian private 
actors can be understood as materializations of globalized mindsets that are 
enabled and entrenched through the economy of the OAs. In the same line, 
their scale is factored by the socio-economic aspirations and conditionalities of 
Ramallites. Scholars often recount recently constructed neighbourhoods (e.g. 
elReehan) as ‘settlements’ in juxtaposition to the illegal Israeli colonies where 
the main argument relies on the aesthetics and spatial configurations of these 
residential areas. Indeed, modes and characteristics of space production in 
Palestinian cities are not institutionally acknowledged as mediums of questioning, 
negotiation, and customization. Rather, the built environment continues to be 
governed through eclectic sets of laws, regulations and supplements inherited 
chiefly from the British Mandate (1918-1948), the Jordanian annexation (1948-
1967), and the Israeli COGAT (1967-present). However, the new emerging 
neighbourhoods cannot be reduced to mere copies of colonial spatialization and 
the psycho-behaviour of the oppressed internalizing features of authority. The 
mansions that are considered characteristic of Ramallah were conceived through 
the environment of the British Mandate, does that make them colonial spaces? 
The specific detached-units suburbanization has also existed in Ramallah since 
over three decades; e.g. the Doctors and Engineers complexes are  examples from 
elTireh neighbourhood, both executed in the 1980s. As the names suggest, these 
were conceived through frameworks of unions, mirroring the politico-economic 
hierarchy of the time where socio-spatial enablement stemmed from unions 
rather that today’s neocolonial networks.
The dialectic of urbanisms as ecologies suggests that the different kinetics 
of Ramallah compared to that of the nearby colony of Mod’in produces distinct 
procedures, and hence varied end-products although employing similar strategies. 
Re-employing Marx’s six moments (see section 3.2.4, p. 164); in regards to the 
nature of the process of suburbanization, this practice is rooted in the industrial 
revolution which laboured worker-towns around sites of production, and these 
evolved in shape, scale and function over the course of history and changing 
economic orders. Akin to their predecessors and associates, residential suburbs (be 
they gated communities, banlieues, or favelas) are the natural spatial articulation of 
particular social needs and modes of economic production (see section 2.3, p. 91). 
While the different typologies correspond to scaled stratifications, nonetheless, 
they all depend on functioning mobility infrastructures that connect them to 
the agglomerate’s centre(s). Here, a characteristic difference lies in the form of 
activity producing colonies in comparison to that of Ramallite suburbs. While the 
former is a centralized and subsidized colonial strategy of land-alienation aimed 
at furthering Palestinian fragmentation (see section 2.2.2, p. 82); on the other 
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side, the latter is a product of de-regularized capitalist speculation whose indirect 
impact is the further encouragement of re-expansion of Ramallite mental and 
lived geography (see section 3.2.3, p. 151). This translates with the fundamental 
difference of fencing and armament of colonies vis-á-vis the open borders of the 
– nonetheless policed – suburbs. This in turn lies in tension with the evolution 
of social relations within these spaces. While the success of this model in both, 
Israeli colonies and Ramallite suburbs, is due to the individualization and hence 
mobility of the citizen; yet, the aforementioned differences yield the exasperation 
of narrow Zionist biopolitics and fear in colonies, while suburbs are normalizing 
the death of the Palestinian politics of national-homogenization, and incubating 
the naissance of new relationalities (see section 3.3, p. 173). 
In both cases these forms of urbanization sustain through marketing 
themselves as extensions of cities and their ability to cater for particular living 
conditions that are on demand. While doing so, the market-process necessitates 
considerations of maximization of profit, which too often lead to discourses 
of mass-production (see section 4.4.1, p. 223). The fact that there are aesthetic 
similarities is largely caused by the fact that both Israeli and Palestinian 
operations pump their elements from the same pool of construction technology, 
hence they assemble similar resources in highly comparable topographies. 
Naturally, this in turn induces the contesting mental perceptions of these spaces. 
Protagonists focus on provincial (non urban) features of landscape romanticisms 
and controlled population features (lower diversity, spatialized familiarity, hence 
reduced otherness) as advantages of these micro districts. Contenders on the 
other side focus on their spatio-economic and social exclusivism and elevated 
rates of consumption of capital and natural resources. In Tel Aviv the majority 
of opposition to the settler project is based on economic considerations, since 
significant portions of annual national budgets are diverted to the exclusive 
benefit of groups that accept the village-like suburban trade-off. The same applies 
to the case of Ramallah. 
There is no doubt about Ramallah’s continued northward expansion. The 
intense relationship between Ramallah’s horizontal orientation and the largest 
(nearby) singular institution – Birzeit University – has been nurturing this 
pattern since the 1970s. The Israeli militarization and dissection of the Qalandia 
and elRam areas to the south, the construction of colonies to the east and west, 
and the placement of headquarters (e.g. Jawwal), representatives (e.g. German 
House), and commercial activities (e.g. elErsal Centre) in the northern parts of 
the agglomerate all feed further into this trend. Hence suburban projects that 
include vital regional infrastructural elements (e.g. elReehan Neighbourhood) 
could actually serve as advantageous stimuli, where the degree of advantage or its 
opposite depends on the value of the trade-off. Here the question is whether the 
value of public funds diverted for the operation of the particular private project 
shared or partisan?
Hence, returning to commentaries over post-OAs large-scale urban projects; 
first, the criticism of Ramallah’s suburbs based on their aesthetic similarity to 
Israeli colonies is too narrow and distracting from the real problematic. A drive 
to Haifa along Highway 1 then 2 provides an album of typological similarities 
with Ramallah; its rich and poor, and its older, middle-aged and newer 
neighbourhoods. The difference though is that while pedestrian connections are 
abundant in areas under Israeli civil legislation, they cease in territories under 
its military rule. In addition, one of the main problems of suburbs such as the 
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Image 5.14. (above) A view over the Diplomatic Quarter (centre of image) from the highest 
point of elTireh Neighbourhood. In the background lies Birzeit.
A
B
Image 5.16. View from point B – showing the Diplomatic Quarter as seen from the (still un-
urbanized) valley road that connects to elTireh and elReehan neighbourhoods.
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C
Image 5.15. (below) View from point A – within the Diplomatic Quarter towards the west, bringing 
into sight elReehan N. and others of smaller scale, some abandoned others under construction.
Image 5.17. View from point C atop a tower at Ramallah’s centre direction north-west, showing 
the city’s old core, followed by elReehan N. and the Diplomatic Quarter.  
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Diplomatic Quarter (Image 5.14 - Image 5.17, p. 269) if compared to elReehan is 
that and although considerably closer to the built-up areas, it did not bother to 
create common infrastructures where it is designed as an alien enclave with no 
connections to the existing fabric except through a policed gate. On the other 
side, elReehan features the – to be – largest hospital building in the area, a small 
and open commercial area, an archaeological site, pedestrian areas and no gates. 
While the architect of the Diplomatic Quarter boasts that ‘its main problem is 
also its advantage, where the incredible steepness (almost 42%) has resulted with 
all houses having open views’ (Ziadeh 2012), his eye-sore tactic of hundreds of 
+10 meters-high retention-walls has to still stand the test of time. 
Second, in plight of the iconic image as marketing tool for attracting 
visitors,  investors, the TNC clientèle and parties that contribute to positioning 
and visibility (Ramallah Municipality 2010a; Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying 
2002); municipalities in the Ramallah agglomerate and other PA-tiers have been 
granting licenses for voluminous real estate projects. Akin development policies 
in Valencia (Brück 2010), private investors are granted privileges on the expense 
of the average citizen; e.g. elErsal Centre in the PNG vis-à-vis construction in 
the huerta lands; and, Rawabi’s forced land appropriation from owners vis-à-
vis institutionalized mechanisms enabling developers from appropriating lands 
in Valencia. Hence, the depiction of Ramallah’s patterns as Amman-ization 
or becoming like Dubai is also narrow, because it obscures the fact that these 
neoliberal spatializations are global on one hand; and on the other the fact that 
unlike the two examples, Ramallah is not a monarchy rather a walled-in enclave 
under extensive systems of colonial rationalization. Hence, the fact that glass-
towers are rising in the warm and extra-sunny climate of Ramallah should be of 
no surprise, although not recommended. However, what should be addressed is 
the fact that these structures are subjugated to the same regulation parameters 
as those of residential units at a time the scale, resource impact and circulation 
pressure are significantly higher. 
This calls back the discussions of chapters 2, 3, and 4 regarding the 
incompatibility of the political, economic, urban and regulatory systems of 
decision-making in Ramallah. The visionaries stirring the motors of Ramallah’s 
growth potentials are (not absolutely but largely) over-aged men of guerilla-
revolutions and nation-state imaginaries, middle-aged businessmen with careers 
in Dubai-making and master-planning, and young professionals nurtured in 
neoliberal development discourses of manuals and statistics. The ontological 
translations of their visions are therewith  attempts to normalize their respective 
pseudo-concrete spatial fantasies which among other impacts ‘promotes the false 
construct of a flat, one-dimensional, monolingual horizontal identities’55 (Jacir 
2013); as described in the introduction of this work.
The pull-and-push dynamic – between these camps and their significant 
physical undertakings on one side and on the other proponents of re-imagination 
of the direct space free of the blemished of borders and limitations of present 
geopolitical and economic realities e.g. Anani (2010), Petti (2011), Shibli (2012) 
– is feeding into the growing sentiments of othering and disenfranchisement 
within the larger space of Ramallah. Under neoliberal austerity investors receive 
subsidies and citizens lose their securities. In the short history of the PA many 
PPPs have been signed whose declared aims are positive change, however, whose 
impacts have been adverse. These projects whose ultimate target is profitability 
‘produce a landscape that does not encourage urbanity’ and the spread of 
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whose gains amongst society ‘depends on the size of the direct governmental 
commitment to public benefits’ (Fainstein 2009:768); which in Ramallah lie 
below minimums of human dignity. That said, the reality that Palestinian private 
sector – local or glocal – is conceiving and implementing mega-projects is neither 
pioneer nor alarming; ultimately, development and progress entails investment. 
However, the failure and danger lies in two; first, the absence of future vision in 
decision making, as stated by Khoury (and endorsed by Anani 2010, Kassis 2010, 
Barghouthi 2012, Shaheen 2012) who describes Palestinian private investors as:
[T]hey are noble people and quite respectable. In my opinion, they are looking 
for a role to play. You think they do have a role, but surprise or not, they don’t 
have one; which is unfortunate. You know what, I wish there was a conspiracy 
and those private investors are a part of it, I wish! because at least if there was a 
conspiracy, then that implies that somebody is thinking! (Khoury 2010)
The combination of the laissez faire mentality of the PA and the socio-
economic psychology of existential emergency due to continued colonization has 
led to a real-estate market dynamic similar to the board-game Risk. Friends and 
acquaintances voluntarily engage in a sport where to survive one has to conquer, 
and to conquer one has to keep shifting allies for the momentary goal of staying 
in the game for five more minutes, and then another five. What this implies is that 
the corporations exampled in this chapter and others have been and will continue 
to constantly shift their tactics. Thus, calculating trends and mindsets of spatial 
consumption by the varied Ramallites, can the local urban intellect influence 
the discourse of the private, profit-oriented sector? Could new imaginaries of 
socio-spatial equalities engage in the temporal speculation industry? Can fluid 
groupings compete against exclusive PPPs through projects of urban commons? 
(see section 4.4.2, p. 234).
This brings forth the second shortcoming; Ramallah’s mutated 
transformation is largely caused by the appointment of private investors 
as uncontested visionaries for the diverse space while – atop – freed from 
accountability to legal, public and differently-educated opinions. Besides the 
fact that the systems grants investors and developers free-range; discussions over 
patterns of Ramallah’s evolution are absent from the public realm. Beyond a (small 
but growing) nucleus of academics and artists this research failed to find any 
local critical journalistic investigation or media report that questions the physical 
spaces of the city and its features – yet. While complaints are echoed daily on the 
streets of the city, there is a lack of attempts to knit webs of solidarities   (alAtar 
2010, Barthe 2011, As’ad 2010). In comparison, e.g. Berlin’s communication of its 
transformation processes post its reunification in 1990 was extensive:
[Debates] took place over more than a decade, on what the urbanism of the new 
Berlin should be about and what it should look like. Such debates were omnipresent 
in the city’s physical and virtual public sphere: in the numerous planning and 
architectural exhibitions displayed in public buildings or private art galleries, 
in the public debates between built environment experts and politicians, in the 
daily articles of the press reporting planning and architectural controversies. [...] 
Alternative visions of the future of Berlin were debated, and communicated, through 
words, ‘maps, models of the city, virtual-reality simulations, newspaper articles, 
planning codes, architectural sketches, and even tourism practices’. (Colomb 2012:3)
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Berlin’s transformation over the past decade is naturally contested (Colomb 
2012; Kappan 2002), more so, as ideology, perception of value and taste are 
subjective elements – an argument in defence of the controversial choices of 
the Palestinian private sector. The sentiments of Berliners about Potsdamer 
Platz or Parisians about La Defence vis-à-vis tourists will probably re-assemble 
in Ramallah with its forthcoming elErsal Centre. Nonetheless, the difference 
in Ramallah in comparison to Berlin is (as detailed in section 3.1.2, p. 118) the 
absence of mediums of stakeholder conversation and negotiations due to the 
colonial legacy on one hand, and on the other the Arafatian legacy of absence 
of principles of debate and the culture of differences (Abdulhadi 2014). In turn 
this elevates levels of tension and contestation between the stakeholders detailing 
the spatialization (morphology) of Ramallah. In the opposite corners sit the 
(discourse-defender) PA and (its current main opposition) the educated elite. To 
win each needs the voice of at least two of the three referees: the average citizens, 
transnational capital and ideologies, and private capital (real estate corporations); 
each of which practices a different dynamic with the main contenders; as shown 
in Diagram 5.1. 
Hitherto the PA has been empowered by its ability to win the real estate 
coterie through providing them with access to resources (a.o.), as well as the donor 
financing of its neoliberalized system of government. This has been enabling 
it to control the average citizen (poor and middle-classes) through extensive 
and expensive policing and illusions of PPPs as collective opportunities from 
the other; i.e. through repressive hierarchies and dependency. On the opposite 
corner of the ring sits the educated elite with their significantly diverse fantasies 
of utopian social hierarchies and connections inspired from exposure to – and 
on itself being part of – varying sets of transnational (global, denationalized) 
self-reinforcing ideologies. These, as afore-discussed, have hitherto not been able 
to forge significant channels that enable tapping into resources for engendering 
negotiated location-based innovation. While many debates are taking place 
advocating the different models, the outreach of these voices of alternatives remain 
limited in narrow (non-overlapping, yet) relationalities with the average citizens; 
whose access to resources and improved living conditions form the official raison 
d’être of the demanded administrative (political) change. The success or failure 
in forging additional points of cross-ideological solidarities – whether with 
real-estate corporations or the average citizens – determines the outcome of the 
current struggle of these visionaries against the threshold of mobilizing a critical 
mass and/ or capital capable of pressuring political decision-making. 
Influence over decision-making and its diversification and customization is 
conditioned by the interest of the larger public to directly engage in the process; 
which in the case of the Ramallah can only be partly blamed on the municipality, 
while mostly, on the public whose concern and engagement have been occasional 
and minimal (Kassis 2010, Rayyan 2010, alKhalili 2012, AMAN 2014). However 
and as this work has showcased hitherto, the breeze of protest has indeed found 
echoing corners in Ramallah. Evidently, the geopolitical dimension creates 
an equation different than that of Hong Kong56 nor Barcelona57. The web of 
relations is far more complex than this schematic Diagram 5.1, p. 273, and at each 
of the layers the forces of the fluid colonial system shift the chemical reactions. 
Whether Ramallah’s desires for change will evolve to engendered currents and 
spatializations is the fundamental question of the moment (see section 3.2.3, 
p. 151). Phrased differently, the ability of Ramallites to continue their twentieth 
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century behaviour of synthesising regional conditions and elements to produce a 
compatible, shared environment is detrimental.
While only the future can answer how the current politico-economic 
dynamics will translate in Ramallah; nonetheless, here speculators should factor 
the impact of the so-called Arab Spring on the sensibilities of the five illustrated 
stakeholders (Diagram 5.1). The still ongoing displacement of millions in Syria 
and Iraq, the urban crisis and rising insecurities of Cairo and Tripoli, and the 
Israeli policies of spatial appropriation versus annihilation in the WB and GS 
respectively; together these happenings have detrimentally altered the variables 
of Palestinian-Israeli politics and economics. They are the finishings of a two-
decade long process of dismantling of the nation-state imaginaries of freedom 
and security. The ongoing neoliberalization of professions and marginalization 
of the public sector has hitherto provided a critical opportunity for the private 
sector. However, continuation is conditioned on the load-bearing capacity of a 
compromised system that likely will not be able to contain the charged citizens 
within ‘movements that lack overall political coherence’ as described by Harvey 
(2013:119) who also notes:
Diagram 5.1. Illustration of main features of the 
pull-and-push between Ramallite stakeholders with PA 
and Visionaries as main opposing poles.
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If urbanization is so crucial in the history of capital accumulation, and if 
the forces of capital and its innumerable allies must relentlessly mobilize to 
periodically revolutionize urban life, then class struggle of some sort, no matter 
whether they are explicitly recognized as such, are inevitably involved. This is 
so if only because the forces of capital have to struggle mightily to impose their 
will on an urban process and whole populations that can never, even under the 
most favorable of circumstances, be under total control. An important strategic 
political question then follows: To what degree should anti-capitalist struggles 
explicitly focus and organize on the broad terrain of the city and the urban? 
And if they should do so, then how and exactly why? (ibid:115)
And he answers:
The urban obviously functions, then, as an important site of political action and 
revolt. The actual site characteristics are important, and the physical and social 
re-engineering and territorial organization of these sites is a weapon in political 
struggles. In the same way that, in military operations, the choice and shaping 
of the terrain of action plays an important role in the determining who wins, 
so it is with popular protests and political movements in urban settings. The 
second major point is that political protests frequently gauge their effectiveness 
in terms of their ability to disrupt urban economies. (ibid:117) 
These discussions which are gaining more ears with every new urban 
protest are inviting investors in Palestine (whether real estate corporations or 
transnational capital) to choose: does one continue with the tactic of five-minute 
survival through association with the hegemonic central government? Or does 
one bet on experimental (subversive, alternative) modes of decision-making and 
government? In financial terms, should one seek profit by investing in risky stocks, 
or buy a lotto ticket. Investors have already commenced weighing their options of 
how to sustain and further their gains shall the PA’s feet slip. The fact that PIF as 
well as many other donor programs have in the past few years allocated millions 
in credits and grants for the development of MSME’s is an indicator of a changed 
economic structure that reduces the power of exclusive oligopolies in favour of 
higher democratization of production (Colomb 2012, Johar 2014). The cafés of 
Ramallah are the scenes of increasing numbers of free-lancers hoping to be able to 
afford the expensive commercial rent values. This sub-group of Ramallite average 
citizens forms a strategic opportunity for both, the educated elite recruiting for 
an urban revolution and the real estate corporations that are searching for new 
markets. Here it is largely the choice of independent visionaries to continue 
observing and commenting, or publicly engage with practical proposals in spite of 
absence of official invitations; to push open channels of contiguity, negotiations, 
and re-modelling through voluntary compromise, or watch the city as it turns 
into sets of incoherent, or discontinuous, or sometimes lifeless spaces as shown in 
Image 5.18 - Image 5.23, p. 277. 
The masses of refugees from atrocities of war in Syria and Iraq have created 
many ripples, one of which is the suspension of the Palestinian regional monopoly 
on the phenomenon which directly reduces the weight of the claim of the latter 
for the return of their refugees. However, currently there is no Palestinian political 
party or figure who has either the power or the suicidal wish necessary to sign-
off this unalienable right in a treaty with Israel. Combined with the demands of 
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Zionist maximalists for their government to annex the WB, the sweeping protests 
within Israeli cities by its Palestinian nationals and sympathizers, and the fatigue 
of the PA from chasing separatists and shrinking capital; together these are forcing 
the re-definition of the PA and questioning the relevance of the PLO in general. In 
the particular case of Ramallites, their reactions to the genocide committed during 
Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in summer 2014 revealed the heterogeneity (and 
schism) in socio-political principles and the absence of leadership frameworks. In 
spite of the trauma, anger and depression, in this agglomerate the majority decided 
to be no hero, rather, remain composed and focused on the day following the 
settling of the rubble. There were nonetheless two noteworthy activities within the 
city, with very clear messages to the political and capitalist tiers.
The first one was the ‘48,000 March’ which took place on 24 July 2014 and 
brought together 15,000 protesters. The naming comes from the 1948 Nakba 
re-instating this historic event again as the focus rather the 1967 project, and 
the declared goal was the breaking through Qalandia checkpoint at the south of 
Ramallah and (re)entering Jerusalem. Besides the fact that this was the largest 
demonstration to take place in Ramallah since the signature of the OAs in 1993, 
it has confirmed that Ramallites are highly charged, and capable of mobilization. 
The inability of the organizers to build on the momentum of the event is a result 
of the afore-discussed detrimental absence of broad solidarities and strategists. 
Yet, indicators point to that this could alter with passing time. The second 
activity, which was the multiple popular campaigns pressuring merchants and 
Image 5.18. A view at alLid Street in alJabal Neighbourhood, which in the Master Plan 
of the city is divided between Residential A and B regulations, which typically should 
respond to 4 floors or an elevation upper limit of 15 metres, see Table 4.11, p. 224.
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Image 5.19. An abandoned typical 1970s house at the Library Street (alNuzha Neighbourhood) 
whose plot is classified as Residential B. The voluminous commercial building rising directly 
behind it stands on a lot classified as ‘Office - Retail - Tourism’.
Image 5.20. (below left) The Sanawbar Residential twin-villas complex of 12 units which was 
the first to be built in this area in the late 1990s is now being curtained from view by multi-
story apartment buildings from front and behind.
Image 5.21. (below right) A view on alMughtaribeen Neighbourhood at Ramallah’s centre. 
Notice the lack of spatial connection of these constructions which accumulated over time.
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Image 5.22. Khalil alSakakini Cultural Centre and its surrounding in alHussein 
Neighbourhood.
Image 5.23. Old and new constructions merging in the absence of regulations at Dar Ibrahim 
Neighbourhood, whereby the further part lies under the classification of Linear Commercial 
while the closer segment lies under Residential C.
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businessmen to divest from Israeli counterparts, which was much stronger in 
Ramallah than any other WB city. On one side, at the end of a dialectic logic this 
movement is representative of voiced rejection for partisan economics which 
diverts winnings from Palestinian pockets to Israeli ones. The sociology of the 
oppressed and the history of urban revolutions suggests that among the coming 
protests will be those demanding access to resources. As such and in the absence 
of functioning state-apparatus and subsidiarity to colonial counterparts, the 
politics of real-estate corporations (whom traditionally set the scale of applied 
standards and forms) has to widen its base of loyalties if it desires to remain in-
balance. As alKhalili argues:
The identity of this city is not elaborated in the architecture – including 
planning – rather, in the anti of architecture. The architecture we see is a 
reflection of the political conditions we are living: a neoliberal economy, quasi-
dictatorship politics, absence of democracy, social stratification, and presence 
of a coterie that is ‘rich and able’ that is having an affair with this political 
regime: capital has found union with political authority. This constellation is 
producing a certain kind of space as well as a human. The new Palestinian is a 
breed of his/her city and not his/her Palestinian-ship. [...] It must be noted that 
the donor capital is designed such that the current political stagnation persists: 
it doesn’t die, but doesn’t prosper either; in the interim plane under life but 
above death. The resulting economy – bars, restaurants, new cars and houses – 
is that of being cyclically in debt. Profit is made and spent in the consumption 
possibilities Ramallah is increasingly providing; you have a number of bars not 
just one, diverse culinary experiences, varying settings and acoustics, etc. And 
each of these sub-spaces attempts to attract a share of the circulating capital and 
maintain a seat on the revolving table. [...] One is an employee at an institution 
that produces elements with no market value; so-called studies, publications 
and basically ink on paper that is void of reinvestment possibilities. Then 
one spends the money for rent or construction, a beer, a pair of pants from 
suppliers that in turn depend on that person cashing in on a salary paid – by 
the external donor – for producing a zero market-value product. [...] And as 
such, Ramallah’s viability relies on political stability that caters for remaining 
resource-dependent. On the other side of the same coin, even if political 
stability persists, this economic trend is bound to reach saturation that triggers 
a lapse. (alKhalili 2012)
In other words, private investors should investigate making profits through 
selling citizen satisfaction. This brings about the other side of the same coin; 
similar to the bio and organic markets, this demand will induce the creation of 
alternatives to existing products. This market opportunity and its derivatives 
could be many different things, depending on multiple subjective variables. Here 
innovation lies in the ability to re-arrange the elements that Ramallah has today 
to produce a different range of spaces than those exampled here. Hence, are there 
any – logical and also innovative – concepts for forging different spatial trends and 
an integrated resilient morphology in Ramallah? And how are these rationalized?
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6  | WHAT FOUNDATIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE 
RAMALLAH?
‘What separates the worst of architects from the best of bees’, says Marx, is 
‘that the architect erects a structure in imagination before realizing it upon the 
ground’. (Marx IN Harvey 2009:236)
It is also scarcely realized that demographers, statisticians, geographers, 
architects, and planner have been central to Israel’s efforts to deepen its control 
over the three dimensional spaces of the Occupied Territories. Their analyses 
and prescriptions have helped to shape the annexing of Palestinian land, the 
construction of walls and ‘buffer zones’, the mass bulldozing of houses and 
olive groves, the demodernization of Palestinian cities, the ethnic cleansing of 
selected areas, the construction of carefully located Jewish settlements and 
access roads, and the appropriation of water and airspace. (Graham 2006a:35; 
emphasis added)
Even though Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have become accustomed 
[...] to the wanton destruction of buildings and infrastructure, extrajudicial 
executions, acute poverty, random checkpoints, and the draconian permit 
regime, their intimate familiarity with this reality does not yet entail that 
they can carry out the kind of planning that diminishes and distributes risks. 
(Gordon and Filc 2009:478)
Although no official date has hitherto been named as the end of the so-called 
Second Intifada (illusion of continuation? prolongation of emergency?); in effect 
it has lapsed in the months following Mahmoud Abbas’s election to preside the 
PLO, where he coupled with the first-class financier Dr. Salam Fayyad who was 
described as the Palestinian Ben Gurion by Akiva Eldar1. Together they put forth 
an agenda to ‘discipline’ the unruly and superfluous PA towards building the 
institutions of the State of Palestine by 2011; a task Abbas declared his government 
has fulfilled in an address at the UN General Assembly meeting on 29 November 
2012, and there has been much noise since. Countless statements from foreign 
ministers and politicians warning of the catastrophe, the demise of the imaginary 
two-state solution, and in the months between October 2014 and January 2015 
several European parliaments and/or governments announced they would 
recognize a State of Palestine. Whereas the particular parameters of these positions 
are irrelevant here; one might view them as expressions of growing solidarity with 
Palestinians and the desire to pressure Israel into changing its politics. On the other 
side of the same coin these happenings cynically mirror the early 1990s where two 
years after the PLO made its Declaration of Independence, western democracies 
rushed to embrace the (neoliberal) diplomatic discourse – what later would 
become the Oslo Accords – as the bearer of remedies for decades of colonization. 
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Here the importance of employed terminology re-appears. Involved world 
governments are not expected to choose the course of ‘diplomatic crisis’ by 
voicing support to e.g. a one-state solution that advocates a united geography. 
However, opting for the ‘state’ term implies the legitimacy of ongoing ethnocratic 
separation. In place one could easily resort to general principles of justice 
instead, e.g. expression of support for ending the Palestinian statelessness. Haste 
to recognize a State of Palestine again blatantly and audaciously sidelines the 
immobility of about 600,000 settlers in the illegal colonies, and more importantly, 
their economies, not to mention other colonial webs which are best expressed 
in the Israeli proposals made between 1997 and 2001 (see Map 1.21 - Map 1.24; 
pg. 39). Eight decades passed since the Palestine Question was put on the agenda 
of global forums and the (oft self-describing) ‘enlightened’ world is still evading 
articulating the obvious; the reality that the Zionist project gives Palestinians the 
choice ‘between inferiority and dependency[, o]utside these options there is no 
salvation’ (Fanon 2008:74). As the current Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon 
frankly stated it: ‘We need to free ourselves of the conception that everything 
will enter the framework of a state. From my perspective, let them call it the 
Palestinian empire. What do I care? It’s autonomy’ (Newman 2014). Any serious 
work about Palestinian localities in general cannot claim to be apolitical, and the 
case of Ramallah in particular research has to acknowledge that it ‘is not just the 
story of new urban identities and possibilities, it is also  story of class, and still 
more a story of colonialism’ (Abourahme 2009:502).  
Israel’s ethnocratic ideology, drive and mechanisms have been scholarly 
explored and are progressively accumulating evidence (e.g. Yiftachel 1999, 2000; 
Weizman 2006; Graham 2006; Pappe 2007; Hamami and Tamari 2008 a.o.). The 
spatializations of doctrines and methodologies of the WZO, IOF, COGAT, urban 
planners, global financial and political players have been reviewed, as well as those 
of the changing role of the Palestinian liberation movement, PLO, PA institutions, 
the coterie and their oppositions. In light of the discussions of former chapters, it 
is painless to accuse Mahmoud Abbas with lethal compromise of the Palestinian 
unalienable rights, his PA with imperial agency, and his security apparatuses 
of being a quasi colonial brigade. However, here ontological approaches could 
provide perspective to more complex chemistry, whose understanding is a 
condition for educated future imaginations of modes of producing urbanity in 
Ramallah; which is the goal of this chapter. 
Discussion over the PA’s  agency is highly controversial for Palestinians, 
exceptionalised by nationalized discourses, and is hampered by Israeli politics as its 
confrontation entails a finale to the variably employed ‘politics of denial’ by Israeli 
governments since the declaration of their state; denial of ethnic cleansing2; that the 
land had natives; sumud possibilities; and recently, the ability of the globalization 
of the Palestinian question to delegitimize the Zionist project. On the other side 
of the same coin, thirty five years of Arafat’s monopoly over the PLO created a 
centralized, fragmented, and highly militarized politics whose hierarchies contain 
the ambitious, belligerent and disunited coterie. From amongst those a leader 
had to rapidly emerge after the abrupt death of Arafat, at a time the latter had 
systematically undermined any competition including that of Abbas3. 
The not-so-popular statesman who – akin his contending comrades – has a 
significant number of competitors was thereof to operate a polemic environment 
of politico-economic alliances on which he had and has little leverage. The public 
showdown between him and Mohammad Dahlan (former Fatah politician) 
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is a case to point: Abbas is not Arafat. Thankfully? Abbas’s initial moves were 
indeed focused on curbing the tentacles of patronage e.g. reclaiming state 
property, revoking of (actually illegal) diplomatic status privileges, prosecution 
of corruption and combating other tools of cooptation utilized by his successor. 
Nonetheless soon after – irrelevant willingly or otherwise – he stepped into the 
pre-(co-)tailored shoes. 
While this might explain the limited performance of Abbas it does not 
exonerate him from not having changed the design after almost a decade in office. 
Here it should be acknowledged that he belongs to his generation of politicians 
and revolutionaries; their memories, education and ideology of disciplined 
guerilla revolutions which fail to recognize the thin line between struggling for 
the people and turning into the dictators, e.g. Saddam of Iraq, alAssad of Syria, 
Ben Ali of Tunisia, alGaddafi of Libya, and Mubarak of Egypt among many other 
similar cases worldwide. Abbas is a believer in the power of the nation-state 
as apparatus of order and protection against racist dominion. This mentality 
prevents him (and his troupe of politicians) from recognizing that the state 
and state-making politics of his young days were severely undermined by the 
technological advancements in (physical) mobility possibilities, and buried with 
the digital breakthrough (mental and information mobility). The impacts of these 
are not pressuring the state-politics of the PLO only, but also those of centralized 
regimes throughout the world. Post-nationalism may have been born in the 1990s, 
but it is only now that cities are recognizing the significant political shifts it brings 
about. As cross-border solidarities and urban movements gain momentum, it is 
imperative to ask how these processes will translate in localities where Cold War 
politicians still hold decision-making monopolies? How could PA institutions, 
particularly Ramallah Municipality re-organize in this era of protest? 
The inconclusive clauses of the OAs (see Annex.3; pg. 384) have translated 
with the PA operating in what Khalidi et al. call ‘minimal policy space’ (2011:12), 
labouring an autocracy whose continuation depends on an exchange, loyalty to 
the regime for a title (e.g. diplomatic passport), capital (e.g. expensive health 
treatments), or position in any of the countless tentacles of this institution as 
asserted by Shikaki (1996), Brynen (2000), and Samara (2000) among many 
other works. Beyond the biology that purchasable loyalties will always change 
to the higher bidder; these and other investigations of the PA have been limited 
to its function as colonial subcontractor and its corollary tools, aesthetic 
and behaviour. The political impotency, corruption, lack of sovereignty, 
dependency, neoliberalism and various failures of the PA are often flagged. Yet, 
the triangulation of these aspects with their epistemologies on one hand and on 
the other their locational sociospatial (hence micro-political) impact remains 
curbed, particularly the reality that the PA has also been a producer of an 
imagined ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’ of Palestinians. The system which assumes 
a homogeneous society in which ‘minorities must abide by decisions of the 
majority’ (Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence; Annex.4; 
pg. 392) has generated a dynamic in Ramallah – the city of new comers – 
whereby the majority is many groups, and the othered minorities are considered 
bacterial infections that can be ‘corrected’.  
Perhaps the most significant impact of the OAs – and certainly a 
detrimental one – is the amorphous social change across localities, where one 
of the few commons is aberration from the political liberation movement and 
preoccupation with quotidian emergencies. The discordant trajectories of the 
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various localities stand witness to the failure of the old guard in building a social 
national strategy in support of their political national project. How did and does 
the PLO plan to achieve economic and structural independence when it advocates 
Israel’s colonialism as a passing event that will be resolved through the magic of 
PA politics and diplomacy – rather than being approached as a phenomenon 
necessitating cross-sector, targeted economic and spatial innovation?
Regardless what protagonists of the PA and PLO claim, it is quite evident 
that the deliberate and systematic suspension of the resistance and liberation 
movement from being the responsibility of the individual and doyens (the Hara 
and its motors) has in effect resulted in the removal of the major adhesive of the 
various Palestinian communities and sub-cultures. As Chapter 2 elaborated, the 
low-hierarchy and fluid politics of the NGCs and their varying elements resulted 
in progressive strategies in which the individual and representational-spaces 
were both dependent on and creators of a functioning social order; a flowing 
system of (arguably) balanced trade-offs (cross-dependencies) of responsibility, 
accountability, and relative security. The PA monopolized these roles and 
barricaded them behind bureaucratic, eclectically-efficient, and hence psycho-
sociologically imbalanced procedures, which in turn lead to the disintegration of 
the foundations of twentieth century Palestinian ‘collective’ political power. While 
the popular struggle before the OAs was motivated by the desire for inclusion 
under the umbrella of beneficiaries of civic rights; in a cynical turn of events 
the PLO politics has de facto and de jure laboured a partisan system of exclusive 
rights that is morbidly similar to that of the enemy, therewith exasperating the 
precariousness and pregnability of average Palestinians. Here naturally the 
average citizen moved her/his attention to the following item on the priority-list, 
landing at the human preoccupation with financial prosperity and normalcy. 
Ramallah has normalized its colonial reality, but that does not make it a 
disappointing exception rather the reliable rule, and therewith re-points to the 
central concern of this work. Building on this interpretation of politics, relationalities 
and economic-conditionalities of socializations of Ramallites over the past century, 
this closing chapter elaborates on the curator role that Ramallite visionaries are 
implored to assume. In this process there are three fundamental postulates:
First, the combination of historic patterns, contemporary regional and global 
events, and Oslo’s dismantling of Palestinian channels of commoning are 
opening the possibility for a new Palestinian project. While alKhalili states 
that ‘At a certain point the common consciousness should prevail over the 
individual gain, thence will a movement emerge in one form or another’, 
Harvey asserts that ‘commons’ in a culturally mixed urban environment are 
typically ‘contradictory and therefore always contested’ (2013:71).
Second, a ‘common consciousness’ can only mentally prevail (become popular) 
through lived individual gain (positive trade-off). Hence, Palestinian 
decolonization can only be achieved through (among other elements) the 
democratization of production, therein access to resources, opportunity, and 
the right to flourishing. And,
Third, I argue that Ramallite civic liberation (equality) cannot be achieved 
through rigid political structurations and exclusive national emblems and 
labels; rather, it necessitates reduction of sociospatial othering through 
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conditional (mercurial) decision-making mechanisms that accumulatively 
serve diluting the PA’s infrastructural power, the lifeline of the despotic 
power. Decolonization of Ramallites starts inside their city, in its heavily 
surveilled, fragmented and controlled everyday-spaces, in creating a socially 
resilient (as opposite to fearful, compromised) community.
Here it would be ludicrous to assume that the PA would concede its 
centrality, or that its politico-ideological allies (e.g. Hamas) would not attempt 
to place their grip on the failing system. Hence a central question that future 
scenarios must attend to is: What incremental, progressive and insurgent urban 
policymaking frameworks should be employed to eliminate threats of creating 
cloned replacements, and guaranteeing success in coopting stakeholders into the 
suggested system of mutually accepted and beneficial compromise? In particular, 
what are examples of morphological strategies that scale, contextualize, and 
orient the varied pseudo-concrete social imaginaries overlapping in Ramallah 
into complementary units that together produce coherent and representative 
spaces? And what kind of morphological game-rules (flexible regulations) can 
be employed to ensure capacity to variably capitalize on the rapid technological 
and social changes as powerful elements in producing different yet economically 
and environmentally resilient sub-ecologies? 
These questions are laboured through some morphological imaginations 
of future Ramallah in the second section of this chapter. I will not be proposing 
particular solutions nor spatial re-arrangements. Indeed, over the past months 
I have puzzled with several potential spatial alternatives, how their economies 
would flow, their environmental characteristics, and the socio-political ‘step 
in the right direction’ they could, potentially, bring about. The combination of 
the methodological dialectics of this project and my work-logic as an architect 
rendered issues of incremental applicability a requirement for validity. In other 
words, for each of the broad-line morphological arrangements I am suggesting in 
this closing chapter I have conceptualized technical, measured urban proposals 
of micro-, mes-, and exo- scale interventions. They are applicable under today’s 
parameters, and arguably bear the potential for contributing towards a positive 
transition of Ramallah (with all its citizens in their various roles and hopes) 
into the definitively coming positioning as district-city within the continuous, 
varied, contested Jerusalem metropolis.
As the principles I state earlier warn, monopolization of spatial imagination 
is not a discourse that is limited to those who had or today have decision-
making power, but also too often extends to those who contend the latter (e.g. 
professionals, educators, activists, etc). In excluding my visions of Ramallah’s 
future scenarios I am differentiating between the plausible analysis, conclusions 
and recommendations that this work places at hands of interested urbanists and 
visionaries on one hand; and on the other, my subjective interpretation of this 
information as a secular urbanist, a leftist scholar, and a woman who – borrowing 
Yazan Khalili’s (2012) self-description – ‘lives and works in and out of Palestine’. 
When and how will I share those visions – as contributions to the necessary 
combinations of Ramallite imaginations – are questions that lie beyond the scope 
and goals of this work. 
Thereupon, this concluding chapter presents a conceptualization framework 
that links the political, economic, social and spatial discussions of 100 × Ramallah 
with foundations that are necessary under visions / scenarios that aims at 
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engendering a resilient and healthy city-space; regardless of specific designs and 
tastes, and in spite of the over-whelming uncertainties determining a city’s course 
of evolution. This framework (Diagram 6.1) is based on universal principles 
and hence can be appropriated and customized to varying urbanities in and 
beyond Palestine. However and as could be expected, this framework is justified, 
elaborated and argued as potential tool for city-space (re)imagination from the 
specific perspective of Ramallah and its geopolitical context and variables.
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Diagram 6.1. Conceptualization Framework to 
help determine foundations, parameters, and therewith 
accumulative impacts of undertakings within one space.
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6.1.    CITIZEN’S AGENCY AND 
RIGHT TO FLOURISHING: 
WHAT CRITERIA?
In an address at the Urban Futures 2050 conference in Lisbon, October 
2014, the geographer and planner Mee Kam Ng stated that the recent Umbrella 
Movement4 in Hong Kong and similar social ‘movements can be seen as protests 
against a perceived collusion between the government and the capitalist sector 
in transforming all sorts of different spaces for the market, for exchange values’ 
(2014:40). Through expounding on the concepts of rights, flourishing, the human 
threshold of ‘capability to function and the somewhat higher threshold that 
constitutes a good human life’ (ibid:41); she argues that the ‘pressure cooker’ 
environment of many cities can only be brought under control when citizens are:
[...] ‘authors of their own conception’ rather than passive receivers of ideologies 
implanted into their mind. In other words, the rights to human flourishing 
require subjective efforts as well as a nurturing objective environment. These 
can only be realized through a value transition or a reframing process of what 
community psychologists would call the ecosystem of our lives from individual 
to micro- (family, schools, work units), meso- (combination of micro-systems), 
exo- (neighbourhoods, world of work, district cities) and macro-systems 
(cultural values, customs and institutions). At the personal level, the practice 
of mindfulness can develop our moment-to-moment awareness and the insight 
into patterns of thoughts, feelings and interactions with others, thereby skilfully 
choosing helpful responses rather than automatically reacting. [... Therein,] 
strength involves ‘the capacity to cope with difficulties, to maintain functioning 
in the face of stress, to bounce back in the face of significant trauma, to use 
external challenges as a stimulus for growth, and to use social supports as a 
source of resilience’. (NG 2014: 42)
Explaining the tensile relationalities involved in creating a healthy community 
Ng borrows Diagram 6.2; pg. 286. As the diagram illustrates, in the absence of 
mediums of negotiations and compromise, levels of competition and preoccupation 
with personal interest lie at their highest values, hence predominantly creating 
spaces of wealth, and occasionally one of the other three forms; public services, 
personal growth, and replenishment spaces. Each locality has its varied set of 
criteria whose fulfilment is necessary to creation of balanced environments. In 
the case of Ramallah there are three main pillars; first, understanding society 
as an assembly of differentiated subgroups rather than a ‘national genus’  which 
necessitates fluid systems of local government that could cater for personal 
and need-based replenishment spaces; second, access to space, resources, and 
democratization of production which socializes spaces of wealth and services; and 
third, environmental, climatological, and geopolitical criteria which are central to 
the continued liveability (attractiveness) of the city. The first two sets of criteria 
are elaborated here, while the third is expounded in the following section which 
utilizes those as arguments for exampled future morphological foundations.
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6.1.1.   Decolonizing Ramallite Governance 
through Social Learning
Today one of the most universal debate-topics is the rise of  neoreligiosities, 
their ultra-conservative politics, and the potential impacts these could have 
– among many other levels – on globalized cities and economies (e.g. AfD in 
Germany, Front National in France, Tea Party in USA). In countries of the Arab 
League a vocal opinion attributes the rise of Islamic neoreligiosity – namely 
Da’esh and the Muslim Brotherhood from which Hamas stems – to the colonial 
legacy of the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916. These claim that the borders of Arab 
nations as drawn up by colonialists had cut through ethnic regions and created 
unstable systems of rule by minorities, making today’s separationist politics a 
normality. Dissecting this logic, Dodge (2014) contends this opinion by stating 
that the ‘settlements that created the majority of states in the Middle East had 
little connection with the Sykes–Picot agreement’ which had ‘to be consigned to 
the Diplomatic lumber-room’ created by ‘the Russian Revolution and America’s 
entry into the war’ (ibid:8). Using this narrative encourages commentators ‘to see 
the current crisis in a specific and inaccurate way’ where; first, ‘the post-colonial 
origins of a state do not in any way nullify its ability to function’, and; second, 
by ‘identifying faith as the key factor in the Middle East, an unchanging essence 
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socially sustainable community (Ng 2014:43).
What Foundat ions for  the Future?  |  287
that traces back centuries, proponents of the Sykes–Picot narrative are guilty 
of primordialisation’ (ibid:9, emphasis in original). While Dodge falls short of 
acknowledging that colonial legacies have proven to be destabilizers of off-spring 
states; notwithstanding, the wars and civil wars in the Middle East over the past 
century on one hand and the other the economy of oil industries have significantly 
shifted the population compositions of the entire region, and interaction has 
altered the practice of cultural activities and equally religions; the Sunnis of Beirut 
are not one, and their quotidian practices differ from faith brethren in Baghdad, 
Jedda and Casablanca. Today’s demonstrations, revolutions and wars should not 
be, again, narrowed to imagined mythologies. To these arguments I would add; 
third, this logic (unintelligently?) attributes the failure of Arab governments (of 
which the PA) to the absence of balanced political representation as function of 
pliable cultural differences hence in effect marginalizing the concrete common 
of disenfranchisement. It feeds into excusing state and religion’s roles in the 
destruction of life (violently or otherwise) on basis of (non)affiliation, rather 
than condemning government structures and preachings of exclusion which 
through their various scales cause the failure of political systems. The difference 
between Tunisia and Egypt stands as evidence; since the former enjoys a relatively 
more advanced system of plurality it has been able to force Ennahda Party into 
comparatively nonviolent compromise up to the moment, while in the latter the 
Muslim Brotherhood (together with former regime operatives) are garnishing a 
corporeal crisis. 
Critical analysis of city-dynamics (production of politics) entails factoring 
social ethos (spacio-behaviour) into understandings of happenings and decision-
making (Amin and Graham 1997, Jessop et al. 2008). Ramallah’s old city is a 
mere 20 minutes walk (1.7 km) from that of alBireh, yet the two are worlds apart. 
Besides the evident reality that Hamas’s activities are significantly wider in the 
latter than in the former; further, the ability to cohabitate Ramallah’s oldest 
mosque with its surroundings of alcohol vendors and growing leisure corners 
has little to do with the legal framing of Christian practices and character, and 
much to do with the strata sustaining this dynamic. As detailed elsewhere, these 
crowds are limited to neither a religion nor particular places of origin (Taraki 
2008, 2008a). The normalization of otherness and behavioural variance was 
laboured through everyday encounter, at the hand of the same temporalized 
mental-frameworks that normalized the colonial enclavization of Ramallah. That 
said, the spaces which served in familiarization and internalization of socio-
behavioural discordance are not growing and evolving at a pace compatible to 
that of the population. As the urban planner Shaheen explains:
[S]ocial change is a continuous process. In each phase we need to examine the 
factors causing the change and direction. The OAs launched the individualism 
era in Palestine, particularly in the centre area around Ramallah. This is linked to 
[...] the promotion of certain concepts of life-style which are exampled all around 
the city through billboards; the image of supposedly self-owned apartment 
overlooking the landscape, the image at the coffee shop having a drink, etc. I am 
not against these practices, yet one should recognize that these images represent 
a reality that did not naturally evolve into a dominant social behaviour, rather, 
they are being artificially promoted. [...] Countless cities went through these 
gradual processes of change into the modern form of urbanity, nonetheless, 
what is happening here in Ramallah is that we are trying to leap ahead rather 
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than change gradually, and this is caused by the imposition of ideas; whether 
elaborated economic systems or media-driven inspiration. This of course has an 
impact on the way people perceive the city and interact with its spaces, which in 
turn is linked to and influenced by the increasingly visible social stratification 
[...]. One could imagine Ramallah as a series of bubbles which correspond to the 
varying ideologies. [...] While Ramallah continues to expand it is noteworthy that 
these bubbles do not overlap. Conservative new-comers still arrive in Ramallah 
among other ideologies, yet they choose to either blend in – where some succeed 
while other don’t and thus their relationship with the plural spaces remains 
superficial – or choose their geography carefully and attempt to solidify their 
presence via marking their territory. [...] What is particular about Ramallah today 
– in contrast to pre-Oslo times – is that it is no more the space of Ramallites only, 
and this is a very natural condition of large cities globally whereby the city is the 
container for people of all walks of life. (Shaheen 2012)
Schematically and without factoring scale, the change in socializations of 
the varied groups of Ramallites can be represented in Diagram 6.3. In former 
pre digital, mass-media times and given the socio-politics of austerity, sumud 
as well as economic quasi-isolation from the world; in those times, the fewer 
groups had their centre of mass (productive activity) in the public sphere and 
hence through collective weight individuals were able to be part of and influence 
decision-making on the level of local politicians (NGCs and the similar). On the 
other side of the same coin, this translated with fluid practices of negotiations and 
compromise. In contrast, with the turn of the millennium the political, economic, 
and social shifts described through this work induced a spatial reconfiguration 
by which the centres of mass of social production lie chiefly in semi-private and 
private spaces, while the public sphere is dominated and produced by the affluent 
few. Concomitantly, as the spaces of overlapping (exchange) of the various groups 
shrink, their defining borders are becoming less permeable and more rigid. 
Public Spaces – services, political ideology and commercial activities
Social grouping, its centre of weight and permeability
Semi-Private Spaces – wealth production and personal growth opportunities
Private Spaces – residence and social circulation
Liberals
Conservatives
Diagram 6.3. Schematic illustration of socialization spaces of the 
varied groupings of Ramallites in former times (left) and now (right).
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Therewith, today Ramallites as a bundle of transnational ethos in a militarized 
enclave of relational loyalties are staging subterranean fault-lines whose seismic 
activity depends on the city’s ability to reduce tensions, which are intra- as well 
as inter-group. Taking an example from within the assumed liberal and tolerant 
sub-groupings of cosmopolitan Ramallites and internationals; in the first two 
phases of the OAs (1994-2005) the latter were spoiled with generous hospitality 
as their presence was framed as political solidarity. However, the systematic, legal 
and economic privileges separating them and their Ramallite equals on one hand, 
and on the other their continued profiting in spite of the impasse of the political 
process have been feeding into sentiments of resentment. The combination of 
double-standards, preferential treatment and salaries of internationals whose 
presence exasperates competition over resources and opportunities for local 
yuppies (spaces of personal growth and wealth accumulation) is alienating the 
two currents, where many feel that ‘Ramallah is more embracing of internationals 
than its children, everything here appeases them and aborts us, starting with the 
operating systems of NGOs, through apartment advertisements, and ending with 
culinary rituals’ (Yehya 2013:115). The othering of internationals in Ramallah – 
including by persons whom themselves lived or are living abroad – is a direct 
byproduct of the constraints placed on Ramallite’s right to flourishing; a chemical 
reaction that also feeds into other expressions of othering. 
Questionnaires filled by participants of the eight focus groups conducted 
within the framework of this work confirm the aforementioned (Diagram 6.4; 
pg. 290). The named most negative aspects of Ramallah are largely spatial (69%) 
and poverty-related (16%), while positive ones range between the romanticised 
social ethos of pluralism and modernity (48%) and opportunity (36%) – the two 
domains that lie under particular threat at the moment. Noteworthy, the non-
mentioning of matters of corporeal security in the questionnaires reflect the tone 
of the preceding conversations, wherein emergency and pregnability are tangible, 
depressing and angering, but contained and suspended by fear of traumas of the 
past fourteen years landing within the direct space.
The hegemonic politics of the PA is ‘concretizing the imagined community 
of the nation by articulating spatial, bodily and temporal matrixes through the 
everyday routines, rituals, and policies’ of the collective space (Alonso 1994:382). 
These constrictive measures are reproducing dissatisfaction in a ‘pressure-
cooker’ process of forces acting in two directions; against the container (political 
authorities) and the othered groupings with which friction (competition) is 
present, as exampled above. Unlike civic protests in countries of advanced 
democracies, in cities like Ramallah such expressions through claiming of 
(surveilled) public space face many obstacles, and as ‘there is no agreement on 
the symbolic and actual act of sharing public space, the unrest is more likely 
to spill beyond the familiar or easily managed spatial bounds’ such as those of 
squares (Davis and Raman 2012:29). If the current trend of bypassing negotiations 
in claim-making continues, it is highly likely that Ramallite ‘efforts’ for equality 
‘are directed towards more rebellious and unconstrained insurgent action’ where 
citizens do not employ (cannot enjoy the physicality of) sites that are officially 
categorized for such purposes; rather, revert to back-streets and the underground. 
As such, the physicality of insurgency will be constructed in ‘interstitial, marginal, 
peripheral, dispersed, and less easily controllable spaces where the state’s power 
and authority is less easily wielded’ (ibid). While the relative enclosure of such 
acts of protest caters for their nurturing, at the same time it isolates them from 
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exchange (negotiation) and co-mobilization possibilities. In the absence of 
‘balancing elements’ of otherness, the result is growing radicalism equally in 
liberal and conservative realms.
In light of this, Ramallah Municipality’s quest for larger power-range (see 
section 4.3.3, pg. 203) is approaching a critical point, whereby its success or 
failure is largely determined by its consciousness and ability to be among the lead 
in tackling the rising socio-economic polarization. Its official goal of becoming 
an international city can find its foundations in the denationalized ethos and 
networks of its nowadays residents. However, the stability of this infrastructure 
is dependent on the municipality’s understanding of its two-edged positioning at 
the bottom of a long command chain. 
On the negative side its political subsidiarity to the MOLG, MOPAD, 
and partisan presidential office interventions, the dominance of neoliberalized 
administration and planning tools (master plans and manuals), and the withdrawal 
of several of its civic duties into mandates of other bodies5; combined, these have 
detrimentally (logistically and bureaucratically) compromised discourses of 
progress through linking ‘initiatives to education, job training and placement, or 
social services’ (Fainstein 2009:770) and equally those of legal reform e.g. new 
spatial organization, regulations and decision-making proposals. The Ramallah 
Developmental Planning Framework (RDPF) will prove case to point, akin 
the preceding exercises. Hence, municipal strategy should shift its focus from 
work on regulatory reform – state-legislation which is hostage to the military 
administration of the COGAT and the monopoly of Fatah and Hamas politics – 
to inquiry about the case-based needed forms of reform. The municipality should 
be collecting the pieces of the puzzle of what do Ramallites think they need? 
How could it capitalize on this civic mobilization? Equally, what do non-partisan 
educated opinions suggest? And therein, how can the municipality practice 
policy-making as a social learning process as Peter Hall (1993) suggests?
The evident incapacity of the municipality to provision city-wide 
participatory decision-frameworks is on itself the potential, if recognized; the 
positive side of its positioning as the front-desk of the city-management and 
planning apparatuses within the PA. Being the body closest to the masses and 
the processor of their claims and complaints, it is the one capable of determining 
which regulations to concretize and which to place under questioning and 
re-examination through pointing un-expecting petitioners to systematic 
loopholes. Here Ramallah Municipality has to decide whether it wants to try 
to orient insurgent urban endeavours (through e.g. premature gratification 
spatial experiments; see section 4.4.2, pg. 234) or waste valuable resources 
trying to contain them. In other words, it could either continue to operate as 
an administrative arm of the PA only, or add to that the function of advocacy 
and enablement of ideas debated in platforms such as Qalandia International 
and Civic Encounter symposiums that are focused on alternative imaginations 
of space and society, among others; i.e. being the pivot of a dignified ‘balance of 
power between classes and fractions of classes, as between the spaces they occupy’ 
(Lefebvre 2009:280; emphasis added). In this regard Abourahme states:
The question that remains is whether Ramallah will reinforce the colonial– 
neoliberal logic of space and entrench this particular brand of ‘post-colonial 
colonialism’, or whether the city will use the inevitable openings that colonial 
performativity leaves behind to force genuine ‘newness’, to manifest an 
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alternative political project in the interstices between colonial design and the 
failure of a national elite. (Abourahme 2009:508)
The difference here lies in institutional engagement in the shaping of 
the spill-out (physicalities of) protests to right of flourishing that are erupting 
throughout the city or delegitimize them; hence exasperating the inter-group 
contestation among Ramallites, or alternatively, force mediums of exchange, 
negotiation, empathy-construction, and within the manifolds spaces of 
normalization of otherness through co-gratification. Architecture, urban volumes 
and morphologies are expressions and generators of hierarchies and corollary 
privileges, thence intensities of socio-spatial polarisations (Alonso 1994, Davis and 
Raman 2012); a reality that implores the municipality to grow beyond discourses 
of spatial speculation in terms of market-value to the larger scale of speculation 
on social ecologies as the loci of profit and attraction. 
Beyond the orthodox arguments concerning the role of attractiveness of large-
scale urban environments to creative yuppies and therewith regional and global 
weight (e.g. Mayer 2012, Colomb 2012); Ramallah’s geo-temporal enclosure renders 
obsolete eurocentric urban policies and management systems, which have proven 
over two decades to be ‘political subjectivication writ large’ (Abourahme 2009:505). 
It’s growth into the significant Jerusalem metropolis (whether Israel recognizes this 
or not) rests on its ability to consolidate and reproduce the genetic elements of its 
resilience in the hundred years past, namely its ethos of pluralism, opportunity and 
joie de vivre. Shall Ramallites and their transnational solidarities find systematic 
channels of coexistence, the city might be able to reap the benefits of a pool of 
sociospatial decolonization (shared flourishing) principles. In case of failure, it 
should brace itself for violent confrontations triggered by the imminent crossing 
of the red-line of sustenance needs of the masses, the ‘restive populations’ (Harvey 
2013:117). In some sense, the battle for the civic right of flourishing in Ramallah 
has been announced, and here institutions and intellectuals are faced with the 
challenge of timely tailoring the battlefield, whose features are detrimental of the 
outcomes. Will Ramallah labour a Friedliche Revolution (DDR, autumn 1989)? A 
Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia, 2010)? A Euromaidan Revolution (Ukraine, 2014)? 
Or a more destructive version? In other words, what kind of political identities do 
parties of influence want to actively or passively endorse? As Uday Mehta writes, 
‘space is discontinuous, social, and relational, and [...] it is just as important as time 
in the shaping of political identities’ (Mehta, IN: Harvey 2009:41).
The aforementioned requires a fundamental shift in the logic of Ramallite 
stakeholders, regardless of their sub-groupings. At the moment the absence 
of social justice is largely associated to the narrow perspective of failed state-
making, camouflaging the fact that conquest and colonization have been regular 
uninvited tenants since the Iron Age, while the recent scales and intensities of 
disenfranchisement are the new phenomenon that is undermining and re-defining 
resistance potentials. Over the twentieth century the Palestinians constructed the 
individual sense of purpose – sumud – through collective concepts of national 
statehood. The clinical-death status of this politics has dismantled – but did not 
find replacements for – the paradigms which rationalize and orient the objective 
individual sensibilities, and it is particularly those adhesive spacio-relationalities 
that Ramallah has to re-configure and engender. These processes of Umdenken, 
of rethinking the status quo advocate broadening perspectives and therewith 
opportunities, as explained by Quiquivix:
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The Palestinian liberation movement is not alone in coming up against these 
limits. In Latin America in particular, many have responded by shifting away 
from prescriptions, whether they be recipes for revolution or dictates on living 
life. This has entailed a rejection of a Left ‘from above’ that focuses on Party 
doctrine and the taking of State power, and toward a left ‘from below’ that 
affirms peoples’ collective capacities to self-determine in their contextually 
specific settings. The Zapatistas in Chiapas, who began as Marxist–Leninists 
and remade themselves after undergoing a long period of questioning, are 
exemplary in this regard. A politics ‘from below and to the left’ as they term 
it; coupled with a desire to ‘create a new world where many worlds exist’. It is a 
world that comes into being not by given prescription, but by ‘asking questions 
as we walk,’ caminando preguntamos. Through their own analyses, the 
Zapatistas have found that these practices and desires are irreconcilable under 
the project of sovereignty. Accordingly, they reject seeking it. They recognize 
that their participation in sovereignty’s relation of command–obedience itself 
helps perpetuate the oppressive relation; thus, they seek to dismantle it by 
disengaging and simultaneously going on to create the world anew. (Quiquivix 
2013:5; emphasis in original)
For Palestinians the word Oslo is rapidly associated to the failed state-making 
project and its legacies. However, there is a different O.S.L.O. emerging  which 
resembles the Zapatistas’ caminando preguntamos that this work encourages 
Ramallites to take notice of; which according to Inderpaul Johar stands for Open, 
Social, Long-term, and Organized. Achieving a safe urbanism commences with 
nurturing public behaviour and awarenesses that conceive and foster positive self-
reinforcing trends (Gehl 2011, Quiquivix 2013, Davis and Raman 2012). These can 
be measured through accessibility to service-providers and resources; quality and 
security of journey; availability of integrated emergency and support frameworks 
and infrastructures; socio-economic compatibility and integration of private 
and public realms; forging constructive relationships between built and natural 
landscape among many other aspects which fall within the mandate and limited 
range of influence of Ramallites and their municipality regardless of positions of 
the PA, donors and Israel. Such domains of activity would in effect re-frame and 
re-size the political alongside the social, economic and environmental through 
nurturing new forms of representative spaces; wherein elements of visions are 
timeless, and methods are adaptive to new knowledge, happenings and scale. In 
technical terms, what the city needs is the re-calibration of its ‘code of rules’ in 
order to produce ‘visible connections between new and old uses, buildings and 
activities’ (Trancik 1986:19-20). 
Like the sitting room emerged through a process of discarding the formal 
public space and appropriating private informal substitutes between the 1960s 
and 1980s (see section 2.2.2.ii, pg. 84), a reverse process should be anticipated. 
The inflation of property prices, reduction in intensities of family-based social 
activities, the new modes of societal interdependency, and the emerging 
perspectives on claiming of city-space will ultimately induce the shrinking of 
private living space, substituting the spatial demand elsewhere. Whether this shift 
in demand ends up feeding into a collective (public, e.g. hara) or exclusive (semi-
private, e.g. club) spaces, the answer and its relative scales will be factored by the 
city’s undertakings – whether institutional or clandestine – and the following 
reactions to materializations; i.e. the employed discourses in the production of 
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new representational space which is not necessarily monumental (e.g. square), 
but surely behavioural (e.g. inter-property sharing). 
For example, in 1993 the Wogeno München eG (Germany) was founded by 
an independent group of citizens not as a political act, rather, simply as claiming 
responsibility to one’s direct environment. The founders wanted concrete social-
solidarity-based spatial alternatives against segregation, shareholder-value and 
social erosion (Wogeno 2014). Under the motto of ‘self-goverend, social and 
ecological living’ the cooperative states that ‘for people in Wogeno buildings, 
home starts not at the door of the apartment, rather beforehand at the gate of 
the court, on the street, in  the neighbourhood’ (ibid). The various projects of 
the cooperative that contribute with a third to social-housing and are based in 
principles of micro social ecologies and resource efficiency, which among their 
manifolds include the maximization and socialization of use of infrastructures, 
e.g. at ground-floor levels gardens are not parcelled and privatized, rather 
maintained as large units for all tenants. Through its various components, this 
framework is contributing to what Ng (2014) categorizes as the micro, meso, and 
exo levels of space. 
The rise in the number of housing cooperatives and multi-unit projects 
in Ramallah mirrors a similar process, albeit with less maturity. Ramallite non-
corporate complexes (by cooperatives) are strictly residential which – with their 
image of wealth – has made them target for securitization and segregation, and 
within the micro borders they are parcelled rather than continuous (e.g. alItihad 
project, Image 6.1). Notwithstanding, the current legal loophole which allows the 
bundling of smaller properties into management entities whose peripheries are 
regulated but internals free, this gives room for new ideas of spatial production. 
Here the threshold towards change is less legal, and more about socio-economic 
perceptions, knowledge, and innovation. Hence, assuming that the first 
determinant is met i.e. processes of social learning are understood and given their 
size on decision-making tables; then, what are the other determinant factors?
Image 6.1. alItihad residential cooperative, north of Ramallah (Surda), September 2014.
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6.1.2.   Who shares the Wealth of Ideas? Anti-
Capitalist Struggles, Citizenship, 
and Ramallite Flourishing
In an series of 12 episodes stretching over 720 minutes the documentary 
series Mankind the Story of All of Us (directed by Dan Clifton and Hugh 
Ballantyne) trails the development of homo sapiens from creation to modernity. It 
showcases that humanity’s evolution and prosperity have been determined by our 
ability to perceive surrounding elements and happenings, conceive and construct 
derivative ideas, and plan their applications (Du Preez and Rafiq 2014). The 
cyclical processing of inputs using tools and artefacts has been the constant in the 
changing forms and scales of wealth generation. Here, life-sustenance motivates 
technological creativity aimed at exploiting particular opportunities in both forms, 
soft and hard; governance skills and equipment. In turn, changing perceptions of 
wealth in relation to life-sustenance have constantly driven politics of societies, 
which essentially is a domain of management concerned with regulating shares of 
wealth; who receives what and why? The answers to these questions determine the 
volatility or stability of an ecology of production, whether wealth accumulation is 
continuous or interrupted with e.g. strikes, revolutions. As debated in countless 
liberal and conservative scholarship alike; capital and ideas will always remain 
key in our day-to-day life activities, and among many aspects, the making of cities 
(Lefebvre 2009, Harvey 2013, Amin and Graham 1997, Jessop et al. 2008).
Up to the signature of the OAs colonial stratification had secondary impacts 
on Palestinians who in spite of their differentiating conditions were dominated 
by politics of austerity and accountability; and whose economy was isolated 
and introverted. Nonetheless, the ‘intranational and intrastate disparities and 
cleavages’ created by what Yiftchel calls Israel’s ‘ethnocracy’ (1999:729; emphasis 
in original) surfaced and intensified after 1993. The combination of insecurity 
(high risk) and planning and construction regulations (see section 4.4.1, pg. 
223) erected an invisible yet efficient barrier that in effect de-democratised city-
production; now only the rich can concretize their visions in Ramallah. That said, 
the local financial elites - the bourgeoisie of Fanon (1963) - tend to avoid risks 
hence preferring investments securitized by coincidence with colonial interests or 
the opposite, but refrain from staging a challenge (Abourahme 2009, Anani 2011, 
Shaheen 2012). For Fanon, in geographies where ‘enormous wealth rubs shoulders 
with abject poverty’ (1963:117) one of the main problematics of the large range of 
influence of this clique lies in their incapacity to conceive new worlds, where he 
argues that the bourgeoisie ‘is lacking ideas, because it is inward looking, cut off 
from the people, sapped by its congenital incapacity to evaluate issues on the basis 
of the nation as a whole’ (ibid:102), and there with in practice their roles are those 
of subsidiary managers rather than entrepreneurs.
The politics of infantilization (Harvey 2009, Anderson 2006) has nurtured 
a system of opportunism (Fanon 1963, Brugmann 2009) which has unfolded into 
the only form possible; the ‘businessman mentality’ that engenders discriminatory 
loyalties rather than the very much needed ‘captain mentality’ that balances the 
ship against tipping. Seen from this perspective, the mobile characteristic adds 
to the worriments, whereby the city’s nature as a translocality suggests that the 
vulnerability of its economy reaches deeper beyond dependency, as the cherry-
picking ability of large capital makes those unreliable. In every case of war the 
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affliction of cities is engraved by the rapid loss of significant capital as those with 
means for decent relocation into safety exit borders. In the years between 2001 
and 2004 scores of Ramallites emigrated carrying their wealth elsewhere, and 
the deteriorating conditions in the West Bank have driven many riches into the 
city of newcomers. Is Ramallah ready for the predictable unfoldings of its current 
economic stagnation which may not balance out as the former one?
While large capital enjoys relative freedom of choice, small and medium 
capital have narrow options; either in savings and securities, or in buying a piece 
of land – which is considered the most secure investment in Palestine. As for the 
Ramallite rising middle-class (in-born and newcomer white-collars), the shift in 
economic orders has replaced the clan with the bank. Through popular capitalism 
the bulk of the local market’s stable capital (that of less mobile strata) is largely 
locked away from circulation, either in the form of inflexible securities or debt. 
The result is the absence of financial shock-absorbers, which in turn examples itself 
with the growing stagnation of Ramallah’s economy since 2011. Tonkiss writes:
The economic crisis that has disfigured so many cities in the last half a decade 
broke out along twin fault lines. This dual crisis – of property and credit – has 
shown the extent to which ‘normal’ urban development processes have been 
financed by debt all along the speculative chain: from sub-prime mortgage 
lenders to insolvent developers, bad banks, and overleveraged governments. 
(Tonkiss 2014:165)
The most circulated concept in face of the financial-crisis-exposed 
vulnerability of large-scale transnational economics is that of the ‘creative city’ 
which advocates cultural innovation as high-value market product (Colomb 2012a, 
Ferguson 2014). In Berlin, the crisis had decelerated the neoliberal appropriation 
of the ‘poor but sexy’ city giving rise to the new motto of ‘sei stadt, sei wandel, sei 
berlin’ (be city, be change, be berlin; Colomb 2012:259). Local government politics 
is claiming desire to engage with its ‘creative’ citizens in redefining its strategies 
and spaces, where in Regula Lüscher (Senate Building Director of Berlin) 
announced that ‘[c]ultural strategies are able to attain accomplishments above and 
beyond those of planning’ (IN Ferguson 2014:10). Debates over urban commons 
(see section 4.4.2, pg. 234) are based on such discourses which advocate ‘making 
social engagement profitable’ (ibid:16). While the compatibility of Berlin’s most 
recent strategies cannot be determined with certainty yet, here Brugmann warns 
that urban decline cannot be reversed with ‘corporate city models – even with the 
best technology and infrastructure designs’ (2009:274). 
As every change in discourse – whether societal or spatial – requires 
investment, ‘there is no getting around the fact that the bourgeoisie still has the 
initiative in its struggle for (and in) space’ (Lefebvre 2009:56). In light of the 
current poverty and fragmentation levels it is highly unlikely that the Ramallah’s 
poor alone will be able to forge the necessary debate, although they definitely 
compose the charged – yet unorganized– critical mass. Equally, it would be 
ludicrous to assume that the PA could assume command. As Diagram 6.5; pg. 297 
demonstrates the PA’s 2014 General Budget (akin former ones) regards the sector 
of Planning and Administration as less important than Border Control (which 
receives 2.5 times more and is anyway decided upon by the Israeli Army); the 
Council of Ministers (which receives 3.4 times more at a time its function as the 
cabinet does not justify the allocated capital); the PLC (which receives 5.4 times 
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Ministry of Women Affairs
Ministry of Media
Ministry of Economy
Council of Ministers
Authorities of Water, Power, Natural Resources and Environment
Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology
Higher Council of Youth and Sport
Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs
Ministry of Local Government
Ministry of Prisoners
Ministry of Education and Higher Education
Ministry of Planning and Administration
PLC
Ministry of Labour
Ministry of Waqf and Religion Affairs
Border Control Authority
Higher Council of Justice
Ministry of Public Works and Housing
Presidents Office
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Interior and National Security
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Communications and IT
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Justice
PLO Institutions
Ministry of Social Affairs
PA Budget 2014
0,05%
0,07%
0,42%
0,27%
0,95%
0,15%
0,51%
0,40%
1,22%
3,34%
10,00%
19,22%
20,00%
0,08%
0,43%
0,34%
0,99%
1,00%
0,20%
0,25%
0,65%
0,40%
1,58%
2,00%
10,62%
27,96%
0,14%
0,44%
0,50%
0,38%
1,07%
0,26%
0,74%
0,75%
0,41%
2,35%
10,66%
100,00%
more at a time it has been inactive since 2007); and the Ministry of Waqf and 
Religion Affairs (which receives a staggering 12.4 times more and whose absence of 
services are neither collectively felt nor as destructive as planning shortcomings). 
Similarly, the PLO Institutions (hard to determine what these do) receive almost 
double and the President’s Office 30% more than the budget of the Ministry of 
Local Government. In another comparison, the Ministry of Interior and National 
Security (whose security?) receives almost 23 times more than the MOLG. Finally 
and beyond numerical considerations, ‘studies convincingly’ demonstrate that 
it is ‘much easier [...] to organize and enforce collective and cooperative action 
with strong participation of local inhabitants in smaller jurisdictions’, as well as 
Diagram 6.5. (above) PA General Budget for 2014, selected items 
(PMOF 2014:20-22; for full table see Annex.7; pg. 398)
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‘the fact that the capacity for participation diminishes rapidly with larger sizes of 
administrative unit’ (Harvey 2013:81).
In this context neutralization (hence balanced sociospatial transformation) 
necessitates gradual cooptation of three economic groupings and their 
organization into co-dependent (cooperative) systems of space production. 
These are; First, powerful private investors who are married to the PA which 
composes the ‘most privatized political entities in the world’ (Gordon and Filc 
2009:467) and along with those the petite bourgeoisie whom are troubled by 
growing risks and are ‘looking for a role to play’ according to Khoury (2010), 
whose ambition remains profit accumulation; Second, ‘the intellectuals, 
professionals, and others who have hitched their fortunes to Ramallah’ and are 
‘in fact underlying its secularism’ (Taraki 2008:14), who are alarmed about the 
rising contestation and radicalism which threaten their sociospatial freedoms, 
whether ideological or behavioural, and; Third, the rapidly growing poor strata 
whose existential worriments are those of improving their living conditions. 
Systematically similar to nationalism and neoliberlism yet parametrically 
varied, a viable resilience strategy should orient the role and gain of the powerful, 
be popular as capitalism yet inclusive as socialism, and grant space and access 
– not virtual hope – to the underprivileged and marginalized. Its respective 
vision should be concerned with re-puzzling the relations of varied groups and 
stakeholders to reveal and consolidate overlapping, multi-charactered commons, 
while concomitantly move the centre of mass (activity of production) out of the 
segregated private and closer into the visible public and semi-public spheres .
To achieve co-dependence planners have to become miners that excavate 
precious stones from seemingly effete elements that conceal significant 
profit opportunities; both in social and financial terms. For example, elBireh 
Municipality held its battle against the spatially problematic Palestine Tower from 
the standpoint of an administrative arm and through the lens of pressure on and 
cost of infrastructure; giving excuse for the investor to attain the needed licenses 
from the higher (corrupt) authorities therewith side-lining the municipality 
altogether. Meanwhile, had a co-dependence relation between the municipality 
and the local small scene of innovative and motivated urbanists and social 
activists been in place, the latter could have advised of alternative methods which 
deprive the investor from the opportunity to grab permit elsewhere. Alternatives 
(proposals to commence negotiations rather than employing the proven 
compromised sovereignty) could have been granting the permit as conditioned 
with e.g. financing of infrastructural solutions, aesthetic amendments to the 
design, and/or the supervised furnishing of parts of the bordering (closed and 
unlandscaped) Palestine National Garden (see section 5.1.1, pg. 245) – akin the 
Barcelona Olympics urban strategy of conditioning the development of private 
commercial spaces to their surrounding public (social and spatial) infrastructures. 
The addition of independent urbanists and activists into the formula moves 
the concern – the responsibilitization – from the government-investor monopoly 
into the public realm, hence enabling the masses from exercising power as 
showcased in the example of the Library Street project in Ramallah, whose 
course was forced into a compromise through the incident of information spill 
(see section 4.4, pg. 220). Here and as AMAN’s study (2014) of LGs integrity 
explains, the lack of transparency creates a void in place of public opinion due 
to the lack of interest of both, LGs to publish and discuss their operations and 
the journalists to ask. In the case of Ramallah, the problematic lies more in 
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the latter than the former, as Ramallah Municipality voluntarily publishes its 
selected highlights on its FaceBook page daily. Here the fact that these ‘post-
it’ style of announcements neither reveal technical and pivotal details nor are 
archived on the official website (to create coherent order of happenings) has 
yet to be questioned by the hundreds of local journalists, whose work is mainly 
that of collecting press releases and statements rather than serious investigation 
of happenings. On their part, corporations and investors have little reason to 
publish their plans, since secrecy allows e.g. the tens of millions of dollars worth 
project of elErsal Centre to be executed without having to neither negotiate nor 
compromise with neither LGs nor local communities, although the detrimental 
chunk of project-capital, the site is public property (see section 5.1.3, pg. 249). 
Further, as detailed in section 4.3.3; pg. 203, the municipal welcome of 
non-binding, free-of-charge, often disregarded consultancies from its creative 
visionaries is neither attractive nor sufficient for those to engage with these 
bureaucratic and complicit bodies. To bring the equation of co-dependency 
into functioning municipalities have to share some of their decision-making 
power with the inventors. Under such conditions there are several Ramallite 
professionals and educated activists willing (at least initially) to volunteer their 
time; not out of charity or philanthropy, rather, by power of the individual sense 
of purpose – be that psychological or professional satisfaction (profit) – and 
the ‘start-up’ economic mentality. In the absence of R&D departments in their 
houses the municipalities of the Ramallah agglomerate should be celebrating this 
resource which is not as abundant in other cities under the authority of the PA, 
and activists and urbanists in turn should understand that municipalities could 
be their legitimation and whistle-blowers in their struggle against the free-reign 
of neoliberals and the hegemony of their politics.
Harvey notes that while history provides many examples of trials for 
autogestión (self-management) by worker movements through cooperatives 
and the like, these ‘have not so far proved viable as templates for more global 
anti-capitalist solutions’ (Harvey 2013:122). He argues that the main reason for 
this failure is that ‘All enterprises operating in a capitalist economy are subject 
to ‘the coercive laws of competition’ that ‘undergrid the capitalist laws of value 
production and realization’, which down the ecological cycle create a dynamic by 
which often ‘workers end up in a condition of collective self-exploitation that is 
every bit as repressive as that which capital imposes’ (ibid). The Engineers Union 
in Palestine is evidence (see section 4.4.1, pg. 223). Unless a movement is able 
to encapsulate all three basic elements of the circulatory process – monetary, 
productive, and commodity capitals – its chances of success are accidental. Hence:
Anti-capitalist struggle must not only be about organizing and re-organizing 
within the labor process, fundamental though that is. It must also be about 
finding a political and social alternative to the operation of the capitalist law 
of value across the world market. While worker control or communitarian 
movements can arise out of the concrete intuitions of people collectively 
engaging in production and consumption, contesting the operations of the 
capitalist law of value on the world stage requires a theoretical understandings 
of macroeconomic interrelations along with a different form of technical and 
organizational sophistication. [...] De-coupling from these relations, as some 
now propose, is close to impossible [...]. (Harvey 2013:123)
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The outcomes of the Cold War attend to this premise, and the embrace of 
radical capitalism by former socialist countries (e.g. Russia, China) has significant 
numbers of revolutionists propagating change through either the termite theory 
of ‘smashing of the state’ which has proven counter-effective; or autonomous 
organization of production by localized communities and controls which do 
function in ‘small groups but are impossible to operationalize at the scale of a 
metropolitan region’ (ibid:125). Here, to succeed urban protest movements should 
labour overarching organizational frameworks whose resilience is grounded 
in sets of temporal, intuitive practices. Revolutionary principles that cannot 
integrate into the larger economic, social and/or political systems are bound 
to fail, sooner or later. Hence, imaginaries of a future Ramallah have to define 
both, their elements and how they function – particularly, how they integrate 
into capitalist laws of value and feed of them to create alternatives. In the same 
line, concepts that plan the socialization of Ramallite spaces of wealth production 
without catering for a corollary empowerment and reform of official institutions 
of planning and local government are unlikely to sustain. The failure in this 
attempt at state-making does not make the state a failing system of management 
and administration. 
Class struggles are often equally citizenship struggles and vice versa, and 
both have their physicalities within the totality of the urban landscape, which 
on itself is the locus of capitalist vulnerability. Awareness to the reality that 
disruptions of status quo jeopardize the capitalist process has had elites ‘gearing 
up’ for confrontations through association with and endorsement of curtailment 
state apparatuses (whether oppressive securitization or parliamentarian lobbying). 
On the other side of the equation, protesters are capitalising on the advantage 
of mass-claiming of vital connections whether through acts of protests e.g. 
demonstrations and encampments, or those of insurgency e.g. hijacking of supply 
lines. The blocking of the vital Highway 60 and Road 446 among others in the 
West Bank on 14 November 2012 by activists contending the colonization could 
be regarded as example of an insurgent spill-out that employed anti-capitalist 
pressure in a carefully chosen, and unexpected, territorialization. 
Amongst some capitalists and colonialists there are pioneers that foresee 
the impossibility of compound growth and are seeking alternatives. Maximalist 
Zionists like the Israeli Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett comprehend that the 
continuation of compound growth of colonies is exasperating urban poverty in 
Israel proper. For him, the goal of demographic superiority can only be achieved 
through annexation of the West Bank and its de-segregation from the rest of the 
geography. This strategy is further justified by Israel’s need to provide stability 
and a new lease of life to the economic infrastructures in the colonies of the West 
Bank which are starting to suffer at the hands of internationally growing boycott 
movements as attested by the Israeli Finance Minister Yair Lapid; e.g. In 2013 
SodaStream became target of extensive pro-Palestinian campaigns’s, 18 months 
later the stock of the company had tumbled 17%6, and on 29 October 2014 the 
company declared relocation into southern Israel (Reich 2014). The compound 
growth of the settlement enterprise is reaching an inflection point.
Some Palestinian capitalists and economists have grasped that the compound 
growth of their mass-scale undertakings is reaching a similar faith. The circulating 
rumours of bankruptcy of Rawabi (see section 5.1.4, pg. 256) and the hundreds of 
empty apartments around Ramallah (in spite of continued need) are indicative, 
and forgers of a change in the economic and spatial discourses, which hitherto 
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independent visionaries are not part of. The current standings where Micro, 
Small and Medium sized Enterprises (MSMEs) ‘employ 85% of the private sector 
labour force and contribute more than 55% to the country’s GDP’ (PIF 2014c) 
on one hand, and on the other the PDRP (MOPAD 2007) and Abdullah’s (2012) 
naming of high-value and knowledge-based economic sectors as most viable for 
Palestinians; combined these constitute an under-explored domain for nurturing 
an anti-capitalist mode of city-production that socializes spaces of wealth 
accumulation in Ramallah. As numbers clearly indicate, it is not singular parties 
that are producing wealth, but those are the ones that succeed in appropriating the 
surplus of city-wide labour through e.g. rent, costs of services, etc. One of the most 
crucial challenges for Ramallah therein is the re-configuration of the system to 
allow larger groups of the society to keep and share the capital of their labour, and 
therein gain leverage necessary for participation in decision making on how this 
capital is re-employed within the city-space. 
Neoliberal institutions are already exploring the potentials of MSMEs (e.g. 
FastForward program by Leaders NGO; Sharakat Fund by PIF among others), 
however, discussion over how these operate collectively and in relation to the 
wider city-space and/or city-vision is absent. The acute lack of engagement of 
private capital and corporations in the reform and amelioration of performance 
of the public sector through joint undertakings is justified by Huleileh (2012) as 
being ‘a very risky business’ since ‘laws are neither coherent nor regular regarding 
public-private-partnerships’. While this argument stands ground of truth on 
short-term fiscal-year balances, it decomposes when regarded from the larger 
biological lens, as market value of singular projects is directly dependent on the 
spatial conditions and values of its direct as well as indirect surroundings. Yet 
again and as argued in the earlier section, the bourgeoisie are always relevant for 
the financing and enablement of positive change, but are seldom the drivers.
Giving a spatial example, the inflated values of property have recently 
inspired several investors to employ the row-house model (Image 6.2, Image 
6.3; pg. 302). They are able to implement these singular constructions due to the 
fact that regulations govern the surfaces of the volume of the property from the 
perspective of two-dimensional maps – retention from four sides and overall 
height from street level – leaving the insides to the wishes of owners. Through 
this same rule developers of the past decade have been excavating into mountain-
ridges erecting (legally) twelve and thirteen floors in zones marked as four or five 
stories only. Meanwhile, up to date discussion on whether row housing at city-
scale (rather than only within sporadic parcels) are compatible solutions is absent, 
and the same applies to the decade-old flagrant risks of six basement floors. Had 
the bourgeoisie been less focused on the day-to-day bank account balance and 
more engaged with the future, they would’ve already financed a municipal reform 
of regulations to allow them to extract the discussed higher, longer-term gains 
from their undertakings.
That said, the continuation of the status quo is largely caused by the 
domination of reductionist utopia vs. dystopia comparisons as mutually exclusive 
realities, rather than integrative constructs that draw on the ontological relations 
conjoining and scaling the two poles. Just like utopias are products of human 
fantasy, dis-topias – which are unstable – are sustained by the collective failure in 
re-organizing the present to produce a different future. The inability of majority 
of visionaries to translate their ideas into practical measures can be directly linked 
to the fact that these have to grow from within the existing ecologies and systems. 
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Image 6.2. An 8-unit rowhouse residential project in alMasyoun, Ramallah, September 2014.
Image 6.3. A row-house building under construction within the second phase of alReehan 
Neighbourhood (PIF), September 2014.
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In place of dismissing present-day components on the basis of their complicity in 
the discriminate system, proposals have to encompass and re-orient these into the 
larger collective. This necessitate engagement and negotiation with power holders, 
whether the financial elite or the average citizens beholding the necessary critical 
mass. In turn, such processes of negotiation require both, soft and hard systems of 
operation; assemblies that synthesize inter and intra group interests on the various 
scales (micro, meso, exo and macro), as well as physical spatializations of these 
relations as essential for nurturing progressive re-production. Under this logic the 
reform of Ramallah municipality (whose politics is supportive; pg. 203) to act as 
an accountable conductor for the orchestra of stakeholders is essential, and the 
history of ‘municipal socialism’ that catered for nested hierarchies presents many 
examples to draw inspiration from (e.g. Paris Commune in 1987, Red Bologna in 
1970s, and the Bolivian El Alto in the 2000s among others). 
In conclusion, co-dependency, -gratification, and hence wealth-sharing are 
relationships and engagements whose evolution is dependent on progressive 
re-tuning and incremental re-configuration of exchange and negotiation 
mediums, whose soft side is the concatenation of various sets of assemblies of 
spatial management across the scalar spectrum; from the neighbourhood scale 
(average citizens), to that of the district (larger private capital), agglomerate 
(local governments), the national (central government and other localities), and 
the trans-border (international actors). As Chapter 3 demonstrates Ramallah’s 
prosperity rests on actors and supply lines (whether goods or human capital) 
beyond its own territory, and as Chapter 4 showcases, the centralization of 
decision-making in upper tiers has led to the suspension of programmed 
undertaking from the tangible location-based needs; which in turn has provided 
room for eclectic corporate-led urban development policies – Chapter 5 – by 
power of relational fantasies inspired elsewhere. 
Ramallah’s ability to remain attractive and liveable rests in the hands of all 
its stakeholders who must collectively labour a long-term vision that integrates 
timely concerns yet whose focus lies beyond, e.g. year 2100. Such time-frames 
leave the doors wide-open for methodologies to evolve, while ensuring that 
these draw a contiguity through the certainly changing components and tools. 
The damage of decades of British and – more importantly – Zionist colonization 
cannot be reversed through ‘swift’ global state-political and neoliberal economics, 
and certainly, these are not limited to Area C and the colonies. Rather, 
decolonization necessitates solutions whose foundation lies in the everyday 
lived as well as symbolic / representational space; in understanding that how 
Palestinians organize their everyday practices and economies has a direct impact 
on the strength of the colonial project of systematic fragmentation through 
disenfranchisement. Antivenoms to colonial strategies have to be extracted 
from within, thereby, temporality should be redefined from being the domain 
of the colonizer, to being the very strategy of the colonized in their sustenance. 
Ramallah does not need Master Plans and twenty-year frameworks such as the 
RDPF. Instead, through the all-encompassing right to flourishing as opposed to 
the partial state-making, Ramallite politics could employ frameworks of anti-
capitalist struggles to forge a healthy urbanity that is routed in citizenship, which 
in turn regulates the ongoing denationalization; because ‘all those whose labors 
are engaged in producing and reproducing the city have a collective right not only 
to that which they produce, but also to decide what kind of urbanism is to be 
produced where, and how’ (Harvey 2013:137, 150).
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6.2.    IMAGINING A FUTURE 
MORPHOLOGY FOR RAMALLAH
Neither cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the question is 
only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose? (Peter Marcuse)
Social pluralism, economic equality and political reform are operational 
systems whose installation requires the provision of a compatible hardware. The 
morphology of Ramallah is rejecting the heavily-financed development policies 
and programs not out of (the interruptible) corruption and mismanagement, but 
due to the fact that their methodologies are discontinuous through the varying 
detrimental levels of space, which among other impacts reproduces the former. 
Borrowing an example from the WB at large, school-buildings at EU-
standard for girls throughout the area will not change the gender-prejudice and 
the socio-behavioural system of memorization (obedience, rigid hierarchies) 
with a desired critical thinking (labouring democratic process). Rather, 
investment in infrastructures that induce a collective requestioning of the norm 
will evidently employ endemic innovation in determining and financing need-
based facilities. Empirical data collected through three assignments within 
six-years for a leading donor7 revealed that significant numbers of aspiring 
girls successfully finishing their high-school education do not enrol in higher 
education (whether technical or academic) predominantly due to the costs these 
entail, hence ending up as dependent (not free) housewives, which feeds into the 
discrimination against them. Tracing the devil’s cycle rapidly leads to the logic 
by which indeed, women’s empowerment requires their financial independence, 
yet concomitantly, the inability of impoverished areas to finance long-term 
education implores shorter tracks between training and actual production, and 
a direct relation to the timely lived space. What is needed is enabling popular 
access into the pool of unprocessed resources to collectively (hence many 
individuals) construct the locationally-needed productive (and hence symbolic) 
space. Compulsory systematic high-school education for girls of impoverished 
strata defeats its purpose because it doesn’t translate into swift generation of 
income, hence sustenance, hence flourishing whether in terms of basic rights or 
personal growth; The ‘realm of freedom’ Marx said ‘begins when the realm of 
necessity is left behind’ (IN Harvey 2013:127).
Re-scaling to Ramallah, in response to the commercialization and 
internationalization of tourist-taste culture, during the past few years there has 
been a ‘back to the roots’ form of cosmopolitanism, a process of re-discovering and 
re-integrating the traditional into the contemporary (which is happening in many 
other cities as well). The enablement of cross-border trade by the OA’s had led to 
a standardization of – among many other sectors – clothing. In response, today 
there is a surge in demand for hand-made and customized wear and accessories, 
paralleled by artistic re-questioning of such elements e.g. Omar Joseph Nasser-
Khoury’s exhibition The Ceremonial Vniform (March-April 2014, Birzeit University 
Museum). Unfortunately, the inflation of commercial space values makes it 
difficult for entrepreneurs (amongst which designers) to make their products 
accessible (e.g. show-room) to those willing to purchase the eccentric, higher-value 
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product; which and in the absence of online banking possibilities and functioning 
postal systems (imposed by Israel) is curtailing their growth into meaningful cells 
of employment and production. This is feeding into two; the majority of products 
with traditional expressions retain older forms (lack innovation due to isolation 
from further processing), and crafting and tailoring remain under-paid professions 
due to their need to compete with the imported as well as locally mass-produced 
goods – which as explained earlier are incapable of innovation and production of 
new forms. In this process, the surplus that Ramallites produce is appropriated by 
large-scale importers and factory-owners rather than being circulated among the 
larger local strata through supply and demand of alternatives. 
Hence, while investment in MSMEs and financing of start-ups through e.g. 
shared office-space by the FastForward project of Leaders (NGO) is important, 
nonetheless, without solving the kernel problem of market and resource 
accessibility success stories will always be considerably fewer than the actual 
potential, and the same applies to Ramallah’s project within the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities program (see section 4.4.2, pg. 234). Here ‘more 
attention to geographical rather than sectoral forms of organization’ is needed, 
a discourse the maturity of which is expressed through ‘values and ideas’ being 
‘articulated through popular cultural events and activities’ (Harvey 2013:134, 148). 
These produce collective memories and engender a sense of citizenship, which 
is an operation that several Ramallite intellectuals (particularly contemporary 
artists) have grasped, and are attempting to translate into an agenda through 
invoking open discussions. Speaking about the Qalandiya International (QI) 
2014 series of contemporary art and discussion events which describes itself as 
‘collective creative resistance’ (QI 2014); The urbanist and curator Yazid Anani 
states in a televised interview that:
We had a crisis in the period following the period of committed art of artists like 
Suleiman Mansour and Nabil Anani. From there we leaped into contemporary 
art rapidly [...]. People were accustomed to fine arts paintings [...] which 
contain all familiar symbols. Now there is a significant group of young artists 
employing the tools of contemporary art to express themselves in attempts to 
connect locally as well as internationally. In my opinion, people are gradually 
accepting these materials that are critical and highlighting of particular 
present-day problematics, whereby ideas and questions about the society we 
live in are being presented. These are not just a visually appealing painting that 
is framed on the wall, rather, they are materials that invoke discussion. (PBC 
2014a: minute 5:35)
Talking specifically about the Archives, Lived and Shared series of exhibitions, 
Anani states that ‘artists focused on less known periods of our lives, which have 
been referenced to distinct moments, the 1967, the 1948; the in-between is as if 
lost, forgotten’ (ibid: minute 3:50). Here his colleague Sally AbuBaker (Programs 
Officer at Ramallah Municipality’s Department of Culture) notes that: 
The idea behind the exhibitions was such that, since these are based on 
materials extracted out of their cabins in municipal archives, also the works 
have to leave their conventional spaces – into homes, historical buildings, etc 
– and be exhibited in a form different than that of a museum, thence avoiding 
framing the art in spaces that could be fenced from citizens. (ibid: minute 5:00)
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Ramallah does not suffer the absence of alternative (sectoral) knowledge 
whether regarding the political, economic or social, rather, an entrapment that 
the post OAs reality created; geographic cantons, ideological landscapes, and the 
missing mobility network inter- and intra- the dozens of divisions of both, which 
initiatives such as Qalandiya International aim at breaking. Mobility – physical 
and mental – has become kernel to the contemporary Palestinian liberation 
movement. While physical mobility inter-localities remains hostage to systems of 
colonial-fragmentation, nonetheless, mobility intra-localities – and hence intra-
residents – is an urban design domain welcoming intervention. 
In the post-Oslo era walls between neighbours gained height and 
speared metal fences – formerly spared to enable activists from commuting 
in shadows, escaping a chase by the military, and the families sharing gardens 
and scarce resources. Can-sprayed political slogans became acts of vandalism 
and infringement on public space – formerly symbols of daily victories and 
continued resistance, hence in effect delegitimizing acts of protest as harmful 
to public order and safety. Refugee camps became liminal sites of poverty; lack 
of order and chaos – formerly the fortress of the national movement and the 
sumud of the people. These are but few examples of many others unfolding in 
the corners of Ramallah. 
While the state-making project has failed, the slogan of the Palestinian 
liberation movement of ‘right to self-determination’ remains present and within 
its multi-layers lies the right to desire and choose – regardless of ideology – the 
characteristic-elements of one’s city-space as an imperative right to freedom of 
activity in a just democracy. This right is systematically compromised by the 
locally imposed and sustained construction and planning regulations detailed 
in section 4.4.1; pg. 223. Here Abourahme’s question about whether Ramallah 
is able ‘to force genuine ‘newness’, to manifest an alternative political project’ 
(2009:508) is rather dependent on its success in reforming the game-rules of 
spatial decision-making, and therewith socialization of access to resources 
necessary for translation and nurturing of ‘genuine’ ideas. In view of this, the pace 
of growth and degree of collectivity of the current debates on space and societal 
problems depends on the physicality into which they materialize. Evolution 
processes necessitate offshoot initiatives that complement and feed into this 
root by spatializing the exhibitions into e.g. installations that familiarize acts of 
questioning of norms, followed by interim projects that are ‘planned from the 
outset to be impermanent’ and characteristically ‘seek to derive unique qualities 
from the idea of temporality’ (Haydn and Temel IN Colomb 2012a:135); that is, 
the ability to investigate the applicability, potentials and harms of ideas ahead 
of granting them license, which among its manifolds serves training a sense 
and logic of experimentation and creation of new micro-systems (concepts of 
Zwischennutzungen, premature gratification; see section 4.4, pg. 220). 
Shall Ramallite visionaries succeed in these two levels of temporality, they 
might be able to reap the fruits of their creativity in the form of legislation, which 
by nature is fostering of progressive reform. This process underpins the difference 
between revolutionary acts of protest, and those which could be described as 
reformist – the upward mobility of the former is limited by scalar determinants, 
while the influence of the latter reaches deep into ‘layers of possibility’ (Harvey 
2013). Hence here the central question – of this section – becomes: what available 
components from within the present-day system can be employed by visionaries 
and planners to foster alternative, resilient urbanism in Ramallah?
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The IFRC defines resilience as ‘[t]he ability of individuals, communities, 
organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying 
vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from 
the effects of adversity without compromising their longterm prospects’ (2012:7). 
As demonstrated through this work for Ramallah the anticipatable ‘adversity’ 
has many forms and tentacles, yet here I focus on three main paradigms that 
visionaries can employ, and whose tackling aims at labouring alternatives from 
within the capitalist market towards cross-strata satisfaction. 
First, I address topographical and climatological incompatibility of 
planning and construction regulations (including circulation/mobility 
concepts) that are threatening of public safety, well-being, attractiveness, and 
constitute onto themselves a waste of valuable resources which also exasperates 
the following two points. Second, since threats to social pluralism (inclusion 
versus exclusion) in Ramallah are mainly produced by lack of spaces of 
elimination of otherness and nexus (assimilation) of diversity into a web of 
relational co-dependency and -gratification; hence this sub-section proposes 
alternative forms of geographical organization and the corollary potential 
impacts on creation of cooperatives that on one side engender dialogue, and 
on the other collectively balance the weight of corporations in decision-
making over city-space. And third, the reoccurrence of natural and man-made 
emergencies implore a new approach to the city’s infrastructure that factor 
those into the making of lived-space. Together these imaginaries aim at tackling 
roots (ecological sources) of vulnerability of the city, rather than the neoliberal 
methodology of containment and damage-control.
Suggestions featured on the following pages synthesis the findings of this 
work into spatial proposals that are rooted in the belief that ideas (of which 
revolutionary political discourses are one) are inspired by socioeconomic 
needs and phenomena. The formulation and change in individual’s sense of 
purpose is variable across temporal and ecological scales, and their expression 
or repression is reflected by the form and intensity of activities of protest and 
their materializations through space. The aspired future, decolonized, resilient 
Ramallah and a widely shared ethos of sumud and pluralism therewith necessitate 
timeless principles whose parameters are fluid, adaptive and steered towards 
labouring systems of progressive:
• reform of policy- and decision-making apparatuses through incremental 
processes of claiming and sharing political power through social-learning 
and -puzzling, which among their manifolds include the empowerment 
of municipalities into becoming bastions of democratic dialogue and 
achievements; 
• educated makeshift spatial engagements and longer-term experiments 
that employ careful scrutiny, constructive critique, new knowledge and 
technologies; 
• factoring of the space-time compression of globalized localities and 
the resulting policy-mobility by power of pseudo-concrete fantasies. 
Therewith, gradual and perpetual taming of capitalist practices through 
cooptation and assimilation under new game-rules which foster positive 
trade-offs and coalesces between the public good and private benefit, hence 
nurturing micro-ecologies of varied yet complementary sensibilities;
• employment of principles on antispaces as abundant loci with significant 
potentials for socioeconomic synthesis and extraction of the collective 
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symbolic out of the individual lived space, which can be connected with 
identification of high-value products and knowledge-based economy as 
the most viable options under colonial precariousness; and,
• fine-tuning and re-orientation of undertakings towards improving the 
mental (security, accountability, freedom), lived (dignity, connectivity, 
satisfaction) and representational (rooted, inclusive, accessible) spaces of 
Ramallites.
 
Combined, these principles and the forthcoming morphological scenarios 
showcase urban planning and design parameters that reduce and gradually 
eliminate the herein established sociospatial fragmentation of Ramallah, elements 
of systematized disenfranchisement and denial of access to resources, and what 
alKhalili calls the ‘political castration’ that characterizes the Oslo era.
6.2.1.   Scenario – Remaking Ramallah through 
the Feet of Ramallites: Environmental and 
Climatological Risks and Opportunities
Every city has an amazing amount of vacant, unused land in its downtown core. 
[... T]he highway, the Modern Movement in architecture, urban renewal and 
zoning, competition for image on the part of private enterprise, and changing 
patters of land use in the inner city have [...] together created the dilemma of 
modern urban space [... A] code of rules should accommodate a diversity of 
building styles and forms. It should also express the rules of scale and character 
for making coherent, visible connections between new and old uses, buildings, 
and activities. [...] In the end, the streets and squares of our cities should once 
again become spaces for social discourse, taking precedence over the movement 
and storage of automobiles (Trancik 1986:1, 18, 19, 20)
The official systems of planning in Ramallah which are rooted in 
Functionalist Movement ideologies consider work, mobility and socialization as 
distinct domains rather than continuous units of life. Their combination with 
colonial strategies of maximized surveillance and swift repression on one hand 
and capitalist greed on the other have fragmented the city into discontinuous 
islands and normalized inefficient use and unjust distribution of resources as 
detailed in section 4.4.1; pg. 223. Beyond economic loss, disregard to climatological 
elements is threatening the lives and well-being of persons as detailed in section 
2.1.3.iii; pg. 65; as do the predicted climatic shifts to Ramallah’s oldest gratis 
charm, its mild summers. Meanwhile, the city is facing annual challenges with 
ponding storm water and wadi-s (streams), and equally, water shortages due to 
Israeli discrimination. As this work repeatedly argued, LGs have to revise and 
modernize their construction regulations; the fact that buildings reach 25 and 30 
meters in elevation at a time the code marks upper limits at e.g. 15 meters in B 
and C residential areas are not accidental, rather perpetuated by shortcomings of 
executive apparatuses. 
Noteworthy, about 150 kilometres northwards Haifa presents a case proving 
that Ramallah’s regulation could produce a much healthier environment in an 
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equally steep topography. From walking around it becomes clear that the city 
curtailed the carving of the mountain ridge by simply upholding the upper limits 
indicated in scripts. The average height of buildings around Haifa is also 4 stories. 
However, unlike Ramallah, on plots west of streets (mean plot elevation lower than 
street) the majority of buildings conform to one basement floor and three atop. 
On the opposite side (mean plot elevation higher than street), the ground floor 
generally rises at two meters above street level, hence conforming to four regular 
stories and no basement. Further, Haifa has numerous public and countless semi-
private staircases which extend all along the ridge, making it possible to walk 
from the tip of the mountain to the seaside – or in the other direction – with 
minimal contact with vehicle-roads, their noise, pollution and stress (Image 6.4 - 
Image 6.7; pg. 311). Besides their mobility function, these staircases are efficient, 
affordable, and low-technology channels of storm-water which significantly 
reduce ponding. This modern interpretation of pedestrian mobility (which 
conforms to better land use as well) finds its roots in older Mediterranean urban 
fabrics, such as those of Nablus, Bethlehem and Jaffa (Image 6.8 - Image 6.9); 
whose cisterns in the various neighbourhoods of their old cities testify of the 
importance of incorporation of water collection infrastructures for the survival of 
urban residents of this region. 
The decreasing ratio of private wells throughout Ramallah is often 
defended as natural shift of citizen’s dependency to modern, more comfortable 
infrastructures. However, while this logic might be pardoned in geographies of 
stable politics, it certainly is, at best, naïve in colonial settings. It is an established 
fact that clients in Ramallah are willing to bridge the establishment costs for – 
particularly – water reserves. Here the fact that in spite of marketability the 
production of these infrastructures is suffering has more to do with the non-
tailored mass-production mentality of developers who prefer to avoid the non-
additionally profitable hassle of constructing wells. The municipality’s reluctance 
to tackle this phenomenon is hard to justify, particularly given its struggles 
with low-supply in summers, and flooding by storm-water. The chosen path of 
provision of city-wide networks is highly costly, vulnerable to failure of singular 
elements, and a time-extensive process which caters for only one side of the water-
problem: the release. Meanwhile, the problem of capturing water remains open. 
In Table 6.1; pg. 311 I list the dominant construction zones which correspond 
to 62,8% of the city’s total area. Bearing in mind that not all these areas have been 
developed yet; notwithstanding, three fifths of these are municipally deregulated 
retention (Diagram 6.6; pg. 315). For visionaries pondering the future of the city, 
these correspond to significant landscapes of opportunity. From such a perspective 
and considering that existing regulations allow owners to employ retention zones 
for technical infrastructures under the condition that these do not rise above 
ground level; therein, an easily applicable and technically simple suggestion would 
be the licensing of – and conditioning of licenses with – construction of cisterns 
in definable segments of the retention antispaces, whose ceiling is inclined with 
the original topography of the site. Such a system would catch and store water 
throughout the city, hence sparing the need to create large-scale collection 
networks, treatment plants and re-distribution pumps and infrastructures. The 
surfaces of these (terraced, spill-system)cisterns complement side-walk channels 
and absorption holes for water, as well as pedestrian mobility. Elaborating the idea 
further; these infrastructures could provision private entrances for apartments 
at the corresponding levels of multi-story buildings, which directly translate as 
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Image 6.4. The Bonyak Street in Haifa which is one of many public staircases that snake 
through residential parcels. Some are connectors while others are semi-private dead-ends.
Image 6.5. (right) Shifra Street, Haifa.
Image 6.6.  A view eastwards from Hillel Street, Haifa; notice how staircases are omnipresent.
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emergency escapes whether in cases of fire, earthquakes or other. As the images 
of e.g. Jaffa’s dense fabric demonstrate (comparable materials and conceptions), 
facade features of windows and doors would have to be laboured in parallel. 
Here I should clearly state that I am not advocating neither this proposal as the 
only option, nor that of making Ramallah a copy of either of the exampled cities. 
Rather, I am providing an example for the extraction of lessons from regionally 
comparative cases and their adaptation into the desires and needs of Ramallites 
today, and the modern technologies available in (can be developed by) their local 
markets. Here for example, prolonging location-based cycles of grey water should 
also be incentivized and developed.
While laws and protagonists consider retention as catering of privacy and 
necessary for adequate ventilation and light, Ramallah renders this logic void 
through the way investors capitalize on its steep topography. The man-made 
canyons (Image 2.12; pg. 65, and several others in Chapter 4, pg. 216) place 
people’s bedrooms in one another, block casual breezes, stream ground-winds at 
high thresholds, and trap dampness in the cold months therewith endangering 
the long-term stability of the site. The solution for the locally needed deceleration 
of winds in winter and entrapment of humidity and cool breezes in the summer 
has been long found – internal courts. This concept can be utilized at the various 
morphological scales, whether in the future in newly-organized areas, or in the 
present-day built-up ones albeit in its smaller scale – shafts. 
In pondering alternative spatializations to those of the past two decades 
alMa’ared Street (front, Image 4.3; pg. 204; back, Image 6.10; pg. 313) at the 
city’s centre could serve as inspiration, where a set of varying larger volumes 
are connected by (protrude from) a narrower one whose course parallels that of 
the street. While the municipality should study this model for re-employment 
in areas yet to be developed (elaborated later); nonetheless, the fact that the 
majority of hundreds of existing buildings have depths exceeding twenty 
meters equally implores a treatment, as well as the volumetric character and 
relations along the runways of neighbourhoods. Here the suggested concept of 
shafts could be applied partially or completely into the retention zones along 
with water and mobility treatments, e.g. in the form of protruded balconies 
or bridged-elements that filter and moderately circulate winds in varied 
mechanisms over the seasons. The characteristic of these elements can also 
be varied, whereby an option could be encouraging the re-interpretation and 
production of the balcony street rhythm of volumes, among other suggestions 
(Diagram 6.6 - Diagram 6.7; pg. 315).
Through the logic of improved ventilation, water channelling and capture 
infrastructures, mobility and disaster-evacuation, the municipality can allow 
immediate experimentation to test and identify the healthy parameters of such 
a change in construction forms and elements. The outcomes of the tests could 
then induce or save the conduction of expensive legislation reform. Under 
such scenarios the mode of application and produced end-forms will constitute 
reflections of the ability of Ramallites to communicate and negotiate. As a 
significant portion of the apartment buildings are owned by their tenants, the 
implementation of depth-long interventions necessitate that all owners agree, 
otherwise application will remain limited. For rented buildings, property laws 
protect tenants against elevation of rent, which by macro-economic logic and the 
current poor standing of apparatuses of customer rights protection will together 
translate with majority of owners refraining from the upgrading of their buildings 
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unless tenants concede to contribute financially; whether directly or indirectly, 
immediately or over longer periods. 
Like any urban upgrading and renewal scheme, unless it is escorted with 
protection legislation it shall lead to gentrification. For these to crystallize 
Ramallites will have to – sooner or later, with or without such a scenario – 
organize their positions on matters of dignity and life-sustenance, which in turn 
necessitates frameworks such as neighbourhood committees or the smaller-
scale cooperatives that congregate multiple properties. It should be noted that a 
handful such frameworks exist around the city today, amongst which the Birzeit 
University Teachers and Employees Housing Cooperative (BZU-HC in elTireh 
neighbourhood) which has achieved decision-power and recognition within the 
municipality. This project which composes of 89 units (Image 4.33; pg. 215) hosts 
a couple of operative committees which internally decide on compatibility of unit-
extension proposals by its individual members, employ a gardener who is the 
caretaker of shared spaces, and finance public infrastructures within its vicinity; 
hitherto a multi-purpose hall, two staircases, and two out of the total four open 
gardens. Unfortunately, the level and nature of this cooperation between the housing 
cooperative and the municipality is not matched elsewhere, which indicates that 
this form of city-management has not matured into a significant scale, yet; but that 
grounds are fertile, the tools are familiar, and potentials are tangibly evident.  
The conception and growth of such work-groups in Ramallah will come 
as a result of growing threats and/or desire to ameliorate one’s direct space, 
however, their efficiency and impact will be proportional to two.; first, the 
amount of ideas and options developed by or shared with them – as indicated in 
the case of BZU-HC whose employed patterns lack imagination of alternatives. 
In addition to segregation of various spaces through walls, members of this 
collective did not explore construction spatialization alternatives to those of 
the municipality although they had the opportunity, as demonstrated by the 
nearby (and younger in age) Tal alSafa complex whose morphology is inspired 
from traditional regional cities of back-to-back fabric, overlapping of units, and 
tens of staircases and alleys. And second, the growth and efficiency of this city-
management discourse depends on the availability or absence of future prospects. 
The Ramallah Beautification Committee is case to point (see section 4.4, pg. 220), 
Image 6.10. A row of buildings from the late 1970s at alMa’ared Street from the back, Ramallah, 
September 2014. Notice how some bodies protrude from a main linear volume.
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whereby unless people are able to influence spatial decision-making to suit their 
desires, over the long term motivation – which could be high at beginnings – will 
recede, or translate into insurgent forms of urbanism. 
The details over scale, hierarchies, and mechanisms of operation of 
community-based cooperatives and neighbourhood committees in relation 
to municipal offices on one hand, and the particular roles of bourgeoisie 
and visionaries on the other are vast and detrimental domains welcoming an 
exploration that I will not undertake on the few remaining pages. However, here 
I would like to invite visionaries of Ramallah to note that beyond traditional 
principles of democracy, decolonization necessitates the dismantlement of 
armaments around social and institutional mandates, enabling permeability of 
ecological relations and therewith overlapping of competences beyond the artificial 
sectoral borders. A political shift has to materialize through the features of lived 
space, and extract newness from it. Herein labouring of alternative elements for 
and use of retention antiscpaces is one and many from amongst a bundle of city-
wide elements requiring revision. 
To the right I schematically and randomly spatialize the suggestions of 
this section within alQudaira neighbourhood of Ramallah. These are based on 
the conclusion that Ramallah’s climatological resilience as well as sociospatial 
decolonization can be guided by the feet of its citizens. The larger the ratio 
between areas for shared-use in favour of those for exclusive purposes (e.g. 
financial threshold), then the higher the sociospatial and resource fragmentation, 
and hence the lower the ability to make investments in social and climate-control 
infrastructures profitable; and down the line, stage and gradually normalize 
meaningful and progressively constructive activities of protest through nonviolent 
critical mass. 
Under current construction laws and the cover of temporality, and before 
initiating legislation reform; both municipalities and visionaries of Ramallah are 
invited and implored to engage in cross-group urban imagination, experimentation, 
and exploration. At this stage it would be speculative to indicate a particular geo-
demographic scale as the most suitable for reorganization of management and 
construction elements. The colonial geopolitics of Ramallah stipulates that these 
can only be determined through trial and error, the outcomes of the push and 
pull between the geographically varying constituents e.g. is the neighbourhood in 
question that of Ramallah elTahta (old city) which composes of relatively intense 
social ties and dense layers of historical spatial value, or is it the Im elSharayet 
neighbourhood which composes mainly of differentiated newcomers whose 
arrival over the past decade was the motor of its modern geometry?
Scenrio / fantasy Ramallah 2030 
It is the city of dreams for those with time to linger, a smell for hidden short-
cuts, or a crave for re-discovery. Its shadows are hardly mellow,  smell of 
garlic and cooking meat, fresh laundry, herbs on thresholds, damp and mossy 
concrete, and occasionally of bathroom odours. It is hard to generalize 
a compliment for all, as the different courses interplay varying melodies of 
shade and sun, of coolness and heat, of noise and tranquillity, of greenness 
and aridity, of boredom and exhilaration, of stairs that are of calculated sizes 
and others that you cannot avoid tripping on. Just when you think you’ve seen 
it all, you discover another version, of creativity at times, and of confusion at 
others; of a cliché at times and that of hallucinations at others.
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Existing antispace that could 
be employed for benefit / at 
wish of tenants
Spaces of potential physical 
interventions for vertical 
pedestrian mobility and storm 
water channelling (at ground 
level) and climatic treatments 
(within higher elevations of 
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Parcel border (not accurate)
Parcel border (not accurate)
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100 m0
Diagram 6.6. Schematic plan 
of a selected area from alQudaira 
basin which borders the old-city 
at its western and southern ends. 
The map highlights strips between 
existing buildings whose total 
retention antispaces reach 52% of 
plot areas, as this basin is primarily 
classified as Residential C in the 
Master Plan. 
Diagram 6.7. Schematic plan 
of a selected area from alQudaira 
basin as imagined in the future, e.g. 
in 2030 when new constructions 
and connections are implemented. 
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6.2.2.   Scenario+ – Discovering and Crafting 
New Corners, Perspectives, and 
Uses for Ramallah’s Landscapes
It is important to be in the room long enough to make a contribution – 
temporary steps can be a way to build trust with a sceptical client. A successful 
process means that everyone is implicated: the activist, the developer, the 
designer. The value of the participative practice is that architecture develops 
slowly. Urban regeneration professionals, planners, architects, and developers 
are serial monogamists. Someone has to stay to see the whole process through. 
(Thomas 2014:151)
The map of the street-network of Ramallah is very expressive of the city’s 
lived reality where motorized vehicles have eased access to every doorstep. 
Ramallah spends significant portions of its annual budgets on provision of 
additional such streets, continuously ignoring lessons of larger and older cities 
which stipulate that the more roads and parking places there are, the higher the 
inclination of citizens to drive rather than to walk or use public transportation. 
Indeed, the extensive use of vehicles by Ramallites is encouraged by the absence 
of reliable and significantly cheaper public transportation on one hand, and 
on the other its steep topography which necessitates a shower after a walk in 
its hot summers, and drying in its wet and windy winters. As discussed earlier, 
while the former requires a large scale sectoral reform, the latter can be induced 
with simple morphological treatments. Assuming that the city engages in 
the redefinition of its antispaces, what are the larger-scale, temporally longer 
consequences of such a Scenario+ experimentation beyond the afore-speculated 
climatological and pedestrian mobility amelioration?
One of the most tangible impacts of functioning mobility networks is the 
creation of a lived democracy; for pedestrians, skaters, cyclists, riders and drivers 
alike. In such geographies citizen’s right to security (predictability, safety) and 
inclusion (equality) are enacted. The latter has several definitions and corollary 
scales, expressions and materializations. It is considered as a lived state wherein 
the number of obstacles facing desirers of particular city-activities and -elements 
are limited, if any. The higher the number of persons theoretically able to fulfil 
a recognized appetite that coalesces with particular spatializations, the higher 
the city’s levels of inclusion and vice versa. At the base of the democratic ladder 
lies the right to free movement. Withstanding the fact that Israel continues to 
expand its elaborate system of territorialized and hard-to-predict controls; this 
logic of exclusive privileges and discriminatory rights has to be uprooted from the 
cartography of the stranded haven, Ramallah.
As detailed in section 2.1.2; pg. 53 and concluded from a glance at Map 6.1; pg. 
318 of Ramallah’s streets, the city relies on a radial network of major connections 
with concentric rings whose course parallels that of ridges of mountains. The 
panoptical surveillance and swift oppression paradigms underline the out-timed 
Palestinian official planning rhetoric of rapid commuting; which shatters daily 
with the tempers of drivers locked in traffic-jams; pedestrians rubbing shoulders 
along the liminal spaces separating heat-generating motors, shop-windows, and 
branches of trees lining the centres of the narrow sidewalks, atop which cars crowd 
as well. In the past few years Ramallah’s municipality has applied several proposals 
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for re-organizing the flow of traffic through designating roads in one direction 
only. Needless to elaborate, this helps in reducing nodal and momentary traffic 
jams but does not solve the problem because ultimately the roots have remained 
intact. In addition, under the new systems mental maps of parking possibilities 
for drivers are now spilling into hitherto relatively under-discovered areas within 
the centre, while walking remains a practice that street engineers clearly do not 
understand its flow and kinetics. 
As Chapter 4 argues, to reduce the pressure on street-infrastructure the 
appeal of car-use has to be tamed through encouragement of more responsible and 
rational choices of commuting methods by residents and visitors. The municipality 
should invest less money on proposals for parking buildings and provision of new 
streets into still uninhabited slopes (see pg. 207, pg. 210; Ramallah Municipality 
2010a), and more into creating genuinely egalitarian spaces which car non-owners 
and their opposite can equally enjoy and employ. Almost every resident walks, but 
not everyone owns a car. The fact that the Master Plan of the city designates 22% 
of its total area to cars and a malnutritioned 0,3 to pedestrian (see pg. 192) is at 
best a miscalculation, and in reality, growing monuments for disenfranchisement. 
In an enclave where demographic growth feeds into evermore inflating property 
prices and colonization into economic stratification and emergency; it is hard to 
find excuses for a discourse that prioritizes parking lots over productive spaces of 
resilience, whether in non-monetary (social, mental) terms or those calculable by 
the market (economic, lived).  
There is no specific evolutionary biology for the employment of pedestrian 
connections whose conception could materialize with any of many possible 
realities. Marginal aesthetic and physical differentiation of spatial allocations 
of the different modes of commuting generates fluid, swift negotiations relative 
to the momentary rationalities of mass and scale8. In Ramallah urban miners 
have to labour and tailor their discoveries. Again, one of the most efficient and 
least costly policies has been that of resource re-distribution, which essentially 
conforms to releasing exclusive spaces for shared purposes; e.g. parklets, kiosks, 
mini-plazas, promenades, gardens, etc. The ingredients behind the success of this 
tool are, first, its compatibility to the market logic of value, and second, its ability 
to rapidly create appealing alternatives. In cities which employ such policies (e.g. 
San Francesco, Seville, Berlin) municipalities are generating additional income 
through leasing pre-installed basic infrastructures, lessees garnish higher profits 
through resource-accessibility and visibility, and residents enjoy less pollution, 
easier access to services, and generally more comfortable circulation – and hence 
socialization – environments.
To sustain as an attractive and widely appropriated practice the imagination 
and provision of new networks through antispaces of Ramallah are undertakings 
that have to fulfil the same equation. Under Scenario+ developers and investors 
triangulate, first, the locally growing demand for MSMEs spaces, second, the 
(neoliberalized, capitalist) public sector’s support for those, and third, the current 
market-reality that grants retail and commercial spaces higher values than 
residential ones. Municipalities welcome the neoliberal practice as it saves them 
infrastructural investment costs, generates additional income through taxes,  and 
outsources some of the managerial load aside of other complimentary gains. In 
their turn, Ramallites puzzle with the opportunities underlying the higher supply 
which brings about relative lower leasing prices (affordability of spatialization 
of production cells, hence optimization and possibly spaces of personal growth, 
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wealth creation, or replenishment – see Diagram 6.2; pg. 286); the hybridization 
of space which indirectly yields higher security and efficiency (policing through 
presence of civilians rather than militarized officers; and less commuting distance, 
time and cost necessary to run errands), and; the translations of the re-integration 
of the three aspects of lived space – production, mobility, and privacy – into over-
lapping rather than segregated uni-function formations. As the city of newcomers 
and refugees Ramallah contains significant imports of memories of hybridized 
city-space and its codes of rules; whether from ancient centres such as Nazareth, 
Nablus, Jaffa and Bethlehem, or from refugee camps such as Dheisheh, Qalandiya, 
alAm’ary, and ‘Askar among others. 
Nonetheless, like rivers through cities require basins that absorb the 
numerous in-spills, resist changing of paths and seasonal flooding; likewise, 
future currents of Ramallite circulation, employment and consumption of space 
require thought-through channelling amid the unfamiliar volumes of antispaces. 
Herewith, stakeholders are likely to redefine (reduce or intensify) the present-
day sociospatial contestations as these condense within the directly lived space of 
one’s neighbourhood, at the doorstep, below the window. 
The profit-led (re-)design of (formerly abandoned) retention ontologically 
caters for breaking the current dichotomy of either public or private spheres 
by amplifying the semi-private dimension, which down the evolutionary cycle 
of urban spatial production could conceive a fourth level, the semi-public. 
The balance of ratios between the four is sensitive to the maturity of Ramallite 
mechanisms of commoning, sharing of decision-making power, and within the 
manifolds legislation; detriments all of which perquisite funnelling of pseudo-
concrete perceptions and behaviours through compatible – hence temporal 
and fluid – self-reinforcing partnerships of co-gratification. As Harvey notes, 
‘Organizing the neighbourhoods has been just as important in prosecuting labor 
struggles, as has organizing the workplace’, and ‘building bridges between the two, 
becomes even more crucial’ in today’s internationalized dynamics of cross-border 
economies and solidarities (2013:132, 133).
 To nurture resilience (as opposite to socioeconomic fragility) Ramallah has 
to allow the appropriation and re-definition of its streets, along with the walled-in 
retention antispaces. It should test and develop licensing parameters for physical, 
nodal re-arrangements that interrupt hegemonic surveillance and repression 
networks, and induce cross-group socialization, co-mobilization, solidarity, and 
a reform-focused revolutionary logic; hence mental and physical mobility alike. 
In an optimistic imaginary, a Scenario+ treatment of Ramallah’s morphology 
would likely result with a number of patterns of public, semi-public, semi-private 
and private gradients that are enacted through the feet of circulating persons 
and the modes in which they employ vehicles. In combination with the varying 
ethos and sensibilities of the agglomerate and hierarchies of organization (e.g. 
Buildings as seen in aerial image of 
Google Maps that coincide with those 
in municipality’s file, schematically
Buildings indicated in municipality’s 
file but could not be verified from the 
Google Map one
Contour lines, 10m intervals
Streets for vehicles as obtained from 
city-map
Wadi – naturally forming stream of 
storm-water
Map 6.1. (right) Ramallah’s street-network as existing today. (map is a combination 
of the municipal file which has many technical errors and is not up to date, and 
second, tracing by author from an aerial image obtained from Google Maps)
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neighbourhood committees) these would formally and informally territorialize 
and express some of today’s and tomorrow’s Ramallite metanarratives through 
webs of new representational and lived spaces, labouring Lefebvre’s ‘from things in 
space to the actual production of space’ (Lefebvre 2009:37, emphasis in original).
Scenrio+ / fantasy Ramallah 2040 
Inner-ring Jerusalem is a cable-car, fifteen minutes, and canyons of biblical 
antitheses away.  Jaffa, a fisher-man’s pendulum and several degrees of 
humidity and heat away.  Ramallah, meanwhile, dances on a very, very thin 
line, between aggressiveness and inviting open arms as well as charms. 
Without mastery of navigation in hilly topographies, the chances of a new-
comer spending a life-time of stranger-hood surges.  Seniors speak of the big 
wave of human colours, their clash, mixing and territorial markings. On those 
markings new-comers are now rapidly dissolving. Change is exponential you 
know, and Ramallah now is not itself in the 2010s, and definitely not Berlin of 
the 1990s. If you decide to come here, don’t build your hopes up, none will 
tell you where the peak-holes are. Don’t be naïve, only few will send you the 
announcement for apartment swapping. Be an optimist, a couple will take a 
leap of faith with you.  
Connections that prioritize pedestrians, enable tenants and lessees from reaching 
their properties comfortably, yet obstruct movement of transiting vehicles with 
e.g. dead-ends at crossing reclaimed into public spaces. The areas suggested here 
behold particular characteristics of attraction that visionaries can capitalize on in 
the creation of new representational spaces. 
Connections that ration use between pedestrians and vehicles either through 
temporal or permanent measures and rules of organization; which filter transit 
drivers into main streets away from the ‘protected’ yellow connections.
Streets for rapid transit which grant priority to vehicle movement and filter 
pedestrians intoorange or yellow alternatives
Map 6.2. (right) Schematic illustration of today’s mobility network in Ramallah as 
imagined in the future, e.g. in 2030 when a culture of claiming of space has developed, 
and Ramallites enact the public, semi-public, semi-private, private gradients of 
spatializations with their feet and mode of use of vehicles.
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6.2.3.   Scenario++ – Nurturing Decolonization 
through Antivenoms to Emergency and 
Socialized Policies of Responsibilitization
A revolution in temporal and spatial relations often entails, therefore, not only 
the destruction of ways of life and social practices built around preceding time-
space systems, but the ‘creative destruction’ of a wide range of physical assets 
embedded in the landscape. (Harvey 1990:425)
In his book The Prince (written ca. 1505), the Florentine political 
philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli argued that destruction of life, i.e., murdering 
individuals, could aid in upholding societal order as it instils fear yet does not 
amount to systematic – hence unforgettable and unforgivable – suffering. 
However, destruction of livelihood (e.g., source of income, accumulated wealth, 
securities, etc.) and hence infliction of long-term systematically regenerated 
suffering breeds desperation, and perpetuates desires of vengeance and the 
mentality of crisis, amongst others. The deprivation of Palestinians from elements 
of dignified life and modernity through spatial – hence social, economic, and 
ideological – disenfranchisement and annihilation has been quintessential to 
the Zionist colonial discourse, as transcribed by Machiavelli centuries prior the 
birth of the former and expounded in countless volumes of works by others 
since (e.g. Graham 2006a; Hamami and Tamari 2008; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 
2009). Israel justified and continues to justify its undermining and destruction 
of homes, neighbourhoods, and communities for reasons of ‘security’; using 
bulldozers, segregation walls, tightened economic valves, and advanced 
weaponry. These highly expensive operations of intensive and extended, direct 
and indirect sustenance of Palestinian emergency are an existential requirement 
for the continuation of its colonial superiority; therein maintaining a Palestinian 
inferiority and impeding the re-emergence of a societal modernity capable of 
leading a successful revolution. While the erasure of over 400 villages and the 
confiscation of land throughout and after the Nakba is often displayed, the 
hijacking of the major Palestinian urban centres of modernity is underplayed. 
Subsidiarity is not only financial or legal, as often discussed, but ultimately and 
more importantly, intellectual and therein societal. Economic dependency – 
e.g., through taming and destruction – is predominantly a tool for ideological 
co-optation which in this case is two-fold: first, enabling self-imposed socio-
economic shackling through perpetuation (self-reinforcement) of non-
individuality, and second, political castration (see Chapter 3).
Through citing history academia has shown that modernity and civic 
freedom, as well as decolonisation, require flexible, locational, and relational 
solidarities whose emergence is highly linked to alternative economies and 
societal practices, and therein the ability to choose beyond limited norms. 
Akin to other earthly processes, these require incubation and nurturing, hence 
partnerships, trust, and inspiring examples of fruition. Why would an inventor 
undertake the risks of start-up investment under conditions of blockade and 
periodic obliteration? How will new solidarities – hence ideas and practices – 
emerge under repeated displacement and societal amputation? The calculated 
urban mutations and occasional spatial annihilation of Palestinian communities 
has little to do with security and a lot to do with impeding organic – and strategic 
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– social development in favour of hegemonic (and even fascist) socio-political 
systems such as the PA.
In a parallel dimension, the World Bank mentality is an anti-politics machine 
forcing a discourse which sidelines the detrimental colonial reality, convincing 
real-estate corporations to pump ‘unimaginable amounts of investments’ in 
projects such as those described in Chapter 5 by logic of ‘a detected strategic 
location and the underlying potential’, according to Huleileh (2012). The 
eagerness of such actors to ‘seize the opportunity’ down-play the anticipatable 
vulnerability to disconnection shall Israel close-off Ramallah another time – as 
it repeatedly did in the 1990s and extensively in the early 2000s – or shall the 
annual snow-storm set foot. On one side these undertakings could be argued 
as proactive beyond the imposed precariousness and breakers of discriminatory 
territorializations rather than caving inwardly. On the other, the fact that the 
processes bringing these to light fell short of creating the necessary emergency 
infrastructures reflects the scholarly transcribed comfort of the bourgeoisie 
in the limitations of fiscal logic in geographies of corporeal and mental crisis. 
Thereupon, distancing clouds of man-made political and economic theories 
and grounding analysis on biology of organisms brings to light the concept of 
vaccinations in treatment of pathologies. If poison can be treated by its kind, can 
colonization be disheartened by its own mechanisms?
Whether it is a snow-storm, earthquake, or yet another Israeli incursion, 
curfew, or assault, Ramallah’s current morphology exasperates the city’s 
vulnerability due to the concentration of services and activities of production in 
few areas; e.g. in old centres, concentrations of PA institutions,etc. Seen from the 
perspective of resilience, the city should instead seek to create complimentary 
networks as well as layers that cater for needs at the scale of neighbourhood based 
on the worst-case scenarios of dismemberment. 
To clarify I will refer to the example of bakeries and crisis. During the 2002 
incursion of Operation Defensive Shield (see section 3.2.2, pg. 142) the IOF 
imposed curfew for forty consecutive days, catching Ramallites by surprise, and 
for the first eight days denying them a break to re-stock their drained supplies of 
basic goods such as bread. In the absence of bakeries which typically store reserves 
of flour in peripheral neighbourhoods the suffering of countless families was 
engraved. This ordeal of many Ramallites could have been significantly reduced 
in intensity had the municipality set a strategy to encourage newly opening 
bakeries to place themselves at regular, walkable distances throughout the city. 
From the centre of the old city (crossing of Deir elRoom Street and alBaladieh 
Street) and within a radius of 400 meters there are eight bakeries. In comparison, 
the significantly populated basins of Khillet el’Adas and alKarmel have none. 
Hence, quintessential to Ramallah’s resilience in the short-term and 
decolonization in the longer is the lining of its landscapes with shock-absorbing 
infrastructures that reduce impacts of emergencies, whether natural or man-
made. In the 2013 snow-storm Alexa Ramallah’s municipality earned the respect 
of hundreds of citizens and professionals due to its ability to integrate its in-house 
technologies with disaster response activities; and equally, the number of tolerated 
cases of abuse of its hotline by citizens who complained of unmoved snow at their 
private entrances. Thus and in line with earlier suggestions, under Scenario++ 
Ramallah would have learned about and developed many applications to further 
capitalize on the opportunities of its recently established, expensive and well-
funded and maintained GIS system. 
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Besides data-sharing which empowers neighbourhood-based committees to 
act as support-units, such systems could improve the balance of distribution of 
investments and growth. For example, through the simple addition of a ‘contribution 
to resilience’ factor the municipality can legitimately collect higher taxes from less 
helpful entrepreneurial proposals to subsidize ones of priority. While the specific 
criteria for determining such an index has to be locally and relationally factored 
and scaled; nonetheless, one of those should definitely be closeness to nearest 
alternative. Under such parameters licensing of new spaces that could serve as 
supply lines in times of crisis such as bakeries and markets would be considered in 
reference to short radii like 500 meters, while response units such as medical clinics 
and pharmacies to less-intense radii of 1000 meters, and investment-extensive 
shelter infrastructures such as schools and hotels would therewith be referenced to 
wider radii of 2000 meters. The full-scale utilization of such systems that combine 
compatible hard- and soft-ware directly feeds into neighbourhood-based and -co-
financed disaster response-plans, whose progressive enactment exhibit what Gehl 
(2011) describes as positively self-reinforcing urban patterns which ultimately help 
non-partisan socialization of responsibilitization for provision of services, while 
keeping LGs in the driver’s seat. Municipalities should not have their arms bent by 
capitalist, but to stand their grounds they require anti-capitalists for cover.
Scenrio++ / fantasy Ramallah 2050 
The panic is starting to settle as the sixth day of this year’s snow-storm kicks in. 
The main water supply-pipe which burst on the third day cannot be fixed, but 
the neighbourhood’s reserves can sustain another week or two, depending 
on how responsible people are in their consumption. In our building we 
haven’t discussed it. Should I be worried? I’ve been spending the hours by 
going around with Dr. Toubasi, who is actually a retired ninety-year-old dentist 
but knows his way around with general medicine and hence been keeping up 
with some of the sick. I think he’s mostly bored and wants to walk his legs, and 
I have nothing better to do. My flatmate Nura tells me there was a woman 
that went into labour in our building while I was away, and that she helped 
the husband and four neighbours carry her for three kilometres where finally 
an ambulance was waiting. She described the comedy with her usual style, 
whereby she laughs herself out before you get the full sentence. Apparently 
the coordination of carrying a person on a blanket through staircases is a 
sport people should pay more attention to in this city. So that’s how we 
are sitting-in the hours of this storm. Apropos passing time; Some of the 
neighbours are starting to make business out of the lock-down. Remember 
Ayyoub? The Tunisian old man who lives in the basement? Well, anyway, he’s 
baking and selling Baharat cookies, while my other flatmate Raji sells glühwein. 
With them around, the tiny Kahwe at the corner is doing business better than 
usual, since people are locked to the distances their feet could carry them.
Schools [shelter], radius of 1,000 meters
Pharmacies [response], radius of 500 meters
Bakeries [supply], radius of 500 meters
Map 6.3. (right) Schematic and approximate illustration of a selection of today’s emergency 
infrastructures in Ramallah, demonstrating the unbalanced spatial distribution of bakeries, pharmacies 
and schools. The indicated radii are scaled to the size of the illustration as indicated in the key below.
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6.3.    RAMALLAH × 
100 SCENARIOS 
IS NECESSARY
[E]very society produces a space, its own space, [...] Any ‘social existence’ 
aspiring or claiming to be ‘real’, but failing to produce its own space, would 
be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from 
the ideological or even the ‘cultural’ realm. It would fall to the level of folklore 
and sooner or later disappear altogether, thereby immediately losing its 
identity, its denomination and its feeble degree of reality. (Lefebvre 2009:53; 
emphasis in original)
Ramallah is not unique, but uniquely complex. It is a product of its 
colonization, but has created what some call hallucinations of freedom, and 
others regard as spaces of opportunity. It show-cases the pitfalls of mass-tailored 
neoliberal development, but does not lack persons willing to engage in its re-
making. The importance of visions, imaginations, and factoring of relational, 
cross-border psycho-geographies in the processing of urban futures is starting 
to receive recognition, but remains isolated from the collective realm. Yet the 
city has accomplished initial steps towards, first, exercising ‘collective puzzling’ 
cross-discipline and specialty, but whether this will accelerate to the speed of 
progress of knowledge remains doubtful, and; second, it has been tracking and 
deciphering the growing inflow of information, but has yet to forge mediums for 
their negotiation, compromise and utilization. That said, through its course over 
the past hundred years, one could speculate that Ramallah is able to ‘be one day 
ahead of them’ as Leó Szilárd was quoted in 1961, shall its various tides of protests 
be able to co-enforce some of their shared claims.
To achieve this the city has to re-negotiate its morphological norms. Why 
does Ramallah’s old city constrict to its pre-1920s core, in place of being demarcated 
along the outlines of its modernity hence up to the 1970s? Shouldn’t the balcony 
streets of alMa’ared, Ghassan Harb, AbdelRahim Haj Muhammad, and Palestine 
Street be protected against the crawling monstrous commercial centres? Shouldn’t 
their former character of hybridization of residence and merchant’s promenades 
be protected against the slow evacuation of its citizens? 
Conceptions of history are engendered by monumentalization, whether 
through folklore, literature, art, or/and space. Ramallites here should ask whether 
the current version of history suits them; whether they want a city (state) less 
morphologically (less ethnically) mixed and therefore geographically fragmented, 
limited, incoherent; or the opposite? The question about Ramallah’s future spatial 
organization is directly tied to its political ideology, hence behavioural patterns, 
which in turn are glocal and many. Here city officials and decision-makers have to 
understand that – in Bruno De Meulder’s words9, ‘city is not about order’, rather, it 
‘is about chaos, difference, and thus violence’. The less the city’s ability to tame its 
sources of violence, the dimer are its chances of stability. 
The fact that urban violence predominantly stems of poverty is elementary, as 
well as its impacts of withdrawal to privatized spaces, segregation, securitization, 
What Foundat ions for  the Future?  |  327
and therewith otherness, inequalities, and contestation enter a vicious cycle. 
Ramallah’s historic attractiveness of being the better home for newcomers 
– its bearers of new wealth – is threatened. Hence what will Ramallah do to 
downscale its current discrepancies? Will Ramallite officials recognize that their 
own wealth depends on that of the masses and not the subsidized coterie? Will 
Ramallah’s Municipality accord the opinion of Nabil Hamdi that ‘when people 
are poor, governments are poor; simply, there are no taxes to collect’10? Ramallah’s 
Municipality should understand that the expansion of its own power, hence 
budget, necessitates that they – legitimized by the citizens they represent – tap 
into the wealth appropriated through quotidian consumption. 
Every city has a history of violence in one form or another, as well as 
threatening fault-lines. The degree of vulnerability – threshold at which tangible 
protests are released – depends on two; first, the length of the duration in which 
the masses are able to endure a crisis (economic, political, environmental, etc.) 
before means of basic sustenance are broken (security, poverty, dignity, etc.), 
and; second, the progressive ability of the city to re-adapt into new (compatible) 
forms of urbanism that consolidate attractiveness and relevance to mobile 
wealth, hence curtailing the chances of crisis occurring in the first place. 
This continuous diversification and making-anew of cities (industrial cities, 
financial capitals, ‘smart’ districts, a.o.) reduces the strains and weights on the 
individual composing systems (economic sectors and their off-shoots). So what 
are the models – and their adaptations – that Ramallites think their city should 
incorporate? Why and How?
Regardless of what these are, Ramallah’s future forms of urbanism cannot 
be suspended from its current ecology of compromised executive systems of 
democracy and the hijacking of wealth (by Israel and international donors alike). 
Herein decolonization starts with building a resilient society that is capable of 
anticipating, balancing and taming risk collectively and relationally. The death 
of the PLO politics and the national liberation movement was eminent given its 
losing bets on many things, but mostly, the prolonged ‘self-sacrificing love’ and 
the ability of quotidian Palestinians to internalize precariousness. If one should 
name one lesson learned it would be the importance of fluid strategies that are 
rooted in evolving socioeconomic needs of sub-groupings of popular movements, 
be those anti-capitalist or -colonial or other. Visionaries, urbanists and planner’s 
have the detrimental role here of moulding the channels for the rising tides, to 
influence their volumes, scales, and orientation and therewith accepting diversity 
of individual sense of purpose as the new collective that consolidates the needed 
self-sensorship and co-security. Where do the parameters of this collective lie? 
What are the principles, typologies and time-scopes of co-habitation that this city 
wants to enact and engender, and how?  
Visionaries – innovators, theorists, entrepreneurs, etc. – remain the most 
equipped for detection and optimization of the discoveries of the coming century 
and the re-definition of its economies, to the better or worse. In our approaches 
we should keep in mind what Mudar Kassis said: we cannot solve the problems 
of the future through selective ointments of the past, at least not solely, as these 
require couplings into present ecologies and bridges into those impending. Here 
is where creative destruction of norms (way we think, plan, act) again re-appears 
as kernel. Will the anti-PA and state-politics tides in the city gain momentum? 
Or will they break at the spatial fortifications? Which battlefields will the rising 
new Ramallite ethos construct and manipulate to ensure sustenance and growth? 
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How do these translate physically and morphologically? How can these be made 
fashionable for wide-spread, voluntary adoption? How does this benefit and 
co-opt present-day decision-makers yet equally contributes to empowering the 
rise of new ones? What kind of street-, neighbourhood-, district-culture does 
the municipality want to adopt? In the (re)drafting of those necessary hundred 
or more visions of their city, Ramallites should follow the questions and their 
branches, fuse scenarios and let others fade. 
The ecological cycle of nature suggests that the momentary political 
and economic impasse will conclude with the birth of replacement systems; 
hence inviting Ramallah to broaden its horizons, re-size technical planning 
and development paradigms into their real power-dimensions, and labour an 
attractiveness based on endemic urban assets rather than those of neoliberal 
manuals and donor economies. ‘How, then, does one organize a city?’, writes 
Harvey, ‘we simply do not know’ (2013:140). 
Ramallah should experiment, discuss and pursue the creation of a new 
collective ethos of Ramallite sumud that socializes spaces, risks and benefits, 
and reproduces the cohesive joie de vivre as tool for decolonization. History and 
contemporary political shifts alike teach us that liberation is an accumulative, 
hence continuous process whose stability is relative to levels of satisfaction 
of the critical mass, thus wealth sharing. The city has significant reserves of 
antispaces which visionaries could capitalize on in many directions, the better 
and worse. The latter will depend on the ability of all Ramallites to negotiate 
their differences, and therewith reduce the cancerous otherness. To this end 
many contributions are necessary, among the lead of which those of sharing 
and connecting of ethos and sensibilities in the district-city; hence making 
scenarios from imaginations, existing and forthcoming. Genuine participation 
(democratization of production) requires less technical vocabulary and more 
urban planners who understand their role not as fortune-tellers, but as curators. 
Today’s urban visionaries are implored to become combiners of the different 
perspectives finding the multiple interpretations in the one, and generators of 
more elaborate, integrated processes; a category with which this project hopes to 
have contributed.
That said, to communicate and relate the various singular pieces of the 
puzzle it would be helpful to have an open and overarching platform that archives 
debates of critical perspectives’ questioning of norms; hence in pondering 
whether the coming hundred years of Ramallah will tell stories of continued 
assimilation, resilience and making new, or those of destruction, and how either 
could be influenced. While Ramallah’s future will not be determined by this or 
any singular work, I would like to close with an echo of Ramallah:
There is a balad* that is growing in us,
As the world gets smaller on us and on our wishes,
We raise hope, until it gets greater,
And in us gets greater a longing, 
As that of a sailor to the harbour, close to which the winds abandoned his sail,
So he sang,
Keep me in mind, you far away balad, 
I don’t have a harbour in you, nor a girl or a boy [offspring], 
What I have is friends and songs,
So I did what I can do, my hand in my guitar and to you I sang,
I sang about a sky and the facade of my window, 
Singing about the sea till the salt in my nets melted,
Me, to whom my sea is haram**,
Yet, still it grows, still a balad is growing in us.,
As the world gets smaller on us and on our wishes,
We raise hope, until it gets greater.
Shadi Zaqtan and Imad Sayrafi
from the song Fi Balad [there is a balad],
album released in 2010
*balad: country, also used to indicate locality
**haram: sin, here used to indicate forbidden
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NOTES
CHAPTER  1  | PROTEST URBANISM AND 
THE ‘NEW COMER’ RAMALLAH
1. Chiapas is the southern most state in Mexico, and home to the Ejército Zapatista de 
Liberación Nacional (EZLN, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation), which has been 
resisting the ‘Spaniard’ regime since 1994 demanding basic rights for the indigenous 
population. Although some politically classify their discourse as Libertarian Socialism and 
Marxist thought, the movement emphasized the centrality of the Mayan beliefs to Zapatismo 
thought. In the past few years its strategy has been based on mass mobilization for non-
violent civil disobedience. The capital of Chiapas is Tuxtla Gutiérrez while the stronghold of 
the Zapatistas is the city of San Cristóbal, former capital until 1892, continued cultural capital, 
and located within the central mountain region of the state.
2. see ‘Annex.2 Table of Conducted Interviews and Focus Groups’; pg. 382.
3. see Terms section; pg. xx.
4. See Map 1.13 ; pg. 30.
5. see Terms section; pg. xix.
6. see Terms section; pg. xxi.
7. For example, in Berlin projects such as the New Schönefeld-Airport, Stadtschloss, Media 
Spree, Tempelhofer Feld, and the Potsdamer Platz are the most known of a growing list of 
projects to which many Berliners are claiming an opinion and protesting a perspective 
(Colomb 2012). This phenomenon is taking place in countless other cities from Mumbai 
(Industrial Corridor Project), through Beirut (Solidere downt-town) and reaching Rio de 
Janeiro (anti-Olympics city plans).
8. Usufruct (noun): ‘the right to use and derive profit from a piece of property belonging 
to another, provided the property itself remains undiminished and uninjured in any way’ 
(British Dictionary).
9. When the (alleged) contemporary founder of Ramallah Rashed elHaddadin arrived to 
the region, he chose the location due to several factors, one of which was the availability of 
infrastructure due to the presence of the established alBireh town (Shaheen 1982, Barthe 2011, 
Ramallah Municipality 2013).
10. PA official websites are generally either limited in terms of contents and/or are outdated, 
e.g. the website of the Ministry of Economy, under the Studies sub-menu, latest upload for a 
Study was in 2005.
11. For example, the nolli plan employed for the city of Ramallah in this work is largely drawn 
from aerial images obtained from Google Maps, as the municipality’s AutoCAD drawings 
of the city were incomplete; not to mention the technical shortcomings of these files whose 
correction consumed several weeks from the time of this work.
12. Sykes Picot was signed on 9 May 1916 in a secret convention during World War I between 
Great Britain and France pre-empting the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement 
stipulated the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various 
French- and British-administered areas. It took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes 
of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France.
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13. see Terms section; pg. xix.
14. see Endnote 12; pg. 329.
15. According to ICBS (2013) the number of Jews in Israel in 2013 totalled 6.042 million 
persons, 1.658 million Israeli-Palestinians, and 0.318 million non-Jewish Internationals. 
According to the PCBS (2013) population in WB (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip 
numbered 4.42 million. If East Jerusalem Palestinians are deduced from the latter to avoid 
the double-counting from the figures of the ICBS (2013), then the numbers add up to 6.042 
million Jews, 5.858 Palestinians, and 0.318 non-Jewish internationals. As such, Jews form 
49.45%, Palestinians 47.95%, and non-Jewish internationals are 2.60%.
16. In 1948 in the UN established the UNRPR for immediate response to the Palestinian 
calamity in cooperation with the ICRC. Upon the persistence of the situation, in December 
1949 the UN Assembly issued resolution 302 (IV) through which the UNRWA was formed.
17. Pan-Arabism is ‘Nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its 
origins lie in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy led to a cultural and 
literary renaissance among Arabs of the Middle East. This contributed to political agitation 
and led to the independence of most Arab states from the Ottoman Empire (1918) and from 
the European powers (by the mid-20th century). An important event was the [...] founding of 
the Arab League in 1945. Pan-Arabism’s most charismatic and effective proponent was Egypt’s 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’ (Britannica 2011).
18. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967: The Security Council [...] 1) 
Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires [...] the application of both the 
following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict; [...] 2) Affirms further the necessity [...] (b) For achieving a just settlement of 
the refugee problem [...] (UN 1967).
19. UN Security Council Resolution 338: October 22, 1973 : The Security Council [...] 2) Calls 
upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation 
of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 3) Decides that, immediately 
and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned 
under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East 
(UN 1973).
20. For details please check the Taba (Oslo II) Agreement of 1995.
21. Dayton Era: Formally known as the US security assistance to the Palestinian Authority 
(USSC). Officially, the mission of the USSC is ‘to coordinate various international donors 
under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize 
additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian 
security forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right-size its force and 
advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce 
the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom 
they serve’ (USSC 2009). Nonetheless, Palestinians in general view the Dayton Era as the time 
where the PA Police was turned from ‘for the people’ to ‘against the People’, up to using the 
term ‘Dayton Police’. The naming ‘Dayton Era’ was coined by mainstream Palestinians who 
viewed the actions of the US Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton with suspicion, particularly in light of his 
former missions in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan amongst others.
22. ‘EUPOL COPPS is the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support. 
[...] The aim of the Mission is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective 
policing arrangements and to advise Palestinian counterparts on criminal justice and rule of 
law related aspects under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with the best international 
standards and in co-operation with the EU institution-building programmes conducted by the 
European Commission and with other international efforts in the wider context of the security 
sector, including criminal justice reform.’ Duration: Jan.2006-Jun.2013 (EUPOL 2013).
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23. The Israeli Civil Administration is an arm of the Israel Army that caters for limited civil 
services - collection of taxes and few basic services such as education and health - within the 
territories that Israel occupied in 1967. 
CHAPTER 2  | THE COLONIAL PROJECT: 
ETHNOCRATIC TERRITORIALITY AND 
THE IMAGINED PALESTINIANS
1. The name of the city comes from Canaanite where ‘ram’ means the high edge, since 
Ramallah is the highest in the central region. It is commonly believed that the suffix ‘-allah’ 
(god) was added later by the Arab inhabitants as it oversees Jerusalem.
2. Information about the ‘Founding Families’ can be found on the Ramallah Municipality 
webpage under: http://www.ramallah.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=XZm5Mea174170799aXZm5Me.
3. Plural for Mintar, which is also known as Kasser. This is a tower-like construction of 
vernacular stones from the fields where these constructions are located. Normally they are 
formed of 2 floors for functional purposes. These are used for guarding the fields during 
harvesting seasons, for storing and processing the collected crops, as well as for living during 
that period (al-Jubeh & Bshara, 2002).
4. ‘The number of emigrants from Ramallah to the United States reached 2,580 people in 1953 
at a time when the total population of Ramallah was 4,500. In 1961, the number of immigrants 
reached 2,027’ (Ramallah Municipality 2013).
5. For more information about the relationship of the Expatriates with the city 
please visit the Municipality’s web-page (http://www.ramallah.ps/ar_page.
aspx?id=TXpt3Ha166556775aTXpt3H&m_id=240) or that of the American Federation of 
Ramallah (http://www.afrp.org).
6. see section 1.3.1 ; pg. 22.
7. In 1919 Pension Odeh was established and hosted mainly Lebanese teachers working at the 
Friends Schools. In the 1931 it was renovated by the returning son, enlarged and renamed 
to the Grand Hotel (Barthe 2011). While both names remain in circulation, the Odeh family 
retains many firsts: first Ramallite emigrant to the USA was Yousef Odeh elDibbiny; first 
Mayor of Ramallah in 1908 was Elias Odeh elDibbiny; first Ramallite female to inherit was 
from this family and the first registered hotel was the Grand Hotel which was also the first to 
be connected to electricity and installed a telephone (alJubeh and Bshara 2002).
8. Records uncovered in Riwaq’s (2006) project for the Registration of Historic Buildings in 
Ramallah indicate that by 1930 half of Ramallah’s – traceable – historic structures (176 units) 
were already in place, making constructions in the decade 1921 to 1930 account for 14% of the 
total built heritage through 49 documented items (alJubeh and Bshara 2002).
9. Taraki points out that the ‘[r]epresentations of Ramallah as a tolerant and open town have 
a great deal to do with the fact that it was originally a predominantly Christian town. In the 
wake of the Nakba of 1948, Ramallah’s native Christian population was augmented somewhat 
by Christian refugees from Jaffa and Jerusalem, and also (in larger numbers) from the smaller 
towns of alLidd and Ramla. This infusion of Christians cemented the Christian cast of the 
town, even though in subsequent decades the original Christian population of Ramallah was 
greatly reduced due to emigration’ (Taraki 2008a:66). 
10. see Terms section; pg. xxi.
11. The closest building to the Mukata’a (at the time, at a distance of about 300 meters) is 
alHambra Palace Hotel which was constructed in 1926 employing several English construction 
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techniques in combination with regional elements (alJubeh and Bshara 2002). During the 
Mandate period this hotel often hosted administration and government personal.
12. Arouri (2013) argues that the siding of the USSR with Palestinians during the Cold War was 
not subsequential rather ideological. For more please refer to his article ‘October Principles 
and the stance of the Soviet Union regarding the Palestinian Cause between 1917 - 1949’.
13. In 1971 the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham published a proposal as part of a legal and 
social reform agenda. The kernel argument was discipline through the established possibility 
of surveillance. In his model an entire prison population could be projected to the possibility 
of being surveyed through an individual point that lies at the centre of the cylindrical 
alignment of prison cells.
14. ‘The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit is subordinated to the 
Minister of Defense and is part of the General Staff. The unit carries out and implements 
civilian policy of the Government of Israel in the West Bank and vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip in 
coordination and conjunction with the Prime Minister’s Office, other government ministries, 
the security forces and the IDF General Staff ’ (COGAT 2014).
15. The Decolonizing Architecture Program crystallized in the aftermath of the unilateral 
withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip to its periphery, where it ‘deals with a fundamental 
question: how Israeli colonies and military bases – the architecture of Israel’s colonization – 
could be reused, recycled or reinhabited by Palestinians, at the moment it is unplugged from 
the military/political power that charges it’ (Decolonizing Architecture 2009:7).
16. Within its Centennial Program (see section  ; pg. 189) the municipality rehabilitated 
a number of Ramallah’s pre-OAs staircases. However, provision of new pedestrian 
connections has been very limited. For example, in the case of the Staircase Garden in elTireh 
neighbourhood, it was enabled by the owner of the property’s relinquishment of ownership in 
favour of the municipality.
17. Mayadin is plural of Maydan, which is Arabic for ‘square’. This is the term used by the 
Ramallah Municipality to describe what in reality constitute traffic roundabouts. 
18. UNRWA services in 2014 are provisioned in 1) 12 camps in Lebanon, with 444,480 
registered refugees (r.rs.); 2) 9 camps in Syria, with 507,904 r.rs.; 3) 10 camps in Jordan (of 
which 5 as a result of the Six-Day War of 1967), with 2,034,641 r.rs.; 4) 8 camps in the Gaza 
Strip, with 1,221,110 r.r.s.; and, 19 camps in the West Bank, with 748,899 r.rs.; hence totalling 
58 UNRWA camps and a registered population of 4,957,034 persons (UNRWA 2014). For 
geographic visualization refer to Map Map 1.10 ; pg. 27.
19. For more information about the Six Days War of 1967 refer to section 1.3.2 ; pg. 28.
20. Tawfiq Zayyad was born on 7 May 1929 in the Galilee in Mandate Palestine, and he was one 
of the 10% of Palestinians who managed to stay in historic Palestine during the 1948 Nakba. 
Upon completion of studies in the USSR and returning home he was – to the surprise and 
alarm of Israeli Government – elected as Mayor of the major city Nazareth on 9 December 
1973, as head of the Palestine 48 Rakah communist party. From his seat at the Knesset he 
worked on pressuring the Israeli Government towards changing its racially discriminatory 
policies towards its Palestinian population on both sides of the Armistice Line. ‘A report he 
co-authored on Israeli prison conditions and the use of torture on Palestinian inmates was 
reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Al HaMishmar. It was also submitted to the United Nations 
by Tawfik Toubi and [Zayyad] after their visit to Al-Far’ah prison on 29 October 1987. It was 
subsequently quoted from at length in a UN General Assembly report dated 23 December 
1987, where it was described as ‘Perhaps the best evidence of the truth of the reports 
describing the repugnant inhumane conditions endured by Arab prisoners.’ Zayyad was also 
a poet whose work was described as ‘poetry of protest’. He ‘died on 5 July 1994 in a head-on 
collision [...]. At the time of his sudden death, he was still Mayor of Nazareth, a member of the 
Knesset and a ‘leading Arab legislator’ (www.zayyad.com).
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21. Emil Habibi ‘was born in Haifa on 29 August 1922 [in Mandate Palestine...]. In his early 
life, he worked on an oil refinery and later was a radio announcer. Under the Mandate he 
became one of the leaders of the Palestine Communist Party.’ Having endured the Nakba and 
stayed in Haifa, ‘Habibi was eventually granted Israeli citizenship. After the war, he helped 
to create the Israeli Communist Party and established the communist paper Al-Ittihad. He 
stayed in Haifa his whole life. His gravestone reads (at Habibi’s own request): ‘Emile Habibi – 
Remained in Haifa’. [...] He served in the Knesset between 1951 and 1959, and again from 1961 
until 1972, first as a member of Maki, before breaking away from the party with Tawfik Toubi 
to found Rakah’. Habibi was also a novelist, where he ‘began writing short stories in the 1950s, 
and his first story, ‘The Mandelbaum Gate’ was published in 1954. In 1972 he resigned from 
the Knesset in order to write his first novel: The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist, which 
became a classic in modern Arabic literature. The book depicts the life of an Palestinian, 
employing black humour and satire. It was based on the traditional anti-hero Said in Arab 
literature. In a playful way it deals with how it is for Arabs to live in the state of Israel, and how 
one who has nothing to do with politics is drawn in to it’. Habibi died on 2 May 1996 (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Habibi).
22. ‘The Allon Plan of 1967 recommended that some 20 ‘agricultural’ villages, designed to 
contain some 7,000 ‘frontiersmen’, be established within fifteen years. A string of settlements 
near the Syrian ‘border’ was clearly devised as a border ‘maker’ and as a first line of defence. 
The settlements near Lake Tibrerias, on the other hand, were to constitute a rearguard defence 
as well as an economically profitable set of investments. By 1969 plans had exploded to a more 
ambitious (but then unrealistic) scale which foresaw a resident population that would reach 
45,000-50,000, in industrial and service towns and agricultural villages, within ten years. It 
should be pointed out that in 1969, when such plans were being set forth, only 300 Jewish 
‘settlers’ had actually been implanted, scattered in 11 ‘settlements’ that were mere military 
outposts’ (Abu-Lughod 1982:18).
23. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47 ‘proscribes the annexation of occupied 
territory, and the United Nations has repeatedly condemned Israel’s precipitous annexation of 
East Jerusalem and a wide belt of surrounding suburbs, villages and towns. Article 49 of the 
same convention prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of residents from an occupied 
area, regardless of motive. And yet thousands of Palestinians have been expelled while many 
more have been [...] ‘pressured’ to leave. The same Article expressly forbids the transfer by 
an occupying power of any of its civilian population into occupied areas. And yet, at most 
recent count, over 90,000 [in 1982] Israeli Jews have been officially ‘settled’ within the illegaly-
annexed Jerusalem district, and more than 30,000 other have been ‘settled’ in some 100 nahals 
(military forts), villages and even towns that the Israeli government has authorized, planned 
financed and built in unannexed zones beyond the 1949 cease-fire line that Israelis refer to not 
as a border, but euphemistically a ‘green line’’ (Abu-Lughod 1982:17).
24. The illegal Israeli colonies established in occupied territories while President Golda Meir 
was in office are as follows; Argaman and City of David in 1968; The French Hill (Giv’at 
Shapira) in 1969; Alon Shvut, Massu’a, Mevo Horon, Ramat Eshkol and Givat HaMivtar in 
1970; Hamra and Mizpe Shalem in 1971; Beka’ot, Har Gilo, Kiryat Arba, Neve Yaakov and 
Ma’alot Dafna in 1972; Mechora, East Talipot and Gilo in 1973; and Ramot Alon in 1974 
(B’Tselem 2013).
25. There are multiple kinds of Israeli colonies in the WB , while under international law these 
settlements are illegal, however they are categorized as either Registered Settlements thence 
making them legal from the perspective of the Israeli government; or, there are Outposts 
which are considered – even by Israeli law – illegal. Notwithstanding, in reality many of the 
former were initially established as the latter and Israeli legalisation arrived in retrospect.
26. see Terms section; pg. xx.
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27. While of OAs stipulate that Israel will refrain from construction of new settlements, 
since then Israeli governments have exponentially intensified their settlement activities sous 
prétext natural growth. While there are no official accumulative statistics available, news of 
additional units has become regular headlines. Exampling the intensity, few days after the 
launch of the latest – USA imposed and brokered – round of negotiations between Israel and 
the PLO in August 2013; President Netanyahu declared the approval of about 900 additional 
units in settlements (Sterman and Stoil 2013), followed by another 3,500 in October 2013 
(AbuGaneyeh 2013), and further 2,268 units in March 2014 (MEMO 2014).
28. Observers confirm that the majority of Israeli settlers (70-80%) describe themselves 
as ‘economic settlers’ i.e. relocation due to achieved financial advantage; in contrast to 
‘ideological settlers’ whose purpose of residing in colonies is the fulfilment of the claimed 
Eretz Israel via demographic Jewish domination (alAtar 2006). ‘Rather than concentrate on 
ideologically motivated settlers, the Likud government (1977-1984) sought to attract average 
Israelis interested in improving their quality of life. It was hoped that these suburban settlers 
in order to protect their economic investment in the higher quality of life, would create a 
strong lobby that would prevent any political solution based on territorial compromise’ 
(Shehadeh 1997:5).
29. The Palestinian unalienable rights are 1. An independent and sovereign state in the borders 
of 1967 which constitute 22% of historic Palestine; 2. The return of refugees, and; 3. Annexed 
East Jerusalem as capital. 
30. Ramallah elTahta is the neighbourhood encapsulating the historic centre thus constituting its 
natural direct extension, and in turn, highest density of structures constructed up to the 1970s.
31. E.g. at central crossings and in terrains enabling strategic vision.
32. In the IOF incursions into Ramallah (as other Palestinian cities) since the year 2000 it has 
systematically converted residential buildings into barracks, a process through which tenants 
of the multiple apartments are either temporarily displaced (left to seek refuge somewhere 
else) or imprisoned forcefully in one or more rooms under sever conditions (primary 
testimonies).
33. Ariel Sharon is former Israeli Hagana militant – 1947, appointed company officer in 1949, 
and in 1950 promoted to intelligence officer. In 1952 he became Major General and focused on 
prosecution of Palestinian resistance cadre. After several operations and growing controversy 
around his character he was released from military duty in 1974. He turned to politics and 
worked as aid to then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Three years later he returned to 
prime position as Minister of Agriculture under the Menachem Begin government 1977-81, 
and in the second term as Minister of Defence 1981-82. This was the era in which Sharon’s 
ideology had begun to crystallize, making him the godfather of the Israeli settler colonialism 
and the mastermind behind the geography and infrastructure of the illegal colonies (Weizman 
2007). Ideologically he belonged to the extreme right politics which opposed integration of 
Palestinians into Israel on arguments of ethnicity and religious inferiority. An official Israeli 
government investigation committee found Sharon responsible for the massacres against the 
Palestinian refugees of Sabra and Shatila, which were committed as he led the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982 (Anziska 2012). In the aftermath of the Lebanon Invasion and over the 
years 1983-84 Sharon was minister without portfolio, then Minister for Trade and Industry 
1984-90, Minister of Housing Construction 1990-92, Minister of National Infrastructure 
1996-98, Foreign Minister 1998-99, and ultimately Prime Minister in 2001 and until his stroke 
in January 2006 placing him in vegetative state until his death in 2014. He is responsible for 
sparking the wave of uprisings in September 2000 which were later called the Second Intifada. 
In 2002 he led Operation Defensive Shield in which the IOF reoccupied all of the WB, placed 
the entire population under curfew for six months, granted Israeli soldiers the green light 
to sabotage, loot, intimidate and murder. Under this operation the Church of Nativity was 
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placed under siege and was targeted by snipers in an audacious violation of international law 
and in the absence of articulated objection from the Vatican. In Jenin the IOF levelled the 
refugee camp killing scores of civilians. In Bethlehem and Nablus the historic dense centres 
were targeted with Apache and F16 missiles. Sharon imposed strangulating checkpoints in the 
WB, and turned the GS into an open prison after unilaterally withdrawing Israelis in colonies 
in 2005. For Palestinians, Ariel Sharon remains the number one War Criminal.
34. Given that Ramallah’s governorate’s average family size (lowest in Palestine) is 5.1 (PCBS 
2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of this building is 23 apartments × 5.1 =  117 persons.
35. ‘Some account of the geographical conditions which appear to be related to the distribution 
of seismic activity follows, and it is indicated that there are at least three distinct earthquake 
provinces in Palestine and Syria. The southern one corresponds to the plateau of Palestine and 
is of moderate activity. A central one comprises the arcs of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon 
ranges and centres in Damascus. The northern one coincides with the distinct arcs between 
Homs and Aleppo. A fourth, which may be regarded as belonging to Asia Minor, is the arc of 
the Giaour Dagh and Cyprus that has been the origin of the many destructive shocks recorded 
in the history of Antioch’ (Willis 1928).
36. Torque is also referred to as ‘Moment of a Force, in physics, the tendency of a force to rotate 
the body to which it is applied. The torque, specified with regard to the axis of rotation, is 
equal to the magnitude of the component of the force vector lying in the plane perpendicular 
to the axis, multiplied by the shortest distance between the axis and the direction of the force 
component. Regardless of its orientation in space, the force vector F can always be located in a 
plane parallel to the axis (Solarbotics 2014).
37. Newton’s third law stipulates that ‘when a force acts on a body due to another body, then an 
equal and opposite force acts simultaneously on that body’ (www.dictionary.com).
38. The impact force of projectile debris against surfaces is called Impulse (I), and it equals the 
difference in linear momentum (P); I = ΔP = mvf - mvi .
39. ‘antispace’ was coined by Trancik (1986) in reference to ‘lost space’; term elaborated upon 
in coming pages.
40. This observation was established through the author’s one-year residency and studies in 
Barcelona between 2009 and 2010.
41. see ‘4.3.3.  Beyond Manuals: Municipal Programs, Approach and OAs Legacy’; pg. 203.
42. see ‘’; pg. 189.
43. By the end of the British Mandate emigrating Jews owned a mere 5.8% of the territory, 
and Jews composed   a minority in all districts as demonstrated by the table below (Pappe 
2007:295):
District
Land ownership (%) Population (%)
Palestinian Jewish Public & Other Palestinian Jewish
Acre 87 3 10 96 4
Baysan 44 34 22 70 30
Beersheba 15 <1 85 99 <1
Gaza 75 4 21 98 2
Haifa 42 35 23 53 47
Hebron 96 <1 4 99 <1
Jaffa 47 39 14 29 71
Jerusalem 84 2 14 62 38
Jenin 84 <1 16 100 0
Nablus 87 <1 13 100 0
Nazareth 52 28 20 84 16
Ramla 77 14 9 78 22
Ramallah 99 <1 1 100 0
Safad 68 18 14 87 13
Tiberias 51 38 11 67 33
Tul-Karem 78 17 5 83 17
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44. Expression borrowed from Jacir (2013), in her ‘Letter from Roma’, where she writes about 
‘What’s left of the Left in Italy’.
45. Taking healthcare and medical infrastructure as an example; ‘By virtually any measure, the 
standard of health care in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1987 
lagged well behind those in both Israel and Jordan. For example, in 1985 infant mortality in 
the occupied territories was 70 per 1,000 live births, while it was 55 in Jordan and 14 in Israel.5 
In the occupied territories there were between 6 and 8 doctors for every 10,000 Palestinian 
inhabitants in 1986, while Israel had 28 and Jordan 22.6 From 1974 to 1985 the ratio of the 
number of hospital beds to population in the occupied territories actually decreased from 2.2 
to 1.6 per 1,000 individuals. By comparison, in Israel in 1985 there were 6.1 hospital beds per 
1,000 people. Other problems included the virtual absence of adequate health care in rural 
areas, the lack of coordination between health care providers, and the low levels of health 
insurance’ (Robinson 1993:302).
46. ‘Eretz Israel, the name for Palestine in the Jewish religion, had been revered throughout 
the centuries by generations of Jews as a place for holy pilgrimage, never as a future secular 
state. Jewish tradition and religion clearly instruct Jews to await the coming of the promised 
Messiah at ‘the end of times’ before they can return to Eretz Israel as a sovereign people in a 
Jewish theocracy, that is, as the obedient servants of God (this is why today several streams of 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews are either non or anti-Zionist)’ (Pappe 2007:10).
47. ‘‘Strangers’ here meant everyone not Jewish who had been living in Palestine since the 
Roman period’. (Pappe 2007:11)
48. For more information refer to Pappe 2006 and ‘Towards a Common Archive – Video 
Testimonies of Zionist Fighters in 1948’ under http://www.palestinemonitor.org/details.
php?id=9lkzwba930ysvn44m6eh .
49. Besides the Lassez-Passer a Jerusalemite can obtain a Jordanian Passport which states that 
the holder is actually not a citizen of Jordan. Herein, note that the status, living conditions and 
legal mazes surrounding Jerusalemites are complex, extensive, and beyond the clarification 
capacity of this work.
50. From a primary experience, in Darmstadt the nationality was stated as ‘ungeklärt’ (not 
clarified), in Barcelona it was ‘no diplomatic relations’, and in Berlin it is ‘Other Asian 
Nationality’ (author).
51. For more information refer to Campaign for the Right to Enter The Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: http://www.righttoenter.ps/index.php .
52. ‘Settler international’ as coined by Collins (2011:58) is ‘a term designating the convergence 
of interest and action among settler colonial states’. Through this naming Collins is appealing 
for critical analysis ‘beyond the self-representations of the powerful [e.g. NATO] and opens 
up new analytical possibilities’ (ibid).
53. ‘Nasserism is a socialist Arab nationalist political ideology based on the thinking of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, one of the two principal leaders of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and Egypt’s 
second President. Spanning the domestic and international spheres, it combines elements of 
Arab socialism, republicanism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, Developing World solidarity, 
and international non-alignment. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nasserism was amongst the most 
potent political ideologies in the Arab World. This was especially true following the Suez 
Crisis of 1956 (known in Egypt as the Tripartite Aggression), the political outcome of which 
was seen as a validation of Nasserism, and a tremendous defeat for Western imperial powers. 
During the Cold War, its influence was also felt in other parts of Africa, and the Developing 
World, particularly with regard to anti-imperialism, and non-alignment.’ (Wikipedia)
54. As indicator of this mobilization, ‘in 1973 and 1976 Labor had allowed local municipal 
elections in the West Bank, in the hope of blunting and re-directing political aspirations away 
from the PLO. By the second election round, the populace overwhelmingly elected nationalist 
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figures who began to coordinate as a block under the umbrella of the National Guidance 
Committee’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:29).
55. Curfew and closures is a classic tool of the IOF (B’Tselem 2014a). According to primary 
testimonies when neighbourhoods were placed under e.g. curfew for extensive periods of 
time, the aforementioned frameworks worked on smuggling supplies in support of the sumud 
of that particular area.
56. Mashrabiya is a ‘projecting oriel window enclosed with carved wood latticework located on 
the second storey of a building or higher, often lined with stained glass’ (Wikipedia).
57. In 2013 Israelis of Palestinian origin composed 20.7% of total population of Israel. This 
statistic does not take into account Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip, or the refugees 
(CBS 2014).
58. see Terms section; pg. xx.
59. see Terms section; pg. xxi.
60. Yitzhak Shamir was born in 1915 in Ruzhany, Belarus. In 1935 he emigrated to Palestine 
and  two years later he joined the Irgun militias which carried out terrorist activities against 
the British Mandate and Palestinian natives. Samir said: ‘we didn’t take any action blindly or 
automatically or just for the sake of violence. Our aim was to intimidate rather than to punish’ 
(Lis 2012). In 1940 Shamir left the Irgun militias and assumed the leadership of a yet more 
extreme one, the Lehi a.k. by the British as Stern Gang. With charges of terrorism Shamir 
was arrested in 1941 and imprisoned in the Acre prison ‘Mizra’, from which he escaped a year 
later. The militia he continued to lead assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister of state 
in the Middle East in 1944. As a result, the British Mandate deported him to Eritrea in 1946. 
A year later he escaped his exile back to Palestine where he picked up arms and fought among 
the militias again. in 1955 he joined the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, where he served 
for ten years. In 1970 Shamir switched from being a ‘field agent’ to politics, and was first 
elected into the Knesset in 1973 with his Zionist Likud Party (Lis 2012). With his right arm 
Ariel Sharon he changed the face of the occupied territories, the most articulate of the scares 
is his colonialist settler enterprise where by the time he left office the numbers of colonies 
in occupied territories  had tripled (alAtar 2006). For more on the marriage of the two, see 
Endnote 33; pg. 334. and see Endnote 18; pg. 330.
61. Avi Shlaim is an Iraqi-born British/Israeli historian.
62. The miri classification enabled the concealment of land appropriation until 
commencement with physical works, thence minimizing the space for Palestinian ‘legal’ 
objections (Weizman 2006).
63. Named after its author Matitiyahu Drobless, head of the WZO’s Settlement Division.
64. see Endnote 60; pg. 337. this chapter.
65. by Israeli Military Order 783 of March 1979 (Abdulhadi 1990).
66. see Regulatory Framework and Authorities for Planning in the West Bank; pg. 395
67. see Terms section; pg. xix.
68. In his paper ‘‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine’ the Israeli researcher 
Oren Yiftachel states that ‘ethnocratic regimes, which are neither authoritarian nor democratic. 
Such regimes are states which maintain a relatively open government, yet facilitate a non-
democratic seizure of the country and polity by one ethnic group. [...] Ethnocracies, despite 
exhibiting several democratic features, lack a democratic structure. As such, they tend to 
breach key democratic tenets, such as equal citizenship, the existence of a territorial political 
community (the demos), universal suffrage, and protection against tyranny of the majority’ 
(Yiftachel 1999:364). Thereof, ‘[t]he fact that in Israel’s fiftieth year the state’s highest legal 
authority still finds it difficult to protect a basic civil right such as equal access [of Palestinian-
Israelis] to state land’ (ibid.) provides evidence to Yiftachel’s postulate.
69. Partial Regional Master Plan 1/82, 1981 (Abdulhadi 1990:52)
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Zone Area (dunums) %
Arab Development 58,940 13
Special Use & Future Planning 76,600 17
Nature Reserve 28,820 7
Agricultural 263,570 59
Roads 18,270 4
Total 446,270 100
3  | RAMALLAH’S OSLO: NEOLIBERAL 
STATE-MAKING AND SOCIO-
RELATIONAL SENSIBILITIES
1. ‘Non-member sovereign states are free to submit a petition to join as a full member at their 
discretion. The petition is then evaluated by the United Nations Security Council and the 
General Assembly. For example, Switzerland was a permanent observer state from 1948 to 
2002, until becoming a full member on September 10, 2002. Currently, there are two observer 
non-member states: the Holy See and Palestine. They are both permanent observers, 
described as ‘Non-member States having received a standing invitation to participate as 
observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent 
observer missions at Headquarters’.’ (Wikipedia)
2. Since 1974 the PLO has been considered the ‘legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people’ (UN Resolutions 3210, 3236, and 3237), which includes all Palestinians around the 
world and in UNRWA refugee camps through the near-east. The PA on the other hand is an 
administrative governing body of some of the territories in the WB and GS. As such, the PA 
is officially neither concerned with nor representative for any Palestinian other than those 
present within the territory of historic Palestine and holding an Israeli-issued Palestinian 
identity card. Within this specific territory, the PA excludes Palestinians holding an UNRWA 
refugee status, and the territory of the camps themselves. This becomes further problematic 
when taking into perspective that a core principle of the Palestinian liberation movement is 
the return of the refugees.
3. Authority is ‘a person or body of persons in whom authority is vested, as a governmental 
agency’ (dictionary.com); in contrast to concepts of sovereignty and independence of decision. 
The french journalist Benjamin Barthe describes the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas 
as Qai’emmaqam (governor of provincial district in the Ottoman empire period), while the 
actual authority rests in the Israeli Civil Administration offices within the settlement of Beit 
El, on the outskirts of Ramallah (AlQuds 2013).
4. see Terms section; pg. xxi.
5. According to Roy ‘During the spring 1996 total closure, for example, approximately 
30 percent of households in the Gaza Strip were compelled to use savings or sell jewellery 
in order to buy food and other essential items’; and ‘in 1997, at least 8 percent of the total 
Palestinian population (approximately 200,000 people) received critically needed relief 
assistance’ (Roy 1999:77).
6. Shari’a is Islamic ‘law, seen as deriving from the Koran, hadith, ijma’, and qiyas’ (www.
dictionary.reference.com).
7. Areas A compose less than 15% of the WB and GS, which in turn correspond to 22% of Palestine.
8. ‘The centrepiece of Sadan’s plan was the construction of specially sealed industrial zones 
that would provide infrastructure and easy and secure access to the Israeli market for investors 
in the Strip. The result was the development of an industrial site at Beit Hanun (Erez) on 
Gaza’s border, with five additional estates being planned. In support of the project, Military 
Order 105, issued in 1991, ‘permitted for the first time free Palestinian investment in Gaza’, 
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while the Civil Administration began to expedite new licenses and provide subsidies and 
benefits to expatriate Palestinian investors, including the right of residency in the territories. 
This policy was coupled with the bureaucratization of Palestinian life, among the most notable 
instruments of which were the by now infamous magnetic IDs [...]. A key advantage of these 
enclaves [for the Israeli economy] was that they would be closure-proof, allowing the free 
movement of workers and goods. By mid-1994, discussions had yielded tentative agreements 
on the eventual establishment of three industrial estates, one in Gaza and two in the West 
Bank’ (Lagerquist 2003:7-8).
9. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949: Section II – General protection and 
administration of civilians in time of warsee Endnote 23; pg. 333.
10. Israeli politicians stipulated that they can foreclose the Palestinian demand for statehood 
through achieving an ‘economic peace’ with the Palestinian political and economic elites 
(Khalidi et al 2011; Halper 2013; Vlazna 2013; al-Masri 2013; Ravid 2009). Khalidi et al 
elaborate: ‘Earlier episodes have included Moshe Dayan’s policy of open bridges and 
cooptation of traditional elites in the 1970s and Menahem Milson’s Israeli Civil Administration 
and Palestinian Village Leagues in the 1980s. The Israel- PLO Protocol on Economic Relations 
of 1994 added a whole new meaning to pacification with its promised ‘peace dividend’ and the 
material benefits it bestowed on a new class of PLO bureaucrats who had returned from exile 
and on their Oslo-inspired “self-government” structures’ (2011:7).
11. Government expenses refers to: Compensation of employees; Use of goods and services; 
Consumption of fixed capital; Interest; Subsidies; Grants; Social benefits; and Other expenses 
such as ‘scholarships, NGOs support and emergency expenses for central government, and 
insurance & maintenance of vehicles, workers allowances, expenses for executing local 
projects, promotional discounts to repay debts for local government’ (PCBS 2011a).
12. In 2011 and with the outbreak of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’, foreign 
donors reduced their contributions to the PA as they remobilized considerable sums in favour 
of the other contesting areas.
13. Mann illustrates the two dimensions of state-power vis-à-vis the four ideal types of state as 
follows (Mann 2003:55):
Infrastructural Coordination
Despotic Power Low High
Low Feudal Bureaucratic
High Imperial Authoritarian
14. The 12 official Palestinian security elements are: 1. National Security Forces, 2. Civil 
Police, 3. The Preventative Security Service, 4. General Intelligence, 5. Military Intelligence, 
6. Military Police, 7. Coast Guard, 8. Air Guard, 9. Civil Defense, 10. Local ‘Governorate’ 
Security, 11. Special Security, 12. Presidential Security & Force-17 (Estimate 2000, Marsad 
2013). These elements do not cover the armed factions, which are numerous.
15. While conservative estimates indicate the ratio of security personnel to civilians at 1:110, 
here are the ratios of some of the countries of the world: US 1:390, Germany 1:336, Mexico 
1:273, Jordan 1:248, Turkey 1:206, Russia 1:183 (Eurostat 2013).
16. For more on the MDLF see section 4.1 ; pg. 184.
17. Since the signature of the OAs in 1993 the following election rounds took place: Parliamentary 
in 1996 and 2006; Presidential in 1996 and 2005; Local Government in 2005 and 2012.
18. On May 15th 2013 prominent Fateh (ruling party) as well as independent politicians 
and businessmen  launched the ‘Popular Movement for One Democratic State in Historic 
Palestine.’ Their agenda consists of lobbying and mass-mobilization in support of this concept 
across the WB, GS, as well as inside Israel proper (Prusher 2013).
19. Quiquivix wrote: ‘Might we then find it analytically useful to also distinguish between the 
party-centred Left (tat has been similarly taken by the conservative project of independence) 
and those leftist Palestinian desires that continue to persist? Those Palestinians, as George 
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Jackson might put it, who need liberation? If so, we should make these distinctions and be 
prepared to hold onto them. We cannot begin this work, however, by continuing to mirror 
our scholarship and action with a leadership class that (1) dismisses self-organized action 
outside of traditional organizational structures and (2) cannot see how the capacity of people 
to resist also can translate into the creation of new organizational structures. But this will need 
to go well beyond denouncing these prejudices and blind spots, for they are difficult to shake 
off. This is especially so for those of us who make a living from their existence’ (2013:6).
20. The PA employees about 140,000 public servants which correspond to approximately 
one third of the total workforce in the WB. These include close to 60,000 security officers 
(Elgindy 2013).
21. see Terms section; pg. xvii.
22. ‘The definition of relevance currently focuses primarily on the goals and priorities of 
donors or country/local governments, instead of focusing on meeting the needs of the targeted 
population. [...] Similarly to relevance, the definition of effectiveness focuses on determining 
the extent to which the intervention met its goals, and not the needs of aid recipients. [...] 
The current definition of sustainability is limited to prospective (likelihood of) sustainability 
and do not make any reference to retrospective sustainability (how sustainable it has been). 
Furthermore, it only mentions the need to consider environmental and financial aspects 
of sustainability, leaving out other essential elements to the sustainability of interventions 
such as political support, cultural appropriateness, adequacy of technology, and institutional 
capacity. Efficiency even though tackling some of the right issues, falls short on the coverage 
of costs (e.g., non-monetary costs) and comparisons (e.g., creative alternatives). Furthermore, 
the term efficiency often gets defined as least costly approach, but it is a limited definition 
given the way evaluations are structured. Cost-effectiveness seems a better term to define 
this criterion. Two key criteria are missing: quality of process (e.g., ethicality, environmental 
responsibility) and exportability of whole or part of the aid intervention, meaning the extent 
to which it could produce important contributions to other aid interventions’ (Chianca 
2008:44; emphasis in original).
23. For example, the ranking of LGs is factored by ‘Satisfactory Collection Efficiency and own 
Revenue Generation’ with three main categories: ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ which correspond to ‘specified 
own revenues’ are either ‘> 100 NIS per capita or 10% above last two years’ average’; ‘> 50 NIS 
per capita or 5% above last two years’ average’; and ‘> 25 NIS per capita or above last two years’ 
average’ respectively. Under this equation, both Ramallah and Tulkarem are ranked as ‘B’, at a 
time a single serving of Hummus costs an average of 15 NIS in Ramallah, which is equivalent 
to the price of 1 kilogram of Hummus in Tulkarem. In other words, the statistical criteria of 
the MDLF omits the stark differences in living costs and inflation levels among localities.
24. GDR: German Democratic Republic; FRG: Federal Republic of Germany.
25. see Endnote 20; pg. 340.
26. In the WB the school curriculum is based on the Jordanian system, while in GS it is 
based on the Egyptian. As such, the material and final examination is not unified across the 
presumed one-nation. Needless to say, these curricula contain marginal – if any – information 
about the history of the Palestinian liberation movement, and its trajectory. The high-school 
diploma (examination) system ‘Tawjeehi’ has been criticized for years – even before the PA – 
as mind-crippling in terms of emphasizing memorization and marginalizing critical thinking 
and skills of questioning and construction of individual opinion. These problems are further 
entrenched on the following levels. The vocational training centres are limited in terms of 
number as well as professions on offer due to restrictions imposed by Israel, thus maintaining 
this trajectory as basic. Universities meanwhile are all private institutions with relatively high 
fees due to the anaemic support of the PA. The continuous cuts in the budget of the PA for 
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universities has pushed the latter into crisis, resulting in tangible drop in quality of services in 
comparison to pre-OAs times.
27. Under ‘Old Guard’ Tamari places senior PLO figures (predominantly returnees) such as 
‘the troika of Mahmud Abbas, Ahmad Qurai’, and Nabil Shaath’ (2002:107).
28. Under the ‘Young Guard’ Tamari names Mohammed Dahlan, Jibreel elRjoub, Tawfiq 
Tirawi and ‘‘gangsters and warlords’, such as Sami Abu Samahdaneh in the Rafah area and 
the late Atef Ebiat [...] in Bethlehem, as well as Fatah radicals, such as Marwan Barghouti and 
Husam Khader (opposition PC members, respectively, from Ramallah and Nablus). It also 
includes liberal Arafat loyalists such as Sari Nusseibeh, holder of the Jerusalem portfolio in 
the Palestinian cabinet’ (ibid).
29. Mohammad Dahlan ‘managed the affairs of the ruling Fatah movement, coordinated with 
Israel regarding matters of security, and even wheeled and dealed in issues of regional and 
international affairs. [...] Dahlan – a former Palestinian Authority (PA) minister, a former 
National Security advisor and a former head of Gaza’s PA Preventative Security Service (PSS)- 
was king of the hill. All of his rivals were conveniently or by chance out of the picture. Arafat 
was then imprisoned in his office in al-Muqata’a, and Dahlan’s toughest contender, Jibril 
Rajoub, leader of the West Bank PSS, was discredited’ (Baroud 2014).
30. July 2012, demonstration condemning President Abbas’ planned meeting with Israeli Vice 
(and former IOF general and hard-liner) Premier Shaul Mofaz.
31. July 2013, demonstration against the renewal of US-brokered negotiations.
32. December 2013, cross-factional Palestinians protested the Prawer Plan which was passed by 
the Israeli Knesset few months earlier, aiming at displacing Beduins.
33. Traffic police has launched many campaigns such as enforcing use of seat-belt, prohibition 
of using of cellphones by drivers, reducing congestion by regulating parking, etc. Nonetheless, 
non of them surpassed the adjective of ‘campaign’ into becoming a ‘behaviour’. 
34. Between July 2013 and May 2014 the WB-bound PLO has been involved in negotiations 
under USA monopoly on mediation, and recently signed a reconciliation agreement with 
Hamas in the GS. In spite of colonial escalations (e.g. expansion of colonies, attacks by radical 
settlers), the Council of Governors and Mayors has not made any official statements in the 
indicated period nor publicly presented its position on any of the happenings.
35.  see Endnote 21; pg. 330.
36.  see Endnote 22; pg. 330.
37. In an interview with Dr. Samir Abdullah who directed the drafting of the PDRP, was 
subsequently Minister of Planning and Administration between 2008-2009, and is a member 
of the Palestinian Monetary Authority; he has testified that the proposal request US$ 5.6 
billion in place of the granted US$ 7.7 billion at the Paris Donor Conference in December 
2007 (Abdullah 2012).
38. The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding 
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations 
was an agreement on continuation of the PP in spite the termination of the agreed-upon 
transitional interim period. This agreement reassembled the following: 1. Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), September 1995; 2. Protocol on Economic 
Relations, 1994; 3. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 1994; 4. Washington 
Declaration, 1994; 5. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
Between Israel and the PLO, 1994; 6. Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities, 1995; 7. Wye River Memorandum, 1998.
39. In this regard alAtar (2010) narrates: ‘Tony Blair decided that he wants to work with the 
Art Community, and a meeting with him was set up in the American Colony in Jerusalem. 
From the beginning he gave us the speech of we being the artist, the voice of the people and 
the persons most capable of influencing politics and that entire repertoire we hear all the time. 
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After a long discussion he said: ‘We have to give the Palestinians something to worry about 
losing’. His justification was that in order for the Palestinians to start calculating their actions 
and be more rational they have to have something that they would worry about losing. In 
other words, I will open a factory for you in Ramallah under strict apolitical slogans and rules, 
and then we as Palestinians would always want to make sure that there are no demonstrations 
around the facility with at least 2km in order to protect it.’
40. While Zionists have widely claimed that they established a ‘state for a people without land in 
a land without people’, scholarship, records and governmental archives (whether Ottoman or 
British) reveal a socially and economically vibrant Palestine whose interruption was brought 
about by the neocolonial project. For more information please refer to Jumana Manna’s ‘A 
Sketch of manners’ (2013; www.jumanamanna.com) and Benny Brunner’s (2010) ‘The Great 
Book Robbery’.
41. Fateh; Communist Party; Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and; The 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDLP).
42. No official records and statistics about rent values could be found during this work, and as 
such these numbers are based on primary research and observations.
43. Khalili elSakinini was a Palestinian teacher, scholar, poet, and Arab nationalist. ‘In 
1909, Khalil Sakakini founded the Dusturiyyah school, which became known for its Arab 
nationalist approach. Sakakini pioneered an progressive education system: no grades, prizes 
or punishments for the students, and emphasis being placed on music education and athletics. 
He also introduced new methods of teaching Arabic, and made it the primary language 
of instruction instead of the Turkish. Sakakini led a movement to reform and change into 
a more Arab approach to what he considered to be a corrupt Greek Orthodox Church of 
Jerusalem, and wrote a pamphlet in 1913 titled ‘The Orthodox Renaissance in Palestine’, which 
led to his excommunication from the Greek Orthodox Church. He later became Inspector 
for Education in Palestine, a post he held for 12 years, until his resignation in protest of the 
appointment of a Jew as High Commissioner of the Palestine Mandate, Herbert Samuel. After 
working as a school principal in Cairo, he returned to Palestine in 1926 and became a school 
inspector. [...] During the [Nakba], the Sakakini’s were one of the last families to leave the 
Katamon neighborhood [Jerusalem]. A few days before the city was divided, the Sakakini 
family fled to Cairo. [...] Khalil Sakakini died three months later [after son’s death], on August 
13, 1953.[8] Sakakini’s two daughters, Dumya and Hala, lived together in Ramallah until their 
deaths, in 2002 and 2003’, and Khalil elSakakini Cultural Centre in a mansion that ‘was the 
former family home of Khalil Salem Salah, the mayor of Ramallah between 1947/1951, [it] is 
now owned by the Palestinian Ministry of Culture’ (www.wikipedia.org).
44.  see Endnote 33; pg. 334.
45. Curfews are imposed in individual cities or neighbourhoods, sometimes multiple, 
sometimes centrally coordinated, in others decision is taken by a low-rank regional 
commander,  sometimes for hours others for days, etc. Hence curfews are difficult to quantify.
46. For Gazans, the worst contemporary attack was the latest Operation Protective Edge which 
took place between 8 July - 26 August 2014, and was described as ‘genocide’ where entire 
neighbourhoods were levelled to the ground, internationally banned weapons employed, 
and hundreds of civilians killed. The impact of this tragedy is still under survey two months 
past. Up to summer 2014 Operation Cast Lead was considered the worse attack on Gaza (27 
December 2008 - 18 January 2009). 
47. As often articulated by its state-figures, Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley is not 
considered an option.
48. Ahmad Qurei’ (Abu elAla’) is a Fateh Central Committee member who served as director 
of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), 
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Minister of Economy & Trade, Minister of Industry, Prime Minister, speaker of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, and remains a PNC member and an advisor to th PA.
49. Dov Weissglass is an Israeli lawyer and businessman who – besides private business – 
served as chief of staff and legal advisor for Ariel Sharon.
50. see Terms section; pg. xx.
51. Transcripts can be found under: http://ramallahsyndrome.blogspot.de .
52. The Table below demonstrates the number of cultural activities and their spaces amongst 
the districts of the WB starting the third phase of the OAs (PCBS 2014i):
WB District
Number of Cultural Centres in Operation In 2012, Number of Operating:
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Museums Theatres Cultural Activities*
Jenin 5 4 5 62 71 67 70 - 1 716
Tubas - - 2 13 14 15 15 - - 195
Tul-Karem 7 7 9 31 23 50 48 1 1 483
Qalqilya 1 4 3 13 12 8 26 - - 137
Salfeet 4 3 4 10 15 17 18 - - 498
Nablus 24 30 36 109 95 102 107 - - 2,063
Ramallah 10 22 36 28 22 40 59 2 2 355
Jericho - 1 - 18 7 16 16 - - 979
Jerusalem - 27 27 47 34 55 56 2 3 256
Bethlehem 24 25 30 78 60 73 76 3 - 1,400
Hebron 37 43 44 97 81 88 86 2 - 1,513
* includes Art Exhibitions, Concerts, Courses, Lectures, and Symposiums
53. On 12 April 2014 the Ramallah Governorate organized a performance for an Indian dancing 
group which was also scheduled to perform in Tel Aviv. The event violates the BDS directives 
and course of action signed upon by over 170 CBOs, trade unions, universities, etc. A group 
of BDS activists organized a demonstration in front of the theatre, which was oppressed by 
the PA security forces and wherein 4 activists were arrested and subsequently presented with 
charges of ‘disturbing public peace’ by the General Attorney. 
54. Israel has established multiple ‘number-graveyards’ in which undisclosed numbers of 
bodies of war casualties and former prisoners are kept. The naming stems for the fact that 
graves are market by codified numbers rather than biographic information. Amongst those 
are fighters from the 1967 war, as well as Palestinians whose last trail ends inside walls of 
Israeli prisons. Needless to say, this act violates both human rights and international treaties 
on conduct of states in war. The Jerusalem Legal Aid Centre (JLAC) launched a campaign for 
identifying and retrieving these human remains in 2008, and has hitherto managed to close 
26.5% of the total number of documented cases. For more information see http://www.jlac.ps/
index.php?page=inside&pid=24&sectionid=4&parentId=0 .
55. A term coined by Emil Habibi. see Endnote 21; pg. 333.
56. Friday and Sunday used to be the weekly days off in Ramallah since its population was 
either Muslim or Christian. Governmental, financial and many private organizations switched 
to a Friday-Saturday weekend after the signature of the OAs. Some Christian organizations – 
like Ramallah Municipality, Birzeit University – continue to operate with the pre-OAs system. 
Hence, Thursday is the Palestinian equivalent of the western Friday. 
CHAPTER 4  | PA INSTITUTIONS, 
DISCOURSE, PROJECTS,  AND IMPACTS
1. For more information on the plan see ‘2.2.2.iii. Land Alienation: the Drobless Plan’; pg. 89.
2. Naming in reference to the Israeli architect S. Shamshoni who was previously ‘commissioned 
by the [Israeli] Central Planning Department to prepare plans for about 180 villages within 
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the Jerusalem district’ and ‘another 103 towns and villages in the northern part of the West 
Bank’ over the following two years, where ‘the salient feature of these local plans was their 
total disregard for the facts on the ground’ (Abdulhadi 1990:54).
3. The town of elAzariya which in 1986 had 1,950 dunums of built-up area was designated for 
this purpose a mere area of 650 dunums that are already constructed (Abdulhadi 1990).
4. ‘In 1983, representatives of the various [Palestinian] districts established the ‘Committee to 
Follow Up Objections against the Proposed Regional Road Master Plan’. Letters were sent to 
representatives of various countries and to the UN, and numerous articles condemning the 
plans were published in local newspapers’ (Abdulhadi 1990:56).
5. For Drobless Plan see pg. 89.
6. Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) was declared by Prime Minister Dr. 
Salam Fayyad in 2008 as his road map for the refinement of PA’s institutions (amongst other 
items) to suite the establishment of the State of Palestine.
7. ‘The Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) is a Palestinian semi-
governmental institution that works on translating local government policies approved by the 
Palestinian government into programs and projects that contribute to the empowerment of 
the local government units through managing funds (grants and loans)’ (MDLF 2013).
8. In a sense, the relation simulates that between Palestinian localities and the COGAT pre-
OAs, whereby ‘under [Israeli] Military Order 418, issued March 1971, all planning authority 
was vested in the Higher Planning Council, which was given extensive powers to suspend 
any plan or license anywhere within the West Bank, including the municpalities which in 
principle retained the authority to grant permits. While ultimate authority rests with the 
Higher Planning Council, it is its executive arm, the Central Planning Department, which 
is directly involved on a day-to-day basis in every aspect relating to planning, including the 
issuing of permits, carrying out demolitions, ruling on plans’ (Abdulhadi 1990:49)
9. Municipal Council 2007-2012.
10. Ibid.
11. ‘The role of the Ministry [of Planning and Administrative Development is] to lead the 
cross-sector planning, to develop comprehensive development policies with the participation 
of all relevant Palestinian institutions, and to coordinate and support sector planning in the 
concerned ministries and institutions so as to ensure their consistency with the comprehensive 
cross-sector approaches and plans. In this context, the Ministry develops different plans 
and programs and introduces them along with their policy foundations to the Cabinet for 
deliberation and approval; then referred to the legislative council for ratification’ (MOPAD 
2013).
12. The SDIP is a “four-year participatory development planning process and instrument that 
intends to steer local development directions in an integrated multi-theme and -stakeholder 
approach” (SDIP 2009:6). This tool is developed by the MOLG, MOPAD, and MDLF in 
cooperation with the GIZ towards promoting decentralization, improving responsiveness to 
needs, enhancing provision of services, and setting basis for integrated development amongst 
others.
13. This ministry changed names a number of times. Dr. Ghassan Khatib – Minister of Planning 
2005-2006 – narrates the process by stating ‘MOPAD started as Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation (MOPIC) and filled the role of both, a ministry of planning and 
that of foreign affairs. In 2003 or 2004 they separated the two files, so this ministry became 
Ministry of Planning (MOP). In 2007 Dr. Samir Abdallah was appointed to be minister and 
at that point the name was changed to Ministry of Planning and Administration. Later, when 
Dr. Ali Jarbawi was appointed to the position [2009-2012] they changed the name yet again 
to Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development.’ (Khatib 2012). While officially the 
renaming came to suit the elaboration of the functions of the institution; people on the street 
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provide a simpler explanation whereby they believe that the renaming was committed to suit 
the institution to the profile of the chosen minister each at his the time.
14. Kufur Aqab lies within the Israeli Greater Jerusalem territory. As such, building permits 
and provision of services is the responsibility of the Municipality of Jerusalem. Noteworthy, 
this neighbourhood is neglected and highly marginalized by the Israeli authorities.
15. In October 2011 a visit was conducted to the JCU office in Beitunya Municipality where 
an interview with the head of the unit Arch. Khawla alTaweel was conducted. The only 
project at hand was that of planning a Ring Road. She indicated that the Ring Road planning 
is not progressing due to Israeli objections, and simultaneously all proposals mentioned in 
the MOPAD published plan are frozen pending donor funding. In the same line, interviews 
as well as unofficial conversations with employees of Ramallah and alBireh Municipalities 
confirmed that the JCU is a virtual body with no presence in their daily functions. Hamas 
stands for Islamic Resistance Movement which currently is a right wing political party. In 
early 2000s the USA named Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations.
16. see Table 4.11 ; pg. 224.
17. ibid.
18. ibid.
19. see Endnote 15; pg. 345.
20. Anani (2010), Arouri (2010) and Huleileh (2012) clarified that private investors avoid 
engagement with the industry section due to constraints by the Israeli Government. Arouri 
explains that besides the frequent imposition of closure over the territories and destruction of 
Palestinian infrastructure, industries require a hard-to-earn Israeli blessing in order to work: 
‘Simply speaking, if one makes a factory and Israel has not given its blessing, Israel could - and 
has often done so - block the raw materials the investor imported and needs for production 
in their customs. With everyday the materials stay in the Israeli customs the investor has to 
pay numbers for its storage in the Israeli facilities, and in no time the ground fee exceeds that 
of what he/she had paid for the material itself. This has happened very often, and there are 
countless stories of Palestinian importers dropping their rights over products they purchased 
after being held for a period of time in Israeli customs. So Israel can strangle any industry at 
any time, and this is beside transportation of goods, licenses, etc.’ (Arouri 2010).
21. In 1996 the PA held presidential and legislative elections that will ultimately form the PA. 
Mayors and municipal councils nonetheless were appointed by the PA. Between 1996 and 
2000 no particular accomplishments were registered as the dominant aspect was that of 
efforts to configure scope of mandate while allowing the population to do what it wished ‘for 
the first time’ i.e. laissez faire. 
22. see section 3.2.2 ; pg. 142.
23. GIS: Geographic Information System.
24. see Terms section; pg. xvii.
25. ‘Calatravalandia’ translates into ‘Calatrava Land’ in reference to its exclusive designer, the 
Valencia-born international architect Santiago Calatrava.
CHAPTER 5  | REAL-ESTATE 
CORPORATIONS AND URBAN 
LANDSCAPES OF RAMALLAH
1. First steps were taken by the appointment of the World Bank schooled technocrat Dr. Salam 
Fayyad as Minister of Finance in 2002 and till 2006. In 2007 he was appointed Prime Minister, 
where he oversaw the preparation of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan 2008-
346 |  100 × RAMALLAH
2010 (MOPAD 2007) thus cementing the long launched process of institutionalization of 
neoliberalism in Palestine.
2. Khabieh in colloquial Palestinian term that refers to a place where things are stored. These 
could be oil vats of pottery, or shafts of clay inside rooms for storing grains. 
3. PECDAR’s Objectives as stated on its website (PECDAR 2013a):
• Formulating economic and social plans, in accordance with the general policies of national 
and local institutions.
• Coordinating the flow of international assistance for the benefit of the Palestinian people.
• Identifying investment projects and other activities to be financed by the donor countries.
• Administering and monitoring the implementation of such programs and projects.
• Evaluating the economic, social and environmental impact of PECDAR ’s programs and 
projects. 
• Implementing a process of institutional strengthening and human resources capacity 
Building for PECDAR and for other agencies charged by the Council with responsibility for 
executing particular activities.
• Undertaking any other tasks assigned to it by the PLO Executive Committee in the area of 
economic and social development.  
4. see Terms section; pg. xix. 
5. alGhadeer Neighbourhood is located at the meeting point of the borders of Surda, AbuQash 
and Jifna villages at about 7 km northwards from Ramallah’s centre. It composes of 34 
residential buildings with 11 apartments in each corresponding to a total of 374 apartments, as 
well as two commercial services buildings (PRICO 2014). Given that Ramallah’s governorate’s 
average family size (lowest in Palestine) is 5.1 (PCBS 2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of this 
neighbourhood is 1870 persons. 
6. Given that Gaza’s average family size is 6.0 (PCBS 2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of the 
Pearl Towers is 3,300 persons.
7. See section 3.1.1 ; pg. 107.
8. ‘Fayyad, who formerly served as country director in the Palestinian areas for the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), became finance minister last June during a Palestinian 
cabinet reshuffle. His appointment was considered a result of US and international pressure 
who demanded that the PA carry out intensive financial and other reforms. Israel has also 
added to the pressure when it froze millions of US dollars in PA tax revenues and refused 
to release any amount without financial reforms first, in addition to other conditions. 
Nevertheless, Fayyad rejected in a meeting with reporters in Jerusalem to announce the 
publication of the report the claims that reforms were carried out as a result of pressure 
insisting that it was part of the PA’s reform efforts as demanded by the people. Fayyad, 
from the West Bank town of Tulkarm, has concentrated his efforts since assuming office to 
unification of all PA accounts into one fund managed by his ministry’ (AbuKhater 2003).
9. Over the decades the PLO had accumulated significant wealth, which in the pre-Oslo era 
was obtained from third parties (states, political bodies, patriotic businessmen, etc.) in the 
form of support and financing of the activities and treasury of the organization. In the post-
Oslo era most of these caches were represented as private investments, mainly in outsourced 
monopolies to the PA’s coterie of private entrepreneurs (Calabresi 2002, Abdullah 2012). 
Under this system private persons cashed the benefits of capitalization and circulation of 
public wealth, while the government and its people remained poor and dependent on foreign 
donations (Kassis 2010, Abdullah 2012, a.o.).
10. ‘PIF’s main objective is to promote sustainable economic growth and private sector 
development in Palestine, through originating and investing in economically feasible, socially 
responsible and developmentally sound strategic projects in vital and viable economic sectors 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in partnership with the Palestinian private sector and 
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international investors. These investments aims [sic] to revitalize the Palestinian economy by 
creating new job engines to reduce poverty and unemployment, and raise living standards. 
PIF has been focusing on stimulating the growth of a strong, cohesive, efficient and highly 
experienced private sector that is competitive locally and worldwide to lead the Palestinian 
economy a very important factor in building and growing the national economy’ (PIF 2014).
11. In 2013 the PA’s public revenue totalled US$ 2.88 billion (Shaban 2013); which renders PIF’s 
share at 10.4% of the total revenue.
12. see Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories by Cavatorta, Ghazawneh, and 
Andriani, 2009.
13. see Policies to Promote an Enabling Environment for a knowledge-Based Economy in 
Palestine and Jordan by Ersheid and Jabarin 2007.
14. MAS: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute.
15. Economic sectors targeted by PIF’s MSME’s ‘Sharakat’ Program: IT, Tourism, Microfinance, 
Industry and Agriculture.
16. Images can be found under this link: http://amaar.ps/index.php?lang=en&page=130762286
5162&item=130857109003
17. Barthe indicates that the initial designs had the towers at 50 floors but later sufficied with 
20 floors, as ‘N’est pas Dubai qui veut’ (Barthe 2011:20)
18. Weekend days in Ramallah are Friday and Saturday. As such, on Thursday afternoon 
thousands commute to their localities of origin, back to Ramallah, or otherwise. In this 
sense, the situation is comparable to Friday afternoon traffic in western countries. The only 
alternative to this artery is Nablus Road. 
19. Unrecorded conversation with Mr. Khaled Batrawi in October 2012.
20. Nablus Road lies few hundred meters to the east of Ersal Street, and is the original axis 
connecting north the WB with its centre and south. It passes along the walls of COGAT 
headquarters and Beit El settlement. Nablus Road was closed from 2000 until recently in 2013, 
and remains today scene to obstructions and arbitrary closures.
21. A happening confirmed by Dima elTaweel (architect working at alBireh Municipality), 
Khaled Batrawi (Civil Engineer, co-founder of the Palestinian Centre for the safety on Roads 
and Environment, and consultant for alBireh Municipality), and the interviewees Barghouthi 
(2012) and Shaheen (2012).
22. CBS have been connected to cases of urban gentrification, infringing on citizen’s right to 
space through exclusion, security and surveillance, suboptimal living condition, elevated rates 
of violence and questions of high costs fuelled by the relative lifelessness of these districts at 
night, where ‘in many cities, downtowns are now islands surrounded by decayed or decaying 
areas. True, here too there are encouraging signs of rehabilitation and re-population, partly 
fed by immigrants from abroad. But the picture is everywhere still partial even contradictory’ 
(Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011: 238).
23. elReehan Neighbourhood; elGhadeer Neighbourhood; Diplomatic Quarter, elItihad 
Neighbourhood, and elBasateen Neighbourhood to name a few.
24. The execution of elReehan Neighbourhood is planned over four phases. Phase one includes 
the 18 villas, 27 (16%) of apartment buildings, and the 11-storied hospital.
25. alManara Square is considered as the centre of the agglomerate. In this case the route to 
elReehan follows the new network via elTireh neighbourhood (north-west of Ramallah), 
rather than the traditional one through Surda.
26. The residential space composes of 18 villas and 162 apartment buildings. The footprint of 
these structures values 130.000 sq.m. of the site total of 25.000 sq.m.
27. Open Space (green areas and walkways) is 28.585 sq.m., 11.43%; and Open Space (historical 
area) is 8.615 sq.m., 3.45% (elArd and CEP 2010:3-2).
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28. Officially there are the villas and the eight apartment-building typologies. This work 
considers a tenth residential typology, namely, the penthouses.
29. Real estate prices are consequential of land-use categorization and geography-sensitive 
market prices. In this case, the price per sq.m. in Surda is lower than that in Ramallah.
30. PIF’s ‘Infrastructure Programs’ includes Wataniya Mobile, Gaza Gas Project, Palestine 
Power Generation Company in WB, and Palestine Electric Company in GS (PIF 2014c).
31. PIF’s ‘Large Caps’ investments include ‘The Arab Palestinian Investment Company’, 
‘Palestine Commercial Services Company’, ‘Palestine Islamic Bank’, and the ‘Arab Islamic 
Bank’ (PIF 2014c).
32. PIF’s ‘Capital Markets Portfolio’ management includes ‘Khazanah Asset Management 
Company’, ‘Rasmala Palestine Equity Fund’, and ‘PIF’s Investments In The Palestine Exchange’ 
(PIF 2014c).
33. PIF’s ‘Aghwar And Dead Sea’ includes ‘Jericho Agro-Industrial Park’, ‘Moonlight Tourism 
City’ and ‘Madinat AL Qamar’ (PIF 2014c).
34. Beyond the rare publication of its financial reports, Massar’s website provides neither 
information about its start-up nor current accumulative capital, nor necessary links to some 
of its subsidiary companies, and some of the provided links lead to limited, aged, cancelled, or 
inactive web pages. This lack of transparency raises significant doubts about Massar.
35. See terminology section: Fayyadism.
36. Slogan of Rawabi, which has been flagged to distract from the hierarchy of vision of this 
project. Searching ‘Palestine’s first planned city’ using the Google engine results with about 
3.440.000 results.
37. alMasry is the richest family inside Palestine, and probably the most influential.
38. Rawabi was announced at the Palestine Investment Conference, Bethlehem, 21-23 May 2008.
39. MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
40. Through meetings with persons affiliated with Massar, Bayti and Rawabi as a project 
a number repeated the argument that their delay is partly caused by the PA shortcomings 
in terms of the promised public social infrastructures. The identities of these persons is 
protectively concealed by this work.
41. Rawabi’s construction commenced in 2010, which translates to sixty-two years since the 
Nakba of 1948.
42. In the WB alone, since 1968 – immediately after the 1967 War – Israel has constructed over 
125 illegal settlements and over 120 outposts (B’Tselem 2013). The ratio is 5.2 entities per year 
since 1967. This numbers do not take into account the Israeli colonial settlements in the Golan 
Heights, Gaza Strip, Sinai peninsula, and the construction of new cities inside Israel proper. 
Meanwhile, Rawabi is the only new Palestinian city that Israel allowed since 1948. 
43. Massar’s evident complicity with Israeli authorities and service providers under the slogan 
of achieving peace through economy; see Endnote 10; pg. 339. In the same line: ‘Bashar Al-
Masri, managing director of Rawabi, said that though no Israeli companies have been involved 
in constructing the city, hundreds of Israeli suppliers provide it with raw materials such as 
cement, sand, electric components and plumbing. He estimated that Israeli businesses benefit 
from the Rawabi project to the tune of tens of millions of dollars a month’ (Miller 2014).
44. Metaphor from ‘the end justifies the means’.
45. Construction sites are rarely policed or regulated. The multi-story skeletons are neither 
fenced nor is basic labour-mobility throughout them secured. In most cases side-walks 
are turned into material-storage space, and in several cases streets collapsed due to deep 
excavation for placing subterranean floors. These streets were thence interrupted for months.
46. Shortest building has 7 apartment floors and the garage in the ground floor, totaling 8.
47. ‘les trentes glorieuses’ is a term used by french-speakers to refer to the three decades 
following WWII (Lévy-Vroelant et al 2008:37).
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48. In the last couple of years the ‘Atara Checkpoint has been generally open with little 
obstruction to traffic. Nonetheless, it has not been dismantled. Thus the threat of its 
reactivation remains in place.
49. The main road to Rawabi extends through C-Areas which lie under full Israeli sovereignty. 
The COGAT agreed to the construction of the street on temporary basis, namely, that each 
year Massar/Bayti is required to apply for the renewal of the permit, otherwise the street will 
be closed. The alternative connection extends through the village of ‘Atara, costing an addition 
10-15 minutes. In a similar respect and among others, up to date of this work Israel has granted 
no permit for the construction of the quintessential water-line for the supply of the city (PBS 
2013). This reality has also been reported in the news, e.g. ‘The Civil Administration, an 
IDF organ entrusted with the civilian governing of the West Bank, objected to the widening 
of a local road leading up to the city and passing through area C, which lies under Israeli 
administrative control. And Israel’s national water company, Mekorot, has still not guaranteed 
a water supply to Rawabi’ (Miller 2014).
50. In the early 2000s a corrupt businessman called Fu’ad Mash’al constructed a 14-story 
building in violation of building regulations, on heritage-protected lands, and without 
having obtained a construction permit. Upon the launch of investigations against corruption 
he fled the country. A couple of years ago the PA purchased the non-finished construction 
for a total of US$ 10 million, at a time it was legally capable of confiscating it (testimony of 
Abed Mansour, Civil Engineer  and construction-site manager currently working on the 
refurbishing of the Mash’al Tower into its new function, the PA’s Media Headquarters). 
51. The latest international financial crisis – whose domino effect commenced its sweep 
from the USA in 2007 – was accompanied by world-wide mass protests against inequality, 
particularly income inequality. The most renowned series of protests was lead by 
geographically varied chapters of the ‘Occupy Movement’, e.g. in NY had the local chapter 
was ‘Occupy Wall Street’. Lately a study by Oxfam has been published where the organization 
investigated growing inequality. Among other data the study presents the ‘percentage 
increase in share of income of the richest one percent’ and ‘the share of national income 
going to the richest one percent’, which translates with the wealth of the richest 85 persons 
on this globe being equivalent to that of three billion persons, albeit, the poorest three billion 
persons (Wearden 2014). Palestine is no stranger to the slogan of ‘we are the 99% (www.
wearethe99percent.us).
52. see Endnote 6; pg. 338.
53. ‘Nussbaum suggests that a properly designed liberal education cultivates three basic 
capacities among cosmopolitan citizens to free their minds from narrow tradition, custom and 
habit including the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions (Socratic 
self-examination), the capacity to identify with a global moral and human community, and 
finally the capacity for narrative imagination, or the ability to imagine cultural difference 
in order to decipher alternative narratives of the ‘other’ and relate or connect to them in a 
meaningful and sympathetic way’ (Naseem and Margison 2006:53).
54. For the definition of ‘normalization’ in the Palestinian context see Terms section; pg. xx.
55. Jacir (2013) speaking of Italian policy, yet the phrase applies to the happenings in Ramallah, 
and was articulated in conversations with the architect, urbanist and researcher Dr. Yazid 
Anani in 2013, with whom also an interview was conducted in 2010 by the author.
56. Hong Kong having similar colonial heritage but different scale and context in comparison 
to Ramallah.
57. Barcelona having a similar economic and cultural history to that of Ramallah, but 
significantly different geo- and socio-politics than the latter.
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CHAPTER 6  | WHAT FOUNDATIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE RAMALLAH?
1.  In his article A day in the life of the Palestinian Ben-Gurion which was published in Haaretz 
(online) on 11 February 2010. The article can be found under: http://www.haaretz.com/
weekend/week-s-end/a-day-in-the-life-of-the-palestinian-ben-gurion-1.263177.
2. ‘We came to this country which was already populated by Arabs, and we are establishing 
a Hebrew, that is a Jewish state here. In considerable areas of the country we bought lands 
from the Arabs. Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know 
the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you, because these geography books no 
longer exist; not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahalal 
arose in the place of Mahalul, Gevat – in the place of Jibta, Sarid – in the place of Haneifs and 
Kefar Yehoshua – in the place of Tell Shaman. There is no one place built in this country that 
did not have a former Arab population’ Moshe Dayan, former Minister and Chief of Staff of 
Israel’s army (Said 1992:14).
3. Abbas was appointed first Prime Minister for the PA in March 2003 through international 
pressure to curb corruption and reduce Arafat’s monopoly. The creation of this post was not 
a pleasant choice for Arafat, who in response cornered Abbas bureaucratically, inducing the 
resignation of the latter after six months from assuming office, in September 2003.
4. The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong took to the streets on 26 September 2014 
demanding electoral reform and was still ongoing at the time of production of this work.
5. As the architect and planner Lubna Shaheen notes: ‘Unfortunately up to date focus lies on 
Master Plans, and in turn the latter are being limited to land uses and physical development. 
Questions of differentiated urban functions corresponding to the varying geographies were 
not addressed by government institutions, and Ramallah fell within this realm; will Ramallah 
become the administrative-political services centre? Will is remain tourism-focused? What 
is the role of future Ramallah in 5, 10, or 20 years? In my opinion this vision was missing, 
and this is what allowed private investors to define the developmental path for the public 
institutions rather than the opposite taking place. This reality is what we see translated on the 
ground, whereby every second day there is a new detached urban project being implemented 
in accordance with laws, or better said, by taking advantage of legal loop-holes and decision-
making hierarchies in light of high rates of nepotism. The problematic of this hierarchy goes 
further, where many municipal decisions are being imposed on municipalities from higher 
levels such as the Presidential Office or the HPC issuing approvals over projects; e.g. The 
Palestine Tower has no file in elBireh Municipality archives as approval and licenses were 
granted from the Presidential Office. This forms a genuine obstacle in face of development of 
municipal departments and work’ (Shaheen 2012).
6. For more information please refer to SodaStream sales fizzle as Israeli company struggles 
in the US by The Guardian, available under: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/
oct/07/sodastream-sales-stocks-israeli-struggle-us-market ; and Update: ‘Blood bubbles’ 
— mainstream media turn on SodaStream and Scarlett Johansson by Mondoweiss, 
available under: http://mondoweiss.net/2014/01/scarlett-johansson-eyebrow ; and Growing 
concern in Israel over BDS by Ynetnews, available under: http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4484336,00.html .
7. Bound by professional ethics I will not reveal the name of the institution. 
8. E.g. larger numbers of persons can casually claim the right-of-way in alleys but not on veins 
or arteries.
9. Keynote speaker at ‘Cities to be Tamed? Standards and Alternatives in the transformation 
of the urban south, Milan, 15-17 November 2012. 
10. ibid.
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Annex.2 Table of Conducted Interviews and 
Focus Groups
Table A.1. List of interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012
Year Interviewee Position / Affiliation Field
2010 Basem Khoury CEO of Dar el-Shifa’ Pharamacuticals & Former Minister of Commerce
Politician / 
Investor
2010 Mohammed alAtar Film maker and director Media
2010 Shuruq As’ad Radio Monte Carlo Journalist
2010 Elias Zananiri Speaker of Ministry of Civil Affairs Journalist
2010 Mahmoud Abdullah Member of Ramallah Municipal Council Engineer
2010 Janette Michael Mayoress of Ramallah City Educator
2010 Dr. Samih El-Abed
Palestine Investment Fund, Consultant + 
Former Minister of Planning & International 
Cooperation
Architect / 
Politician
2010 Alia Rayyan Heinrich Böll Foundation, Consultant NGO worker
2010 Dr. Mudar Kassis
Prof. of Philosophy and Political Science & Dean 
of the Faculty of Law & Public Administration at 
BZU
Analyst / 
Educator
2010 Dr. Lisa Taraki Researcher and Prof. of Sociology, BZU Researcher
2010 Dr. Yazid Anani
Prof. of Urban Planning & Architecture, BZU 
+ Head of Academic Board, International Arts 
Academy
Researcher 
/ Architect /
Artist
2010 Tayseer Arouri Prof. of Physics, BZUCivil Society Activist & Former PLO Politician
Politician / 
Activist
2012 Samir Huleilieh CEO of Palestine Real Estate Investment Company - PRICO
Businessman 
/ Investor
2012 Yazan Khalili Freelance Artist, Urbanist and Architect Artist / Urbanist
2012 Bashir Barghouthi
Head of the Policies Department at the Ministry 
of Local Governance Engineer
2012 Dr. Ghassan Khatib
Vice President for Advancement and 
Communication at BZU + Former Minister 
of Labor, Minister of Planning, and Head of 
Government Media Centre
Politician / 
Administra-
tor
2012 Dr. Samir Abdullah
Director of Palestine Economic Policy Research 
Institute - MAS + Former Minister of Planning & 
Administration
Economist / 
Politician
2012 Dr. Samia Botmeh Head of Centre for Development Studies, BZU
Economist / 
Researcher
2012 Ali Ziadeh Lead Architect of Rawabi (Planned City) Architect
2012 Dr. Lubna Shaheen Prof. of Architecture & Urban Planning, BZU
Researcher / 
Architect
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Table A.2. List of Focus Groups conducted in October 2011
No. Age Group Location Date N
o.
 o
f 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
1 17 - 18 Arab Evangelical Episcopal School 13.10.11 12 3 9
2 35 - 45 Arab Evangelical Episcopal School 15.10.11 3 1 2
3 25 - 30 GIZ Development Unit 18.10.11 5 3 2
4 17 - 18 Friends Boys School 20.10.11 18 9 9
5 17 - 18 Evangelical Lutheran School of Hope 20.10.11 14 6 8
6 50 + Birzeit University Housing Cooperative 24.10.11 9 4 5
7 17 - 18 Ramallah Boys High School 25.10.11 10 - 10
8 20 - 22 Birzeit University, Department of Architecture 25.10.11 6 2 4
77 28 49
Focus Groups that were cancelled:
30 - 50 Business Women Forum 22.10.11
25 - 35 A group of local artists 26.10.11
17 - 18 Ramallah Girls High School 27.10.11
18 - 22 Birzeit University - non-Architecture students 28.10.11
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The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing 
the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and 
conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful 
coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, 
the two sides agree to the following principles:
Article I: Aim of negotiations: 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace 
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 
the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based 
on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is understood that the interim 
arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the 
permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) 
and 338 (1973).
Article II: Framework for the interim period: 
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.
Article III: Elections: 
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern 
themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections 
will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while 
the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in 
accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not 
later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realisation 
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
Article IV: Jurisdiction: 
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the 
interim period.
Article V: Transitional period and permanent status negotiations: 
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area.
Annex.3 Oslo accords - Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements  
(NAD 1993)
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2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the 
beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian people’s representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with 
other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be 
prejudiced or pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.
Article VI: Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities: 
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government 
and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed 
herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the 
inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the 
following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and 
tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as 
agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the 
transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
Article VII: Interim agreement: 
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period 
(the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the 
number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement 
shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with 
Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the 
inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and 
responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the 
Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea 
Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a 
Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water 
Administration Authority and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the 
Interim Agreement, that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the 
Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
Article VIII: Public order and security: 
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel 
will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal 
security and public order.
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Article IX: Laws and military orders: 
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, 
within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining 
spheres.
Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee: 
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and 
any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this 
Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in 
order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields: 
Recognising the mutual benefit of co-operation in promoting the development of the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, 
an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Co-operation Committee will be established in order to 
develop and implement in a co-operative manner the programmes identified in the protocols 
attached as Annex III and Annex IV.
Article XII: Liaison and co-operation with Jordan and Egypt: 
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and co-operation arrangements between the Government of Israel 
and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and 
Egypt, on the other hand, to promote co-operation between them.
These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will 
decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. 
Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.
Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli forces: 
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of 
elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in 
accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military 
forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate 
with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the 
Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
Article XIV: Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area: 
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol 
attached as Annex II.
Article XV: Resolution of disputes: 
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, 
or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by 
negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X 
above.
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2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which 
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the 
parties will establish an arbitration committee.
Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional programmes: 
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for 
promoting a “Marshall Plan”, the regional programmes and other programmes, including 
special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as 
Annex IV.
Article XVII: Miscellaneous provisions: 
• This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
• All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and agreed minutes pertaining 
thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
Done in Washington, DC. this thirteenth day of September 1993.
For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres 
For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas 
Witnessed by: The United States of America (Signed) Warren Christopher 
  and The Russian Federation (Signed) Andrei V Kozyrev
Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections: 
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election 
process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues: 
• The system of elections 
• The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their 
personal composition 
• Rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements 
for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting 
and television station.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be 
prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process owing to practical 
reasons.
Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area: 
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of 
this Declaration of Principles an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from 
the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements 
to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the 
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agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not 
exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.
3. The above agreement will include, among other things: 
• Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives 
• Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, 
except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations and other mutually 
agreed matters 
• Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the 
Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from 
abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). 
Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad 
should be trained as police and police officers 
• A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon 
• Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Co-operation 
Committee for mutual security purposes 
• An economic development and stabilisation programme including the 
establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment and 
financial and economic support. Both sides will co-ordinate and co-operate jointly 
and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims 
• Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho area.
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for co-ordination between both parties 
regarding passages: (a) Gaza-Egypt  (b) Jericho-Jordan; 
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian 
authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located 
in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will 
continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in 
the interim period.
Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation in economic and development 
programmes: 
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing committee for economic 
co-operation, focusing, among other things, on the following: 
1. Co-operation in the field of water, including a water development programme prepared 
by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of co-operation in the 
management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals 
for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of 
joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.
2. Co-operation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Programme, 
which will also specify the mode of co-operation for the production, maintenance, purchase 
and sale of electricity resources.
3. Co-operation in the field of energy, including an energy development programme, which 
will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the 
Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy 
resources. This Programme may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical 
industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.
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4. Co-operation in the field of finance, including a financial development and action 
programme for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
5. Co-operation in the field of transport and communications, including a programme, which 
will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza sea port area, and will provide for the 
establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Programme will provide for 
carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.
6. Co-operation in the field of trade, including studies, and trade promotion programmes, 
which will encourage local, regional and interregional trade, as well as a feasibility study of 
creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones and 
co-operation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
7. Co-operation in the field of industry, including industrial development programmes, 
which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial research and 
development centres, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines 
for co-operation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and 
science-based industries.
8. A Programme for co-operation in, and regulation of, labour relations and co-operation in 
social welfare issues.
9. A human resource development and co-operation plan, providing for joint Israeli-
Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training 
centres, research institutes and data banks.
10. An environmental protection plan, providing for joint and/or co-ordinated measures in 
this sphere.
11. A Programme for developing co-ordination and co-operation in the field of 
communications and media.
12. Any other programmes of mutual interest.
Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation concerning regional development 
Programmes: 
1. The two sides will co-operate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting 
a development programme for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
to be initiated by the Group of Seven. The parties will request the Group of Seven to 
seek the participation in this programme of other interested states, such as members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, regional Arab states and 
institutions, as well as members of the private sector.
2. The Development Programme will consist of two elements: 
• (a) An Economic Development Programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The economic development programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will 
consist of the following elements: 
• A Social Rehabilitation Programme, including a Housing and Construction 
Programme 
• A Small and Medium Business Development Plan 
• An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, 
transportation and communications, etc) 
• A Human Resources Plan 
• Other programmes.
• A Regional Economic Development Programme. The regional economic 
development programme may consist of the following elements: 
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• The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a 
Middle East Development Bank, as a second step 
• The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for co-
ordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area 
• The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal 
• Regional desalinisation and other water development projects 
• A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated 
regional effort for the prevention of desertification 
• Interconnection of electricity grids 
• Regional co-operation for the transfer, distribution and industrial 
exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources 
• A regional tourism, transportation and telecommunications development 
plan 
• Regional co-operation in other spheres.
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups and will co-ordinate towards 
their success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-
feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups. 
Agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on interim self-government 
arrangements:
A. General understandings and agreements: 
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the 
Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same 
principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these agreed minutes below. 
B. Specific understandings and agreements: 
Article IV: It is understood that: 
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, 
military locations and Israelis.
2. The Council’s jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, 
spheres and authorities transferred to it.
Article VI (2): It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows: 
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians 
who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the 
Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education 
and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed 
upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations 
in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also 
will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes 
collected by the direct taxation office.
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4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations 
will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on 
the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.
Article VII (2): 
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for co-ordination and co-
operation.
Article VII (5): 
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the 
powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Article VIII: 
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for co-operation 
and co-ordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of 
powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, 
as agreed in the Interim Agreement.
Article X: 
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli 
and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them 
as members of the joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee. It is further agreed that each 
side will have an equal number of members in the joint committee. The joint committee will 
reach decisions by agreement. The Joint committee may add other technicians and experts, as 
necessary. The Joint committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
Annex II: 
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be 
responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and 
Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho area.
Agreed in Washington DC, on 13 September 1993. 
For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres 
For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas 
Witnessed by: The United States of America, (Signed) Warren Christopher 
  and The Russian Federation, (Signed) Andrei V Kozyrev.
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Annex.4 Palestinian National Council 
Declaration of Independence (NAD 1988)
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people 
was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured 
for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history.
Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national 
identity, rising even to unimagined levels in its defense, as invasion, the design of others, and 
the appeal special to Palestine’s ancient and luminous place on the eminence where powers 
and civilizations are joined. All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political 
independence. Yet the undying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the 
land its character, and for the people its national genus.
Nourished by an unfolding series of civilizations and cultures, inspired by a heritage 
rich in variety and kind, the Palestinian Arab people added to its stature by consolidating a 
union between itself and its patrimonial Land. The call went out from Temple, Church, 
and Mosque that to praise the Creator, to celebrate compassion and peace was indeed the 
message of Palestine. And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave 
of itself unsparingly in the valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the 
unbroken chain of our people’s rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national 
independence. And so the people was sustained in the struggle to stay and to prevail.
When in the course of modern times a new order of values was declared with norms and 
values fair for all, it was the Palestinian Arab people that had been excluded from the destiny 
of all other peoples by a hostile array of local and foreign powers. Yet again had unaided justice 
been revealed as insufficient to drive the world’s history along its preferred course.
And it was the Palestinian people, already wounded in its body, that was submitted to yet 
another type of occupation over which floated that falsehood that ‘Palestine was a land without 
people’. This notion was foisted upon some in the world, whereas in Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations (1919) and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the community of nations 
had recognized that all the Arab territories, including Palestine, of the formerly Ottoman 
provinces, were to have granted to them their freedom as provisionally independent nations.
Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in 
their dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-determination, following upon U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one 
Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international 
legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty.
By stages, the occupation of Palestine and parts of other Arab territories by Israeli forces, 
the willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes of the majority of Palestine’s 
civilian inhabitants, was achieved by organized terror; those Palestinians who remained, as a 
vestige subjugated in its homeland, were persecuted and forced to endure the destruction of 
their national life.
Thus were principles of international legitimacy violated. Thus were the Charter of the 
United Nations and its Resolutions disfigured, for they had recognized the Palestinian Arab 
people’s national rights, including the right of Return, the right to independence, the right to 
sovereignty over territory and homeland.
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In Palestine and on its perimeters, in exile distant and near, the Palestinian Arab people 
never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence. 
Occupation, massacres and dispersion achieved no gain in the unabated Palestinian 
consciousness of self and political identity, as Palestinians went forward with their destiny, 
undeterred and unbowed. And from out of the long years of trial in ever-mounting struggle, 
the Palestinian political identity emerged further consolidated and confirmed.
And the collective Palestinian national will forged for itself a political embodiment, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole, legitimate representative recognized by the world 
community as a whole, as well as by related regional and international institutions. Standing on 
the very rock of conviction in the Palestinian people’s inalienable rights, and on the ground of 
Arab national consensus and of international legitimacy, the PLO led the campaigns of its great 
people, molded into unity and powerful resolve, one and indivisible in its triumphs, even as it 
suffered massacres and confinement within and without its home.
And so Palestinian resistance was clarified and raised into the forefront of Arab and 
world awareness, as the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people achieved unique prominence 
among the world’s liberation movements in the modern era.
The massive national uprising, the intifada, now intensifying in cumulative scope and 
power on occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the unflinching resistance of the refugee 
camps outside the homeland, have elevated awareness of the Palestinian truth and right into 
still higher realms of comprehension and actuality. Now at last the curtain has been dropped 
around a whole epoch of prevarication and negation.
The intifada has set siege to the mind of official Israel, which has for too long relied 
exclusively upon myth and terror to deny Palestinian existence altogether. Because of the 
intifada and its revolutionary irreversible impulse, the history of Palestine has therefore arrived 
at a decisive juncture.
Whereas the Palestinian people reaffirms most definitively its inalienable rights in the 
land of its patrimony:
Now by virtue of natural, historical and legal rights, and the sacrifices of successive 
generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their homeland; 
In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences and relying on the authority 
bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations 
Organization since 1947; And in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to self-
determination, political independence and sovereignty over its territory, The Palestine National 
Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims 
the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem 
(Al-Quds Ash-Sharif).
The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is 
for them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a 
complete equality of rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions 
and their human dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself 
based on freedom of expression and the freedom to form parties.
The rights of minorities will duly be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide 
by decisions of the majority. Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality 
and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, 
color or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent 
judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine’s age-old spiritual and 
civilizational heritage of tolerance and religious coexistence.
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The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, 
at one with that nation in heritage and civilization, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, 
progress, democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by 
the Charter of the League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with 
each other shall be strengthened. It calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance 
the reality of state, to mobilize potential, and to intensify efforts whose goal is to end Israeli 
occupation.
The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of 
the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its 
commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement.
It further announces itself to be a peace-loving State, in adherence to the principles of 
peaceful co-existence. It will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent 
peace based upon justice and the respect of rights so that humanity’s potential for well-being 
may be assured, an earnest competition for excellence may be maintained, and in which 
confidence in the future will eliminate fear for those who are just and for whom justice is the 
only recourse.
In the context of its struggle for peace in the land of Love and Peace, the State of Palestine 
calls upon the United Nations to bear special responsibility for the Palestinian Arab people and 
its homeland. It calls upon all peace-and freedom-loving peoples and states to assist it in the 
attainment of its objectives, to provide it with security, to alleviate the tragedy of its people, and 
to help it terminate Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories.
The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the settlement of regional and 
international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter and resolutions. 
With prejudice to its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence, it 
therefore rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism against its territorial integrity 
or political independence, as it also rejects their use against territorial integrity of other states.
Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold 
of a new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen 
ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has 
been illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up and irradiated by the light 
emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the 
fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard for freedom, 
our children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those ties to our 
sacred soil are confirmed in camp, village, and town.
We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian Woman, guardian of sustenance and 
Life, keeper of our people’s perennial flame. To the souls of our sainted martyrs, the whole of 
our Palestinian Arab people that our struggle shall be continued until the occupation ends, and 
the foundation of our sovereignty and independence shall be fortified accordingly.
Therefore, we call upon our great people to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and 
defend it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and dignity in that homeland, 
which is a homeland for the free, now and always.
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:
“Say: ‘O God, Master of the Kingdom, 
Thou givest the Kingdom to whom Thou wilt, 
and seizes the Kingdom from whom Thou wilt, 
Thou exalted whom Thou wilt, and Thou 
abasest whom Thou wilt; in Thy hand 
is the good; Thou are powerful over everything.”
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Annex.5 Regulatory Framework and Authorities 
for Planning in the West Bank
(World Bank 2008:35-6)
PA administered 
areas (A & B)
Area C – Palestinian 
localities
Area C – Israeli 
settlements
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• Jordanian City, 
Village, and Buildings 
Planning Law of 1966
• Building and 
Planning Regulations 
for Local Councils, 
Draft Regulation No. 
3 (1996)
• Building and 
Planning Regulations 
Outside the 
Planned Areas Draft 
Regulation No. () 
(1996)
• Agriculture Law
• Registration Law
• Jordanian City, 
Village, and Buildings 
Planning Law No. 79 
of 1966
• Military order 418 
– Planning of Cities 
and Villages, 1971 
and subsequent 
amendments
• Jordanian City, 
Village, and Buildings 
Planning Law No. 79 
of 1966
• Military Order 418
• Military Order 604
• Military Order 783
• Military Order 895
• Military Order 860
• Military Order 1043
• Military Order 848
• Israeli Planning and 
Building Law, 1965
Ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 P
la
ns
No regional plan. (PA 
Regional Plan for 
West Bank was never 
approved)
British Mandate 
Regional Plan for 
Jerusalem (RJ5), 1942 
and British Mandate 
Regional Plan for 
Samaria (S15), 1946 – 
of undetermined legal 
status
• British Mandate 
Regional Plan for 
Jerusalem (RJ5), 1942 
and British Mandate 
Regional Plan for 
Samaria (S15), 1946 – 
of undetermined legal 
status
• Partial Regional Plan 
No. 1/82, 1982
• Road Plan 50, 1984
Master Plans available 
for all municipalities 
and most localities 
(originally 
developed by Civil 
Administration), 
currently being 
updated, 120 of about 
500 plans already 
revised by MOLG
Special Partial Outline 
Plans available for a 
few localities, usually 
prepared by the Central 
Planning Department, 
most localities have no 
master plans
Master Plans usually 
prepared by the Israeli 
Ministry of Housing 
and Construction 
or the Settlement 
Division of the World 
Zionist Organization 
and submitted to the 
Supreme Planning 
Council
• Note: This list of laws, regulations, and military orders includes most of the key pieces of 
regulation, but is not comprehensive, particularly in the case of Israeli military orders.
• Sources: Based on information from interviews with officials from the PA Ministry of 
Local Government as well as Coon, Anthony, “Town Planning Under Occupation: An 
Examination of the Law and Practice of Town Planning in the Occupied West Bank”, 
University of Strathclyde, Al Haq, Ramallah 1992.
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(World Bank 2008:35-6)
PA administered 
areas (A & B)
Area C – Palestinian 
localities
Area C – Israeli 
settlements
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ns • Higher Planning 
Committee (PA 
Ministries and service 
authorities.)
• District Planning 
Committees
Supreme Planning 
Council – General 
Sub-committee and 
Central Planning 
Department – Israeli 
Civil Administration
Supreme Planning 
Council – Settlement 
Sub-committee
M
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al
/ L
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al
 
M
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te
r P
la
ns
• Higher Planning 
Committee
• District Planning 
Committees
• Municipalities 
and local planning 
committees (village 
councils) may prepare 
plans
Supreme Planning 
Council – General 
Sub-committee and 
Central Planning 
Department – Israeli 
Civil Administration
Supreme Planning 
Council – Settlement 
Sub-committee
D
et
ai
le
d 
A
re
a P
la
ns
• Higher Planning 
Committee
• District Planning 
Committees
• Municipalities 
and local planning 
committees (village 
councils) may prepare 
plans
Supreme Planning 
Council and Central 
Planning Department 
– Israeli Civil 
Administration
Supreme Planning 
Council – Settlement 
Sub-committee
Jewish Regional 
Councils designated 
as “special planning 
committees”
Bu
ild
in
g 
Pe
rm
it 
Au
th
or
iti
es W
ith
in
 m
un
ic
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al
 
m
as
te
r p
la
n
Municipal authorities
Not applicable (no 
municipalities exist in 
Area C, only village 
councils)
Jewish municipal 
or regional councils 
designated as “special 
planning committees”, 
otherwise Supreme 
Planning Council 
and Central Planning 
Department – Israeli 
Civil Administration
W
ith
in
 v
ill
ag
e 
m
as
te
r p
la
n
District planning 
committee
Supreme Planning 
Council and Central 
Planning Department 
– Israeli Civil 
Administration
O
ut
sid
e m
as
te
r 
pl
an
 ar
ea
District planning 
committee
Supreme Planning 
Council and Central 
Planning Department 
– Israeli Civil 
Administration
Supreme Planning 
Council and Central 
Planning Department 
– Israeli Civil 
Administration
 (Brynen 2000:88)
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Annex.6 Structure of donor Coordination in 
the WB & GS, 1998
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(PMOF 2014:20-22)
Ra
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iz
e
Institution
Financial 
Budget 
in 1000 × 
NIS
Percentage 
of Total 
Budget
Sector
51 Negotiations Affairs Department 2.335 0,02% Government
50 Investment Encouragement Authority 4.271 0,03% Economy
49 Industrial Cities General Authority 4.840 0,04% Economy
48 Ministry of Women Affaris 6.128 0,05% Social Affairs
47 alIfta' House 7.021 0,05% Social Affairs
46 Standards and Quality Authority 8.310 0,06% Economy
45 Ministry of Media 9.498 0,07% Social Affairs
44 Central Elections Committee 10.000 0,08% Government
43 Ministry of Planning and Administration (MOPAD) 10.296 0,08% Government
42 Diwan of Financial and Administrative Monitoring 13.715 0,10% Government
41 Environment Authority 13.860 0,10% Infrastruct.
40 Public Expenditures 16.000 0,12% Government
39 Ministry of Culture 18.690 0,14% Social Affairs
38 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 19.445 0,15% Economy
37 Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology 20.222 0,15% Economy
36 Palestinian News and Information Agency – Wafa 20.542 0,16% Social Affairs
35 Land Authority 22.646 0,17% Economy
34 Border Control Authority 26.326 0,20% Government
33 NGOs, CBOs and Human Rights Affairs 26.810 0,20% Government
32 Diwan of Supreme Judge 28.036 0,21% Government
31 Ministry of Communications and IT 34.261 0,26% Infrastruct.
30 Council of Ministers 35.914 0,27% Government
29 Ministry of Labour 44.410 0,34% Social Affairs
28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 49.824 0,38% Government
27 Palestinian Water Authority 50.725 0,38% Infrastruct.
26 Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs 52.393 0,40% Government
25 Ministry of Public Works and Housing 53.576 0,40% Infrastruct.
24 Ministry of Justice 54.076 0,41% Government
23 Ministry of Economy 55.016 0,42% Economy
Annex.7 Edited edition from: PA General 
Budget for 2014
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Financial 
Budget 
in 1000 × 
NIS
Percentage 
of Total 
Budget
Sector
22 PLC 56.976 0,43% Government
21 Ministry of Transportation 58.470 0,44% Infrastruct.
20 Power and Natural Resources Authority 61.415 0,46% Infrastruct.
19 Higher Council of Youth and Sport 67.570 0,51% Social Affairs
18 Higher Council of Justice 86.726 0,65% Government
17 Ministry of Agriculture 98.202 0,74% Economy
16 Financial Reserves 100.000 0,76% Government
15 Radio and Television Authority 101.867 0,77% Social Affairs
14 Diwan of Public Employees 108.446 0,82% Government
13 Ministry of Waqf and Religion Affairs 130.889 0,99% Social Affairs
12 Ministry of Finance 142.014 1,07% Government
11 Ministry of Local Government (MLOG) 161.130 1,22% Infrastruct.
10 Embassies 200.253 1,51% Government
9 Presidents Office 209.847 1,58% Government
8 Public Lending Service 220.000 1,66% Government
7 PLO Institutions 310.979 2,35% Government
6 Ministry of Prisoners 442.407 3,34% Social Affairs
5 Affairs of the Retired 900.000 6,80% Government
4 Ministry of Health 1.405.971 10,62% Social Affairs
3 Ministry of Social Affairs 1.411.579 10,66% Social Affairs
2 Ministry of Education and Higher Education 2.544.698 19,22% Social Affairs
1 Ministry of Interior and National Security 3.702.012 27,96% Government
TOTAL 
BUDGET 13.240.637 100,00%
A
Government Sector 6.362.978 48,06%
of which Control and Security Sector 3.728.338 28.16%
of which for Judicial, anti-Corruption 
and Human Rights Systems 209.363 1,58%
B Social Affairs Sector 6.211.270 46,91%
C Infrastructure Sector 433.437 3,27%
D Economy Sector 232.952 1,76%
MOPAD and MOLG combined 171.426 1,30%
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